





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ON

The Christian Doctrine of Sin.

VOL I.

EDINBURGH:

T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.

1885.

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THE
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.

BY

✓
DR. JULIUS MÜLLER,

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HALLE.

Translated from the German of the Fifth Edition

BY THE

REV. WILLIAM URWICK, M.A.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

EDINBURGH:

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1885.



TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

DR. JULIUS MÜLLER, the author of the present work, was born at Brieg, in the government of Breslau in Prussia, on the 10th April 1801. He was a student at the Gymnasium in his native town, and at the Universities of Breslau, Göttingen, and Berlin. From the study of law, which he first pursued, he passed to that of theology, and attended the lectures of Tholuck, Strauss, and Neander. In 1825 he was appointed minister of the Lutheran Church at Schönbrunn and Rosen, where he remained six years, and wrote a clever brochure entitled "*Zur Beurtheilung der Schrift: Die Kath. Kirche Schlesiens.*" In 1831 a new era of his life began, when he was nominated second University preacher at Göttingen, where he gave lectures on theology and education. The spirit of his labours there appears in a volume of sermons, "*Das christliche Leben, seine Kämpfe und seine Vollendung.*" In 1834 he was called to the chair of theology at Marburg, where for four years he lectured upon Dogmatic Theology and Ethics. In 1839 he was called to the University of Halle, where he still resides. The first edition of his great work, "*Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde,*" was published in 1839. With it his fame is chiefly identified.*

This profound and comprehensive work is of great and acknowledged value to the THEOLOGIAN. It has passed

* See the *Conversations Lexicon*.

through five large editions ; it has become a text-book in many of the Universities of Germany ; and it has been much studied by Biblical scholars acquainted with the language in England, France, and America. These facts suffice to prove its worth as a storehouse of thought and learning, of practical theology and heart anatomy for Christian students, pastors, and teachers. The subject of which it treats lies at the foundation of all Christian conviction and Gospel truth. It is an acknowledged fact that the doctrine of SIN, the unfolding of its nature, its origin, its spread, its aggravation in the individual and in the world, has become a topic of discourse often ignored in the latitudinarian preaching of our time, and to this fact may be attributed the indistinct and inadequate views of many concerning our Lord's atonement. For the great and central doctrine of Redemption can be fully grasped by those alone who have felt the reality and the loathsomeness of sin in its essence and its effects. A deep conviction of sin goes hand in hand (in the individual and in the Church) with a thorough estimate of Christ's redemptive work.

But it is not so generally known that Dr. Müller's work claims a prominent place in the PHILOSOPHICAL controversies of our day. The bearing of the "Philosophy of the Conditioned" (as that theory is strangely called which denies the possibility of philosophy) upon the great truths of God's infinite and absolute Being, Will, and Knowledge, and upon human freedom, was only hinted at by Sir W. Hamilton. He was content with the declaration that, if the Kantian Criticism be carried to its legitimate issue in Morals and Religion, the doctrine of Moral liberty cannot be made conceivable, and that "all that remains for Philosophy is to erect an altar with this inscription, 'To the unknown and unknowable God.'" But his disciple, Professor Mansel, in his famous Bampton Lectures, has developed Sir W. Hamilton's principles, and has boldly argued out

the conclusion, that of the Infinite and Absolute (which nevertheless we must allow God to be) we know and can know nothing. Into "the abyss of the Negative Absolute" (to use an expression of Dr. Müller's) Mr. Mansel, like Strauss, would plunge us; though unlike Strauss, he would rescue us again from this abyss by the force of authority and irrational faith. Dr. Müller, on the contrary, maintains that "a purely philosophical investigation, pursuing an independent course, necessarily leads to the conception of a personal God, who is the only real Absolute," and "that we are no longer obliged to distinguish between the Absolute and God." Müller's argument (chiefly stated in Book III. part i. chap. iv) contains, as if in anticipation, a triumphant refutation of all that Mr. Mansel has advanced upon this subject.

More than one able philosopher of our day has observed that the question of human liberty is the question of the future; and any one who is acquainted with the philosophy of Comte, now so fashionable, and the Determinism to which it leads, will feel the truth of the remark. "Let me," it is said, "unerringly know a man's character and antecedents, and I will unerringly predict his moral acts." Mr. John Stuart Mill has become a very able champion of this doctrine, which he would call "Invariability," in his "Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy" (chapter xxvi.). This great question of human liberty Müller argues out with a master-mind, and in the present work freedom is philosophically established. Müller shows that Determinism, even in its finest form, is really predeterminism, and that philosophically and practically it is utterly untenable. His dissertations on formal and real freedom in the beginning of Book III. take up the argument where Mr. Mill leaves it, and vindicate man's responsibility and guilt as a free agent, in triumphant opposition to philosophical Determinists, whether they be Spinoza's followers or Comte's.

The writer begs to add, that the present English version is

not a revision of that of Mr. Pulsford, but is a new translation, and from a later edition. He is not unaware how great an amount of criticism has been expended on Müller's work, and how much has been said of the difficulties it presents. His aim has been (to use the expression of an able reviewer) "not merely to translate words, but to interpret thought," and to present to English readers Müller's laborious work in plain and perspicuous English. Instead of the long, dreary table of contents at the beginning of each volume, he has divided each chapter into sections, has inserted Marginal Notes throughout, has occasionally added References of his own in the Footnotes, and has appended a copious Index, which will make the work more accessible as a book of reference.

JUNE 1868.

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EXTRACT FROM THE PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE Author of this Treatise deems it unnecessary to offer any lengthened vindication of the present undertaking. It is a pleasing sign of the times that the theological claims of Christian Doctrine are beginning again to be fairly recognized ; but it would be well if there were not such a craving after novelty in the exposition of Christianity as a systematic whole. We by no means undervalue the attempts made in some recent works to present Christian truth in a new light ; but we feel persuaded that what is most needed is the provision of materials drawn from the inexhaustible mine of Holy Scripture, and from Christian consciousness, together with comprehensive treatises upon separate points of doctrine, and, above all, upon each of the main doctrines of Christianity. The present work, accordingly, treats of a subject the paramount importance of which no one will deny. From the time when the author sat as a scholar at the feet of the beloved and revered NEANDER, the conviction has been deeply rooted in his mind, that Christianity is a practical thing, that everything in it is connected more or less directly with the great facts of SIN and of REDEMPTION, and that the plan of Redemption, which is the essence of Christianity, cannot be rightly understood until the doctrine of Sin be adequately recognized and established. Here certainly, if anywhere, Christian theology must fight *pro aris et focis*, repelling deistical attenuations and pantheistic evaporations of its teachings.

Is there any ground whatever for the fear that inquiry upon this subject will end only in making what we seek to explain

more inexplicable and involved than ever? Is it really more prudent to leave the dark mysterious form of sin to lurk in the obscurity of inner feeling and consciousness? It has, indeed, been affirmed by a distinguished writer of our day, that when we examine it minutely, the terrible contradiction in our being, which we call *sin*, really disappears, and that instead of a profound mystery we find only an empty word—the horror of sin which a religious mind feels being shown to be ungrounded. But is this really so? It might, indeed, be so were our speculations based upon mere notions of the intellect, and not upon facts of experience. It might be so were we to begin our speculations by denying that sin is sin. But a consideration of sin, based upon the testimony of Christian faith, cannot possibly lead to the extinction of our religious horror of it, unless we presuppose this horror to be a wrong feeling, or according to Rousseau's maxim, that *l'homme en commençant à penser cesse de sentir*. Healthy Christian Feeling has no need to fear thought and investigation, nor has healthy Thinking any reason to alienate itself from feeling; Feeling freshens and deepens Thought, and Thought in turn explains and confirms Feeling.

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

IN again presenting my Treatise upon the Doctrine of Sin to the theological public, in an essentially unaltered form, I feel that a few words of explanation are due. The scientific investigations of this great anthropological problem, which have been carried on since the first issue of my work, in the theological treatises of HEPPE, SCHENKEL, HOFMANN, THOMASIIUS, PHILIPPI, PLITT, KAHNIS, and in the monographs of ERNESTI upon "the Origin of Sin according to St Paul's teaching," of BRUCH upon "the Doctrine of Freewill and its Relation to Grace," of PAUL upon "Kant's doctrine of Radical Evil;" these, containing as they do, attacks upon my endeavour to solve the problem, not only urge me strongly to avail myself of the opportunity afforded by a New Edition to explain and set myself right with them, but justify my opponents in the expectation that I should do so. Incumbent upon me as this duty is, I must abandon the idea of it; because the affliction which it has pleased God to lay upon me is not yet sufficiently removed to enable me to undertake afresh, a thorough investigation of the subject; and I have therefore determined upon a reprint of the last edition of my work, with a few alterations and additions, rather than attempt a revision, which, considering the profoundness of the subject, and its breadth, would not have satisfied me, much less my readers.

HALLE, 27th September 1866.

INTRODUCTION.

AN exposition of the Christian doctrine of sin, which would not only inform the reader concerning the teaching whether true or false, of the Christian Church upon the subject at different times, but would furnish as far as possible a true view, may adopt one or other of two methods. First, it may endeavour to ascertain the doctrine of Christ and His Apostles in the New Testament: but he only will do this successfully who, with a ready recognition of the distinctive phase of thought peculiar to each of the sacred writers, combines the power of grasping their manifoldness as a whole, and of perceiving their inner unity. Or, secondly, it may take as its starting-point the present consciousness of the Church in her living members whom the Spirit of her founder has not forsaken, and systematically develop therefrom the doctrine of sin in all its essential features. In adopting the latter course we gain the advantage of being able to exhibit the various theological and other differences of thought and opinion current in our day, in their bearings upon the subject. For while the primary aim of all scientific treatment of Christian doctrine is to hold the mirror up to Christian consciousness, and to show it its own contents,—its elements and principles, and their inner connection,—it is necessary, in order to this, clearly to define and explain the intellectual apprehension of Christian faith in its relation to other prevailing modes of thought, so far, at least, as it touches upon the same province with them.

§ 1. Twofold mode of procedure.

Of these two methods, the first should be prosecuted separately, and wholly by itself, without in any way encroaching upon the second. Any such encroachment would be hazardous; it would tend to sully the

purity, and to distort the simplicity, of the critical and historical inquiry, closely connected as this is with every problem of Scripture and Theology. As to the second method, the case is different. Here—more especially upon the principles of Protestant theology—our consideration of the first is at the very outset presupposed, and its conclusions are adopted. The scientific exposition of any doctrine from the springs of Christian consciousness stands in this twofold relation to Scripture. to the New Testament; it is, on the one hand, a further development of the germ of doctrine therein contained, and, on the other, it finds therein its criterion and corrective. Still, being a development of the scriptural germ, and having progressively to determine what hitherto had been undetermined, it cannot be expected that every particular conclusion or inference shall have some express scriptural testimony or text for its foundation. On the contrary, we can easily understand how, while recognizing the fundamental relation we have named, the more exact definitions of any point of doctrine, though opposed to each other, may alike claim—with equal propriety or impropriety—the sanction of Holy Scripture. Perfect coincidence is already excluded by the recognition of the fact that the New Testament transmits Christian doctrine to us, not systematically, but as reflected in the several minds of the Apostles, and tinged with the individuality of each; and no one who recognizes a plurality of apostolic phases of doctrine as compatible with one determinate spirit and meaning, will expect a literal coincidence in each and every representation. Nevertheless Holy Scripture as a whole, and in its main teachings, will ever abide as the touchstone of Christian thinking, the standard by which the Christian philosopher will measure all conclusions: never will he assume the truth of these until he is satisfied that they are ratified by Holy Scripture, or at least in harmony with it. Christian consciousness is indeed the inner and immediate spring from which he draws, but this consciousness itself requires a rule and standard such as Scripture, because though genuine in the living members of the Christian fellowship, and in them alone, it possesses no immunity against the mixture of foreign and disturbing elements. Our apprehensions of theological truth will easily impart to consciousness a bias contrary to its true nature, if the

scientific settlement of any doctrine have no objective sanction or ground of appeal whereby the accuracy of its conclusions may be tested. The data of our religious consciousness, on which this settlement of doctrine is based, do not assert themselves immediately as the inward witness and experience of the heart; they are themselves begotten in the human spirit by God's scriptural Revelation. How, then, could the theological development of these data wander with impunity from the original testimony of that revelation? *

In adopting the second mode of procedure in our present inquiry, we must pause at every new stage of our investigation to ascertain our latitude, and to set ourselves right by the contents of Holy Scripture, and thus to satisfy ourselves that we are not erring from the right way.

The second method adopted in this work.

This second method of treatment calls upon us to contemplate the Christian doctrine of sin in an aspect of it which is quite lost sight of in its narrower treatment, to contemplate, I mean, its SPECULATIVE bearings. For the inner nature of the doctrine itself, and its connection with the great whole of which it forms a part, alike witness that it has a philosophic or speculative side. X

No author in the present day can expect his readers to understand the view he takes of the relation between Christian Doctrine and Speculation, unless he explains to them what he means by Speculation. It is a great mistake to suppose that Speculation denotes something fixed and settled, upon which all are agreed. Men's views regarding it necessarily vary according to the various principles which actuate the spirit world of thought. No theory of Speculation can reconcile or annul these individual differences: our theory itself is dependent on them.

Notwithstanding the divergencies thus arising as to what § 2. What is speculative thinking really is, there is one common Speculation. ground on which all are agreed. All look upon

* For a more exact explanation of this relation between the theological *data* of Christian consciousness and Scripture, see Dorner's acute exposition of the bearing of the material principle of Protestantism upon its formal principle in his work entitled "*Das Princip unserer Kirche nach dem innern Verhältniss seiner beiden Seiten.*" 1841.

Speculation as something distinct from Reflection, from that mental process which deals with certain data, with phenomena which it appropriates and makes its own by continual analysis or synthesis. If this distinction between Reflection and Speculation be well founded, it follows that speculative thinking must not start from certain data as its subject matter, but from determinations, which thought finds in itself as the necessary and original principles of all being, as well as of all thinking. In this sense, it follows that all speculative thinking is of an *a priori*, and all reflective thinking of an *a posteriori* character. Empiricism accordingly, which finds the origin of our knowledge solely in experience, is necessarily the antithesis not only of this or that speculative system, but of Speculation as such ; it starts from perceptions and observations, and does not admit of deductions from principles certified only to the spirit, and independent of experience ; it has certainly a claim to the name philosophy, so long as it makes the knowledge of what is universal and necessary, not indeed its starting point, but withal its goal ; still it essentially follows the reflective method.

More minute definitions of the nature of speculative knowledge will greatly vary according as they are based upon the principles of PANTHEISM on the one hand, or of THEISM on the other. The strongest current in our German literature is undoubtedly that which takes its rise in the springs of Pantheistic thought ; its influence is apparent, not in philosophy alone, but in other sciences, chiefly perhaps in the literature of art ; indeed, the religious and political agitations of our time abundantly show how deeply these modes of thinking have penetrated our national life. Since deistical Rationalism ceased to be a power, at least in scientific and æsthetic literature, Pantheism has assumed the right of inheritance, and spurious forms of the older Rationalism have in vain disputed its possession. It has succeeded in accommodating itself to the prejudices of the age, and thus it rids itself of the unpleasant necessity of criticizing and controverting other modes of thought disconnected with its own principles, and it measures solely by its own established standard, as if its right to do so were a matter of course.

Now Pantheism can only explain Speculation, (with its main

problem concerning relation between the infinite and the finite), Pantheistic according to the category of IMMANENCE, or more theory of what Speculation is. correctly of SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY between God and the world. It makes the essence of Speculation to consist in seeing everything in the absolute, deriving everything from the absolute, tracing everything back to the absolute, and resolving all the antitheses of the intellect into a higher unity in the Absolute. Its Absolute is not therefore an existing thought and a thinking being free of all relation, resting in itself and in itself perfect; it is nothing more than the NECESSARY WORLD-PRINCIPLE, which realizes its own absoluteness in the world process;—the absolute world-unity. From the category of immanence thus understood, it further follows that Speculation must demand an inviolable Necessity and a rigid continuity in the derivation of all finite being from the original principle, and in developing determinations, mutually dependent, attaining completeness, and having one common centre. This demand has hitherto been a mere postulate

Spinoza. in pantheistic systems, or if claimed to be fulfilled, a mere assertion that it is so. Thus Spinoza maintained that from the infinite nature of God, all things proceed with the same necessity, and in the same manner as it follows from the very nature of the triangle, (*ex natura trianguli*), that its three angles are equal to two right angles. But what is this but vain and unmeaning grandiloquence, seeking the honour of Speculation in the degradation of God's infinite nature?—the *modi* or qualities of the substance being all that exists, and it being utterly inexplicable how the substance comes to have

Hegel. any *modi*. Or fares it better with this Necessity in the pan-logical system of Hegel, according to which, every proposition must spring from the preceding so as to form an indissoluble chain, and which knows no logical way of coming to Nature, save by the despairing decision of the logical Idea “to dismiss itself from itself?”

Notwithstanding the failure of these attempts, the demand above referred to well indicates the spirit and design of this pantheistic tendency; and Christian Theism suffers itself to be drawn into its magic circle when it unwittingly recognizes this demand as an axiom of all speculation, in the deluded belief that it concerns only the method,

Christian
Theism must
avoid this
theory.

and not the subject matter. Were Speculation, according to the true conception of it, bound by this law, we should be obliged, upon the principles of Christian Theism, to conclude that the derivation of finite being from the Absolute, cannot be a fact of speculation at all, but is a matter of faith only, and that we can know nothing whatever on this point, save what God has told us by positive revelation. It would indeed be vain presumption to make the limits of our speculative thinking the limit of God's power, and to argue that it is impossible or inconceivable for Him to make the transition from Himself to another being by a free act of will, because, forsooth, He thus would disturb the circle of our school metaphysics, and would break the sequence of that logical process without which our Speculation would be worthless. Upon such a theory, all hope of reconciling Religion and Speculation would be taken away, because religion, at the very outset, refuses to entertain the notion of a Deity destitute of those spiritual attributes by whose activity the world is made. The effort and aim of religion really is, to look upon the world as God's world, and upon God in His relation to the world; the temper of mind actuating it is the conviction that it has to do, not with *an* Object that *must* let itself be known because its very existence is contingent upon its being known, but with *the* Object in relation to whom we are truly Subject, dependent upon Him and waiting till He manifest Himself. Religion demands of us this humility and devoutness, lest priding ourselves upon the irresistible power of our intellectual formulæ, and fancying thus to grasp the treasures of knowledge, by a strange and divinely-ordained irony we lay hold of burning coals instead of gold.

Happily it is only by a feeble narrowing of its true conception, that Speculation can thus be fettered to this so-called principle of "immanence." It may be shown, not indeed from anything this principle has actually achieved in philosophy, but from its very nature, that, based upon it, speculation becomes nothing more than an isolated chain of perfectly uniform and similar elements of knowledge, a series progressing uninterruptedly and after the same method from beginning to end. And who can guarantee that this monotonous series really corresponds with what is objective in nature and reality? Who shall answer

for it that the mind shall not by this method of procedure merely reflect itself in a world of its own creation, seeing moreover, that it will allow what is objective to discover itself according to this one phase or aspect exclusively? That alone is genuine philosophy which prizes TRUTH immeasurably above scientific formulæ, which makes up its mind to throw up each scheme in turn and begin the structure afresh so soon as it finds that its entire plan and scope is too narrow for the reality of things.

ROTHE in the Introduction to his Ethics (§ 2) thoroughly discusses the nature of speculative knowledge, and distinguishes between *philosophical* and *theological* speculation. He adopts, however, a standing point of personal faith so decidedly Christian, that we are constrained to say,—“this speculative theologian would turn his back upon all Speculation, yea, would be content to know nothing save the Catechism, rather than confide in a method which in its results might rob him of a personal God, the THOU of our prayers.” According to him, it is essential to all right speculative knowledge that it shall start from one primary datum which it is warranted to adopt as immediate and certain, and from this to develop by strict logic a system of thought consecutively evolved. “This system,” he says, “of thought generated *a priori*, must, if speculation is to answer its end, be an exact and faithful counterpart or image of the universe—using this word in the widest sense, as including God;—but the speculative process is carried on without any consideration whether or not such a universe really exists, or how the system thus constructed stands related to the universe: it goes straight on, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left, following merely the necessity of logic, whereby each newly attained conception, in virtue of its relation to the rest, and from its own inner fruitfulness, gives birth in its turn to new conceptions.” The distinction (according to Rothe) between philosophical and theological Speculation consists merely in the difference of the primary data from which they respectively start; that of philosophy being *self-consciousness*, and that of theology *God-consciousness*. The method is the same in both; theological speculation is bound equally with philoso-

phical, by the same unvarying logico-dialectic law, and by this alone. The speculative process must, even in theology, be conducted wholly apart from religious considerations and interests; while still incomplete there must not be a single reference to religious convictions; but when it is concluded, its results must be compared with the religious consciousness, in order that, if not coincident with it, it may be demolished, and a new speculative structure be begun.

In considering how far we can adopt this theory of speculation we find ourselves at one with Rothe in the belief that all speculative knowledge must proceed upon a self-consistent and connected system. But this is not peculiar to Speculation. Experimental knowledge, provided it be not simple sensation or perception, but really knowledge, tacitly presupposes the systematic connection of all its parts; without such a connection individual experience could never of itself lead to conclusions conformable with connected thought. It must be allowed, however, that this specially holds true of speculative knowledge, not only because systematic connection of thought is presupposed from the very outset, but because this connection must be made clear to consciousness in order that the relation of each particular to the great whole, of which it is a part, may be demonstrated. But when Rothe makes this systematic knowledge exclusively *a priori*, and a product of the logical process—as if it could not be systematic save on this condition,—we must, even on his own principles, regard this notion of what system is, as an unjustifiable limiting of speculative knowledge, and logically speaking, as reasoning in a circle. He holds that this systematic knowledge obtained by Speculation is a true reflection and copy of the universe; nay, more, he considers the empirical reality of things to be the touchstone whereby the legitimacy of the Speculation is to be tested. But what if the Speculation fail in its coincidence with the reality of things, fail just because in the actual relations of existence there are living syntheses which mock necessary thought, turning points where new principles appear whose activity cannot be explained by mere logic? Is speculative thought to persist in standing wholly

Rothe right
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only.

aloof from the reality of things in order to beget a universe wholly out of itself? Away with philosophy if it is not to teach us more clearly to understand reality!

When Rothe insists that Theological Speculation must avoid all reference to Christian piety—all “glancing at it” even—until its system be complete, we allow that every development of determinate knowledge proceeding from some parent thought as its germ, must pursue its own course, and must not continually be interrupted by comparing its elements with the affirmations of the religious consciousness or the declarations of Holy Scripture. This is not peculiar to speculative thinking; the same necessity is felt even in a consideration of Christian Doctrine, as far removed from Speculation as it can be, whenever it enters upon an actual development of thought. During this operation the mind’s whole attention is directed to the meaning and inner sequence of the several successive thoughts, and not till a conclusion is arrived at does it compare this with what is externally certain, in order, if the external fact contradict it, to reject it. But Rothe would have us construct an entire system of speculative theology without once stopping to institute such a comparison. This idea seems to us an artificial and forced abstraction of the schools, which can never practically be carried out. Do Speculation and Christian piety lie apart from each other in separate compartments of our minds? Is not the germ of Christian consciousness, where it really exists, the all-penetrating, all-inspiring principle of the spirit’s life? If so, we cannot speak with any propriety of “glancing at” Christian piety in our theological speculation. The inquiry must immediately and unavoidably occur to the thinker whether the system he is forming be in harmony with his Christian belief or opposed to it. In a healthy Christian consciousness, moreover, the question concerns the relation of speculative thinking not merely to indistinct “Christian sentiment,” but to determinate Christian knowledge and belief. This is something already developed and definite; it includes convictions upon subjects which Speculation defines according to its own principles. How, then, can speculative thinking and Christian belief ignore one another?

Kinship of
Christian
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Rothe must allow us to entertain an estimate not quite so high as his own of a bare system of logical concepts as leading to a knowledge of the truth.* What really excites and urges us forward in speculative thinking is not the law of logic, but concrete thoughts and imaginings. Hence it is that every system of philosophy bears the imprint of the mental individuality of its author. This fact certainly ill accords with the strange notion of a self-acting process of thought evolving all truth out of itself by necessary reasoning, so that the thinker has to keep it alone before him. We are persuaded that even Rothe himself does not believe in such a chimera. The logical construction of a system furnishes us simply with a network of thought, a web comprehensive enough to embrace, and elastic enough

* Contradictory expressions upon this are to be found in Rothe's own work. At p. 8 he says, that "a system of *a priori* thought must, in order to succeed, be the exact and conformable image of the universe, including in this an adequate knowledge of God." But at p. 10 he calls it "a vain opinion, which no clear head for Speculation will entertain, that any one can construct a *perfect* system of the universe by speculation alone." We are quite at one with him here, and on this very account we hold that the speculative thinker should not thus define his task; for he is certain beforehand that its perfect accomplishment is impossible, that it can only be partially performed, for we are not speaking of a mere gymnastics of the mind, but of real knowledge. If he be "deeply convinced that all our knowledge is partial," this need not hinder his giving his whole energies to advance it, but it certainly does forbid his undertaking to give, by means of Speculation, a perfect image of the universe,—an account of it which is not "partial." It is an obvious contradiction to set ourselves a task with the consciousness that it is unsolvable, for in this case it is not really a task at all. No analogy can fairly be drawn between this and the apparently similar ideal of piety—the task of sanctification: the Christian knows that he really will at length reach this ideal in the perfection of the kingdom of God; but as to the task of constructing a system of abstract thought which shall be a perfect copy of the universe, he knows that it never can be done, neither in this world (as Rothe grants) nor in that which is to come; for *there*—instead of our present kind of knowledge—speculative knowledge, knowledge *per speculum*, 1 Cor. xiii. 11—we shall have SIGHT. Or, as the threatening, yet logical, issue of all one-sided *a priori* systems, is it there also to be our task, even to the end, to work out the satisfaction of the mind's logical and systematizing impulse in a scientifically constructed whole, whose value consists not in its relation to truth, but merely in its own completeness? Once more; we have no right to put God and the world together in our conception of the universe, for then the world must be regarded as the complement of God, and this contradicts the idea of the Absolute. God is a universe in Himself, whether the world exists or not.

to adapt itself to the contents of our consciousness. And we cannot for a moment suppose that it is otherwise in a system of ethics, which has to blend so many different voices in one harmonious whole. The mind that has not lost its own inner unity will trust its logical operations just as it trusts the life of which it knows it is a partaker. It must be allowed, indeed, that the cultivation of an accurate and comprehensive system of thought tends to rouse the mind to beget new knowledge by bringing to light the gaps in knowledge still needing to be filled; but its pre-eminent value will ever consist in the critical detection and rejection of antagonistic elements within its own sphere. We must abandon the notion of the abstract independence of the speculative function, if we would explain the curious phenomenon that philosophical systems starting from very different and even opposite principles, the further they penetrate into the sphere of the concrete, the nearer as a rule do they approach each other; the spiritual life of their authors holds fast the fellowship which the abstract principles of their respective systems deny.

But while Rothe thus on the one hand overrates the *a priori* character of Speculation, on the other hand he Rothe virtually surrenders his *a priori* theory. character of Speculation, on the other hand he lays down principles wholly subversive of it, at least in its application to theology. According to him, theological speculation differs from philosophical speculation generally, in the primary datum from which it starts, namely, our consciousness of God. But this primary datum is for us not the bare consciousness of God, it is "the Christian, pious, yea, evangelical consciousness," (see Rothe, p. 23, 24). But this is not a simple and primary datum presenting a starting-point for the theologian's speculative thought, and presupposing no other starting-points; on the contrary, it is the title and superscription of a whole body of divinity, a fulness of concrete elements; and we cannot conceive how a process of thought, which makes this evangelical and Christian consciousness its fundamental and necessary axiom, and proceeds from it to further determinations, can be called speculative Theology, or Speculation in any true sense. Speculation, properly so called, unquestionably consists in the knowledge of the universal, and of the particular or special in and through the universal; in the knowledge of the abstract, and of the concrete and

particular in and from the abstract ; but in this case, the most concrete elements would be made express presuppositions, and would occupy the place of the abstract. Least of all is such a theological speculation,—which, however, we may remark in passing, we cannot find in this theological system of ethics,—justified in boasting that its primary datum is fuller than that of philosophy (see p. 17). Philosophy would reply, “that may be very convenient for you, but it is a drawback to the scientific worth of your speculation.” It is easy to detect the confusion into which Rothe has fallen, in making what is immediately and absolutely certain to the theologian or Christian, the primary datum of theological speculation. The subjective certitude which needs no further proof, is mistaken for the objective certainty, which is primary, necessary, and axiomatic. Speculation, whether in philosophy or theology, must adopt as its axiom, not what is most certain to the thinking subject, but what proves itself axiomatic by a rigid necessity of thought.

We shall presently see whether there be any really fixed distinction between theological and philosophical speculation ; on a difference of starting-point, as Rothe holds, no such distinction can be based. Not only is it inadmissible to bind philosophical speculation to self-consciousness alone, and theological speculation to God-consciousness, as their data respectively ; neither the one datum nor the other, can be looked upon as the starting-point of any kind of Speculation. *Self-consciousness* cannot ; *Self-consciousness* is not a primary datum. for our consciousness of self, is not something primary, which presupposes nothing else as necessary to its possible existence ; on the contrary, we find ourselves conditioned in our self-consciousness ; yea, our self-consciousness is realized only when we, in the very same act, become conscious of something else, a *non-ego* from which we distinguish ourselves ; and must not this consciousness also, that there is something existing without us, have an equal claim to be the starting-point of speculation ? Descartes is usually—in the history of philosophy, and indeed by Rothe himself,—esteemed the discoverer of this starting-point, but no one can maintain that he really established it as a tenable starting-point of thought. His *cogito ergo sum*, is just as un-

Rothe wrong
in his data of
speculation.

Self-con-
sciousness is
not a primary
datum.

DESCARTES.

assailable as any other tautology, but as his own unequivocal explanations testify, he did not take it as presenting a starting-point for all necessary thinking, nor for metaphysics generally, but simply as affording a decisive transition from the region of *bare conceptions* into that of *real existence*, in opposition to universal scepticism. Descartes, moreover, does not really gain anything by this transition; for what boots it clearly to prove, as he thus does, that there is a Subject for the thinking activity, and that I am conscious of myself as this Subject, if all progressive thought be tied to this starting-point, viz., that various ideas are already involved in this act of thought, (representation, according to Descartes' language), whose reality is collectively dependent upon the one supreme idea, which of itself, witnesses its own reality? Such a principle as this might just as well be inferred directly from the act of thinking, from the *cogito*, without the circuitous reasoning concerning the existence, the *ergo sum*, of the thinking Subject.

From what has already been said it is moreover evident, that our God-consciousness cannot be regarded as a starting-point for speculative thought. Our conception of God is much too complex to be made a primary axiom; it would, so to speak, anticipate the main point, the goal of the inquiry. It belongs to the very essence of Speculation, that it shall have an *a priori* starting-point; and, apart from the question whether the existence of God is demonstrable *a priori*, to make our consciousness of God in all its fulness this *a priori* starting-point, would be utterly unjustifiable in a speculative point of view.

Speculation cannot assume for its starting-point anything more than the bare conception of THE ABSOLUTE in its abstract and negative sense, the absolute as the indefinite, wherein as yet there are neither contrasts nor distinctions, but which implies the possibility of all contrasts and distinctions. This conception, like all concepts, requires other concepts for its explanation; but in its self-completion as an act of thought, it is independent of all other concepts, and really precedes them.* As a starting-point

* Müller here evidently adopts the starting-point of Schelling's philosophy, i.e., the Absolute as the "indifference point" of the subjective and objective

of thought, however, it must be logically justified—*i.e.*, it must be proved to be logically the first of all metaphysical conceptions, and the presupposition of all save itself. That it has but few distinguishing marks, and is meagre in its logical determination, arises from its position in the series of metaphysical concepts. For the same reason, its contents cannot at the outset be regarded as actually existing; yet no one acquainted with the history of philosophy, Gnosticism, and Mysticism,—especially in its Pantheistic form, within and without the sphere of Christianity—will deny its intensely real significance for the inner life of mankind.

The manner of progress from this starting-point is unquestionably the logical *a priori*. For if speculative thinking be possible, reason must possess certain necessary and universal concepts, and possessing these, it must make use of them in constructing a universal system of knowledge: it is the essence of speculation that all knowledge proceed from these beginnings, and be kept in strict logical connection therewith. In his Dissertation upon the relation of theology to philosophy,* STAHL remarks that “the
 X “true method of scientific inquiry is not, as is commonly supposed, to start from known data, and with logical sequence to arrive at the hitherto unknown, but rather to underlay known phenomena with some hypothesis as yet uncertain, and to try whether it will explain them.” We assent to this statement, provided it be applied only to the primary conception of a comprehensive train of thought; its method, if it be of a speculative character, will still be the same, and if it be systematic, it must begin with the simplest determinations,—determinations which in the very necessity of thought take precedence of all others. But as we have already said, we are very far from be-

whence the *ego* and the *non-ego* are evolved, that ultimate and merely negative concept which denotes what is as yet utterly indefinite, answering to what Spinoza called “*substantia*.” The absolute in this sense, is widely different from the absolute in the sense attached to it by Sir W. Hamilton and Professor Mansel. The former, in his Discussions, p. 13, speaks of the ambiguity of the term, and gives it a threefold signification. Its meaning as used by Müller here, is perhaps as much akin to the third as to the first signification assigned to it by Hamilton; certainly it is totally different from Hamilton’s second signification, wherein he says that he exclusively uses the term, and wherein Professor Mansel also uses it.—*Tr*.

* Fundamenten einer christlichen Philosophie, p. 178.

believing that when these determinations are laid down, they will begin, like *automata*, to move of themselves, and, as if by an inner logical necessity, towards an unknown goal, so that the speculative thinker must resign himself blindly to them, saying with Esther, "If I perish, I perish." * They move only as the thinker himself puts them in motion, *i.e.*, only when elsewhere in his consciousness he entertains a definite problem which they must be made to solve. This problem is THE REALITY OF THINGS in its widest range, including the highest of all realities, RELIGION. This they must help him to understand.

In advancing towards this goal, each concept does not of itself give birth to another, and this other to a third, and so on in inexhaustible fecundity. Our concepts do not possess this prolific power in the shadowy realm of logico-metaphysical thinking, nor can any principle of negativity, as if with dialectic spell, give to them this power. In advancing from one determination to another, the laws of logic, strictly taken, furnish only analyses of the concepts we already have, or negations, *i.e.*, descriptions of what must, according to preceding determinations, be excluded from the following. Of course these following determinations annex themselves to those preceding, though they be really more than a repetition of them; but they do not annex themselves unless their possibility—*i.e.*, conceivableness—be already implied. In this combination all that is required is, that the new determinations be not directly contradictory to those preceding; the principle of *sufficient reason* in the sphere of logic possesses only this analytic import.† This bare negativity of necessary thought it is which gives it such a destructive power over everything positive and actual, whenever it is made the all-embracing and paramount principle of knowledge; when it is thus exalted, nothing will save the thinker from the abyss of Nihilism but his own inconsistency in shrinking from it. Conscious of this negativity of all necessary thought, he can avoid this destructive result by taking care not to demand of it what it cannot really supply,—as, for instance,

* Esther iv. 16.

† "These tests (the principles of *contradiction* and *sufficient reason*) may be employed to bring our thoughts into harmony with each other, but are wholly inadequate to ascertain whether our thoughts accurately represent the world around us. They belong to pure Logic alone."—*Thomson's Laws of Thought*, p. 296.—*Tr.*

the production of new and positive elements of knowledge,—and by setting due bounds to the influence of logical proof in this sphere.

Is there then no guarantee that the progressive determining of the mind shall give us any real knowledge of the truth? that this speculative thinking is really more than mere dreaming, more than a mere imagining or persuasion, based upon a subjective necessity and without objective reality? Such a guarantee is to be found in two things. First, the connection of all these successive concepts forms a compact and systematic whole, which by its organic harmony supports and confirms each particular link in the chain, determining it more accurately, receiving determinations from it, and growing with it into a more exact and conclusive unity. Secondly, this systematic whole authenticates itself by serving as a key to the fuller understanding of the reality of things, and it thus is confirmed by what we already know concerning the reality of things from other sources. Here the objection is raised that speculative thinking is thus given a second presupposition besides the starting-point above named, namely, a belief in the reality of things in the consciousness of the thinker. Rightly understood, this is not to be denied; but it never can be the *terminus a quo* for the speculative method, it is only the *terminus ad quem*.

In this reality of things a principle appears which in a very distinctive manner limits the range of logical necessity,—I mean the principle of FREEDOM—and, inasmuch as freedom, being an active principle, can be conceived of only as the will of a personal being, the principle of PERSONALITY likewise. All speculation that aims at discovering the true principles of reality is logically carried on from the starting-point already named, the negative conception of the Absolute—to the idea of absolute Personality. When once this principle of freedom is recognized, the concepts of *a priori* metaphysics and logic will no longer suffice to define what it involves: our conception indeed of divine and human freedom would be a mere mockery, if it meant nothing more than the power of realizing what is already necessarily involved in the very constitution of the being in whom it is. Other concepts must be received, concepts which have meaning only when predicated of personal-

ity, if the course of thought is to follow and to embody the law (now altered in its nature *qualitatively*) according to which all acts in this sphere are contingent upon the Personality itself. Freedom indeed, when it does not break away from the true ideal of the being in whom it is,—when, as in God, such a violation cannot occur,—does not negative the necessary connection; it rather takes it up into its own sphere, and elevates it to a higher range. LEIBNITZ, if I am not mistaken, was the first (in the preface to his *Theodicée* * and elsewhere) clearly to point out this distinction. Between the metaphysical, logical, and geometric necessity to which Hobbes and Spinoza reduce all things, and the arbitrariness of will from which Bayle and some modern philosophers (Cartesians) derive the laws of action, Leibnitz discovers the LAW OF FITNESS (*convenance*)

The law by which freedom works, based upon the principle of the best. This law of fitness is, according to him, the rule by which freedom works; whereas on the principle of irrational necessity which excludes alike choice and moral good and intellect, and on the principle of arbitrariness, freedom is utterly excluded.† This distinction is in the main as just as it is suggestive, though we cannot altogether assent to the application its discoverer makes of it. It here concerns the principle of DESIGN, apparent in nature, forming a network of teleological relations above the web of aiteological considerations, and reigning supreme in the sphere of mind and in history. But the Love which designs, and the Wisdom that realizes the design, are conceivable only as the attributes of a free Being. And, conversely, if the divine intelligence, in virtue of its absoluteness, be conceived of as raised far above the distinguishing of means and end, free will and personality when predicated of Him lose all their meaning. In this case, remembering that a personal Subject alone is properly speaking a Subject at all, possessing the attributes predicated of it, we have, as the ultimate solution of the problem, the abortive notion of a thinking without a thinker. But to allow that God has a plan in the creation and government of the world, that He ordains means to ends, that everything

* *Opp. philosophica*, ed. Erdmann, vol. i. 473, 477. The principal passage in the *Theodicée* is §§ 345-347.

† This resembles the distinction between *necessitas* and *convenientia*, of which the Schoolmen, and Thomas Aquinas in particular, made such frequent use.

in the world is by no means alike means and end to Him, that the mind of God does not rest in the changeful world as it is, but only when His purposes are attained,—to recognize all this is to think of God, not only more humanly, but more divinely, than we could do by determining His relation to the world upon the principle of metaphysical necessity, or according to the æsthetic analogy of artistic creations. It would be utterly inconsistent with the living and motive energies of divine love and wisdom, if our reason (for the sake of preserving at any price the logical *a priori* method in this sphere) deduced God's government of the world by His Wisdom and Love, by necessary sequence from the bare concepts of those attributes. The divine plan, when manifest, witnesses that it springs from love as its principle; but if, according to Plato, wonder is an emotion appropriate to the philosopher, still more is it appropriate to the religious man. The end which divine love designs as the final goal of all souls yielding to its influence is so vast, and so transcends the ideas and hopes of man, that the thought of it, when apprehended by the religious convictions, awakens new wonder and new awe. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him." Still less shall we think of anticipating, by inferences from general ideas of wisdom, the manifold wisdom of God. True knowledge is here possible to us only as we follow God's wisdom in its working; and in order to this, there must be an inner connection between God's wise workings and all the knowledge already attained as well as what is assured to us as *a priori* true; otherwise the new knowledge could not really become our own. The conclusions of metaphysical and necessary thinking may be likened to the Law which precedes the Gospel of this concrete knowledge; but the gospel must never be explained merely by the law, though in all points it be essentially conditioned by the law.

† We cannot, therefore, regard speculative knowledge in a religious and ethical sense as merely *a priori*; its Speculation blends *a priori* method of progress is rather a continual and alter- with *a posteriori* knowledge. nate determining and harmonizing of *a priori* and experimental knowledge.

Of these two factors the experimental element becomes

especially prominent when EVIL appears, and in connection with the divine plans and acts which presuppose its existence. This is the stone of stumbling upon which mere *a priori* speculation must inevitably be shipwrecked; and by the investigations of the present treatise, I hope to prove that to determine to arrive at a knowledge of evil by an *a priori* process is to destroy the true conception of evil altogether. That the champions of *a priori* speculation should be scandalized by the more thorough investigation of this topic is only what might be expected. It throws a stumbling-block in their path, the very existence of which they find it necessary to ignore.

But are we to regard it as a special characteristic of philosophical as distinct from theological Speculation that it takes no cognizance whatever of experience in its great facts of personality, sin, redemption? If so, philosophy would be placed in this dilemma: either it must altogether renounce that knowledge which breathes the warm breath of life into all other knowledges, and must shut itself up in an inaccessible castle of abstractions apart from all reality, or it must make it its distinctive province to establish and maintain conclusions which contradict the reality of its object matter, *i.e.*, to err. The attempt rightly to distinguish between philosophy on the one hand, and Christian science and theology on the other, and to reconcile them, will be fruitless so long as we assign to the latter its own distinctive method, without reference to the spirit and principle of the former. But it is equally true that philosophy must not ignore the objects of theology, nor must it be left to its own bare judgment as to what it shall make the object of its knowledge, and what it shall reject. It is the unquestionable glory of Philosophy, according to the original and true idea of it, that it shall be the universal science, excluding nothing and embracing all—the science of sciences;—and the idea of Fichte was perfectly just, though his exposition failed through partiality and meagreness in its principles, when he called the system of all true philosophy, “*Wissenschaftslehre*,” the Doctrine of Science.

As the antithesis between the philosophical and theological or practical spirit is real, their agreement and harmony is real too. A philosophy which, by its own theory and the conse-

quent laws of its own method, can never do justice to personality and freedom as principles of real life, is the born foe of Christianity and Theology, and excludes the idea of their harmonious progress or their mutual enlargement. And conversely, a philosophy which truly realizes the principle of personality in God and in man is the natural ally of Christianity, though at times it may lead to differences and contradictions concerning isolated doctrines. Not only is such a philosophy influenced by the history of Christianity as a power in the world, but philosophical systems whose principles are anti-Christian are impelled onwards by the very goads against which they kick. All true philosophy, however, finds in Christianity its positive realization, the confirmation and completion of its scientific principles.

When this harmony between philosophy and theology is restored, philosophical development will regain the quiet and discreet bearing which it has lacked in modern times, owing to reckless changes in prevailing systems and to ways of thinking borrowed from radically different principles. Changes which not only affect the external aspect of the edifice of Christianity in certain parts, but pull down the very pillars on which it rests, cannot be esteemed either right or wise, save by a scepticism which has degraded the mind, or by that theory tantamount to scepticism, which, indifferent or hostile to facts as stubborn things, makes the reality of the ideal to consist in the logical process and its inherent negativity. Everyone else will recognize in these changes only a ludicrous satire of success in the avowed object of science, viz., to trace all knowledge to its ultimate principles, and thus to a sure foundation, and to safe paths. He especially who regards the living fellowship of philosophy with other sciences—none of which would exchange their sure method of progress for this game of contradictory principles—as consonant with nature, as a fellowship which does not confuse, but strengthens and illumines the natural sciences, he, I say, will not esteem this strange development of philosophy a sign of health, but will regard it as a token of unnatural strain. Philosophical systems have fallen foul of Christianity, and have failed to take root in our modern spiritual life, because they cannot attach

themselves to its deepest and strongest convictions. If philosophy succeeds in finding that foundation in Christianity which cannot be shaken, it will still have tasks to perform which will not let it pause in the perfecting of its system, and in its ever deepening penetration into the several ranges of knowledge ; but it will no longer, like Penelope, have to begin its weaving over and over again. Such a philosophy does not of course provide a foundation for Christian faith ; Christian faith possesses within itself the most satisfactory ground of certainty, and must already have vanished if it were content to borrow its proof and sanction from philosophy. A philosophy which would pretend to provide a foundation for Christian faith, as if faith without it were groundless, really aims at destroying Christianity, and at setting up itself in its place. The service which philosophy may render to faith, consists in its endeavour to gather and arrange the contents of the human mind, which have their root in its tendency towards God or towards the world into one complete whole. Its perfection lies in its attesting to Christian faith the developed perception of its harmony with all those other elements of life which have an equally true place as constituent parts of human nature. For “the union of Faith with all the formative forces of the age, so far as these are true and contain living germs of the future, constitutes PHILOSOPHY properly so called. The affections can only be at rest when religion is the standard and measure of all truth, and religion receives its final solution when unchanged as to its inner truth—for it is indeed unchangeable and independent of all the vicissitudes of time—it takes up into itself all wisdom and all life.” * In virtue of this unstrained and natural alliance between such a philosophy and Christianity, we may call it the philosophy of Christian Theism or CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, provided that it never ceases to be a free philosophy, and never binds itself to a theological datum as its starting-point.

When such a philosophy of Christian Theism shall be found,—a philosophy which shall give full expression to the idea of Personality, and shall preserve at the same time the certain results of scientific culture in its progress—conditions which,

* Steffens in his *Christlichen Religionsphilosophie*, part i., p. 12.

without depreciating any honest inquiries, we must regard as postulates,—then Dogmatic Theology may omit many elements which it has now to include within its sphere, but it will not forfeit its position as a distinct science, side by side with philosophy. Its task would be to present, in the form of instruction, the great facts of the Redemption which God has revealed, and of the inward work He carries on in humanity, without having to enter upon the development of the more general elements of religious knowledge which it presupposes.

We can never dispense with the monographic and separate treatment of the several Doctrines of Christianity ;
 § 6. The dog-
 matic Mono-
 graph. for it is only by a thorough investigation of each part of the Christian system that we can attain a satisfactory exhibition of the whole,—an exhibition of it I mean, free from all formalism, and based upon clear and definite conceptions. A Monograph must investigate its theme scientifically, keeping in view the systematic whole of which it is a part ; for each part of Christian Doctrine is conditioned by the whole, just as the whole is conditioned by each particular part. A Monograph, if it be in true conformity with the system of Christian Doctrine, is a member of the organic whole ; for while it is itself a relatively independent whole, possessing a completeness of its own, every step in its argument has a bearing upon the greater whole of which it forms a part. If, again, a Monograph include the speculative treatment of its theme, there should be, on the part of its author, an understanding of the more remote premisses of speculation, even in their simplest elements ; though the connection of these with the subject immediately in hand be not fully developed, but only indicated in a rudimentary way.

The method, however, which the Monograph adopts in the
 Its method. speculative consideration of its subject, is the very opposite of that pursued in the comprehensive exposition of speculative theology as a whole. Whereas, in the latter case, the progressive or synthetic method is followed, in the former—the Monograph—the retrogressive or analytic method is pursued. While theological speculation starts from the most abstract metaphysical principles, in order, step by step, to arrive at fuller and more concrete knowledge, the

Monograph begins with some one determinate Doctrine,—peradventure, as in our case, a Doctrine the substance of which is found deep-seated in the consciousness of every developed life,—and endeavours, by analysis, to discover the general concepts and principles which constitute the hidden basis of that Christian truth in the sphere of speculation. Convinced that truth never can contradict itself; that what is true in theology cannot be false in philosophy, it undertakes to prove what must be the answer given to philosophical questions which involve the interests of religion, if that answer is to be in harmony alike with the essence of Christianity, and with the necessary facts of moral consciousness on which Christianity depends. It is obvious that the inquiry must not arbitrarily alter philosophical principles in order to accommodate them to some practical end or subjective want; it must proceed scientifically, so far as to prove from the very nature of those principles, that in proportion as they are universally necessary and true, they naturally find their place in a train of speculative thought corresponding to the express contents of Christianity.

From what has now been said it will be seen that the object of this work is not exactly to exhibit the Protestant Doctrine of Sin with its attendant truths, as it is categorically stated and developed by our older theologians in the Symbolical Books of our Church. It will, we hope, be apparent that our inquiries are conducted in a Protestant spirit; but, by a Protestant spirit we mean something widely different from the interpretation of the term now-a-days fashionable, which makes it the denial of all settled Doctrine and a *protest* against Christian Protestantism. That only can we call a really Protestant spirit, whether in science or in life, which embraces the vital religious principles of the Protestant Churches with the conviction of the mind and the affection of the heart. But in order to the Protestant character of a dogmatic investigation, a perfect coincidence with all our Church Symbols and Confessions is by no means necessary. It is quite possible, we believe, to rejoice and glory in the great dogmatic works of a GERHARD or a QUENSTEDT, as imperishable monuments of scientific Protestantism in Germany, without relinquishing the hope of one day making our Protestant theology a still purer and more living exponent of systematic Christian Doctrine.

BOOK I.

THE REALITY OF SIN.

PART I.

THE NATURE OF SIN.

CHAPTER I.

SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW.

IT requires no special profundity of reflection but only a moderate degree of moral earnestness to prompt us thoughtfully to pause before ONE GREAT PHENOMENON of human life, and ever and anon to turn towards it a scrutinizing look. I refer to the phenomenon of EVIL; the presence of an element of disturbance and discord in a sphere where the demand for harmony and unity is felt with peculiar emphasis. It meets us at every turn as the history of the human race in the course of its development passes before us; it betrays its presence in manifold forms when we fix our eyes upon the closest relationships of society; and we cannot hide from ourselves its reality when we look into our own hearts. It is a dark and dismal nightshade, casting a gloom over every department of human life, and continually pervading its fairest and brightest forms.

§ 1. THE
x FACT OF EVIL,

They, indeed, make very light of their philosophical perceptions who fancy they can dismiss the greatest riddle of the world, the existence of evil, simply by forbidding it serious thought. They speak of the disagreeableness of reflections so studiously directed towards the dark side of life; they find that it is only "according to

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nature," that the more steadily you fix your eyes upon the darkness, the more immeasurable does it appear; and they advise us for our own sakes to turn away from the question of evil, because our troubling ourselves about it will be of no avail save to plunge us into gloomy melancholy.* How gladly should we follow this advice if only Novalist† were right in his bold promise,—which expresses the mind of Carpocrates the Gnostic,‡ and that perhaps of Fichte also,—that, "if a man suddenly and thoroughly persuaded himself that he was moral, he would really be so." Were it true, that if a man with firm resolve shook off "that old and grievous delusion of sin," as a wild and empty dream, he would be free from sin, who would not in so easy a manner be released? But as the well-known device of the ostrich does not save it from the weapon of the hunter, so the mere shutting of our eyes to the reality of evil does not make it vanish, but delivers us only the more surely into its power.

In order to be conquered, the enemy must first of all be known; and the very complaints of the disagreeableness of such reflections strongly witness how dangerous it is to shrink from them. When other things indeed disturb and hinder us, we consider it an honourable effort on a man's part to disregard them; and yet we feel we ought to abhor this plan as mischievous in the case of moral troubles. Bodily pain and physical evil we have in common with all living beings; they pertain to the lower and physical part of our nature, and the prevailing power of the spirit appears doubly noble in rising above them. But moral

Different
from other
troubles of
life.

* We find this advice (very like what some modern philosophers give) in the celebrated work of Boethius, (born at Rome, 445, beheaded 526), *De Consolatione Philosophiae* :—

“ Vos haec fabula respicit,
Quicumque in superûm diem
Mentem ducere quaeritis.
Nam qui Tartareum in specus
Victus lumina flexerit,
Quidquid praecipuum trahit,
Perdit, dum videt inferos.”

† Novalis, born 1772, in Mansfield, died 1801. See his *Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 248.

‡ Carpocrates lived during the first half of the second century, at Alexandria.

x evil, wickedness, belongs to man alone of all living creatures in nature ; it has its seat in the spirit, in the *Will* ; and if this discord has penetrated the spirit itself, what else has man within him whereby to rise above it ? Wickedness is not the only source of disturbance in the spiritual life, and yet it stands quite alone in the manner in which it works upon our consciousness. If man discovers any striking defects in his mental organization, or unavoidable hindrances to a more perfect culture and a more vigorous perception, he is pained at it, but he does not reproach himself for it ; let him be conscious of 'willing what is WRONG, and he immediately knows that he is without excuse.

If our earthly life be fettered with many hard conditions, a thorough and comprehensive reflection will teach
 / Evil alien to our nature. us how to reconcile these with our higher nature and our great destiny ; EVIL alone is excluded as absolutely alien from and repugnant to our nature : no higher ground of contemplation, no clearer perception can ever reconcile us to it. To the problem with which the youth struggled hard, the man of mature age returns ; but the stern experience of real life which he has acquired, and his deeper knowledge of mankind, have only increased the difficulty of solving it.
 x Some philosophic modes of thought may boast of having, by a speculative theory, quite resolved moral evil into a general necessity, and so of having transformed the dark background of existence into light and clearness ; but real life strides on unconcerned alike about the false self-exaltation of the schools and the self-degradation which would forbid the consideration of the subject. The advocates of this opinion are, in fact, refuted by their own experience and conduct, for wrong-doing always awakens in them a feeling altogether distinct from that with which they contemplate the unavoidable limitations and untoward circumstances of this our individual life ; and, moreover, they actually deal with wrong-doing in a manner wholly different from their treatment of the inevitable imperfections of humanity. This theory does not explain the real facts of our moral life and consciousness ; it gives them the lie, and the facts avenge themselves by taking no notice of the theory.

But the moral nature with which evil is so boldly and strikingly contrasted, as an element alien and repugnant to it, is

not that which prevails in real life; nor does it correspond with the actual state of mankind generally. Evil, with its manifold ramifications, has so intimately intertwined itself with, and grown into human nature, that judging by appearances we might conclude it to be part and parcel of that nature. It is a higher truth concerning our nature, a truth perceived only by a more profound reflection that enables us to judge of evil as a perversion which, though we cannot destroy it, ought to be rejected as an intruder.

In this consciousness there is, I say, a truth unveiled which rules our life with unlimited authority, so far as the moulding of it is in our own hands; *i.e.*, so far as our life is conditioned by our conscious self-determination. The power which, by self-determination, we possess of deciding our own state and its influences upon others is denominated WILL. The true conception of will is, not the bare act of choice or decision only. This we must allow to be possessed, in a certain sense, by creatures without intelligence, and as existing in the organic life of nature by virtue of its development from its own principles.* Self-determination only becomes will when it is conscious of itself, and when the subject of it is able, beforehand, to think upon that which by self-determination he realizes. The deeper truth of our nature expresses not that which actually is, but that which OUGHT to be; an OUGHT which is intended to pass into act—*i.e.*, to be realized or obeyed; but which, though not yet realized, does not cease to assert itself as an obligation, a rule of life, a necessity limiting our will.

This inner practical truth of our nature does not of necessity realize itself immediately, carrying into effect the duty imposed. This belongs to the sphere of spirit, and only through the spirit can it be realized. Accordingly, the physical possibility of a deviation therefrom, is not excluded from the self-action of the will. The necessity with which it first appears is itself a moral one, and it has elasticity enough to admit of that possible deviation; still it has unconquerable energy enough ever to assert its authority, notwithstanding actual contradiction.

* "In a certain sense," for strictly speaking there can be no mention of *self* determination where there is no real *Self*.

This practical truth which absolutely governs and yet does not compel the human will, is the MORAL LAW. ^x
 The moral law. The moral law as the rule of the human will, is none other than *moral good*. Hence, it is clear, that the conception of the law presupposes the conception of *the good*; and if an ethical system follows the true order, this latter conception must be deduced prior to the former, and independently of it. The impression of sublimity and of majesty which the moral law makes upon the mind that contemplates it, provided its sensibilities are still unblunted, does not arise from its form merely as an unconditional command, but from the very nature of its contents, upon which the form itself depends. Kant in his moral system directly reverses this order, maintaining that the conception of *the good* is to be determined after the law and by the law; and then he enthusiastically apostrophizes the great name of Duty.* Schleiermacher justly objects that such a glorification of duty must be taken as applicable even to the ethics of Eudemonism for example, because a merely formal conception of duty cannot be refused a place even in that system.†

If in our present exposition we depart from the true and genetic order which ranks the conception of the good and right before that of law, it must be remembered that our business is not to set up a system of morality, but to take cognizance of the DISTURBANCE of our moral life in all its sad reality. In order to arrive at this knowledge, our mode of procedure must, from the very nature of the subject, be first of all *descriptive*. This disturbance of our moral nature must be reflected in the mirror of our contemplation in the very form in which it presents itself to the inner perceptions of mankind generally. We must begin with the phenomena in order to search out its inner nature. ^x

The moral law embraces the whole of human life, so far at least as this life is dependent on the will; but it does this by occupying the highest place above it. ^x
 The moral law in the abstract. So lofty is its throne, that as we take our stand there and look abroad, all the minor varieties of moral duty

* Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 6th Ed. pp. 91, 125.

† Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre, p. 180. (1st Ed.)

in the several spheres of human life and stages of human development vanish, and fundamental moral truth presents itself in simple yet majestic outlines. And yet as we descend, every thing that is of a moral character in all those various spheres and stages must find a place within these outlines, and must prove itself to be in due perspective and harmony therewith. Thus there is a wide distance between the moral law far above us and our moral life here below in its concrete limitations, (wholly apart from the question of harmony or discord between the two,) a barrier so to speak of wide extent, which arises from the very nature of law. The principles of the law demand the obedience of man in every moment of his life, and yet they never descend to the minute moral circumstances of his position; they can never tell him in detail and exhaustively how he is to demean himself in relation to them. Far above the minutiae of actual life, the majestic greatness of the law appears, great in its uniformity, great also in its reserve.

This sublime elevation, which the moral law sustains towards the actual life of man, even when that life develops itself and acts according to its commands, is owing mainly to two things. The *first* is INDIVIDUALITY in the widest import of the word. A moral act, viewed as the determinate outgo of actual life, is never simple and isolated, it is complex and many-sided, and its real moral import, both as to contents and to form, depends partly upon the distinctive character and idiosyncrasy of the doer, and partly upon the special nature of the social relations in which he is placed. Now, as the law presents only a general outline of the normal condition of man's will and life, of what ought to be applicable alike to all, the distinctive duty of each individual could not be detailed therein. The second consideration more closely concerns our present investigation. As to the first, it is impossible for the moral law accurately to define individual duty; this is a task which even ethical science with its wider appliances can only approximately perform. Between its conceptions and principles on the one hand, and the circumstances of the individual on the other, there must always be a disproportion, or at least a gap which no rules can obviate or fill up. What alone can do this is the CONSCIENCE of the man himself, asserting itself and acting in the manner of an immediate

feeling or moral instinct. The *second* thing to which the abstract position of the law, as the rule of our life, is owing, is the MORAL CONDITION OF MAN; this is the presupposition and starting-point, the basis and source, of all effort to fulfil the law. We cannot here consider the diversities of this condition; suffice it to say, that even when this starting-point has undergone a radical conversion and renewal of the moral life, the endeavour after harmony with the moral law is still a continual conflict with inward and outward hindrances. Even in this case, man still requires a moral instructor to take him by the hand, inclined as he is to sin and error though he has been "apprehended" by the divine principle of the law, and to teach him to know the moral process whereby he may progressively realize the moral law in his life. The law itself, however, does not become his instructor, but overlooking the changes and stages of the intermediate course, it contents itself with pointing out to him the right and perfect as his goal.

What then are the intermediate conceptions wherewith

Rothe's theory of relative morality.	Ethics fills up the interval and applies the moral law to the given circumstances of actual life? It must not do this by <u>lowering the standard</u> of the moral law, accommodating it to the ability of sinful man, renewed though he may be by the redemptive work of Christ, and prescribing for him only a relatively normal moral conduct. Yet this is the solution of the question proposed by Rothe, who, in his Theological Ethics, investigates the true conception of the moral law with his wonted acuteness.* The moral law would, by this explanation, be deprived of the ideal authority which, (even according to the scientific language used by Rothe to describe it), really belongs to it, and that <i>dictum</i> of
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* Among other places, see book iii. §§ 806-809. Here Rothe distinguishes between the moral law in a wider and in a narrower sense. By the first, he understands the original and perfect standard of human conduct, the morality of which, according to his theory, consists in the absolute subjection of material nature to personality. But he does not look upon this simple principle as actual law, he would rather call it a moral standard or ideal pattern. It is, indeed, law for the Saviour, but not for the Christian. In his view, the moral law is, strictly speaking, "that formula for human guidance in virtue of whose restraining power the actual performance of moral duty is rendered possible to sinful man, and guaranteed for him through that divine grace of which by redemption he is made a partaker."—P. 13.

Kant, "I can, because I ought," in its reverse form, "I cannot, and therefore I ought not," would become the canon determining what the moral law should be for us.* Such a limitation of the true conception of law in its moral bearing, is not in harmony with the language of Holy Scripture regarding it; indeed, it compromises the entire system of morals and the true and adequate knowledge of sin, as will appear in our progressive inquiry.

It may further be remarked, that no ethical system can include in the conception of the moral law, those individualizing contingencies which arise from the given conditions of actual life, and which vary according to nation, age, and person.† In this case, we should have to treat the moral law itself as mutable according to circumstances, and this would directly contradict its ideal import.

The older Theology, that of the Middle Ages, and that of the Protestant Church, was perfectly right in considering *universality, equality for all, and unchangeableness* as determinations inseparable from our conception of the moral law. Its most essential and distinguishing attribute, viz., its *unconditional authority*, depends upon these. It is quite out of place therefore, at least in the accurate and scientific use of words, to speak of different Moral Laws, one moral law for heathens, another for Jews, and a third for Christians. The only allowable distinction here, is that of a more or less perfect exhibition of the one Moral Law; and what is called the Christian moral law

True idea of the moral law.

* That Rothe's conception of the limits of the moral law really implies this, is clear from the grounds upon which he refuses to recognize "the moral standard" as a moral law for us in our actual state as sinners. It cannot be directly binding upon us, because in consequence of natural depravity, we are not in a position wherein conformity to it would be possible. At p. 12, for instance, he says, "it demands an absolute normal obedience, but even with the help of divine grace, we can only render an obedience *relatively* normal." But this may with equal truth be asserted of any of the commandments, *e.g.*, of that which Christ calls the first and great commandment, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." Indeed, according to the explanation of the Christian moral law which Rothe gives, it would follow, that even this precept cannot rigidly be considered God's practical law for man.

† That Rothe does this likewise, is evident, for he holds that the moral law in the range of its concrete determinations, is in a state of continual change.—§§ 820 f.

is only the pure and perfect embodiment of that one law.* This embodiment of the law does not necessarily presuppose the sinfulness of the being to whom it directs its commands; the prohibitive form of some of these commands is only the inseparable exclusion of what is contrary to the right and good denoted, and this necessarily presupposes, not the reality, but only the possibility of the sin forbidden.

✓ From the universality of the law in the abstract, and its sameness for all, there necessarily arises a range of special limitations which bring it into closer connection with man as he is, in actual experience of life, within the confines of time and space, having various claims imposed upon him by his own wants and the wants of others, whether persons or communities, fettered moreover and hindered by sin without, and by a hard conflict within. This complicated series of particular commands and duties, is evolved from the relation of the universal moral law to the given circumstances of the individual, but its only sure objective basis is that high and authoritative original.

In this intermediate range arises also what is ordinarily called the *collision of duties*. This collision or clashing of definite moral precepts, arises generally from the circumstance, that a man has claims laid upon him for the performance of several simultaneous and perhaps con-

* Hence, of course, we disagree with Rothe when he says that "neither the moral character of our Lord, nor the moral precepts of the New Testament, can be made the Christian's standard." His argument is, that the morality of our Lord was absolutely normal, whereas ours, even when perfect, can be only relatively normal; and moreover, that the moral precepts of the New Testament presuppose a moral condition and circumstances wholly different from our own. We, on the contrary, affirm that the morality of our Lord is a standard for us for the very reason that it was absolutely normal. Rothe would make Christian morals, as they actually appear in each particular age and sphere of life, the standard of Christian morality for that time. But so far from claiming the title of "reformer of Christian morality," the Protestant Christian will recognize the standard of Christian morality in vogue at any given time as law, only so far as it is in harmony with the standard of morality laid down in the New Testament, i.e., in no wise as really law. How could any changeable form of Christian morality, variously defined in various circumstances, possess that divine authority, which even according to Rothe, resides in what is really the moral law? This readiness to recognize an unconditionally valid standard for our conduct in the objective reflection which the passing stage of the world's history casts upon the mirror of our moral consciousness, is only in keeping with the pantheistic bias from which the speculative principles of this system are not free; a bias necessarily arising from Rothe's views, concerning speculative method, to which we referred in the Introduction.

flicting duties in every moment of his conscious life, claims far more numerous than he can possibly fulfil, considering his finite nature and his multifarious moral relations. Strictly speaking, this "collision of duties" always exists; but he notices it only when the conflicting claims press upon him with special liveliness, and seemingly with equal moral force.

Having thus distinguished these two great momenta, the ¹ universal moral LAW, and the ² particular moral OBLIGATION, there is, in the series, a third stage wherein the moral standard is actually transferred to and embodied in the experience of the individual, I mean the ³ DEFINITE DUTY. Herein is pointed out to man the moral conduct becoming him at any given time, and in any given relations, excluding every other wish or act on his part. We may venture to adopt the words of Schleiermacher here, though not in precisely the same sense as he, that every determinate and fixed duty is a distinguishing between conflicting duties.* And from this it will immediately appear that properly speaking there is no such thing as a collision of duties. The true harmony of the several parts in the unity of the moral law, and the unconditional and commanding authority which characterizes its precepts, are restored again in the positive duty now defined and settled, so that the end of the series coincides with its beginning. But in the interval, between the ideal starting-point and the practical goal, the moral law passes through a multitude of moral relationships, with their respective claims upon the individual mutually limiting and narrowing each other, so that it often requires the unravelling of a tangled web of duties in order to ascertain what is the individual's duty at any particular time. It is evident therefore, that ethical science can never decide what is a man's clear and definite duty in any given circumstances, by progressive and logical inferences from its primary principles. The final and completing decision must be left to the CONSCIENCE of the man himself.

The inner witness of conscience The internal perception of the moral law as a rule unconditionally binding, is so essential a part of human consciousness, that were it wholly wanting in any one, we should be compelled to doubt the completeness of his humanity. It never is wholly absent;—indeed it is a

* *System der Sittenlehre, herausg. von A. Schweizer*, § 327. See also Rothe's remarks on this point, pp. 63-75.

fact of great significance, a wonderful witness to the original nobility of the human spirit, that even in the very densest darkness of sin there still linger some elements of the highest knowledge, and still glimmer some sparks of ideal truth. At the lowest depth of this moral darkness we may find moral apprehensions so perverted as to be almost irreconcilable with the first principles of this knowledge; but cases such as these can only be looked upon as isolated exceptions from the universal rule. Even the most uncivilized man will recognize the dictates of justice as valid and binding, when brought to bear upon the behaviour of others towards him; and only when they are applied to his own conduct, do they sometimes become dark and doubtful.

The moral law also verifies itself practically as an objective Embodied in power in history, because its principles form the human law. pure and living germ of all the various rights and duties of man in the family, in the state, and in society generally. Thus, as an objective power, the law may be said to compass man about, onwards from the very first moment of his life, with an authority silent indeed, but never wholly to be slighted, and obliging him in some degree to yield to its demands. But the subjective motive of this compliance is not only in innumerable instances wholly undeveloped, it may even be in many cases positively perverted.

It is evident from the hints here given regarding the relation of the moral law to the consciousness of The Mosaic Law. man, that its elevation to an ever-increasing clearness of subjective conviction depends upon the progressive development of the human spirit generally; and it also follows that it must be exposed to disturbance and darkening in individuals and nations, through the force of propensities and tendencies of the will that strive against it. Hence it comes to pass that a positive revelation of the moral law—a giving of the law—appropriately finds its place in the series of God's historical revelations to man. The Law of Moses is clearly in its moral precepts nothing more than a republication of the moral law in its intrinsic truth, suited to the wants of the Israelites; and, in order to preserve the knowledge of it in the midst of the darkening and perverting influence of human wilfulness and sin, it was necessary to have it committed to

writing as an actual standard of appeal.* But as the moral law was in this case embodied in a code, clothed with outward political authority and interwoven with ritualistic and civil laws, it had to accommodate itself both to the character and historical relations of the Israelites, and to the requirements of the stage of moral culture which the age had then reached. The exposition of it as a whole had therefore to be limited, and its moral principles are exhibited only in the broadest outlines. An unprejudiced consideration of the Mosaic law obliges us to allow that while it announces the eternal principles of true morality, and is ever calculated to beget the knowledge of sin and repentance, there is in the Christian Church, through the power of the pattern of holiness in Christ and of the divine Spirit, a far more developed and deeper knowledge of the law than could possibly have been given to the Israelites through Moses.†

This view of the moral law cannot be subject to the reproach of reducing it to an abstract ideal, hovering over mankind in powerless and inactive transcendancy. Practical power of the law on man. There must, indeed, to a certain extent, be a leaving out or renunciation of the idea of immediate fulfilment and realization in our conception of the moral law. It rules the will, and yet must so far stand aloof as to allow to the will the ability of resisting its rule. But though the individual for himself may overrule the binding authority of the law by his arbitrary will, this cannot be done to any extent in a community;—so closely are some of its principles interwoven with the very existence of society, that the denial of their authority would be the ruin of society itself. The person even who refuses to direct his will any longer by the law, cannot free himself wholly

* Augustine very beautifully says, regarding the *Lex scripta* (Enarr. in Ps. lvii. 1), “*Quia homines appetentes ea quae foris sunt, etiam a se ipsis exules facti sunt, data est etiam conscripta Lex; non quia in cordibus scripta non erat; sed quia tu fugitivus eras cordis tui, ab illo qui ubique est comprehenderis et ad te ipsum intro revocaris.*”

† It in some degree confuses the questions arising from the continual obligation of the moral law upon the Christian, when the older theology of our Church, in the *Formula Concordiae*, part ii., chap. vi., *de tertio legis divinae usu*, usually fixes its eye exclusively upon the Mosaic Law in its moral bearings. The assertion, for instance, that all that Christ announces in His Sermon on the Mount as *πλήρωσις τοῦ νόμου* is only the real and immediate import of the Old Testament commands, is on the face of it an arbitrary one.

from its sway. The repudiated law follows him in his self-perversion, and will not suffer him wholly to rid himself of the sense of an inner discord. But how could the violation of the moral law, proceeding from a will which renounced it, cause an inward strife and variance in the very consciousness of the man if the law itself were not inherent there?

In conformity with these conclusions we find that our consciousness presents to us the evil which is in our
 § 2. EVIL AS OPPOSITION TO LAW. will, in the form first of all of opposition to the law. The man now for the first time becomes morally conscious of a demand requiring of him the unconditional submission of his will to its authority, and obliging him to give up everything rather than refuse obedience. He perceives it at first by a kind of higher instinct of the reason as an instantaneous feeling, yet not less real than when it takes the form of a developed insight discerning its inner necessity. From this moment the man becomes conscious of evil as evil, as opposition to a demand unconditionally binding, and as actual rebellion against a law whose sanctity ought never to be called in question.

And who can deny that in this inward perception there lies a deep truth? that thus there may be imprinted
 The truth implied in this. on the mind, though only in a relative and indistinct manner, a strong conviction that evil may be overcome and put away? In opposition to the universal and impartial authority and to the holy necessity of the moral law, man in evil doing manifests a principle of subjective choice and unbounded arbitrariness of will. This arbitrariness is not the less real because it hides itself conveniently under the guise of a moral accommodation to, or compliance with one's nature, which claims an exceptional law and a privileged tribunal of judgment. The demand so often made in our day, that the moral law must modestly retire before powerful natures, strong passions, complicated relations, and make way for them, does not spring from a healthy sentiment, but from a feeble deification of mere power. True strength consists in submitting the will to the recognized call of duty, in spite of the fierce impulse of one's own nature, and the pressure of circumstances. It would be conferring upon man a very

poor honour indeed, if, in the last instance, he must follow the rule which amid conflicting powers of nature assigns the right to the strong. It is clear certainly, from what has already been said, that the positive moral duty of any one in any given case cannot be decided by the moral law alone; that duty depends not only upon the drift of the law, but also upon the distinctive individuality of the Subject himself, and the distinctive peculiarities of his position. Hence arises a phenomenon continually to be met with in human Spontaneous obedience. experience. It is this. If we examine the springs of moral action in daily life we shall find, in thousands upon thousands of cases, that even where the moral act bears the impress of the law, there has been no conscious reference to the law or its general requirements. Without any resort to general principles, the man in his decisions obeys the calls of particular circumstances, whose moral import and binding power he has become once for all assured of, and his individuality gives to his acts a form of their own, distinct from the acts of any one else. But herein the particular duty is not apart from the universal law nor opposed to it, on the contrary it is included in it and subject to it. The individuality has itself become false and perverted, and the circumstances illegitimate, if they can no longer be subordinated to the moral law.* If individuality be not blended with reverence for that impartial and unerring law which is the same for all, the more energetic it becomes the more ruinously will it operate. And if these definite circumstances and relationships of common life press upon the man with all the weight of moral power, this arises from the moral law which dwells within the heart—the original source of their just claims. If these relations, in the forms which they assume, break loose from their true and primary source, they can impose themselves upon the

* It is clear that we do not here refer to Jacobi's polemic (especially in his *Sendschreiben an Fichte*) against the attempts of the philosophies of Kant and Fichte to bring all moral life under the dominion of one formula; because Jacobi himself in his *Allwill* has expressly combated the principle of moral compliance with nature and its pretence to self-legislation. Nevertheless he cannot be said to have solved the autonomy involved in this—the apparent contradiction, I mean, between the sovereignty of personality over the abstract law, as affirmed in his first-named treatise, and the subjection of personality to the universality of divine commands as affirmed in his last-named work.

man and fetter him, only through the blind and precarious force of habit, or by the interests of selfishness.

If this be the true import of the moral law, then—however abstract our conception of it—evil in all its ramifications and individual manifestations may be described as a violation of it.

It cannot be denied that SIN usually presents itself to us in an *objective* form. Whether we take as our standard—the violation of which constitutes the essence of sin—the Mosaic law, the pattern of Christ, and the precepts which He and His Apostles gave us, or Conscience alone, it is, in our very conception of it, independent of our wishes and subjective fancies, and binding on us in virtue of a higher authority. And it need not in the least confound us that subjective fancies, even the most morally perverted, have often been put forth as the decisions of conscience; for what truth, however sacred, is there, which may not similarly be misunderstood or wilfully misinterpreted by infatuation or hypocrisy?

But if we analyse our conception of sin, we shall find that it is never entirely without a *subjective* element likewise. It would be quite impossible for us to define the moral law, even in its broadest outlines, as distinguished from the laws of nature, without specifying its exclusive reference to beings possessed of WILL. No one could for a moment think of charging the lower animals with transgression of the law; indeed, we can only speak of “the sins” of children in a potential sense, as possibilities, not actualities, so long as will and the moral law exist in them *in potentiâ* only.* Neither can the charge of breaking the moral law

* Upon the same grounds Augustine fully recognizes this freedom from sin, *proprie vite* in the case of very young children (see his Treatise, *De pecc. mer. et remiss.*, lib. i. 64, 65). But some Pelagians, in order to avoid the argument for original sin from the practice of Infant Baptism, attributed actual sin to new-born children to account for the necessity of baptism. The elder Lutheran theologians on the contrary were compelled, chiefly by their principle that original sin where it existed must be embodied in actual sin, to attribute *peccata actualia* to new-born children (see Hutter, *Loci Communes*, art. x., cap. i. 3; and Quenstedt, who has a distinct *quæstio* [the 14th in the polemic section of the chapter *De peccato*], *An in infantes usu rationis destitutos cadant peccata actualia?*) Here the inference seems almost forced upon us, “If an ἁμαρτία (plural) be appropriated by the new-born child in baptism, he must already be guilty of actual sin.”

be brought against the man whose conscious self-determination and will, though present, has been deranged by some physical cause. I say *physical*, for if the connection between self-determination and action be disturbed only by the unrestrained power of the lower impulses, the validity and force of the moral requirement would not be done away. The will must be lord within its own house, and that preponderance of the lower impulses is something that ought not to be. But in the face of any necessity of nature and against its power, the *ought* of the law has no significance. Insanity, again, severs the connection; as also do the severest types of feverish diseases and the like. In such cases the iniquity which lies hidden in the heart may be exposed to view, but actual sin cannot be committed.

X This subjective element of FREE WILL is necessarily involved in the very essence of sin. Whenever anything in the life of a being who determines his conduct consciously is found to be in opposition to the moral law, it is, according to this principle, characterized as SIN;—without examining how it may have originated, or in what relation it may stand to the moral consciousness of the Subject, and to the degree of his present development and power. Taking this description of sin as in the main just, though it does not sufficiently unveil for us its inner nature, we must nevertheless recognize and allow that all further determinations and inferences, essentially pertaining to sin, will be found wherever violation of the moral law objectively occurs.

Holy Scripture likewise defines the conception of sin in this sense, when it declares $\eta \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha \epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu \eta \acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (1 John iii. 4). This expression occurs in the course of an argument against the laxity which, recognizing the general authority of the divine law, did not take it as applying to several sinful practices, because, forsooth, they were not expressly forbidden by the letter of the Decalogue.* In opposition to this depraved sentiment the apostle, in the preceding words ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \acute{\omicron} \pi\omicron\iota\omega\nu \tau\eta\nu \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu \kappa\alpha\iota \tau\eta\nu \acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu \pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}$), inculcates the truth that a partial obedience will not satisfy the claims of a law which demands perfect purity both of will and deed. He

Testimony of
Scripture.

* See Lücke's Commentary on the Epistle of John, and Neander, "Pflanzung der Kirche," p. 144.

shows the blameworthiness of everything sinful, in contrast with the purity spoken of in verse 3, (ἀγνὸν εἶναι), by describing it as opposition to the law of God. When to the declaration—*πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ*, “every one that committeth sin also committeth transgression of law”—he adds, *καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, “and sin is transgression of law”—his intention, certainly, is to *define* the conception of sin thus:—“And herein consists the nature of sin, sin is a repudiation or violation of the law.” The first proposition, viewed by itself, might be understood as meaning only that transgression of the law is one out of many elements in the true conception of sin: but the second defines the thought more accurately, because it puts the two concepts side by side as co-extensive and logically convertible.* The elder Dogmatists of our church were wont to support their definitions of sin by this text.†

In order more fully to define the nature of evil in relation to the moral law, THREE QUESTIONS must be answered. *First*, Is all evil a violation of the moral law? or does the law apply only to outward act, and not to inner motive, not to the prevailing state of the inner life and character? *Secondly*, Does evil denote that only which positively contradicts the law, or that also which fails to satisfy the full claims of the law? *Thirdly*, may not the law and our consciousness of it be really the consequence

* If with Kostlin, (“Der Lehrbegriff des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis,” p. 246), we adopt Lachmann’s reading, *καὶ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, it would appear, considering St. John’s usual accuracy in the use of the article, that *ἁμαρτία* should be taken as the predicate, “and violation of law is sin.” But this would be a very weak and unmeaning proposition in relation to the words immediately preceding, and is not bettered by the exposition, “sin is really sin because it is included in the conception of *ἀνομία*, but this *ἀνομία* is really sin.” As the words occur in this passage, *ἀνομία* is clearly the stronger, and *ἁμαρτία* the weaker and less determinate. Even with this reading, therefore, and in spite of the omission of the article, we should have to take *ἁμαρτία* as the subject.

† MELANCHTHON: *defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei.*
(*Loci Theol. de peccato*, 1569, p. 97.)

GERHARD: *discrepantia, aberratio, deflexio a lege.*

CALOVIVS: *illegalitas seu difformitas a lege.*

BAIER: *carentia conformitatis cum lege.*

BUDDEUS: *violatio seu transgressio legis divinæ.*

BAUMGARTEN: *transgressio legis seu absentia conformitatis cum lege.*

of evil, and not, as we have represented it, its presupposition or basis?

As to the first of these questions, Schleiermacher maintains that the law immediately applies to action only,*
 § 3. THE FIRST QUESTION CONSIDERED. and that it does not of itself require us to look from the outward deed to the inward motive.† This view is manifestly akin to that of Kant, though Schleiermacher draws a very different inference from it. Kant infers that the moral law is a standard for the government of action, and for the several distinct decisions of the will; whereas Schleiermacher, in conformity with his more thorough and comprehensive view, holds that the knowledge of right and wrong in morals ought not to be put in the form of law or command.‡ He considers that law is insufficient to produce the knowledge of sin, and to present to us the goal of perfect holiness.

Schleiermacher accordingly declines to adopt the definition of sin as "transgression of the law."§ For if the law only bears upon the outward act and not upon the life, *i.e.*, the habitual character of the man, moral goodness in its fulness must be more than the fulfilling of the law, and the proposed definition of evil is essentially imperfect. Much that a high sense of rectitude will unhesitatingly pronounce evil,—*e.g.*, habitual depravity of mind, perverted inclinations, passions that have attained so fearful a predominance, that the will, having so often listened to them, does not act but is driven,—could not, according to such a definition, be included in our conception of evil. Are these internal disorders to be considered evil only because they manifest themselves in perverse acts when opportunity offers? Certainly not; on the contrary, no sooner does the consuming flame of selfish inclinations and passions begin to burn in a man's heart, than he falls under the power of evil, though these inward feelings may never be realized in corresponding crimes.

This is Schleiermacher's view, and, to a certain extent, we accept it as true. If the law as moral, contains a
 How far correct. call to duty, if the form of command essentially

* *Kritik der Sittenlehre*, p. 179.

† *Glaubenslehre* § 112, 5 (vol. ii. p. 250, 2nd ed.).

‡ *System der (allgemeinen) Sittenlehre*, § 93 (p. 55, *Schweizer's Ed.*).

§ *Glaubenslehre*, § 66, 2 (vol. i. p. 399).

belongs to it, in so far as it addresses the will in order thereby to be realized in human life, it certainly has to do primarily with the *self-movement of the will to a decision*.^{*} Accordingly the act,—which must not be taken in its narrow sense as referring only to the outward part of it—the act, How far wrong. I say, as a whole, is the primary object or aim of the command. Still, however, everything in the man's life which really springs out of his act, is its derived or secondary object. Thus the limits within which Schleiermacher would confine our conception of law, are already broken through. The law overrules, not only the deed, but the very being of the man, because it begins with the inner part of the act, the sentiment, which includes the fixed and habitual tendency of the person's will, his motives and state of feeling, his likes and dislikes; so far as these again are determined by the prevailing tendency of the will.[†] It is unquestionably essential that these internal and abiding impulses of life should be harmoniously governed in order to the attainment of that moral perfection which no one would ever think of finding in the mere outward conformity of action to law. Thus there is nothing in the true conception of the law which excludes its bearing upon the prevailing moral state of the individual; and taking it in its pure and full import, we may describe it in a general way as *the presentation of the moral ideal in the form of a command*.[‡]

* The full explanation of this position will find its appropriate place in the course of our inquiry concerning the Freedom of the Will in the third Book.

† There are indeed many men of note among theologians and philosophers who have pronounced this growth of a man's real nature (as far as moral character is concerned) from the will as its source, to be impossible. Thus Harless (*Christlichen Ethik*, 6th Aufl. p. 25), viewing inclination as part of a man's being, says:—"I do not know that I am what I am through my will; but I know that I can will through that which I am." I would here confine myself to the remark, in passing, that while I fully allow the latter or affirmative portion of this proposition, I cannot admit its negative part. For we may with a just discrimination say both "I am what I am through my will," and "I will, through that which I am." "*As I will so I am*," and "*As I am so I will*."

‡ Lactantius had this import of the law clearly in his mind when he called Christ *viva præsensque lex* (Institt. Div. l. iv. c. 17, 25), and so had Augustine when he said "*Lex Domini ipse est, qui venit legem implere, non solvere*" (Enarr. I. in Ps. xviii.), and Christ Himself refers to the same relation especially in Matt. xi. 28-30. That the demands of the law extend to perfect holiness, is well shown by Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, c. 14, 36.

The law thus dwelling in the spirit of man is a matter of *knowledge*, more or less clear; and blended with this knowledge, in virtue of man's moral nature, is an inner *instigation* towards its fulfilment.

For since moral good is understood to be law for the will, it is also recognized in its bearing upon practice, and in its authority making obedience incumbent upon us; and such a recognition of it cannot be imagined without some impulse, however weak, to bring the will into harmony with it. Where such an impulse is wholly wanting there can hardly be any knowledge of the moral law, worthy of the name. It has been reserved for that no longer human but diabolical hatred of God, which is the most horrible of all the horrible phenomena in the moral life of our day, to dissolve or pervert this connection between the law of God and man's sense of obligation. It discerns nothing in the moral law beyond the arbitrary will of God as a lawgiver demanding the submission of man, and accordingly, it refuses to discern any moral obligation to obey that command. There is nothing, however, in this inner impulse to fulfil the law blended with the knowledge of it, to give the man power to realize it in a single step of his own development; on the contrary it requires of him that he shall have this power in himself.

In accordance with what we have already said, we readily grant that the most perfect presentation of the moral law cannot exhaustively express all the fundamental principles of morality, nor the various moral bearings of every act of will. But the law does present the perfection of moral life in its main outlines, and in relation both to our moral being and our moral acts. And from this it is evident that what some are wont to call "legality" as distinct from morality, is properly speaking anything but perfect coincidence with the moral law; in other words, this notion of legality has no place whatever in the sphere of morals. Even in the case of national law, obedience does not consist in the bare outward act; it is not satisfactory unless that springs from a true national sentiment which adopts the principle of the law; for even the practical in its true nature has a moral basis.

Knowledge of
the Law
prompts to its
fulfilment.

The law em-
bodies the
perfection of
moral life.

Holy Scripture abundantly witnesses to this comprehensive significance of the moral law, understanding thereby, as it usually does, the Old Testament exposition of it. When, indeed, the apostle Paul (Rom. x. 5 ; Gal. iii. 12) so strongly insists *ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς*, he seems to favour the limitation of the commands of the law to the mere act. A close examination however shows us that he has here in his mind the contrast not between outward action and inward sentiment, but between a righteousness wrought out laboriously by our own endeavours and the righteousness of faith. Again, when he says (Phil. iii. 6), regarding his early life, “touching the righteousness which is of the law blameless,” and adds that he was dissatisfied with that righteousness (verses 7 and 8), it is clear that he makes the assertion according to a human, or, more strictly speaking, a Jewish judgment, which looked only to the outward works (*εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἄλλος πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί, ἐγὼ μᾶλλον*, ver. 4) ; he has no idea whatever of glorying in a real fulfilment of the law in his previous life (compare Romans vii. 8–23). The apostle shows us how far removed that narrow view of the law was from his present belief by an expression which he uses in Rom. vii. 14, where he describes the *νόμος* as *πνευματικός*, that is, coincident as to its contents with the will and mind of the Spirit of God. If the commands of the law had no bearing upon the inner man—upon his affections and motives—Paul would not have been justified in deriving from it the piercing knowledge of sin, the *ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας* spoken of in Rom. iii. 20. It would be in direct contradiction to such passages as Rom. ii. 13, viii. 7, Gal. v. 22, 23, to suppose that the apostle held that even when a man had perfectly fulfilled the demands of the law he would not necessarily be *δίκαιος*, and an object of the divine approval, because even in that case the sentiments of his heart (which God’s judgment always looks to, Rom. ii. 29 ; 1 Cor. iv. 5) might not be in keeping with his outward conduct.* This

* This is Schleiermacher’s view. In a sermon preached in 1830 (*Predigten*, in der Ausg. seiner sämtlichen Werke, vol. ii., p. 655) he says: “As law concerns outward conduct only, God, when He judges according to law, must recognize actions as legal which spring from a heart that is still alien to every God-pleasing sentiment. We are wont to say that no flesh can be justified by the works of the law because no one can perfectly keep the law ; but we may with equal propriety also say that no flesh can be justified by the works of the law

would lead to the conclusion that the cause of man's inability under the dominion of mere law to attain the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is to be found in the objective character of the law itself, and not in man, not in moral state into which sin has brought him and which now renders the law a dead and "death-working" letter. But this would be contrary not only to such declarations as we find in Rom. vii. 12, 14, viii. 3 (*ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός*), but to the fundamental views of the apostle as to the relation between the Old Testament economy and the New; views which recognize the truth that the law in itself would be a way to righteousness and life (Rom. ii. 13, vii. 10) provided that man in his natural state could satisfy its demands. St. Paul accordingly does not hesitate to declare it as the aim of the work of redemption "that the requirements of the law might be fulfilled in us," Rom. viii. 4. What he finds wanting in all law is not the perfect exhibition of moral goodness for our information, but the power of communicating moral life (Gal. iii. 21). It cannot help men to the possession of righteousness because the *σάρξ* (Rom. viii. 3) hinders their perception of it and checks the natural impulse associated therewith to fulfil it.* In accordance with this view of the law Christ refers the young man who came to Him asking, "What good thing shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?" to the keeping of the commandments (Matt. xix. 27). And who can for a moment doubt that He speaks of a sentiment pervading the entire inner life when He expounds the true significance of the Law in the Sermon on the Mount, and in Matt. xxii. 37-40 (in which latter place there is special reference to the Mosaic

because a man might perfectly fulfil it and yet would have no claim to the approval of God." But here Schleiermacher contradicts his own better judgment as stated in *Der Kritik der Sittenlehre*, p. 181 f., where, notwithstanding his theory of the exclusive relation of the law to action, he will not allow that any act can be in an ethical sense conformable to law if it does not spring from pious motives. Dr. Schmid discusses this point very thoroughly in his instructive Weihnachtsprogramm for the year 1832—*De notione legis in theologia morali rite constituenda*.

* See Neander, *Planting*, &c., p. 658. This very testimony to the weakness of the law (Rom. viii. 3) shows that Paul recognised this inner impulse to obedience as indissolubly involved in the knowledge of the law. Were it a matter of mere theoretical knowledge without constraining power, it would be quite out of place to speak of its being "weakened by the flesh" as the reason why it fails to lead man on to its fulfilment. It gives the knowledge, it awakens the impulse; but it is shorn of its power through the flesh.

law)? How again could He designate the love of His disciples to one another, which should correspond to His love towards them, as a new COMMANDMENT (John xiii. 34), if in the very conception of the law there were an exclusive reference to the mere outward act? *

If we now inquire what it was that led Schleiermacher to this limited apprehension of the moral law, we find, Ground of Schleiermacher's view. as he himself intimates, that it was this: he believed that man's inner nature and his moral sentiments could neither be defined nor measured by any law.† That they cannot be generated by the law we allow; but why the law should be unable to describe their perfect form we cannot see. There is nothing in the form of command inseparable from law to prevent its defining perfect morality in its inward and spiritual as well as in its outward form—the motive as well as the act.

According to Schleiermacher's ethical principles, the law cannot give this exposition of perfect duty; on the contrary, laws have no plea in ethics save "to express the external action of the reason upon nature."‡ We can only remark in passing that this is quite in keeping with Schleiermacher's notion that a system of ethics should be constructed according to the analogy of natural science. § In the sphere of nature we elevate our deductions as to the method of her working into laws of nature, when and so far only as they are realized in nature's life; and it is thus that Schleiermacher would regard law in the sphere of morals likewise. If this were so it certainly would not be consistent to take law as the expression of moral perfection, and to make the recognition of its contents (though as based upon the ideal they carry with them the evidence of their own truth and necessity) independent of the

* In proof that the fundamental views of the Reformers as to the nature of the moral law coincide with our own, we will only quote the definition which Melancthon places at the beginning of the section *De Lege Divina* in his great dogmatic work: "*Lex Dei est doctrina a Deo tradita, praeicipiens, quales nos esse et quae facere, quae omittere oportet.*"

† Glaubenslehre, § 112, 3.

‡ System der Sittenlehre, § 95. How this action is to be understood may be gathered from the preceding sections, §§ 92–94.

§ *Ibid*, §§ 62, 63. Compare, too, the conclusion of the dissertation upon the difference between the laws of nature and those of morals in the *Schriften der Berliner Akademie der Wissensch.* 1825.

degree in which that perfection is realized by humanity at large or by its most select and noblest specimens. Indeed according to Schleiermacher's view, the category of "the ought" stands in as close a relation to the sphere of nature as to that of morals.* But would not the science resulting from these principles be a philosophy of history rather than a system of ethics, bearing the same relation to history that speculative physical science bears to experimental physics?†

The view Schleiermacher takes of FREEDOM is evidently traceable to the same source. He takes it to be merely an inspiring and strengthening liveliness of nature, and he makes the acts of free will subordinate to the general course of nature, just as the action of the powers of nature generally are subordinate thereto.‡

* *Ibid.* § 63. Here, among other things, it is said, "What ought to be and what is are non-coincident (*ἀσύμπτωτοι*) in both spheres; in the sphere of morals perhaps the approximation seems to be greater." The dissertation upon the difference between the laws of nature and those of morals further carries out this thought.

† Twesten has similarly expressed himself in his admirable introduction to Schleiermacher's *Grundriss der philos. Ethik*, pp. xviii. xlviii., evidently without intending to find fault with Schleiermacher's treatment of ethical science.

‡ Glaubenslehre, § 49, § 81, 2. It is easy to see how closely these contrasted views are connected with the question concerning the significance of evil and its influence upon human development. The vacillations of opinion regarding the relation of ethics to the moral distinctions of good and evil so accurately indicated by the editor of Schleiermacher in § 91 and elsewhere of the *System der Sittenlehre*, are very striking. This relation was thus described by Schleiermacher at an earlier date: "The contrast of good and evil denotes the positive and negative factors in the process of the growing unity of reason and nature (which process it is the province of ethics according to Schleiermacher to explain); or Ethics is the development of the contrast of good and evil, or the exposition of good and evil in their co-existence." Now this corresponds with the fundamental view of the nature of morality indicated above. But when, in the most recent revision of his Ethics, Schleiermacher totally excludes the contrast of good and evil as beyond its sphere, and will admit no ethical element into the science save under the conception of moral good, and not even *good* as opposed to evil, but *good* as denoting the union of reason and nature by the activity of reason; when, moreover, in the same connection he distinguishes so decidedly between the contrast of perfect and imperfect and that of good and evil; these determinations manifestly violate the principles of that view, and in their logical results would have obliged him essentially to modify his doctrine of free will, of law, and of evil. From this change of opinion in his Lectures upon morals in 1832 we venture to conclude that his noble and profound spirit was engaged anew in the investigation of the problem of evil in the last years of his life.

We must not here overlook a question of undeniable importance in ethics which comes within the range of our inquiry. It is that of the *opus supererogationis*. If, besides deficiencies in the form in which moral truth is presented in the law, moral perfection be not expressed in its contents, it is clear that moral performances are possible which go beyond its demands; and conversely, if there be such performances the law does not express moral perfection. It is precisely on this ground that the boldest and best informed of modern controversialists in the Roman Catholic Church undertake the defence of the so-called works of supererogation. MOEHLER maintains* that he who is sanctified in Christ and filled with His Spirit feels himself always superior to the law. "It is," he says, "the nature of that love which springs from God, and which stands higher, infinitely higher than mere law, never to rest satisfied with its present manifestations, and ever to be fertile in devising new ones; so that Christians of this stamp are often looked upon as enthusiasts, visionaries, or fanatics, by men who adopt a lower standard."

BELLARMINE has arrayed together a large number of quotations from the works of the Fathers in order to show that Origen, Basil the Great, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Gregory the Great, allowed the possibility of works which more than satisfy the claims of the law, maintaining this in connection with the very old distinction between a higher and an ordinary virtue.† It was, however, during the Middle Ages that this conception received its more exact elaboration, and its established place in the system of Church doctrine. The *consilium evangelicum* corresponds with the *opus supererogationis*; the general vows of monachism—poverty, chastity, and obedience—are treated of in both; and the sacraments apart, it was chiefly by these vows that the contents of the gospel law were exalted above the commands (*praecepta*) of the Mosaic and the natural

* *Symbolik*, 3rd ed., p. 214. Moehler died at Munich in 1838.

† *De membris Ecclesiae militantis*, lib. ii., *De Monachis*, c. xii. (*Disputt. de controuv. chr. fidei*, tom. ii.). Bellarmine (born 1542, died 1621) adduces other testimonies, but they are insufficient. He has at the same time passed by the oldest Christian witness for this view—that which occurs in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, lib. iii. similit. v. 3: "*Si praeter ea, quae mandavit Dominus, aliquid boni adjeceris, majorem dignitatem tibi conquires*," &c.

law. Christianity does not, it is said, enjoin these vows, it only advises and recommends them ; and it is evident that the divisions and subdivisions of directions by which these works of supererogation are prescribed under the conception and designation even of a law (*lex evangelica*) must be very indefinitely meant as such.* The essence of law, as bearing upon the will, is not to recommend but unconditionally to command ; that only is moral law which possesses the character of moral necessity.

The Scholas-
tic View. The scholastic theologians, however, do not treat the ques-
tion in exactly the same way as Bellarmine and
modern Catholicism. THOMAS AQUINAS, who upon
this topic is the most accurate of them, puts the *concordia
evangelica* and the *opera supererogationis* in the sphere of
ASCETICISM. In his view they serve very well as means (*in-
strumenta*) the better and more easily to lead men on to the
perfection of moral life and blessedness ; † but he is far from
regarding these renunciations and performances as essential
steps towards this perfection, a perfection which he defines as
a perfection of love, in accordance with that summary of the
law which Christ Himself gave, Matt. xxii. To the question,
moreover, whether perfection depends upon the commandments
or upon the counsels, he replies, “It consists *principaliter et
essentialiter in praeceptis, secundario et instrumentaliter in
consiliis.*” ‡

Indeed, Bellarmine himself seems to coincide with Thomas Aquinas in this his view of the matter. He not only expressly refers to it in his criticism of the *Liber Concordiae*, § but he uses similar language in the beginning of his book *De Monachis*. || But the further development of his conception of the *opus supererogationis* by no means confines itself within the limits of that modest view. In order not to differ with his master, Bellarmine distinguishes a twofold perfection, the one necessary,

* For Thomas Aquinas (born 1227, died 1274) also thus defines “principaliter” the conception of the *lex nova*: It is “*ipsa gratia Spiritus sancti in corde fidelium scripta.*”—*Summa Theol. Univ. Prima Secundae*, qu. 106, art. 1.

† *Ibid.*, ii. 1, qu. 108, art. 4. Thus the deliberative and hypothetical form in which these moral determinations are stated by Thomas Aquinas gives to them a better foundation on which to base them. ‡ *Ibid.*, ii. 2, qu. 184, art. 3.

§ *Judicium de libro Conc., sextum mendacium* (*Disputt. de controuv.*, tom. iv., p. 1185, ed. Paris). || Cap. 2.

the other beneficial; the one necessary *ad esse*, the other necessary *ad bene esse*: the one needful in order to blessedness generally, the other to a higher degree of glory in the kingdom of God. The latter perfection is the portion of those only who perform more than is commanded by fulfilling the evangelical counsels.* But as Bellarmine also must recognize the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις of all divine commands in the declaration of Christ in Matt. xxii., to what monstrous inferences is he driven! In order to show that man may do more than “love God with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his mind,” he tries to weaken the sense of this command by exegetical artifices, or to extract from it a lower sense as well as a higher; venial sins are said not to contradict it;† and he who loves God with all his heart is not obliged to do all that God counsels, but merely what he commands.‡ In these inferences we have the most striking refutation of the principle from which they spring. Is that to be regarded as genuine love, corresponding to the divine command, which so discreetly weighs what in the strictest sense it owes, in order forsooth not to do too much, and which sets itself up before God with the cool explanation, “Thou admonishest me indeed to consecrate my whole life to thy service, but I am under no obligation to obey thy warnings and counsels, but only thy commands”? If there really were a higher moral perfection in the manner of life which those evangelical counsels enjoin, and were man really more acceptable in God’s sight by observing them, then he certainly would be bound to strive after them, and not thus to strive would be sin.§ It is perfectly absurd that man should possess a moral power which transcends his moral obligation.

On the other hand, it is easy to understand why the Catholic Church has never ventured to make what she recommends as the true perfection of man’s life on earth a general command. For wherein consists this higher perfection but in the abandonment of certain spheres, which have their necessary place in the great whole of

* *De Monachis*, cap. vi., vii., ix., xii. † *Ibid.* cap. xiii. ‡ *Ibid.* cap. ix.
 § PETER MARTYR (Vermigli, born 1500, died 1562) urged this objection in his exposition of 1 Cor. ix. Bellarmine quotes him in his *De Monachis*, c. xiii. “*Promoveri nolle est delinquere*,” says TERTULLIAN (*De Exhortatione Castitatis*, cap. 3).

free human life, as being *morally impenetrable*? Had this renunciation been made a universal duty, the marked variance between this one-sided church morality and the general moral duties of human life would be brought to light. The evil, however, is not remedied by avoiding such an extreme as that. If to withdraw one's self from active spheres of life be recognized as a higher degree of holiness, then any participation in them is darkened by an insurmountable profanity, which, as history testifies, cannot be removed by raising one of these spheres, that of marriage, to the dignity of a sacrament; as if an obvious contradiction of the theory could be a corrective of it.

While shrinking from essential parts of our moral duty indicates a false timidity and anxiety, the belief that we can excel the law is no less a proof of false confidence, and of a self-delusion almost inconceivable in men of any moral earnestness and experience. Our astonishment at such self-confidence is very much lessened when Bellarmine informs us that the full discharge of works of supererogation may be carried on by a man simultaneously with acts of SIN, *i.e.*, venial sin.* And

here is exposed to view that pernicious root of this whole system, and of many other errors of Catholic Ethics, the piecemeal and anatomical treatment of morals in relation to the idea of "good works and merit." This moral anatomy has reached its climax in Jesuitical morality, the chief doctrinal errors of which arise from its principles of philosophic sin, of moral acting according to probability, of good intention, which justifies the worst means, and of mental reservation.

If this be the moral import and worth of the doctrine of works of supererogation, we cannot give up, for the sake of it, the ideal character of the moral law, according to which perfection alone fully satisfies its perfect demands.†

* *De Monachis*, c. xiii. In Möhler there is often apparent a play upon different ideas which are confounded with each other, *e.g.*, "love stands infinitely higher than law," which can be taken only subjectively. Then he says, "the free impulse of love produces a far better righteousness than the mere consciousness of the law—of its express and immediate command." In this sense the principle is undoubtedly true, but contains nothing that is not fully recognized in the doctrine of the Reformers.

† Compare the clever criticism of this representation in BAUR's work *Gegen-*

As to the Scripture testimony regarding works of supererogation, no passage has been so frequently urged by Catholic theologians as the declaration of our Lord to the rich young man ;—a declaration which is said to have decided Antonius, the founder of monasticism, and Francis of Assisi, in taking upon them an ascetic life ;—
 Teaching of Scripture ; by Catholic theologians as the declaration of our
 Matt. xix. 21. Lord to the rich young man ;—a declaration which
 is said to have decided Antonius, the founder of monasticism,
 and Francis of Assisi, in taking upon them an ascetic life ;—
 “ *If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast and give
 to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come,
 follow me* ” (Matt. xix. 21). The young man, in reply to
 his question regarding the way to eternal life, was first re-
 minded by Christ to keep the commandments, and thereupon
 had expressed his belief that he had kept them all—a belief
 which Christ does not contradict. To what then could the
 words cited refer, save to a higher perfection far above the
 bare fulfilment of the law, which by self-imposed poverty he
 was to attain ? This explanation of the words *εἰ δὲ θέλεις τέλειος
 εἶναι* is untenable, because, according to the words of Christ
 immediately following (v. 23, 24), the refusal of the young man
 deprived him (at least for the present) of participation in the
 kingdom of God, and of possession of eternal life ;—unless indeed,
 we were to adopt the arbitrary distinction of the Pelagians
 between the kingdom of God and eternal life. Accordingly,
 the fulfilment of the law on the young man’s part was as yet
 in Christ’s judgment imperfect,* and the injunction was not
 intended as if to point him to a perfection transcending the
 keeping of the law, but to show him the idols which he was
 really worshipping in violation of the very first commandment
 of the Decalogue. It is therefore plain that Christ’s require-
 ment was by no means meant as a counsel which the young
 man might have neglected with impunity.

satz des Katholicismus u. Protestantismus, 2d ed. p. 301 ff. Baur refutes it on the ground of the ideal nature of the law ; this is affirmed in answer to the instances of works of supererogation there adduced.

* See the exposition of the words by Neander (*Leben Jesu*, 4th ed., pp 589–592). We need not stop to prove that the *ἡγάπησεν αὐτόν* of Mark (x. 21) simply expressed Christ’s good will and approval of the young man’s earnestness, considering his limited knowledge of himself and God. And it is further plain that the words wanting in Matthew, but given by Mark and Luke, *ἐν σοι ὑστερεῖ—ἐπὶ ἐν σοι λείπει*, require in the due connection of the sentence the addition “in order to obtain eternal life,” and if authentic, favour the interpretation above given.

Catholic theologians next refer us to the case of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. ix. 12–18), who made it a matter of merit and of boasting, that instead of preaching the gospel as an hireling, he exercised his apostolic office with love and unremunerated. We may here refer to the thorough development of that passage in its true meaning by Neander.* The fact that the apostle expressly says (v. 18), that if he did less, it would be an “abuse” of his power in preaching the gospel, shows how little he thought he was doing more than was actually required of him by the special relation he was placed in, and his individual responsibility.

It is curious that the very text which Protestants in ancient and modern times adduce as the weightiest witness against the *opus supererogationis*, and which specially troubles Catholic controversialists in the vindication of their doctrine,† contains, when closely examined, the greatest apparent sanction that can be cited from the New Testament for the possibility of works of supererogation. I refer to Luke xvii. 10. If he who has merely done all that is commanded him is to esteem himself “an unprofitable servant” because he had done nothing more than his duty, the question occurs, Are we to apply this judgment to the *perfection* of a moral life? If we reply in the affirmative, it would follow that Christ Himself must have included His own holy life in the conception of the *δοῦλος ἀχρεῖος*. But if this cannot be entertained, how shall we avoid the inference that a kind of virtue must be possible which does more than what the law demands;—an *opus supererogationis*, though in a far more spiritual and inward sense than the Catholic Church usually apprehends?

In answer to this difficulty it must be remembered that our Lord’s expression refers to the Jewish view of the law, which regarded obedience to the outward letter only. He is not therefore speaking of a fulfilment of the law according to its full import. His aim is to humble the selfish and self-righteous spirit that would keep the law merely for the sake of the re-

* “Pflanzung der Kirche,” p. 746.

† An interesting collection of the manifold objections urged by Catholic theologians against the Protestant application of this passage is given by GERHARD, *Confessio Catholica*, lib. ii., art. xxiii., cap. viii., *De perfect. et meritis opp.* It is only Salmeron (born 1515, died 1585) who usually hits the right point.

ward, and which, boasting of right and service, would demand payment (v. 9). Man must remember that as far as merit is concerned, with all his fidelity and exactness of obedience, he is still only a servant—"an unprofitable servant." * Such a position, however, is left far behind when he becomes no longer a servant but a child of God.†

Modern Catholic theologians, justly feeling the insufficiency of the scriptural argument, have endeavoured by a clever turn to make this very weakness of the doctrine of the evangelical counsels and works of supererogation the means of its strength, by representing it very plausibly as a freer development of Christian ethics in contrast with the strictness of the older Protestantism. While Protestantism does not recognize any ethical determinations which cannot be traced back to the express words of the law as contained in Holy Scripture,‡ the Catholic Church seems to afford freer scope for the development of the Christian piety, because it considers that pious impositions are justifiable and right, though they cannot be proved from the letter of Scripture, provided that they tend in a legitimate manner towards the goal of perfection set before us therein.§ When we come to look more closely into it, however, this seemingly free development turns out to be itself another code of laws, prescribed

* 'Αχρεῖος; in classical Greek usually means aimless, useless, unserviceable; so in Matt. 29, 30. But this meaning of the word is quite inappropriate in the passage, however it be interpreted. For the meaning usually adopted here the LXX. in 2 Sam. vi. 22 is the only precedent; where the Hebrew הַשִּׁי, low, humble, is rendered by ἀχρεῖος, though usually by ταπεινός.

† Taking this view of the passage, we should more naturally suppose that Christ was addressing the Pharisees and not His disciples. And verses 7 and 8, both in the external relations referred to, and in their tone of thought, make this very probable. The fact that in verses 1-6 Christ is speaking to His disciples is no argument against this view; for it is very difficult to prove any real connection between those six verses and the parable following, unless we resort to an artificial exposition, such as Neander (*Leben Jesu*, p. 642) and De Wette (in loc.) recognize in Schleiermacher and Olshausen.

‡ Compare the numerous sayings of Luther and the dogmatic statements of our symbolical books. Also, regarding the *Mandatum Dei* as the condition of every good work, Chemnitz's *Examen Conc. Trid. de bonis operibus*, qu. 2; Gerhard's *Confessio Catholica*, lib. ii. art. xxiii. cap. 7, *de norma bonorum opp.* Quenstedt's *Theol. didactico-polemica*, p. iv. c. ix. sect. 2, qu. 2, *Quae sit norma bonorum operum directrix*.

§ Bellarmine, *De Monachis*, c. ix.

and enforced by the authority of the Church, though always put in the form of a good counsel. When, moreover, our older theologians rightly protested that whatever was to be imposed as a pious ordinance in the Church should be in strict conformity with the express words of Holy Scripture, they by no means exempted the private Christian from the duty of maturing his own moral knowledge, and of moulding his manner of life upon the foundation and plan of Holy Scripture, yet freely developing its contents in his own principles and character.

Having found the untenableness of the doctrine of works of § 5. THE supererogation, we are naturally brought to our
SECOND second inquiry. The moral law, regarded in its
QUESTION second inquiry. The moral law, regarded in its
CONSIDERED. true import, demands nothing less than perfect
obedience; is everything that falls short of this to be described
as moral evil? Taking the question in its widest range, it
manifestly amounts to this, is the concept freedom from evil,
i.e., moral integrity and spotlessness, identical with the concept
moral perfection? It is of course obviously understood, that
when we speak of moral integrity, we have to do only with
beings possessing a moral nature. Of lower existences in
nature, we can predicate neither moral purity nor immorality.

BELLARMINE and other controversial writers of the Roman
Romanist Catholic Church, answer this question in the nega-
view. tive. They allow that the law demands moral
perfection, but they deny that when a man endeavours with
all his powers to fulfil the law, his shortcomings arising from
natural weakness are to be regarded as transgressions of the
law. Bellarmine, following Thomas Aquinas,* makes a distinc-
tion between *obligatio ad finem* and *obligatio ad media*,
meaning by the one, the obligation to perfection, and by the
other, the obligation to the most earnest and persevering efforts
towards perfection. He only who fails to fulfil the latter obli-
gation is a transgressor of the law.†

* Thomas Aquinas lays down the principle, "*Quilibet tenetur tendere ad perfectionem, non autem tenetur esse perfectus*," see his *Secunda Secundae*, quaest. 186, art. 2.

† *De Monachis*, cap. xiii. *De amissione gratiae et statu peccati*, lib. v., c. x. Compare ANDRADIUS *orthodoxae explicationes* (1564), lib. v. p. 396 ff. In support of his view Bellarmine quotes Augustine, who expressly recognizes this distinction between moral perfection and sinlessness, e.g. *De libero arbitrio*,

The early theologians of our Church, on the other hand, give Protestant theory. to this question an affirmative reply. They look upon every act or state which does not adequately embody moral perfection, as SIN or transgression of the law.* The design which Catholic theologians have in view in making the distinction I have named, is to prove the possibility of an adequate fulfilment of the law by human effort, and the working out of a meritorious righteousness of our own in the sight of God; and Bellarmine makes special use of it in his endeavour to prove that the precept forbidding *concupiscentia* belongs only to the *obligatio ad finem*. We can very well conceive how greatly our Protestant theologians would distrust a distinction made on purpose to prop up an erroneous dogma, the more so, as they saw their opponents inferring therefrom such destructive conclusions as those of Bellarmine, that "venial sins are committed not so much *contra legem* but *praeter legem*, and are sins not absolutely, but only relatively,"† or, as that of Stapleton, "the precept which requires

lib. iii. c. 22: "*Non propterea Deus animam malam creavit, quia nondum tanta est, quanta ut proficiendo esse posset accepit*;" and afterwards in his treatise, *De spiritu et littera*, c. 36, where he distinguishes between the perfect righteousness of God and a *minor justitia*, and adds, "*Neque enim si esse nondum potest tanta dilectio Dei, quanta illi cognitioni plenae perfectaeque debetur, jam culpa deputandum est. Aliud est enim totam assequi caritatem, aliud nullam sequi cupiditatem.*" But Augustine is not always true to the insight here indicated. In his *De moribus Manichaeorum*, c. 6, he had before made the *mutari in melius* identical with the *reverti a pervertendo in pejus*, the logical inference from which would be that evil is the negative condition of all moral development. To the same effect, he says, still more plainly, Ep. 167 (Benedictine arrangement), *ad Hieronymum*: "*plenissima (caritas), quae jam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, est in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud, quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est*" (opp., tom. ii. p. 897). The Stoics of old discussed this question, and as they would not make a distinction between virtue not yet perfect and vice, they were logical enough to deny the possibility of such a thing as an increasing virtue. (See the references given by Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, v. 4, pp. 104, 105.)

* *E.g.* Chemnitz (b. 1522, d. 1586), *Examinis Concilii Tridentini*, p. 1, *De reliquiis pecc. orig. post bapt.* (p. 243, ed. 1590); *De bonis operibus*, qu. 3. GERHARD (b. 1582, d. 1637), *Loci Theol. De pecc. act.*, c. 10, §§ 42-45; *De lege Dei*, c. 4, §§ 10, 183; *De bonis operibus*, c. 10, § 1. QUENSTEDT takes exception to Melancthon's definition of sin, "*Inclinatio, appetitus, cogitatum, dictum, factum pugnans cum lege Dei.*" He thinks the *pugnans* too narrow a word, sanctioning the Romish view. See his *Theol. didactico-polemica*, p. ii. cap. ii. sect. ii. qu. 3, dist. 4.

† *De justif.*, lib. iv. c. 12, 14; in accordance with Thomas Aquinas, *Prima Secundæ*, qu. 88, art. 1. See also Melancthon's *Loci theol. De pecc. actualibus*, p. 117, ed. 1569.

of us perfect love to God, is not *obligatorium* but only *doctrinale et informatorium*." * Upon closer consideration, however, we find that what made our older theologians reject this doctrine, was not merely the abuse of it and its grievous perversion, but the suspicion that it was contradictory to their views regarding man's state by nature, and the principles connected therewith.

And can we for a moment hesitate to adopt the view of our older theologians, which in its high moral and ideal features stands out in striking contrast with the pliant accommodating theories of the Catholic Church? The law demands moral perfection, and with the consciousness of this demand, an impulse of the heart to realize it is indissolubly connected; if the man therefore, in whom this consciousness is awakened, comes short in fulfilling the demand, what can be the cause of this but a tendency within him opposing the law and his impulse to fulfil it, in other words *the power of evil*? If, for example, he loves his neighbour less than himself, while the law tells him to love his neighbour as himself, to what can this be owing save to the power of selfishness working in him in greater or less degree?

The old maxim therefore holds true in this case as elsewhere, *Omne minus bonum habet rationem mali*. Were it otherwise, should we not have to say: "the law does indeed demand perfection, yet it does not refuse what is imperfect; but if it recognizes and accepts this, it surely cannot be in earnest in its primary demand"? And must there not in this case be granted an intermediate sphere between the will and deed which perfectly corresponds with the law and that which directly contradicts it? Schleiermacher has triumphantly combated the notion of the *permissible*, understanding thereby that class of actions which may be called natural and spontaneous, neither in conformity with duty nor opposed to it, but morally indifferent;† for an objective and moral import cannot be attributed to such acts without undermining every

* Stapleton (b. 1535, at Henfield, Sussex, died 1598), *De justifi.*, lib. vi. c. 1.

† *Kritik der Sittenlehre*, p. 185 ff. "Concerning the concept of the Permissible," *Sämmtliche Werke, dritte Abtheilung*, v. 2, p. 418 ff. Wuttke, in his *Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre* (v. 1, p. 297), shows that the concept of the "permissible" must be wholly distinct from that of the morally indifferent, and that "the permissible" properly belongs to the morally good, and thus has its root in the just and true maintenance of distinctive personality.

consistent and comprehensive view of man's moral life. But if there be such an intermediate sphere embracing those determinations of the will which neither correspond fully with the law nor directly contradict it, what is this but a modified form of the same error? And yet we must give up a great deal if we reject this distinction.

First of all it is clear that every gradation of moral goodness must vanish which does not arise from participation in successive degrees of evil—every gradation or shade of difference among pure moral beings, and of moral condition. This must apply even to Christ the Holy One. How great soever the holy love must have been which actuated Him, it, too, had its boundary where evil begins, bordering so close upon it, that had it been in the slightest degree less strong, it would have transgressed that boundary.

This will be no stumbling-block to those who recognize therein the sublimity of the moral law, determining every act upon one absolutely simple principle, and condemning whatever falls short of its demand as a contradiction arising from an opposite principle. But can we assent to the further logical consequences? Are we prepared to allow that the conception of a purely moral development is a contradiction?—that evil is the negative condition of all moral development?—and to admit that this development must cease as soon as evil is wholly eradicated from the subject of it, and that a continuous progress in moral goodness implies a continuous though decreasing sinfulness? All this logically follows from the denial of the distinction between blamelessness and perfection. If this distinction be sacrificed to the canon: *omne minus bonum habet rationem mali*, it will follow that all moral development having its goal still before it, and involving a progress from the imperfect to the perfect, must necessarily, and at every point, have evil clinging to it, though in an ever-decreasing ratio. The possibility of a sinless development cannot be vindicated by saying that the *inner germ* of it in its beginning was sinless, and that its advance consists in the outward growth of this pure germ throughout the various departments of life. In the department of morals, the inward and the outward cannot be separately and abstractedly considered, and we cannot imagine a prolonged growth in objec-

tive goodness, without a corresponding enhancement and deepening of goodness within. And on the other hand, the principle of holiness in human life cannot attain its full inward strength and firmness so long as the external sphere of its exercise is not apprehended and penetrated by it. Once more ; if there be no distinction between moral perfection and moral blamelessness, between imperfection and sin, then progress in goodness must involve the gradual casting away of the evil still clinging to the life.

The objection, too, may be urged from quite a different quarter,—Is not that conception which you now apply to moral development true of all real development in human life ? Does not development always involve a self-renovating rejection of what-

ever is inimical to its nature ? A strong development advances not by means of feeble contrasts which are not seriously opposed to each other, but by means of the strongest contradictions. The stimulus which alone is sufficient to urge it forward is the discrepancy between the ideal of life and its reality as experience witnesses. Without this the spring necessary to energetic progress is wanting. The development languishes and dies away, and with it life itself, which is finite, had its being therein.

Confidently entertained as this notion of development is now-a-days by some philosophers, it requires but a small degree of observation to discover how self-contradictory it is. The effort of the individual to free himself from uncongenial circumstances is said to be the mainspring of the development. This is clearly a negative description of his effort to obtain congenial circumstances. And yet he cannot attain these without putting an end, not only to his development, but to his actual existence—in other words, without self-destruction. It is, therefore, clear that this cannot really be the goal towards which he strives. Herein lies the contradiction which modern Nihilism involves ; it explains the development wherein life consists as a continual disease, and annihilation as the final goal towards which life tends. This absurd notion is not altogether new. Fichte's principles, starting from a different theory, necessarily lead on to the well-known *Progressus ad infinitum*, to that

everlasting movement of the *Ego* towards a goal which it never really reaches, because it is infinitely remote ; and this infinitely distant goal—every movement towards which is not only an everlasting approach to it, but an everlasting departure from it—is none other than the entire “annihilation of the individual and his absorption into the absolute Pure-Reason, or into God.” *

And yet we cannot affirm that this representation of human development has no truth whatever at its foundation. It characteristically describes human development as it is, the *present* manner of its progress, which has to overcome the general hindrance caused by evil, and to extirpate every disturbing element. But it is a slavish subserviency to a limited empiricism whose inductions never get beyond the sphere of nature to take the present form of development as if it were its true essence. That, on the contrary, is alone a true development which, as it advances, loses nothing of what it has already attained, because it has nothing to cast away ; at no point does there appear anything to disturb the due determination of the self-developing life.

The question, however, is by no means settled by thus distinguishing normal development from that abnormal progress which involves disturbances and hindrances. Even in the sphere of normal development the existence of *several stages* cannot be overlooked. So long as its inner impulse consists in the desire of progress from imperfection to perfection, so long may it be characterized as *teleological*. It aims for a goal lying before it, and it is not satisfied until that goal be actually reached. The very conception of this teleological development involves the truth that in all its stages, before it reaches the goal, the state of the individual is not yet in *perfect conformity* with its ideal, and that the starting-point must be very far removed from the perfection which forms the goal. But provided this development is normal there cannot be anything in

* *System der Sittenlehre*, p. 194 and the preceding pages. “The entire annihilation of the individual,” it is there said, “is certainly the ultimate goal of the finite Reason ; but it is not possible in time.” Thus ends this philosophy with its Tantalus-like striving after an unattainable *summum bonum*—and this highest good is annihilation !

it contradictory to the ideal. The starting-point cannot lack moral blamelessness or integrity, for were it in any way evil it would lie outside the path leading to completeness, and would not therefore belong to the development. This blamelessness or integrity necessarily implies an unlimited capability progressively to realize perfect conformity with the ideal, and so far the starting-point is itself in conformity therewith; though it must be left behind in order that the reality absolutely answering to the ideal may be reached. Proceeding, then, from this point, we find that in every normal development towards the goal of perfection, the moral state of the being in whom it is carried on will always be in conformity with what the moral ideal imposes in order to its progressive realization; though, of course, this state would not yet be absolutely that of the ideal. In every action dependent upon conscious self-determination, a moral motive would be present and active if only in the form of an instinct for rule and order; but in proportion to the comprehensive clearness of the moral sense, the energy of the moral impulse would be susceptible of many successive degrees. Progress, therefore, from imperfection towards perfection cannot be separated even from normal development; and thus it is plain that evil cannot be predicated of the mere difference between perfection and imperfection, nor of the necessary difference between the ideal and the empirical reality.*

Here, then, we have the true answer to the question just now raised, viz.; "From what can any *minus*, any deficiency in relation to the perfection demanded by the law arise, save from the power of an opposing principle somehow associated with it?" The necessity for such a *minus* in the beginning of man's course arises simply

* This is recognized even by Schleiermacher, notwithstanding the peculiar view he takes of evil. In his *System der Sittenlehre* (§ 199), he says, "Critically speaking, the contrast between good and evil must be viewed as something positive, evil being itself a positive activity of nature, causing corresponding pain to the Reason. Not until this action of evil is removed have we the simple contrast of perfect and imperfect. Imperfection can be predicated only of that which is not evil, and there only can advance be made towards perfection." It is certainly very dangerous in Ethics to speak of "an activity of nature," the continuance of which causes the difference between the antithesis of good and evil, and that of perfect and imperfect; and we need not be surprised if in

from the fact that the realization of moral perfection is *a task assigned him*, the full performance of which in virtue of his very nature he can only accomplish in successive moments of time. It follows, therefore, as a matter of course, and not on account of sin, that it must be beyond man's power at the outset absolutely to fulfil the demands of the moral law in its entire range, and that this following on after the law is moral *imperfection*, but not *sin*. If it were sin, sin would be the necessary outgo of finite human nature in the state in which it is created.

To designate as sin that moral imperfection at the outset which unavoidably arises from man's mental and moral constitution, so far from quickening and deepening his consciousness of sin, really does away with it. These observations of course apply only to a teleological development whose real aim is to reach the goal of moral perfection. When the goal is reached it becomes a development purely representative. The teleological development involves at every stage of it an energetic disclaimer of itself, the disavowal of what has already been attained as unsatisfying; but the representative development advances in a purely affirmative manner. If the name development be objected to as inappropriate to a state of human existence in which there is only the manifestation of inward and uncreated fulness of life in perfect fellowship with God, we willingly give it up; we only wish to maintain that there is still a living and progressive movement in man when perfection is attained, though this movement may be wholly different from what we see in the imperfection of our present state.

Schleiermacher we meet with contradictory assertions arising from the vacillation of opinion apparent in § 91 of his *Sittenlehre* to which we have already referred (see p. 53, note). Thus in his *Glaubenslehre*, § 63, 3 (vol. i. p. 387), he says:—"As the energy of our consciousness of God is never absolutely perfect, there is in it a limiting want of power or weakness which is certainly sinful." Compare with this his *Sittenlehre*, p. 62, where he says, "Moral activity can never do away with the contrast between reason and nature, for this contrast is the pre-supposition and condition of moral action," an assertion the full import of which is apparent when we recollect that according to his theory a contrast between Nature and Reason is a suffering on the part of Reason, and that this suffering is itself an evil.

But if there be a moral development which advances not from evil to good, but only from good to better,—
 True answer to the second question. such for instance as Holy Scripture describes in Christ during His youth, how He was “strong in spirit” and “increased in wisdom, and in favour with God and man” (Luke ii. 40, 52),—it is clear that there is a moral integrity or blamelessness distinct from moral perfection, a state which does not perfectly correspond to the ideal, and yet does not contradict it, and that the true conception of evil is not that of something which does not wholly come up to the perfection which the law demands, but must be defined as contradiction of the law.

In order to guard against the dangerous inferences above referred to, which might be drawn from this conclusion, we must give our attention more closely to the distinction already named (p. 37), between the two conceptions LAW and DUTY.

It may here put us upon the right track, if we observe that in ethics, the conception of *duty* and not that of *law* is usually spoken of in immediate relation to the individual. We say, “my duty is so and so,” not “my law;” if the law be spoken of, the phrase is, “the law is so and so.” Thus, in our conception of duty, personality comes prominently forward, whereas in our conception of law it recedes. The very derivation of the German word *pflicht* from *pflegen*,* indicates the personal and subjective character of the conception thus expressed.

In the ordinary use of language, we include under the term duty, all that the law contains, and without further definition, we use the word law to denote the obligations of the individual. Thus apprehended, duty is simply the application of the moral law to the individual, as that which is to determine his conduct in the form of the imperative—“thou shalt.” “We ought to respect the freedom, the property, the honour of our fellow-men,”—in this and similar sayings, the moral and obligatory bearing of the law upon the man—the fact of its being binding upon him, which is already implied in the conception of law,

* In like manner, the English *duty* from *due*, and *ought* from *owe*.—Tr.

is actually expressed and prominently brought forward. In this general sense it may even be said, "It is the duty of man to obey the moral law, to obtain a clear knowledge of its requirements," and so forth. In this way of speaking, the conception of duty bears unmistakably a merely formal character; it involves no special and individual applications of moral truth.

But besides this general use of the term, there has been formed
 Duty implies in the scientific development of ethical science since present action, the time of the Reformation, especially since a philosophic treatment of our conceptions of right was brought to bear upon moral science by GROTIUS and PUFFENDORF, a more exact apprehension of the conception of duty, far more suggestive and significant. According to this, duty is *that determinate moral claim which addresses itself to any person at any given moment*. Duty in this sense is always something which immediately lies before us to be done, in opposition to self-chosen and far-fetched occupation, to what Fichte cleverly calls "a virtue which seeks adventure."* The moral conduct which this definite duty requires, may be altogether inward, it may be mere endurance, or abstinence from action; but as in any case it implies a movement of the will (otherwise the duty, being confined to one particular moment, would really claim nothing, would not be a duty at all), we may say that conduct or action of some kind is the subject matter of all duty. Duty is the individualized claim of the law; it takes into consideration varieties of character and relationships, and makes these its presupposition; whereas the moral law as such does not enter upon those individualizing circumstances.

By this very definite claim which duty in its immediate bearing upon action makes upon the man, its
 And explains the *obligatio ad medium*. morally necessitating power encloses the will within the narrowest limits. The distinction between perfection and blamelessness finds no place here; if the act of the will falls short of the duty, it is so far opposed to duty. If, on the contrary, it obeys the immediate call of duty, we are not able from this to infer that the entire moral state of the

* System der Sittenlehre, p. 391.

man is absolutely in harmony with the standard of the law, *i.e.*, that it is perfect. But it is evident, that the intermediate sphere lying between the state which perfectly reflects the law and embodies the moral ideal, and the state which is in opposition thereto, is the distinctive and appropriate sphere of duty. And as the conception of duty implies the immediate pressure of a moral claim in every moment of life and action, this must certainly involve a lowering, or at least an accommodation of the standard to this particular case. The demand of duty does not regard perfection itself, which is the goal of the development, but only the simple and determinate exercise of the moral energies (in the widest sense of the word) which lead towards that goal; and if after the awakening of the moral sense there be any lack of acquiescence or of earnestness, we must look for the cause of it in the fettering power of a positively counteracting principle. In this way, we may adopt the distinction before referred to, made by Thomas Aquinas and Bellarmine, between *obligatio ad finem* and *obligatio ad medium*. Our conception of law relates to the former; our conception of duty to the latter.

Upon the principles evolved by this investigation, it will not
 § 6. THE be difficult to answer the third of the questions we
 THIRD QUES- have proposed, viz., does not man's consciousness
 TION CONSI- of a moral law follow rather than precede his
 DERED. fall from moral goodness? In modern times, a profound examination of moral facts and truths has often led to an affirmative reply. As law generally addresses its commands to that which opposes it, the moral law, in particular, may have for its presupposition a disturbance which has already taken place in moral life. That which originally constituted in the highest sense the life of the created spirit, attends him now that he has fallen from his original state, as the consciousness of a commanding law. This is the view of BAADER,* STEFFENS,† and to some extent even of Schleiermacher.‡ If

* BAADER (b. 1765, d. 1841), *Philosoph. Schriften*, v. 1, p. 17 ff.

† Steffens, see chiefly his *Anthropologie*, v. i. p. 391; v. ii. p. 357 f., see also his *Karikaturen des Heiligsten*, v. i. p. 45 f.

‡ In the first edition of his *Glaubenslehre* we find this passage (v. ii. p. 378), "a law can find place only where there is a discrepancy between the whole and

it be true, it is obvious that it is at least a *ὑστερον πρότερον* to define sin as opposition to the law.

It would be beyond our province here to trace the particular relations in which the moral law stands to the successive stages of man's inner development, revealed as this is in the history of divine revelation. We take the conception of law in its widest acceptation. Wherever a rule determining his will presents itself to a personal created being with the true claim of unconditional validity, there is LAW.

It has been already shown (p. 34), that the moral law as Law does not such loses its force in the case of the man who, in imply evil, his moral development, has reached the goal of perfect holiness. The expression *δικαίῳ νόμος οὐ κεῖται*, considering where it occurs (1 Tim. i. 9), can hardly be interpreted otherwise than thus; the Mosaic law, according to the distinctive nature of its contents, is not designed for those who in Christ have become righteous, but for the unrighteous and the wicked, for a people of hard heart and stiff neck. But if we take *δίκαιος* absolutely, as meaning the completeness of sanctification, we may understand the removal of the law in its strict and full sense. The law certainly has a bearing upon but only in- the man who is still imperfect, otherwise morality completeness. could not present itself to him as an *ought*—in an imperative form, and as an objective rule in consciousness. But as we have already seen, we must not confound this state of incompleteness with which man has to begin, with that positive disturbance of moral life which is caused by evil. Why should only this disturbed moral development which has to overcome what contradicts the law be under the law's control? Why should not the undisturbed progress, the advance from the imperfect to the perfect also be ruled by the law and our consciousness of it? * The imperative of the law, "thou

the individual." (Compare the 2d ed. v. ii. p. 147.) ROTHE also holds (part 3 § 817), that the imperative of the law implies resistance of its demand in the Subject. WEISSE takes rather a different view; in connection with his singular theosophy, he apprehends the law in a double light as "spiritual and springing from God as to its *ultimate* source, but tainted with the principle of depravity through the fleshly nature of the creature." *Philosophische Dogmatik*, v. ii. § 761.

* Even HARLESS in his *Christl. Ethik*, p. 81 (6th ed.), lays down the principle:

shalt," viewed objectively, denotes that moral duty, while it does not realize itself in the manner of physical necessity, by a *must* instead of an *ought*, is by no means a matter of option for man, but an unconditional moral necessity, which he is absolutely bound to realize. Our conception of duty, so far from being a mere abstraction, derives its contents from the ideal, and tells directly upon conduct; so that the imperative simply expresses the determination of the law to pass into act. It by no means follows that the imperative "thou shalt" presupposes a violation of the law on the part of the being to whom it addresses itself, in virtue of which it might be argued, "man is commanded to be righteous, therefore he is unrighteous;" to maintain this would be to confound the imperative with the obligation, *thou shalt* with *thou shouldest* or *oughtest*.^{*} When felt as an obligation in the consciousness, it certainly does imply a difference between it and the man's present state, viz., that he has not yet attained the perfection of the law; for if what the man *is* perfectly corresponded with *what he should be*, consciousness could not make this into a command which has yet to be fulfilled.[†] But the imperative does not necessarily imply on man's part any actual contradiction of moral necessity. Were the develop-

"Conscience presents to me the commandments of God in an imperative form, not merely to set before me the divine will objectively, but to make clear to me the discrepancy between my will and God's." Should these two things be separated from each other? Is it not by showing me the discrepancy between my will and God's that my conscience sets God's will objectively before me? I do not hold that "the spirit imposes on conscience the stereotyped image of the morally perfect man" (p. 85). Conscience accompanies the several acts or omissions of the man as the consciousness of a rule according to which they are to be ordered, and thus it is necessary in order to enforce the imperative; but it has its foundation in the conception of moral perfection, and it does not rest till this is realized in the Subject. Regarding this obligation, this determination of moral aim, inherent originally in human nature and implanted there by God, see ULRICI *Gott und die Natur* (1862, p. 571 ff.); also his *Gott und der Mensch* (1866, pp. 629 ff., 691 ff., 720 f.).

^{*} We must not be misled here by another use of the word *sollen*, wherein it is not taken in its ethical import, but as meaning what anything is good for or intended for. It is sometimes thus used to denote a merely subjective ideal.

[†] The Holy One of God applies to Himself the "*thou shalt*" of the divine law, to ward off a temptation assailing Him from without; and this brought into view that possibility of sinning which already was present, Matt. iv. 6, 10.

ment normal, every "*thou shalt*," every definite command, the moment it entered consciousness, would awaken activity in order to its realization. The law would be in force until perfection was realized, and yet there would be no slavery under the law.*

The incompleteness of human development in its beginning necessarily involves, as we shall hereafter see, the possibility of evil; and we must therefore allow that this *possibility* is implied also in the very presence of the law in conscience; but we cannot look upon this possibility as a germ of evil, we cannot regard it as itself evil, unless we are prepared to surrender the freedom of the will, and to regard evil as a necessary link in the chain of human development.

CHAPTER II.

SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD.

ACCORDING to Kant's Practical Philosophy of Criticism, the essence of true morality depends upon the principle that the will is subject to its own law alone, and that the source of this law is nowhere to be found but in the practical Reason. This autonomy of the will, according to the moral system of Kant, is fundamentally opposed to any limitation of the will arising from the nature of its objects; and upon the principle of this philosophy—which takes no account of the essential difference between that which comes to the human spirit from *above*, from its own original (God), and that which comes *from below*, from nature, but abides by the abstract conception of the *ἕτερον*, *i.e.*, of what is external and foreign to the will—it follows further that the

* Rom. vi. 14-22. See WUTTKE as before, part i., pp. 385 ff., § 79.

derivation of the moral law from the Will of a supreme and perfectly holy Being must be rejected as an *heteronomy*, the introduction of an alien law interfering with the *autonomy* or self-government of the will, and thus as subversive of all morality.*

Such an autonomy of the human will seems on the face of it to involve a contradiction. Where law is, it clearly must stand above the being who is bound by it and is subject to it. That this is true in reference to the moral law—that so long as we have no higher authority than the law, our relation to it is not that of inclination towards it arising spontaneously from our inner life, nor of immediate union with it, but that of *submission* to its commanding authority,—of *self-constraint* towards obedience,—this, I say, is a position which Kant himself lays down as the basis of his ethical system,† and which he has insisted upon in opposition to SCHILLER in his Dissertation upon “Grace and Dignity;” and certainly with the preponderance of truth on his side, viewing the human race as it is, and apart from what it may become by Redemption.‡ Kant, therefore, as he makes

* *Grundlegung zur Metaph. der Sitten*, pp. 73, 79, 92. *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft*, 6th ed., p. 184. *Metaph. Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, 2nd ed., Introduction, p. xvi. It is the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of the theoretic and practical philosophy of Kant, that he always regards God as utterly foreign to the spirit of man. He thus has become the real father of modern Deistical theology. It is at the same time quite in keeping with this, that (according to this theory) man, morally considered, has all fundamentally in himself, viz.: 1, the Law; 2, Evil; 3, Freedom from evil,—elements which mutually exclude each other,—the second excluding the possibility of the first, and the third that of the second.

† *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, i. part i., book 3; chapter concerning the motives of the pure practical Reason.

‡ *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, part i., p. 10. It must ever be esteemed a strange obliquity of a noble mind that Kant could entertain the belief that true virtue has nothing to do with sympathetic goodwill towards men, or with the interest the heart feels in their welfare; that it can reveal itself in its purity only where it is uninfluenced by any longing toward the objects of the will. Yet inferences such as these could not be avoided when once the essence of morality was made to consist in reverence for the law of morality, because it possesses the formal character of universal validity. SCHILLER's treatise *Anmuth und Wuerde*, in combating this rigorism so hardening in its effects upon the moral life, contains striking presentiments of Christian truths; but as it does not abandon the general principles of the Kantian morality, it can neither maintain these truths nor avoid self-contradiction, e.g., in the

man his own moral lawgiver, claims for him the contradictory power of separating himself from himself, in order to submit himself to himself.

There seems to be for Kant a very simple explanation of this contradiction in the Dualism of man's rational and sensational nature. If with him we venture to distinguish between man as he is the subject of this legislating function in his Reason, and as he is the object of it in his intellectual and physical nature, we may without contradiction say that, as his own lawgiver, he submits himself to himself. But this solution leads us to results still more paradoxical. For if the moral law be prescribed by the Reason to the sensational nature, the feeling of reverence for duty which is the root of all virtue, must reside * in this latter, and our conceptions of that morality and virtue whose office it is not to give but to maintain laws, must denote states, not of our spiritual life, but of our sensational nature;—a conclusion which no serious person can receive, least of all KANT himself, who in this case would have to give up his principles concerning the way in which the sensational nature is distinct from the

definite charge brought against Kant's system of morals, viz., that humanity is impeached and degraded by the imperative form of the moral law; the fact being that this imperative form essentially belongs to the law in its relation to freedom. Schiller was, moreover, on a false track when he hoped for the elevation of servants into "children of the household," not as Christ did (John viii. 35, 36), by the redemption wrought by the Son, but by an æsthetic culture; and when he attributes to "beautiful souls" what the Holy Ghost alone can work. (See the close of the 9th letter concerning the æsthetic culture of man.) Unacquainted with the positive solution of the problem given in the gospel, he tries to tone down the sternness of the Old Testament law by blending with it the Greek religion of art. But just as the amalgamation of Judaism with Hellenistic heathenism failed to advance Christianity, and gave birth only to a Jewish-Alexandrine culture which never could have regenerated the world, this union of the idea of beauty with that of the moral law is a poor substitute for the divine principle of redeeming love.

* Schiller expressly recognizes this in his treatise above referred to. He holds that this reverence arises from the relation of the sensational nature to the demands of the pure practical Reason, and he says that "its *object* is the Reason and its subject the sensational nature." Reverence for duty is according to this a sensuous feeling, and virtue has its foundation in the sensuous faculties alone.

Reason in man is acted upon, and, indeed, to give up his entire system.*

This also is certain: it is not man's sensuous nature but his spirit, strictly speaking it is the WILL which has to submit itself to the moral law; and in its different movements good and evil have their root.† There is, however, another way whereby perhaps this autonomy may be saved from self-contradiction. The spirit gives the law in so far as it is cognizant of it; it submits to the law so far as it determines action. But whither will this lead us? This view, according to which man's spirit gives the law to his sensational nature, presupposes a kind of external relation between the spirit and the sensational nature; and though this may to a certain extent be recognized as true regarding the beginning of human development (1 Cor. xv. 45-47), it introduces a principle of separation in the inner life of the spirit itself. Reason reveals its august authority in the setting up of a law which, because it is a law to the will, and demands its submission, comes to it as if from without, from another being. We by no means deny that there really is this dualism between the understanding and the will arising from the variance of human nature with itself brought about by sin. But in this theory it is something which has its foundation originally and essentially in the spirit of man, and thus viewed it cannot for a moment be entertained. And further, if the giving of the law is to be distinguished from the cognizance of the law, this distinction must chiefly be explained by the fact that the lawgiving activity denotes an act of the will, an active and energetic recognition of the authority of the law. Kant, therefore, justly considered that the assumed

* Neither could ARISTOTLE have adopted such a conclusion, though Thomas Aquinas attributed this view to him regarding the two virtues of *ἀνδρία* and *σωφροσύνη*, because he says of them (*Ethica Nicom.* lib. iii. c. 10), *δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀριταί*. That this expression is to be otherwise understood is evident from lib. i., c. 13; lib. ii., c. 1.

† Kant himself distinctly allows this; for in his "Doctrine of Radical Evil," he demands that evil must have an intelligible or ideal basis, and he expressly derives the imputation of evil from its source in the freedom which belongs to man as *noumenon*.

power of the spirit of man to give to itself moral laws should never be separated from his will. If, accordingly, we cannot dispense with the formula that the rational will of man gives laws to itself,—man being himself the lawgiver and the law receiver,—the contradiction we have named recurs.*

PERSONALITY is usually described as including self-consciousness and self-determination, and this is correct if taken simply to denote the elementary functions which together make up the conception of personality. Two fundamental tendencies accordingly are presented

* Schleiermacher also touches upon this question, though in a different connection, in his treatise upon the difference between the law of nature and the moral law :—*Sämmtliche Werke*, 3rd part, b. ii., pp. 401–403. See also ROMAN on the Freedom of the Will and Determinism, p. 139 f.

ZELLER in his Dissertations upon the freedom of the Will, Evil, and the Moral Order of the World (Theol. Jahrbücher von Baur u. Zeller's Vindication of Kant's doctrine. Zeller, 1846, p. 3 ; 1847, p. 1, 2), makes many references to our present investigation, and objects that the contradiction here referred to is to be found in every living being ; for each individual is a type of the species it belongs to, has in it the law of its species, and yet as an individual does not wholly correspond thereto. Now, as this contradiction is realized by the very conception of *individuality*, which as a type of its species represents and yet does not fully represent it ; so here it is realized in the conception of *personality*, which includes both the nature common to mankind and its own distinctive features ; and accordingly the consciousness of the transcendent ideal of humanity is included in that of the imperfect individual (pp. 32, 33). This objection anticipates the course of our inquiry, for we have not argued against the Autonomy of the will on the ground of its want of conformity with the law,—we prove the unallowableness of this representation from the principles which the conception of the moral law involves. We may, however, yield to this anticipation, for it is a fact of experience that the human will does oftentimes oppose the moral law ; and as we may assume that though it does so the law still remains in consciousness, it is still more obvious that our will cannot derive the law from itself. That the same contradiction of the individual with the species to which it belongs is evident in nature, and that in consequence such individuals disappear, is a principle of the Hegelian logic as favourite as it is untenable. If we make the general conception of the species a law of nature, we can attribute to it only those determinations which distinguish the higher genus and the differentia of the given species—those characteristics which all individuals of this species must possess if they are to be reckoned as belonging to it. Now it is obvious that individual existences in nature—if we except monstrosities, which themselves are in accordance with certain laws of nature, arising usually from the encroachment of the law of another species—do entirely correspond

to us in human personality, the one theoretic, the other practical,—knowing and doing. If we apprehend these as we find them in the innermost sphere of self, they appear as the *ego* existing *for* itself and *through* itself. In the one tendency, the Subject in the given determinateness of its being is its own object; in the other tendency, the Subject is itself the power which conditions this determinateness of its being. The fineness of this distinction between the two tendencies shows how nearly they are one. Self-determination is what its name denotes only as it is self-conscious; and again, man could never in self-consciousness separate himself with distinctness and certainty from the world, he could not hold fast the identity of the *ego* through all the changes of heterogeneous circumstances, if his real being were wholly determined by the world, if he did not possess the power of determining himself.

If we more closely examine the first of these tendencies, viz., SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS in man, we perceive in it many limi-

with the law of their species. If indeed, in order to this correspondence of the individual with its species, it be required that the conception of the species as such, and what is common to all the individuals of the same class, shall be embodied apart from individual features in one individual existence, the individual not satisfying this demand will naturally be in contradiction with its species; but the demand is itself unreasonable. As little can it be maintained, after what we have said regarding our conception of species, that every such conception requires a perfect exemplar as its adequate embodiment in nature, and that as this can nowhere be found, all individuals must in some way be in contradiction with their species. Such a requirement is not at all included in our conception of species, which here is nothing more than a subjective and æsthetic ideal that can hardly define itself even. To make it a law of nature is an unwarrantable transference of ethical rules for free beings into the sphere of nature where there is no moral freedom. Nature knows nothing of this fancied contradiction between the individual and its species, and even if it did, it would not be easy to see how it could be solved by merely naming the very notion from which it springs—the notion of individuality.

What Zeller further advances in support of the doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will is answered in the course of our argument further on. When he thinks that in rejecting this doctrine, nothing remains for us but to assume that what now seems immoral could by a *fiat* of God's will be made permissible and even obligatory, and that we could not legitimately contradict the assertion that this is now true in particular instances—that acts morally deserving of abhorrence, murder, theft, lying, violence, and so forth, might become laudable if done for God's glory, he must have paid but very little attention to our argument. This very point is the express topic of our inquiry in the first section of the next chapter.

tations. Its inner derivation we reserve for consideration in the third book (part i. chap. 3). Here we shall simply describe it as it presents itself to us.

To become conscious of himself, man must distinguish himself from the external world, must *exclude* from himself another existence which is not himself.

He cannot think of himself without at the same time thinking of another, a *non-ego*. But as he cannot conceive of himself without this strict *exclusion* of all other than himself, he discovers that he is obliged to *include* that other in his self-consciousness. For the determinate being that forms the contents of his self-consciousness is never absolutely independent, but is somehow always co-determined with another. This relativity of man's self-consciousness, arises partly from his necessary relation to a nature which is relatively external to himself, and partly from the fact, that it has itself no reality save in the personal individual who finds himself face to face with other individuals.

But as the self-consciousness of man, however it may accomplish the act of self-apprehension, cannot avoid the entrance of something else, a *non-ego*, co-determining its contents (I say contents, for as merely *formal*, as pure or abstract self-consciousness, it has no reality), it cannot be absolute and original, but must somehow be *conditioned* or *derived*. Could the limitations which beset human self-consciousness be regarded as merely accidental, its originality might, strictly speaking, be vindicated by the supposition that it limited itself by an act of its own, or that the limitation was the unforeseen consequence of its own act, the result of its own free self-perversion. But these limitations are essential to man's self-consciousness, they are inseparable from it, not only in experience, but in the very conception of it; so inseparable, that we cannot imagine human self-consciousness without them. Hence it necessarily and logically follows, that the self-consciousness of man has not in itself the principle of reality and existence, but finds it in another.

This other, this *non-ego*, cannot be nature, for nature cannot give what it does not possess, nature cannot beget what is *toto genere* different from itself; in the sphere of nature, the canon holds good, "like only can produce

like." Self-consciousness cannot be explained by *unconsciousness* but only by self-consciousness, nor can nature make this new beginning far above itself ; that PERSONAL POWER alone can produce it, which from the very beginning raised far above nature, sets in motion the whole development and sustains it, itself the creative principle of all other beginnings. If, therefore, self-consciousness exists, an absolutely *original* and *unconditioned self-consciousness* must also exist. Daily experience, indeed, regarding the origin of particular existences, and science (the scientific history of the earth) bearing upon the origin of the human race, may teach us that human self-consciousness in its realization has for its presupposition the existence of nature, and raises itself above it as its foundation. But it can do this only because there is an Eternal Self-consciousness overruling this process, that stoops to plant the divine spark of personal spirit in the dull material of nature, and preserves it there in still concealment until it can kindle itself into the bright flame of human self-consciousness. The Mosaic account of the creation does not fail to describe nature as preceding the first beginnings of this self-consciousness in time, just as darkness preceded light ; but it also represents the original light of the DIVINE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS as eternally and absolutely preceding all.

Thus the CONSCIOUSNESS OF GOD reveals itself to us in the depths of our *self-consciousness* as its hidden background, and the descent into our inmost hearts is at the same time an ascent up to God. Whenever we reflect closely upon ourselves, we break through the outer crust of mere world-consciousness which separates us from the innermost truth of our being, and come face to face with HIM in whom we live and move and have our being. We know nothing absolutely and originally of any finite object ; as finite objects are in their essence derived, so also is our knowledge of them ; originally and immediately we are conscious only of God.

SELF-DETERMINATION (or Will), the second element of our personality, is no more unlimited than is our self-consciousness. We have already learned in our previous investigations, the original standard by which, as by a sacred necessity, it is bound ; it is the *moral*

Limits of
self-deter-
mination.

law in the consciousness of man. As we cannot become conscious of ourselves without becoming conscious of God also, so we cannot thoroughly see the reality of our self-determination without discovering CONSCIENCE as the rule for the movements of our will. We have also proved (in chapter 1) how this formal apprehension of the moral law as a limit for self-determination becomes higher and more real. The will only realizes its true ideal when it identifies itself with the contents of the law, and makes the law the continual germ of its own manifold and changeful purposes.

These two fundamental activities which together constitute God-consciousness and conscience one. human personality, are thus joined to each other in indissoluble unity, and the principles by which they are limited cannot be disconnected. Experience witnesses to their inner and mutual relationship. Every awakening of the consciousness of God is in the pious man an impulse for his Conscience, and every warning in turn which Conscience gives, awakens his consciousness of God. He who interprets the consciousness of God in the human spirit as a delusion, will soon be logically led to regard the moral law also as the product of benevolent narrowness or crafty calculation; the degeneracy or decay of religion in a nation, is always accompanied with the deepest deterioration of its moral life, and no one ever stifles the voice of his conscience without perverting his religious consciousness in unbelief or superstition.

The first way in which man becomes conscious of a higher union between morality and religion, is by recognizing God as the AUTHOR OF THE MORAL LAW and the Surety of its validity, and by acknowledging the moral law to be the rule according to which the divine Will guides his life. LEIBNITZ, in his "*Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement humain*,"* says: "God is the only immediate and outward (*i.e.*, distinct from the Subject) Object of the soul—external objects of sense are but mediately and indirectly known." This thought of Leibnitz's is clearly in keeping with his system of fore-ordained

God the
author of the
moral law.

Remark of
Leibnitz.

* II. 1, § 1. See also *Leibnitii Epistolæ*, ed. Korthold, vol. iii. p. 67.

harmony ; but as genius has often discovered truth when the premisses from which it thought to arrive at it were false, this remark still contains a deep truth though its subjective pre-suppositions have long since been overthrown. What we have said concerning the relation of our self-consciousness and world-consciousness to our consciousness of God, has its foundation in the thought thus uttered by Leibnitz. If Leibnitz is right, God is also the only immediate object of our moral obli-

gation, the foundation of all other obligations ; every Religious import of our moral duty. moral duty is a duty towards God, and whatever truly binds us in our conscience is the will of God ; obedience to the law is obedience rendered to the living God, "of whom, in whom, and to whom" we are. The relation in which the rational creature stands to God his Creator, when it is true and normal, is the first and closest ; from Him all moral life springs, on Him it depends at every point of its development, and to Him it ever returns from its manifold determinations as to a fixed centre,—“from Him, in Him, and to Him.” In this relation we become conscious of moral obligation, not as an *autonomy*, not as an *heteronomy*, but as a THEONOMY.* All morality is recognized as unconscious religion, and true religion proves itself to be the consciousness of morality.

Hence it will appear that this divine source of the moral law in us cannot be explained merely as expressive of the general dependence of all created beings upon God. The law serves to exhibit the threads in the labyrinth of our consciousness (so far as it does not immediately relate to God), which lead out of its mazes into freedom and space, even unto God ; and to bring to light the undeniable indications of a higher power ruling in us and over us. Had it only the above-named significance as expressive of dependence, every objection that has been urged against the so-called proofs of the existence of God derived from the law of causality might with equal propriety be urged against it.

* Christianity is not to blame, but the contempt of Christianity—the rigid exclusiveness of the finite *ego*,—if to many this Theonomy is nothing more than a Heteronomy.

§ 3. Proofs
that the Law
necessarily
points to
God.

In order still more fully to understand the necessity in the sphere of morals which leads us from the law to God, we must inquire how the matter stands in the sphere of nature.

Kant, in his Dissertation concerning the only possible ground of demonstrative proof of the existence of God, tells the story, how he had explained to an intelligent scholar that well-known property of the circle which makes the figure a key to the solution of a difficult and seemingly complicated mechanical problem ; whereupon the scholar, when he clearly understood it, was filled with amazement and admiration, as if it had been some wonder of nature that he beheld. Such, too, is the deep joy which takes possession of us when for the first time we behold and clearly see any of the simple and inexhaustibly suggestive laws of nature, as, for instance, Kepler's laws concerning the motion of the planets round the sun, or the laws which determine the metamorphosis of plants and of animals. What is the secret cause of this joy ? It is, in the first place, simply the fact that the spirit of man is *itself* reconciled to and understands the sphere of nature which at first sight seemed strange to him. The law of nature, its unchanging rule amid the varied and perplexing changes of phenomena, the harmonious chain traceable amid manifoldness, the inherent conformity to the end in view, whereby what is apparently isolated and scattered is united and blended,—all this is congenial to and in accord with man's spirit ; he discerns in this conformity to law, a power of thought and of intelligence overruling the forces of nature, just as Plato recognized herein a witness for his derivation of nature from ideas. Law is not the one and all in nature ; a living and individual development inexhaustibly rich and varied springs up before us from nature's depths, and to this it is that nature owes its amazing power over our feeling and imagination. And yet this silent spell whereby nature enchains us, though it does not manifest itself in reflection upon nature's laws, but in an immediate and natural feeling, is nevertheless *conditioned* by the dominion of law. Imagine this dominion removed, and we behold nothing but a chaotic waste, a heaving and drifting sea ; nature can give birth to individual

and distinctive life in so far only as rule and order prevail within her.

But if law be a power of Thought over Being, it certainly cannot exist originally and inherently where it exists unconsciously; and thought in nature without a thinking Subject is a mere phantom. The laws of nature presuppose a real power of thought guiding her active energies, and they must have their origin and basis in a free and conscious Being. Laws can be given only by an actual WILL, and no will is real that is not self-conscious; indeed, thought itself does not become a real power until it is united to will. Undoubtedly there is nothing contradictory in the supposition of an unconscious and instinctive working of nature according to the laws of inherent conformity to the end in view, such as is involved in our conception of an organism. But this only proves a Consciousness above nature, as the original seat of this thought and the author of its determining power, by whose will it becomes law. If the coincidence of the active powers of nature with their law be unconscious, it must be determined or decreed from without; real self-determination and unconsciousness mutually exclude one another.*

May not this consciousness be in Nature herself?

But wherein lies the necessity of removing this consciousness as the essential seat of law beyond the sphere of nature? Why should we not regard

* In another connection, J. H. FICHTE (in his profound dissertation upon Speculative Theology in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie*, new series, v. i., part 2, p. 200) has clearly shown that "this unconscious yet active wisdom of nature itself requires explanation, and it is only arbitrariness or indolence of thought that rests satisfied with it as the absolute." See also Fichte's Speculative Theology, § 33, 34, and the skilful exposition of this inherent Teleology of nature in the "Logischen Untersuchungen" (part 2, chap. vii.) of TRENDLENBURG. He says (p. 24), regarding this unconscious conformity, that "it is indeed a fact in formative nature, but if we imagine we have solved the riddle by thus stating it we are greatly mistaken." In like manner SCHWARZ (F. H. C., b. 1766, d. 1837), in his *Wesen der Religion*, i., p. 175 ff., points out the contradiction of supposing a world-aim, without a conscious principle appointing that aim; but it is illogical not to infer from this the conception of a Divine personality. For that God must in this case "separate Himself as an individual from other individuals" (p. 191), is not involved in the concept of *personality*, but only in that of personal individuality, in so far as individuality is correlative of species.

nature herself as the subject of it? and seek in her that which gives life and soul to the whole visible world as her corporeal frame? Why does such a supposition contradict the true conception of nature which necessarily involves dependence and impersonality? Is it because experience and observation confirm this view of nature, and teach us to regard her, whether as a whole or in her several parts, as an object upon which we act,—and without any power to act on us, save as an impersonal law, with blind purposeless necessity resisting our determinations? But how narrow is the range of our experience of nature in comparison with the immeasurable circumference of the whole! Why should it be inconceivable that the spirit which actuates and inspires nature, merely condescends to allow man to indulge his harmless strivings upon the surface of one of her smallest organs? And what is the appeal to some presupposed conception of nature based upon such limited experience but a manifest *petitio principii*?

But if this were so; if this self-conscious intelligence, this No; it must be personal. inventress of nature's laws—this mighty will that guarantees their validity, were also recognized as a *personal subject* in nature, what would follow? She could not have submitted herself to these laws as a spirit and personality, but could only have realized them in her manifestation and operation. And by this conformity to law, not only the life of nature, but its relation to the spirit of man must have been prearranged. In both cases the arranging intelligence proves itself to be, while inherent in nature, distinct from nature, while subject to nature, yet free from its power, and even its mistress. Beginning with the notion of a blindly working and conformable order of nature, this method of representation leads on to a more spiritual view, and whatever its former value, the issue would be to force this law of nature above the sphere in which it rules into a higher sphere, yea, back to an intelligent author. Even they who, in explaining the order of nature as conformable to the end in view, abide firmly by an unconscious power of nature that forms and organizes it, and reject the notion of a creative intelligence, unintentionally contradict themselves; for they attribute to this power of nature what could only belong to such an intelligence.

STRAUSS, instead of removing this contradiction, only doubles it when he speaks of man's spirit as having originally been *an unconscious spirit of nature* ordering the relations of the heavenly bodies, forming earth and metals, controlling the organic structure of plants and animals; and as now, by investigation, reflection, and knowledge of nature's laws, ever awakening the recollection of how it ordered all at first.* The first contradiction here is, that the spirit of man is represented as having once been an unconscious spirit of nature; the second is, that this unconscious spirit is said to have accomplished what can only be attributed to a conscious being. And supposing it compatible with the conception of *spirit*, and that spirit a *finite* spirit, to predicate of it such a creative yet unconscious power, —being an unconscious power, it could only be the organ of a still higher spirit working through it.

In applying these conclusions to the laws of the will, we must bear in mind that the cases are by no means analogous. The thought of law cannot have its original abode in nature, which is the sphere of unconsciousness; but why should we go beyond the self-conscious spirit of man in order to find a higher consciousness still as the original seat of this law of moral freedom?

Why? Surely no one could suppose that the moral law has its primary source in the wills of individuals themselves; such a doctrine would not explain, it would do away with the topic of our inquiry, it would deny the law as a universal power legislating over the will by which man feels himself bound. And is not the ideal of morality clearly a power which asserts its authority in human life independently of man's will, yea, in spite of its opposition? It does this distinctly in two ways. First, in the individual; for even when a man has thrown off its authority in sentiment and maxims, it still asserts itself, if not as an actual consciousness of guilt, yet as a vague sense of the vanity of his strivings. And secondly, in society with its varied ramifications, which is carried on in harmony with law, and even by instruments who are themselves in heart estranged from the law. But may not

* *Christl. Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. p. 351.

these laws and their authority have their origin in the universal will of mankind collectively, which being really one, and part of the essence of man, determines the individual will by means of its unity? This is quite natural, and does not oblige us to resort to a superhuman cause as the source of law, for this universal will itself seems to the individual as a law established over him. True;—but we must not forget what we have already proved, that the origin of the law must be a self-conscious will. A universal will without a willing subject is an empty meaningless abstraction, like thought without a thinking subject; and he who would pass off upon us such formulæ as this, verily offers us stones for bread. There is nothing left for us therefore, on this hypothesis, but to describe this universal will as a *personal Subject*, as a real and hypostatic ideal type of humanity, existing as a personal individual, yet beyond and above personal individuals in whom it is empirically realized. This reminds us of the attempt of modern speculative Christology to escape from its dilemma between species and individual by means of the scholastic realism, whereby theology not only mistakes this realism, but has to adopt a new kind of polytheism into the bargain. Besides, it would ever be quite a futile straining, not indeed of speculative thought, for we dare not impose such an undertaking upon it, but of imagination, to conjure up before itself a universal will, including all the wills of individuals, and yet possessing a distinct personal existence in virtue of which it gives them laws.

It is clear that we can only find the source of the moral Law must have its source in God's will. law, whose demands we hear in our inmost hearts, in a Being in relation to whom the law of the will is not something *imposed*—is not strictly speaking *law*; because He has in Himself the contents of the law in a perfect and immediate manner, because He is Himself the absolute GOOD. Needing no law for Himself, subject to no law, His will can lay down laws for the wills of all other beings, even as He is the principle of their existence.

And here we have unveiled to us *the universal import and necessity of the law*. It belongs to God alone to have life in Himself; every other being possesses it not in itself, but in God, and receives from Him
It has therefore a religious significance.

the rule for the development and manifestation of its life. In the case of unconscious nature, law immediately determines and fulfils itself in the working of its powers. In the case of free self-conscious nature, the divine law is a *command* which does not exclude the possibility of a resisting will. This conception of law has essentially a religious import. If the so-called "autonomy" of the spirit of man were not *self-contradictory*, it would contradict the true conception of man as a created being. The truth of his being as a creature, consists in his continued dependence upon the Creator; the truth of his being so far as it is conditioned by his will is revealed to him in the moral law.

This makes still clearer and confirms what we have already seen (in the preceding chapter), that the rule to guide created personality, cannot have arisen from the perversion of its relations to God. That rule is really involved in the very nature of this relation from the beginning, and onwards until it be glorified in perfect union with God, wherein He will be "all in all," 1 Cor. xv. 28.

The original source of the moral law as thus traced out, furnishes the only adequate explanation of that *unconditional authority* of the law, felt in consciousness, notwithstanding the caprice and opposition of human desires and passions. The unconditioned *Thou shalt!* abides firm even before the will that will not will; its imperative form implies the actual existence of a higher Will appointing the law, and the unconditional authority of its demand witnesses that this will confronting man's will is the will of God. *Εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ νομοθέτης*, James iv. 12. Man may indeed make any rules and maxims he likes for his own guidance, and keep them unvaryingly so long as the force of passion does not become too strong for them, but he cannot originate LAW in the true sense of the word, which abides unchangeable and unflinching amid the inconstant caprice of opinion and choice, and which claims his reverence even in his violation of it.

So strictly and universally is this true, that even in the ordainments of social and national life, all true law has its source in God; it is revered not as devised by man, but as ordained of God, and in

Even social
law has its
source in
God.

obeying it, the individual submits not merely to himself or to his fellow-men, but to God (Rom. xiii. 2).^{*} And accordingly, any so-called lawgiver, or more properly law-proclaimer among men, fulfils his calling more perfectly, the less he presumes to devise or to enact anything by his own caprice, the more he feels bound by a higher necessity, endeavouring to be only the simple instrument whereby the Divine world-ordainments are proclaimed, and the more carefully he regards and is guided by the real revelations of God's mind in the eternal laws of morality, in the distinctive spirit of the people, and in the course of history. Human legislation, if we trace back its enactments to their beginnings, which were coincident with the formation of society and of a body politic, never can have had the task of deciding what was to be right, but must itself have been subject to higher rules of rectitude, either eternal and unchangeable, or historically evolved. It is a dreadful error when the will of a people, embodied for instance in a representative assembly, regards itself as the last and absolutely independent source of what is to pass for right and law among them; as if forsooth the vulgar *power* of establishing what it liked, perhaps at the risk of making itself the offscouring of history, could also confer the *right*!

Now, as the moral law receives a higher sanction when it is recognized as the revelation of God's will to a finite being, *evil* in the same proportion is enhanced when we become conscious of it not only as transgression of the law, but also as **DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD**, as a violation of the relation of dependence essential to the creature.

^{*} We find the discernment of this truth that the source of social ordainments and laws lies far above the caprice of man—a truth which many in our time have quite lost sight of—in AUGUSTINE, *De libero arbitrio*, lib. i., cap. 6; earlier still in CICERO, *De Legibus*, lib. ii. c. 4, 5; see also the passage quoted with deserved encomium from Cicero's *De Republica*, lib. iii., by LACTANTIUS, *Div. Institt.* lib. vi., c. 8; in SOPHOCLES also, though only in reference to a single class of these ordainments, in the beautiful words of Antigone concerning "the unwritten yet unchangeable decrees of the gods, none of which are of to-day merely or of yesterday, but which ever live, and no one knows how long it is since first they were revealed."—*Antigone*, 455-457; see also *Ædipus Tyrannus*, 863-872.

This reference to God in human consciousness it is, that converts evil into SIN. For whatever the true etymology of this word may be, it is in all languages the *religious* designation of moral evil.

Our German word *Sünde* is often derived from *sühnen*, “to expiate,” as if it meant that which made man need a *Sühne*, “an expiation,”—that which has to be expiated. This is Schenkel’s view.* But in the old German and the high German of the middle ages, *sühnen* has a long vowel—*suonan*, *suonen*, *süenen*, “to level,” then “to reconcile,” † whereas *Sünde* is in old high German *Suntia*, in high German of the middle age *Sunte*. J. GRIMM, who considers the derivation from *suonan*, through the Gothic *saun*, at least possible, thinks nevertheless that the most probable derivation is from the old Norse expression *syn*, *synjar*, which means “an apology in court,” and also, “the vindication of a person for non-appearance at court in answer to a summons;” and thus through the successive meanings, “checking,” “going astray,” in the sense of “error,” “defect,” it may have come to mean “sin.” ‡ But would Christian missionaries (whom we must suppose to have been the originators of this use of the term) have chosen so weak a word to designate sin, a word which originally had a good meaning, for *Syn* was among the heathen the goddess of justice and truth, *synja* in Gothic being synonymous with ἀλήθεια?

Much more probable is the derivation (also sanctioned by Grimm) of the word *Sünde*, “sin,” from the Latin *sons* (*sonts*), a derivation which is given by the latest philologists, R. VON

* *Die christliche Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 184.

† RAUMER, in his work on the Influence of Christianity upon the old high German tongue (p. 368), supposes that the German *suona* may have been derived from the same root as the Latin *sanus*, *sanare*, in which case the primary meaning would be “to make good or repair an injury, to indemnify.” PICTET’s observation regarding the derivation of the word *sund* corresponds with this, “*sund kisund* (*sanus*) from *sucna*.” See KUHN, *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*, b. 5, p. 39.

‡ Or, conjectures Grimm, *Sünde* may directly mean *excusatio*, in the sense *quod excusandum, exculpandum est* = *culpa, causa*.—*Abstammung des Wortes Sünde*, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, p. 3.

RAUMER,* LEO MEYER,† and LOTTNER.‡ AUFRECHT § explains *sons*, as FESTUS does, by *nocens*. “As *nocere alicui* means nothing less than *neci esse alicui*, to be the cause of the death or ruin of any one, so *sons* means primarily destroying, killing.” The further derivation of the word *sons* from KTAN seems to me very doubtful.||

* ‘*Ἀμαρτία*, whatever may be its derivation and original meaning, is according to New Testament usage the general term for any kind of transgression of the divine command. When sin is named in the Old Testament, we often find its relation to God distinctly expressed; this occurs only once in the New Testament, Luke xv. 18, 21; but this relation, though not always expressed, is always presupposed. All men are *ἁμαρτωλοί*; the *ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν*, of sins in human consciousness arising from the actual relation of the man to God, is offered to every one without exception, Acts ii. 38, iii. 19, x. 43, etc.; but men are divided into the *πονηροί* (*κακοί*) and the *ἀγαθοί*, Matt. v. 45, xxii. 10.¶ In like manner *παράπτωμα* from *παράπιπτο* (meaning originally the case of one who slips from the path) is used not only for sins of infirmity, but for every kind of transgression of the divine command, Matt. vi. 14, xviii. 25; Rom. iv. 25, v. 15-20, xi. 11, 12; 2 Cor. v. 19; Gal. vi. 1; Eph. i. 7, ii. 1; Col. ii. 13; James v. 16. This transgression of the divine law is distinctly expressed when sin is designated *παρακοή*, Rom. v. 19; 2 Cor. x. 6; Heb. i. 2. *Παράβασις* has the same meaning, it is the act by which a divine command is broken, whether that given to the first

* As before, p. 384.

† KUHN, *Zeitschrift für vergl. Sprachforschung*, v. 5, p. 381.

‡ *Ibid.* v. 7, p. 188.

§ *Ibid.* v. 8, p. 73 ff.

|| The derivation of the Latin *peccare*, *peccatum*, is doubtful. It cannot be, as Salmasius assumes, from *pecus* (*more pecudum agere*), nor as Döderlein supposes (*Lateinische Synonyme u. Etymologien*, part ii. p. 140), from the root *per*, in which case perversion would be the fundamental thought; nor, as Grimm hints is possible, from *prio*, which would bring us back to the notion of expiation. The etymology suggested by Döderlein further on (part 6, p. 260), which brings the word into connection with *παχύς*, “thick,” “dull,” is more probable.

¶ Measured by the absolute standard of rectitude, man is *πονηρός* in God’s sight even when in discipleship to Christ, Luke xi. 13. *Πονηρὸν εἶναι*, however, means not only moral evil (wickedness), but natural evil also; thus Eph. v. 16; vi. 13 (*ἡμέρα πονηρά*); Gal. i. 4 (*αἰὼν πονηρός*); Matt. vii. 17, 18 (*καρποὶ πονηροί*); so also *κακόν*, Luke xvi. 25, Acts xvi. 28, xxviii. 5; *κακοῦν*, Acts vii. 6, 19, xii. 1, xviii. 10; whereas *ἁμαρτία* refers only to moral evil.

man, 1 Tim. ii. 14; Rom. v. 14; or that given by Moses, Rom. ii. 23; Heb. ii. 2, ix. 15 (*παραβάτης*, Rom. ii. 25, 27; James ii. 9, 11); or that written in man's heart, Gal. iii. 19. Finally, *ἀνομία* denotes practical apostasy or alienation from the law of God; it sometimes occurs with the same meaning as *ἁμαρτία*, or side by side with this word, Titus ii. 14; Heb. x. 17; it oftener denotes the determinate forms of sin and of the sinful state, Matt. vii. 23, xiii. 41, xxiii. 28, xxiv. 12; Rom. vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 14; and in the second Epistle to the Thessalonians it is the name given to the perfect and conscious antagonist to the divine law and its author, 2 Thess. ii. 7, 8; (*ἄνομος*). The apostle Paul and the evangelist Luke translate עֲשֵׂה עֲשֵׂה, Rom. iv. 7, Luke xxii. 37 (compare Ps. xxxii. 1; Isa. liii. 12), and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews translates עֲשֵׂה, Heb. i. 9 (compare Ps. xlv. 8)—by *ἄνομος*, *ἀνομία*.

As to the etymology of *ἁμαρτάνειν ἁμαρτία*, according to BUTMANN'S supposition they are derived from *μέρος μείρειν*, hence *ἀμέρδειν*, to make separate, *i.e.* to deprive; *ἁμαρτεῖν*, intransitively, to become separate, *i.e.* not to arrive at, to miss one's aim; the change of the aspirate being not without analogy.* This supposition is very probable; much more so at least than that suggested in the *Etymologicum magnum*, viz., from *μάρπτειν*, to seize, to hold, with *a privativum*; and than that also which REICHE thinks possible, viz., from *ἄμαρα*, a drain or sewer.† *The missing of the mark* was accordingly the original representation, but whether this meant the goal of the traveller, the target of the arrow, or the destined arm of the spear, we do not venture to decide. Homer often uses *ἁμαρτάνειν*, *ἀφαμαρτάνειν* of the arrow or spear which misses its aim, *e.g.*, *Iliad*, iv. 491, v. 287; (*ἥμβροτες, οὐκ ἔτυχες*) viii. 119, 302, 311; x. 372; xvii. 609; (also the derived *ἀβροτάζειν*, *Iliad*, x. 65, of men who miss each other in the dark). But who can certify to us that this representation was the primary and original one in the use of the word among the Greeks?—Whichever of them be preferred, there lies in these etymologies the deep conviction that man in sinning has never attained

* *Lexilogus*, i. 137.

† *Erklärung des Br. a. d. Römer*, i., p. 359.

what he sought, that sin is essentially a disappointment, a delusion, and a fraud. It is not, indeed, intimated that the sinner's aim or goal is in itself wrong; sin here appears only as an act which errs in the choice of means to its end.*

הִטָּה "to sin," with its derivative noun forms, הִטָּאת, הִטָּאתָ, הִטָּאתִי, הִטָּאתֶם, הִטָּאתוּ, "sin," הִטָּא "sinner" (הִטָּאָה "sinner" *fem.* Amos ix. 16), very often occurs side by side with the Hebrew words for sin. similar word פָּשַׁע, פָּשָׁע; *e.g.*, Jos. xxiv. 19; Job xiii. 23; Ps. xxv. 7; Isaiah xliii. 25; Amos v. 12; and also with עָוָן; *e.g.*, Ps. xxxii. 5, xxxviii. 29; Isaiah vi. 7, xlv. 22, liii. 5; Jer. v. 25. We find all three words used together fully to express the sum of human sin; *e.g.*, Exod. xxxiv. 7; Job xiii. 23; Ps. xxxii. 1, 2, 5, li. 4, 5, cvi. 6; Jer. xxxiii. 8. Glaring offences—murder, 2 Sam. xii. 13; blood-red sins, Isaiah i. 18; the sin of the sons of Korah, Num. xvi. 21; idolatry, Ex. xxxii. 21, 30–32; the vice of unnatural debauchery, Gen. xviii. 10; Isaiah iii. 9; Lam. iv. 6;—are denoted by הִטָּאת. Sinning against God and disobedience are frequently expressed by the verb הִטָּה or its cognate noun; *e.g.*, Gen. xiii. 13, xx. 6, xxxix. 9, Exod. xxxii. 33; Jos. vii. 20; 1 Sam. ii. 25, vii. 6, xii. 23; 2 Sam. xii. 13; and especially Psalm li. 6, where the expression "against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned," should, as De Wette and Hupfeld remark, be explained as indicating the intensity of the feeling which, forgetting other bearings of the offence, realizes its one great and highest reference to God.† UMBREIT‡ thinks that הִטָּאת denotes the inward, and עָוָן the outward act of sin, but judging from the above references we cannot look upon this as established. Indeed, in the very first place where the word occurs, Gen. iv. 7, the outward realization of the passionate desire is denoted by the word הִטָּאת.

The primary meaning of הִטָּה, so far as it can be traced in

* Compare the different view of WEISSE, *Philos. Dogmatik*, part 2, p. 392 f.

† HENGSTENBERG, who finds fault with De Wette's reference of the expression to the inward feeling, gives no other explanation himself, save that David sees God in the man whom he had injured, so that his whole sin is transformed into a sin against God. Commentary on the Psalms *in loc.*

‡ *Die Sünde.* Beitrag zur Theologie des Alten Testaments, p. 50.

the Hebrew language, is that of “stumbling on the way to a goal,” Prov. xix. 2; in which is implied a missing of the thing sought for, Prov. viii. 36; and thus it is used literally of slingers who miss the mark, Judges xx. 16, when the verb is in Hiphil, and used just like the Homeric *ἀμαρτάνειν*. Accordingly *חַטָּאוֹת* were sins of infirmity, errors arising from haste and from passion darkening clear consciousness. But the word occurs in this sense in only a few passages, *e.g.* Num. xii. 11, where Aaron calls the sin of Miriam *נוֹאֲלָנוּ* (from *נֹאֵל*, “to do foolishly,” or according to HUPFELD (*Psalmen*, v. i., p. 141) a *metaplasm* for *אָל*, “to be empty or hollow,” Psalm xxv. 8, where *חַטָּאִים* are “sinners” converted to God; in other places *שָׁגָה*, *שָׁגָה*, *שָׁגָה*, *שָׁגָה* are used for sins of haste and infirmity; but *חַטָּא* occurs in a hundred places where there is no room for the excuse of want of forethought and defective consciousness.*

פָּשַׁע from *פָּשַׁע* signifies primarily the breaking of a covenant. Thus *פָּשַׁע* is used to describe the revolt of Israel (Ephraim) from Rehoboam, and the rebellion of the Moabites and Edomites, 1 Kings xii. 19; 2 Kings i. 1, viii. 20, 22. Still oftener does it describe the apostasy of the children of Israel from Jehovah to the service of idols, *e.g.*, Isaiah i. 2; Jer. ii. 19; Dan. viii. 12 (just as *ἀμαρτία*, corresponding exactly with *חַטָּאת*, is used for the apostasy from Christ to Judaism, Heb. iii. 13, and of relapse into a heathenish life, Heb. xi. 15); and sometimes a vicious life and gross offences, *e.g.*, Psalm v. 11; Isaiah lvii. 4; Amos i. 3, 6, 9, 11, 13, ii. 1, 4, 6.

עָוֹן, probably from *עָוָה* “to be bent or perverted,” describes sin as a departure from the normal path for man, the way towards God and obedience to His will. By itself, and apart from its employment as synonymous with *חַטָּאת* and *פָּשַׁע*, *עָוֹן*

* HUPFELD, in his excellent commentary on the Psalms, vol. 2, p. 75, puts *חַטָּאת* in nearly the same relation to *פָּשַׁע* as *שָׁגָה* to *יִרְרָמָה*. But there is only one passage which requires us to regard *פָּשַׁע* as a stronger term than *חַטָּאת*, viz., Job xxxiv. 37; elsewhere both words are used together simply to add fulness to the conception.

Mention will be made of the difference between *חַטָּאת* and *אֵשֶׁת*, especially in Leviticus, further on, in the first chapter of part 2.

is used where Job endeavours to excuse himself on account of the sins of his youth, Job xiii. 26, and also of the fratricide of Cain, Gen. iv. 13 (though perhaps the wish to excuse the deed led to the choice of the word here). According to usage, though not according to etymology, עָוֹן often conveys the idea of *guilt*, e.g., Gen. xv. 16 ; 1 Sam. iii. 14 ; Psalm xxxii. 5 ; Jer. li. 5 ; Lam. v. 7.

There is another word besides these which is often used in the Old Testament for sin, though chiefly in the book of Job, often in the Psalms and Proverbs, and often too in the Prophets, viz. רָשָׁע, which means primarily, according to Rödiger (*Thesaurus* iii.), Hengstenberg, and Delitzsch, "to be restless, noisy, tempestuous;" according to Hupfeld (Psalm i. 1), "to be unrighteous, to trespass against, or blaspheme," in contrast with צַדִּיק. In like manner, מַעַל מַעַל בַּיהוָה, "to deal treacherously with Jehovah, to break his covenant," often occurs in the Books of Chronicles. The transition from the physical to the moral appears strikingly in רָעָע (רָע), which is primarily used of breaking in pieces with a crash, Job xxxiv. 24 ; Psalm ii. 9 ; Isaiah xxiv. 19 ; then of evil or unfortunate occurrences of various kinds, and then at length, especially in Hiphil, of an evil deed.

CHAPTER III.

SIN AS SELFISHNESS.

Division A.

The real principle of the moral law.

EVIL presupposes good as the negative does the affirmative, and the antithesis the thesis ; it is the direct opposite of good, apostasy from it. Possessing no

independent existence of itself, the knowledge of it cannot be primary or original, but is secondary and derived. We cannot understand anything of evil and its root in man, until we possess a true conception of good.

There are, indeed, some keen-sighted observers of the various intricacies of the human heart who must possess but a very shallow knowledge of moral good, seeing that they do not believe in such a thing as a will truly bent upon goodness. Few have spied out evil beneath the manifold disguises in which it delights to lurk in the circles of the polite and fashionable world with keener eye than Rochefoucault, who, in his "Maxims," among other places, asserts that not only the vices but even the virtues of men lose themselves in self-interest as rivers in a sea. But is it not true of him, as was said of Voltaire, that without believing in the devil he saw him everywhere, even where he was not? And yet the idea of a pure will manifestly guided him in his sage reflections upon the weakness and knavery of man, though the belief in its realization he held to be a mere chimera.

If there be this close relation between our knowledge of good and of evil, we must begin our investigation regarding the inner unity in which the various forms of sin are centred by discovering the inner unity of moral good. Good as well as evil presents itself to us in so many and manifold forms that it almost baffles our endeavours to trace in it any inner unity. And yet we confidently take for granted that there is such a unity, a definite central tendency underlying each antithesis, for we include one class of determinations in human life dependent on the will under the conception of good, and another under the conception of evil.*

* The contrast between the apparent manifoldness of good and its inner unity involves the question so variously discussed in the moral philosophy of Greece and Rome, whether virtue is one or manifold. Both are true. Plato shows that the various tendencies of evil thoroughly resist any union, in the 4th book of the Republic (p. 445), where he lays down the principle ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας. If this explanation of the contrast were strictly true it would certainly be unmeaning to speak of a "kingdom of evil," as Christ does (see Matt. xii. 26, and parallel passages). There seems to be a modification of this even in Plato himself when he says in the *Sophists*, p. 256, περὶ ἑκάστον τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀπειρον δὲ πλῆθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

We have now to find out what this central and fundamental tendency is from which that manifoldness springs, first in the sphere of moral good, and secondly, in the sphere of moral evil. We call this central and fundamental tendency in good or in evil the "real principle" of each, but we are ready to exchange this designation for another if any one can suggest a better. After the explanation we have given, no one can mistake the expression as implying any special type of good or evil which appeared first by itself, and then gave birth to various other forms. It may, moreover, easily be shown that in the actual course of moral development, whether normal or abnormal, the individual is not always conscious of the principles which we are about to seek out, but recognizes them only at a subsequent stage of his experience; nay, more, it may even be shown that a *definite* consciousness of them (especially of the principle of evil) is by multitudes never attained. But this would by no means prove that we had not hit upon the right points in which the various radii of good and evil respectively centre; a definite principle may wholly rule the moral life of a man without his having in his mind any definite consciousness of what it is.

It is, of course, a *scientific* feeling which prompts us to endeavour to contemplate the various parts of the moral law as together making up a complete whole, and to trace these various parts as necessarily emanating from this unity. That is true here which Anselm says in the beginning of his great work *Cur Deus homo*,—*Negligentiæ mihi esse videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, id quod credimus, non studemus intelligere.* What we seek is by no means an *a priori* construction of the contents of the law which shall methodically arrange them and avoid at the same time all empirical suppositions and additions. It is evident, from our investigation concerning the speculative part of our inquiry in the Introduction, that we cannot obtain this. Our course of thought, as it has to do with what is objective and positive, must not produce anything independently, but must simply reproduce what has been originally created and revealed by God. It is therefore, properly speaking, reflection upon a theme, or following out a path already

marked out for us by the original thought and will of the Creator. Yet it is at the same time a progressive and connected course of thought, not merely an isolated and fragmentary conception—which would not be a true ‘following out’ of the path even in the apprehension of the individual, for there is nothing isolated in the thoughts or works of God,—but a search after the true connection and course of God’s ordainments.

But is it perhaps just here, in this department of knowledge —the knowledge of the *moral law*—that we have

Objection against this inquiry. no right to expect to discover the inner foundation and connection of part with part, but must rest content with the fact that God has thus ordained it, according to the maxim, *Hoc volo, sic jubeo ; sit pro ratione voluntas ?* Is the principle of Evodius in Augustine’s treatise, *De libero arbitrio* (lib. i., c. 3), *peccatum non ideo malum est, quia vetatur lege, sed ideo lege vetatur, quia malum est*,—is this true only when taken conversely ? This is certainly the view of

Idea that the will of God is the principle of the law. not a few who have investigated the relation of moral law to God. So early as the Scholastic age some of the most celebrated scholars differed from the generally received view, and made the *merum arbitrium Dei*, the foundation and the standard, not only of the government of the world, but of the moral law itself. The chief among these thinkers were DUNS SCOTUS, who excluded even the divine understanding as the source of the moral law, and placed it in the WILL of God alone,* and some of the later

* *Lib. i. Sentent. dist. 44*, “*Ideo—potest aliam legem statuere rectam, quae, si statueretur a Deo, recta esset, quia nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus a Dei voluntate acceptatur.*” Yet Scotus in *Sentent.*, lib. iii., recognizes an unconditional necessity in the fundamental law of love towards God, and in all which this logically includes. Divine arbitrariness refers only to the sphere of finite beings and their relations ; we cannot therefore do away with the necessity of submitting the human will directly to God as its aim, by any divine commandment. This coincides with his fundamental principle, *omne aliud a Deo ideo est bonum, quia a Deo dilectum, et non e contrario* (lib. iii., sent. dist. 19). But he narrows this inference so much as to exclude from it the love of our neighbour (lib. iii., dist. 28 and 37). Regarding this point in the system of Scotus, see BAUR’S “Christian Doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation,” vol. ii., p. 642, and RITTER’S “History of Christian Philosophy,” vol. iv., pp. 393-401 ; and concerning the kindred doctrines taught in the Arabian school of philosophy of the Motakhallim (vol. iii., p. 737). Duns Scotus was born 1265, and died 1308.

Nominalists, OCKHAM,* the disciple of Scotus, GABRIEL BIEL, who published an abridgment of Ockham's works, and PETER D'AILLY.† The doctrine was somewhat modified by the last-named scholar, who, like DESCARTES ‡ after him, while making God's will the foundation of morality, held the inseparable identity of the Divine will and thought.

It was in support of the doctrine of predestination that the stricter theologians of the Protestant Reformed Church (the Supralapsarians) adopted similar opinions in their controversy with the Remonstrants.

This notion
still held by
some.

About the same time this principle (which seems to put an end to all philosophy) was in high favour even in the sphere of philosophy, owing to its adoption by the inaugurators of the new philosophy. DESCARTES derived not only moral laws, but theoretic and even mathematical truths from an indifferent or arbitrary will of God.§ And hence it was that LEIBNITZ, in his *Theodicée*, maintained that the world-ordering will of God was determined by the ideas of the Divine understanding.|| In its exclusive application to moral truth, this principle became the topic of discussion among the founders of the Utilitarian school, and the advocates of the system of Natural Right (*jus naturæ*). PUFFENDORF,¶ in particular, was attacked by his theological and philosophical opponents, among whom was LEIBNITZ,**—but not altogether justly—as the advocate of the

* Ockham (d. 1347), *Sentent.*, lib. ii., qu. 19, “*Ea est boni et mali moralis natura, ut, cum a liberrima Dei voluntate sancita sit et definita, ab eadem facile possit amoveri et refigi, adeo ut mutata ea voluntate, quod sanctum et justum est, possit evadere injustum.*”

† Gabriel Biel (b. 1442, d. 1495); Peter D'Ailly (b. 1350, d. 1425). *In mag. sentent. proem. i. lit. q.*

‡ *Principia Philos.*, p. 1, § 23.

§ *Responsio ad sextas Objectiones*, § 6. Compare *Princ. Phil.* i., §§ 29, 30.

|| *Theodicée*, § 176 ff. Leibnitz curiously maintains that the opinion expressed by Descartes was not meant in earnest. See § 186, “*C'étoit apparemment un de ses tours, une de ses ruses philosophiques.*”

¶ “SAMUEL PUFFENDORF (b. 1632, d. 1694) and Cumberland are the two great promoters, if not founders, of that school in ethics which, abandoning the higher ground of both philosophers and theologians, that of an intrinsic fitness and propriety in actions, resolved them all into their conduciveness toward good.”—Hallam, “*Literature of Europe*,” vol. iii., p. 406. *Tr.*

** *Observationes de principio juris*, § 13. *Monita quaedam ad Pufendorfi principia*, § 4. Further on, § 5, Leibnitz himself remarks that there are statements

doctrine that our conceptions of what is right and wrong depend entirely upon the arbitrary will of God. Even in our day the interest attaching to this question is not wholly extinct ; for while, on the one hand, a wide spreading school does not scruple to derive the moral law from, and to resolve it into a metaphysical necessity wholly independent of God's will, there are not wanting, on the other hand, some who believe that God's absolute freedom in His actual government of the world can only be maintained upon the principle that what is good or evil is established solely by an arbitrary act of God's will.*

As to the question which we here propose to solve, it is clear that if such a principle as this be recognized, all hope of discovering the germ of moral truth in its inner necessity is taken away ; and the question following thereupon regarding the inner foundation of the manifold forms of evil in human life is likewise put an end to. Nothing would then remain in the dogmatic treatment of sin but the consideration of its various manifestations and the classification of these according to their resemblances and affinities, without any endeavour to discover a common root from which they spring.

contrary to this in Puffendorf himself, the apparent contradiction of which, with that quoted by Leibnitz before, might easily be solved.

* We must not confound this view with the frequent division of moral laws into those which arise out of the nature of man and those which depend only upon the *arbitrium Dei*. Thomasius (b. 1655, d. 1728) at first distinguished in his moral philosophy between the *leges naturales*, and the *leges universales positivae (arbitrariae)*. But afterwards in his *Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium*, he takes the Divine ordainments of the latter class to be mere decrees of God. The controversy was resumed in the theological sphere by ERNESTI (b. 1707, d. 1781), who considered that certain legislative enactments contained in Holy Scripture, which depended solely for their validity on the divine choice, possessed the force of universal obligation. See his treatise *Vindiciae arbitrii divini in religione constituenda*, § 48 ff. On the opposite side TÖLLNER (b. 1724, d. 1774) maintained the necessity of the divine law as recognized by the reason of man in his *Disquis. utrum Deus ex mero arbitrio potestatem suam legislatariam exerceat*, &c., and in a second treatise, *De potestate Dei legislatoria non mere arbitraria*. So also VELTHUSEN. As, however, Ernesti, in the 3rd part of his work, limited the conception of the *arbitrium Dei*, the controversy became a mere strife of words ; none of the above-named theologians thoroughly investigated the matter.

A theology which knows its true principle cannot but rejoice in the philosophic efforts of our time to establish the recognition of God's freedom in the place of that derivation of all things from Him by a logical necessity, "which we ourselves cannot endure in our acts—to say nothing of God." * But while avoiding this Charybdis of a necessity which treacherously draws everything into its depths, we must be very careful lest we be engulfed in the Scylla of a bottomless arbitrariness. Our conception of *divine freedom* is already converted into that of *arbitrariness* if we seek the basis of any precept of the moral law in a mere act of God's will, for which no reason can be given, but which we must abide by as an *ultimatum*. Such an act of will would be a *mere decree*, not what every divine choice is—and what alone enables us to look upon it as divine—a *self-revelation of God*. The contents of the moral law, though the product of God's will, would thus be something foreign to, and separate from Him, having no natural relation to His nature. Our idea of God would become a mere abstraction if this principle were carried out, and neither the world nor our own consciousness could give us any indications regarding God Himself; to all our questionings there would be but the one answer, the exhibition of an arbitrary decree ordaining all and indifferent to all. It would, moreover, logically follow regarding even theoretic truth, *e.g.*, regarding the elementary laws of logic and mathematics, that they depend entirely upon the divine discretion, and have no necessary foundation in the divine understanding. It is manifest that such an isolating apprehension of the world-ordering will of God, contrary as it is to a comprehensive idea of the divine perfections and maintaining His infinite power only, must make way for an unbridled scepticism, which even the reference to the historical revelation of God would no longer be able to expel.

This view of the creative fiat of God as resting solely in itself, arises from an important misunderstanding of the nature of freedom, concerning which the *Theodicée* of Leibnitz, however inadequate its treat-

* Schelling's words, in his treatise *über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*; *Werke*, erste Abtheilung, vol. vii., p. 396.

ment of the topic may be in relation to God and creation, may be read with great benefit.* The idea is, that the freedom of an act of will is limited in proportion as the subject may determine his own choice, by the principles which knowledge presents to him. Now we maintain, on the contrary, that the

True conception of freedom. act of a man not only in well but in evil doing, is the more free, the more clearly the actor knows what he wills and why he wills; and the less he wills merely for the sake of willing, the more will his whole spiritual life, whatever its condition may be, be concentrated in the act of will. An arbitrary act, in the merely formal sense of the term, as denoting indifference, is one in which the person acting gives himself up to the blind force of chance, and thus of outward circumstances. If a man resolves upon an act arbitrarily and without reasons, indifferent as to its import, he does not properly speaking determine himself, but he allows himself to be influenced and determined by what is external to him,—perhaps by an impression which the outer world happened to make upon him at the moment of his choosing, and which gave just this direction to the action now originating within,—or by whatever means the unconscious realization of the act may be brought about. Thus the most trifling occurrences may become masters of the emerging action, because it is in its birth wholly destitute of energetic and conscious will. If this be the true nature of an arbitrary action, so far as such a thing deserves the name of *action*, it is evident that while it may be possible (a positive ability it cannot strictly speaking be, for it is only a negation) for a personal created being, it is impossible for God. While in the creature the union between knowing and choosing may be broken, in God it is indissoluble; and herein it chiefly is that the perfection of the divine will consists, it always reflects with unvarying precision the absolute perfection of divine thought in its truth, its wisdom, and its righteousness.

* Part 2, § 175 f., § 191 f., § 225 f., Part 3, § 318 f., &c. We have already referred (p. 21) to the acute distinction between a *metaphysical* and a *moral* necessity, the latter name being applied by Leibnitz, not without danger of misunderstanding, to the necessity implied in the moral attributes of God.

The notion of an eternal law existing independently of God, and revealing itself to man in moral consciousness as a natural moral law, which would be recognized as such even (as Wolf * puts it) if there were no God, is altogether false and even nonsensical. This view has often been attributed to the scholastic philosophers, but where have they propounded it? Alexander von Hales (d. 1245), Thomas Aquinas, Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence (d. 1459), upon whom especially this reproach rests, following in the steps of Augustine,† speak of a *lex æterna* that constitutes the eternal standard of all movements and acts; but they do not regard this as something existing independently of God or above Him, they place it *in the divine understanding itself*; and in thus doing they are right, however they may have failed in the amplification of details. They explain the natural moral law and all that is truly right and conformable thereto in human laws as a *participatio legis æternæ*, and when they maintain that there is for man a *per se honestum vel turpe antedecenter ad voluntatem divinam*, they are far from sanctioning a godless foundation of Ethics; their aim is simply to guard against that representation which bases our conceptions of what is good and evil in an act of divine arbitrariness in God's will as separate from the *mens divina*.‡ They are only to be blamed for describing that eternal basis of the law in the divine understanding, the ideas of things eternally existing in Him, in view of which God has given His law to the world, as itself a law; whereas it can only become law by an act of the divine will

* *Vernünfftige Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen*, p. i., ch. 1, § 20.

† *De libero Arbitrio*, lib. i. cap. 6 (15); *Contra Faust. Manich.*, lib. xxii., c. 27. 28; and many other places.

‡ Alexander v. Hales, *Summa theolog. univers.*, p. i., qu. 35, membr. 3; qu. 27, membr. 2, 3. Thomas Aquinas, *Prima Secundæ*, quaest. 91, art. 1, 2; quaest. 93. Antoninus, *Summa theologica*, p. i., tit. 11-20. The real defect of the scholastic doctrine concerning the law is, that notwithstanding its prolixity, it dwells too much upon generals, and does not sufficiently consider the relation of the law to the present fallen condition of man. The view which Leibnitz in his *Theodicée* developes (especially in §§ 175-192), is very similar to that of Aquinas, as to the relation of the moral law to the divine understanding, save that Leibnitz here also introduces that outward notion of the *dependence* of the divine will upon the divine knowledge which Aquinas, without denying the *distinction* between the two, endeavours to avoid.

and in relation to real existence external to God, a want of accuracy which did not escape the acuteness of Thomas Aquinas, but which, through reverence for Augustine, who had introduced the expression into the dogmatic phraseology of the Church, he did not venture to correct.* But when the statement incidentally occurs in the works of Aquinas, as also in Grotius and Leibnitz after him, that the moral law would not cease to be binding upon man, *etsi daretur Deum non esse*, this must be carefully distinguished from the opinion similar in form above condemned, for it really means nothing more than that the destruction of our *directly religious* consciousness would not necessarily involve the extinction of our *moral* consciousness likewise.† It is an often repeated fact, that even the most emphatic deniers of the true and personal God, cannot entirely rid themselves of the warnings of His law in conscience. And must we not discern herein the holy and gracious ordainment of God, that even when a man has entirely severed the bond of conscious fellowship with Him, there should still remain another bond, whereby, through the striking alarm of an inner discord, the wanderer might be restored?

The doctrine that the foundation of morality is to be wholly sought in the arbitrary will of God, seems to be sanctioned by some expressions of St. Paul, according to which it would appear as if there could be sin or blameable violation only when there is law. Texts which seem to sanction the doctrine of arbitrariness. If that which is condemned by the moral law be not evil in itself and anterior to the law, it would also follow, that what

* *Prima secundae*, quaest. 91, art. 2.

† Rothe, in his *Ethics*, vol. i. p. 191, charges me with making morality possible only on the basis of religion. But the passage which he cites in proof is taken from the first edition of this work, and was expunged from the second edition. That I do not thus determine the relation, my honoured friend will see, if he considers the importance I attach to conscience even in the religious life; conscience I say according to my conception of it, which certainly differs somewhat from his. I can fully subscribe to what he says in the place referred to, for Rothe himself allows that the idea of morality cannot be truly conceived and understood without the idea of God, that morality necessarily involves our relation to God, and that, *ceteris paribus*, the more fully it is penetrated by this, the more perfect it becomes.

the law approves, is not in itself and anterior to the law essentially good.

But it appears on the face of it very improbable that Paul should maintain that the law originated sin and even moral goodness, when, as we have already seen, the very opposite error which would make sin the cause of all law was supposed to have a champion in Paul.

And yet it would appear from the words of the Apostle, Rom. iv. 15, *ὁ νόμος ὀργήν κατεργάζεται οὐ γὰρ (δὲ) οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις*, logically to follow that the revelation of the divine law first introduced a *distinction* between human actions alike and in themselves indifferent, in virtue of which the class in conformity with the law presented itself to man's consciousness as good and necessary, while the other class being transgressions of the law appeared as evil and blameable, bringing upon man the *ὀργή*—the displeasure and punishment of God. And the Apostle's words in Rom. v. 13 seem to coincide with this, if *ἐλλογεῖται* there is to be understood of *divine* imputation. For the words, *ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ· ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται, μὴ ὄντος νόμου*, must be rendered, "For before the law (of Moses), that was in the world which we now regard as sin, but so long as there was no law it was not imputed to us by God, *i.e.*, not in the light of sin;" and, consequently, as God sees things only as they in reality are, it was not really sin. The Apostle's words in Rom. v. 20 are in unison with this; "the law came in (*παρεισῆλθε*) between the promise and its fulfilment that sin might abound." All this seems to coincide with the notion that God, having resolved to lead mankind on to their destination by means of a redemption and by the removal of a contrast ("the slaying of an enemy"), He had first to bring them into a state of inward contradiction by means of the law, which, by awakening in them a sense of the need of redemption, might be their schoolmaster to bring them to Christ. And must not this be regarded as the doctrine of Paul as stated in Rom. iii. 19, 20, and Gal. iii. 22-24? The recollection that the *νόμος* here spoken of is throughout the Mosaic law,—indeed, prominently so in the main text, Rom. iv. 15,—only confirms the inference that it is the law of God alone which *introduces* the difference between right and wrong. For if in the wider sphere of actions

generally, what is done without a knowledge of the Mosaic law can in no true sense be sin, how much less can there be any sin in the much narrower sphere of those actions which are gone through without any consciousness of the law in the inward man?

The plausibility of this view cannot be denied. Let us, Criticism of Rom. iv. 15. however, examine more closely the context of the main passage, Rom. iv. 15. The Apostle had just shown that Abraham was made partaker of the promise "that he should be heir of the world, not by the law, but by the righteousness of faith." 'For,' he continues, 'if they who have the law (and fulfil it, Rom. ii. 13) are to be heirs, faith loses its significance, and the promise is annulled.' Why? Because it rests upon conditions which man cannot perform. 'For it is attested by universal experience that the law instead of leading men to righteousness awakens within them the consciousness of wrath, of God's holy displeasure on account of their sinful state.' Paul now gives us the general reason for this fact, generalizing the concept of law by leaving out the article, — 'for where there is no law in the consciousness of the man sinning, sin is not regarded by him as transgression,' nor can it awaken in him the consciousness of God's wrath. If this be the meaning of the 15th verse, if the *κατεργάζεσθαι ὀργήν* and the *παράβασις* denote what takes place in consciousness, we need not understand the *κατεργάζεσθαι ὀργήν* of a mere increase of the deserved punishment, nor take it as a contradiction of Eph. ii. 3, where the heathen—*οἱ λοιποί*—are described as *τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς*, and of John iii. 36, where the wrath of God is said to *abide* (*μένει*) upon the man who believes not on the Son. The *οὐκ ἐλλογείται* in Rom. v. 13 is to be understood only of the self-imputation of sin as sin, in the consciousness of the sinner. In opposition to the view above described, the Apostle (in Rom. v. 13, 14) shows that though mankind, beyond the range of the positive law of God, are not wont to bring sin to consciousness as it really is, and to impute it to themselves, yet from the universal sway of death over those who have transgressed no positive and revealed law, we must infer the presence of sin before the Mosaic legislation. It thus becomes self-evident that Rom. v. 20 contains nothing about the original introduction of 'the offence,' and that we cannot

adopt the interpretation of the Apostle's chain of thought above described.

But the Apostle not only did not teach—he expressly com-
 St. Paul ex- bated any such representation of the origin of sin
 pressly rejects from the law, whether it be that the law for the
 the notion. first time forbids some out of the mass of indiffer-
 ent acts, and thus makes these wrong, or that by its prohibi-
 tions it necessarily provokes the will, pure in itself, to opposition.
 The passage which seems more to sanction such a representa-
 tion is Rom. vii. 5 where the lusts of sin are described as *τὰ*
διὰ τοῦ νόμου; and, accordingly, Paul takes pains to prove (Rom.
 vii. 7–16) that the law is not to blame for the state of inner
 discord and misery (*θάνατος*) into which the man sinks when he
 becomes conscious of its demands. It is, he says, in itself
 “holy and just and good” (v. 12); it is calculated in itself to
 bring life to man (v. 10); and it is only indwelling sin in the
 man, though still latent and slumbering, which takes occasion
 by the law to slay him. Not only is the consciousness of in-
 dwelling sin awakened in the man, and the inner discord made
 objective by the law, but the indwelling sin is provoked to break
 out with greater energy in particular acts of sin—sinful lusts
 (v. 8), by the opposing restraint of the law, which is too
 weak in itself to bring the will into harmony with it. It is per-
 fectly clear that the Apostle throughout his argument—not
 only in Rom. vii. 7–23, but in vii. 5, iv. 15, v. 13, 20—has
 in his mind the relation of the law, not to man in his primi-
 tive perfection, but to a state in which sin is already present as
 an indwelling bias and tendency. St. Paul confutes the repre-
 sentation we have named from another point of view in Rom.
 viii. 7. We must leave the inquiry as to the meaning of *σάρξ*
 for the present; but these two things are certain, viz., that
 with Paul *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός* is a general designation for a
 sinful being; and that he includes in it a definite tendency of
 human life, a series of lusts and endeavours governed by one
 and the same bias. Now the Apostle says concerning this *φρόνημα*
τῆς σαρκός, “it is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the
 law of God, neither indeed can be,”—i.e., from its inner nature
 and condition. Now if it were the work of the law not to
 bring to light an impulse in itself sinful, but to make an im-
 pulse which is in itself indifferent now for the first time wrong,

this *οὐδὲ δύναται* would lose all meaning as a statement in advance of the *οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται*.

It is therefore wholly a mistake to suppose that the doctrine that the moral law derives its definite contents from an arbitrary decree of God rests upon the authority of St. Paul.

The warning, however, not to trouble ourselves with the investigation of the inner source and connecting centre of morality, seeing that it is divinely ordained, but simply to hold fast to the facts of our moral consciousness and of historical revelation, can have only a subjective meaning. It can only imply that the inner unity of the moral law, amid its manifold commands, though doubtless known to the divine intelligence, is undiscoverable by us. Thus AUGUSTINE thought in reference to predestination; he held that the will of God is absolutely wise and just, but that we are wholly ignorant of the grounds of its conclusions. Amyraut* and Schleiermacher† have clearly proved that CALVIN also did not by his *decretum absolutum* mean a divine arbitrariness, but only an inability in our present state to understand the wise and righteous counsels of God. How far these great teachers of the Church were right in this conclusion we need not decide; we have only to ask whether this renunciation of a thorough understanding of the divine ordainments obliges us to set aside our problem? We must presuppose the possibility of such an understanding, certainly to some extent, where a divine ordainment is given which we are called upon to realize in our appointed sphere by our free will and deed. In behalf not only of scientific thought, but of practical life, we should endeavour to bring to light the productive centre of all morality, the fundamental sentiment out of which the entire Christian life develops itself, and which enters into and penetrates its manifold relations, circumstances, and activities. If this knowledge were virtually denied us, how could the law

* *Defensio doctrinæ Jo. Calvini, de absoluto reprobationis decreto, adv. anonymum. Salm. 1641.*

† In his dissertation *über die Erwählungslehre*, *Theolog. Zeitschrift*, 1st part, p. 78. Calvin has on the other hand made so many positive statements as to the grounds and design of the *decretum absolutum*, that every attempt to harmonize it with the *righteousness* of God, must terminate not in hidden darkness, but in manifest contradiction.

ever become anything but a dead and outward letter, whose prescriptions we should have to apprehend and accept one by one without connection? If the Christian be free from the outward yoke of the law, so that the *spirit of holiness* works in him, and begins to evolve from within the true fulfilment of the law (Gal. v. 18, 22), he surely must be able to understand that fruitful principle of the moral law which his own experience is ever reminding him of, to search into it, and thus to understand the entire contents of the divine will in their true connection, so far as they are revealed to beings possessed of moral freedom in this world.

§ 2. Real prin- The real principle of the moral law from which its varied contents spring, must be sought for in the manner in which it is obeyed, in the essential and universal motive which prompts its fulfilment. When man perceives the true relation in which he stands to His Maker, his respect for the unconditional authority of the law is transformed into ready obedience to a personal God. All the contents of the moral law are involved in the recognition of this relation. We cannot regard anything as the objective principle of the law which is too meagre to be its inner and all-embracing motive. To separate these two things must, from a Christian point of view, be regarded as a mistaken accommodation of science to the imperfect state of man. In subordinate stages of the moral life, in its development as disturbed by sin, and while the contents of the moral law are still in some degree strange and external to the Subject, the objective principle and the highest subjective motive do not coincide. The prevailing motive in this case may be a vague respect for the unconditional demand of the law, or the submission of the creature to the Creator, or the obedience of the servant to the Lord; and none of these motives can be adopted as the real principle of the moral law. When this estrangement of the Subject from the contents of the law is removed, when he fully knows and understands it, external principle and inward motive will be identical.

But notwithstanding this real identity, there will still be a difference between the external principle and the internal motive in their relation to the consciousness of the Subject.

The true relation of man to God as the objective principle of morality, is somewhat remote from the moral determinations of the individual; in order to rise up to it, he must go through several intermediate stages. But in proportion as the highest subjective motive arises from that relation of man to God, it is present in every moment of the moral life, the man carries it in his bosom, and it penetrates him with its divine energy.

Christ tells the Pharisaic doctor of the law who asked Him what was the greatest commandment, that it is LOVE TO GOD penetrating the whole man; and that the second is like unto it in dignity and importance, love to our neighbour as on a par with ourselves, Matt. xxii. 36-39; Mark xii. 29-31. And to guard against the misconception that these commandments were only the greatest among many which come to us from without, and at the same time to lead the inquirer to the knowledge of the truth that in them the living unity of all moral precepts is contained, Christ adds the words, *ἐν ταύταις ταῖς δύοσιν ἐντολαῖς ὅλος ὁ νόμος κρέμαται καὶ οἱ προφῆται*. There are but few statements of Holy Scripture bearing upon this point worthy to be compared with this in importance and fulness, even in an exegetical point of view. We may refer however to 1 Peter i. 16, "Be ye holy, for I am holy;" Matt. v. 48, "Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect;" Matt. vii. 12, "What you would that men should do to you, do you even so to them;" and the exhortations to love often given to the followers of Christ.* It would be easy to show that these expressions, and others like them, are either of a formal character, and inappropriate to denote the real centre of unity in the contents of the law, or are too narrow to embrace the whole circumference of the moral life.

In that answer of Christ, the highest unity appears, though expressed in two fundamental precepts—the love of God and of our neighbour. But the manner in which Christ speaks of the first of these (*αὐτῇ ἐστὶν*

Love to God includes all love.

* Rothe assigns a similar dignity and importance to these words; see, among other places, vol. i. 196. A declaration somewhat like this of Matt. xxii. 39 occurs in the exhortation, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do you even so to them." But it is evident that Christ has here in view but one side of the moral life, which is described in the former text as the love of our neighbour.

ἡ μεγάλη—absolutely “the great commandment,” καὶ πρώτη ἐντολή), very clearly indicates that we must seek the union of both in it; and this is still more plain when we inquire why it is that man, as distinct from all other beings known to us on earth, must be the object of our love, of a love which forbids us to use him as a mere means to accomplish our ends, but which recognises him for his own sake, and endeavours to help him on. If, in reply, we be referred to mere unity of species, this is indeed often spoken of as the natural foundation of general love of mankind, but not as the source of its moral import and necessity. This consists far more essentially in the truth, that the *likeness of God* shines in the spiritual nature of man, and love for God must necessarily extend to all who bear His image. Thus the second commandment has the first for its principle, and the outward distinction between them as standing side by side, or the second subordinate to the first—whereon the usual division of duties into those towards God and those towards our neighbour rests, is resolved into a true unity. God is not only the chief object of man’s love,—a truth which cannot be denied save by the negative theology of our time, which has lost the true conception of God or the conception of His personality, and consequently that of the living relation between God and man;—He is also *the absolute and all-embracing object* of this love, so that all other love becomes holy and abiding only as it is comprehended in love to God. Strictly speaking, this is actually expressed in the command to love God “with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength.” A love which lays claim to the whole inner life, cannot stand side by side with other moral commands as above them or below them, it must embrace and penetrate them all. The Old Testament bases the command to reverence human life upon the fact that God made man in his own image (Gen. ix. 6); and St. James confirms his admonition against cursing men upon the same truth, representing it as an essential contradiction out of the same mouth to bless God the Father, and to curse men who are the offspring of God (James iii. 9–11). The argument moreover of St. John (1 John iv. 20) rests, according to its most natural interpretation upon the same thought; love for the archetype cannot be genuine unless it be confirmed

by love for the likeness ; it is so much the less genuine, we may add, inasmuch as we cannot see the essence of God save through His revelation of Himself, and man is in himself according to his own nature a revelation of God. But the other side of this relation must never be overlooked, namely, that man is a manifestation of God only in proportion as he leads our thoughts to Him.

It is not, however, in this declaration of our Lord alone that love to God is recognised as the life-giving principle of all true fulfilling of the law ; the truth runs throughout the New Testament, and appears in manifold references and ways ; it often asserts itself, moreover, as a tacit presupposition, or an implied principle, even where love and obedience are not the direct topic of discourse. We may call to mind how variously Christ Himself names love to His Father and to mankind as the soul of His own life ; *e.g.*, John xiv. 31, xv. 10 ; how He urges upon His disciples love to Himself, which is identical with love to the Father (John xiv. 9), as the living source of obedience to His commands, *e.g.*, John xiv. 15, 21, xv. 10 ; and how He expressly denies the possibility of this obedience where love to Him is wanting, John xiv. 24. In like manner, love to God, to Christ, or love generally, is represented by the apostles as the inmost essence of all Christian virtues, and as the aim of all law, *e.g.*, Eph. iii. 18, iv. 15 ; 1 Cor. viii. 2, 3, xiii. 1-7 ; Rom. xiv. 7, 8 ; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15 ; Gal. ii. 20 ; 1 Tim. i. 5 ; 1 John iv. 19-21, v. 1-3.* We have the same thought in another form where the Apostle Paul exhorts the Christian that whatever he does, he should do all to the glory of God, 1 Cor. x. 31 ; compare Matt. v. 16 ; for this effort after God's glory is the necessary activity of love. So also where Scripture refers to the law of love to our neighbour as "the royal law," the sum of the law, the bond of all the elements of a perfect life, the spring of the several virtues (James ii. 8 ; Rom. xiii. 8-10 ; Col. iii. 14 ; John xiii. 34, 35) ;—the love of God is beyond all doubt implied as the essential presupposition and living root of our true fellowship with one another (1 John i. 3).

* Regarding the place which *love* occupies among the Christian virtues, see the remarks of NEANDER in his *Planting and Training of the Christian Church*, p. 760. *German Ed.* Bohn, i. 488.

We may now understand that very profound text in Matt. xix. 17. The reading authenticated by external evidence, and adopted by Griesbach, Lachmann, and Tischendorf,—*τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ; εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός*, might at first sight seem to have arisen from a doctrinal objection which the transcriber felt against the form of the expression as it occurs in the other synoptical gospels : *τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν ; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἰς, ὁ Θεός* ; Mark x. 18 ; Luke xviii. 19. But upon closer reflection, seeing that the reading in the paradoxical, disconnected, enigmatical, yet suggestive character of the answer, affords so deep a meaning, and falls in so naturally with the train of thought, we can hardly regard it as a mere correction of a copyist who wantonly makes alterations. On the other hand, the reading in the Received text is easily explained as having originated in a desire to make Christ's answer in Matthew coincide with the parallel passage in Mark and Luke. The disconnected form in which the two latter render Christ's words may have had its origin in a very early inexact apprehension of their meaning, which emphasized the affirmative part of Christ's answer, and altered the interrogative part of it so as to harmonize with the question of the young man. We therefore feel justified in regarding the above reading as the original form of Christ's words, without appealing to the disputed authority of the first gospel.* The inquirer expected, as the form of his question shows, to be told of some one good act by which he might obtain eternal life. When, therefore, Christ replies, *τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ; εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός*, He turns the man's attention first from an individual and outward goodness which was in his thoughts, and wherein he thought he had already done respectably, to the One and all-embracing good, and from the abstract conception of the good in a neutral form, to the personal God as alone good, and to loving fellowship with Him as the source of all good and of all holiness in His intelligent creatures. What follows is in exact keeping with this. Christ refers the young man to the revelation of

* It should moreover be observed that according to Lachmann's rendering of the text the word *ἀγαθός* in the question addressed to Christ is wanting, and it is upon this alone that the words *τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν* depend. Has this also arisen from an intentional erasure ? This is all the more unlikely, because the epithet does not affect the other reading, *τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*.

the will of this absolute Good in the summary of the divine commandments; and then, in order to the exercise of his intended virtue and purity, He demands of him the surrender of that upon which his heart was set, clearly in order to bring him back to the point with which He had begun, and to convince him of the necessity of seeking above all things true fellowship with God Himself, see v. 26.*

Thus Holy Scripture teaches that LOVE TO GOD is the essence of moral good, being in itself the pure willing of what is good and right, and that every other sentiment, every kind of action, is truly moral only in proportion as it springs from this. Regarding other human virtues, we can see that they pertain to human life in its present stage of development only, and that in a state of perfection their significance is done away. But of love, we know with the clearest certainty that it can never lose its significance; it not only holds good for the development of our race on earth, and onwards to a state of perfection,—as Christ says with special emphasis of law, and with reference to *its* goal (Matt. v. 18, 19)—but it is absolutely eternal (1 Cor. xiii. 8), and in every future state of man, however altered his condition and varied his circumstances, it must be the germinating principle of a holy life. God himself is good (*ὁ ἀγαθός*) only as He is LOVE (1 John iv. 8, 16), and His holiness and righteousness depend upon His love. Now, remembering that love to God is not only gratitude for benefits received, but also and essentially admiration for His glorious perfection, this perfection itself in its innermost essence is nothing less than love communicating itself. Thus the distinction which Christian Ethics has more than once made between these two kinds of

* De Wette recognizes Lachmann's text as the true one, but his exposition seems to me wholly to miss the true meaning and connection of Christ's words. Christ does not intend by His question in reply, and by the declaration *εἰς ἔσταιν ὁ ἀγαθός*, to represent the young man's inquiry as unanswerable, but, on the contrary, as one the answer to which was obvious. The *δέ* in the words immediately following, upon which De Wette mainly rests his interpretation, implies that it is not enough to recognize the truth, *ὅτι εἰς ἔσταιν ὁ ἀγαθός*, but that our own will must be made to coincide with the will of the *εἰς ἀγαθός*. In Rom. v. 7 also, it seems to me obvious that *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* should be taken as the genitive of *ὁ ἀγαθός*, God, and *δίκαιος* (without the article) as meaning a (relatively) righteous man.

love to God is done away, and the inseparable unity of both is manifest.

✓ But love can only exist in a Being who, though he might be self-contained, yet will not, but voluntarily goes out of himself in order to live in and for others. Love, therefore, can only realize itself in the sphere of personal existence in beings who possess an independent centre of personality, and consequently by the absolute removal of an absolute isolation. This association of personal beings in love, while it involves the most perfect distinguishing of the *I* and *thou*, proves itself to be the *highest form of unity*. The semblance of love in the sphere of animated nature, the impulse uniting two beings, which works as instinct or physical necessity, is the significant type or presage of love, and is one of the wonderful indications of a glimmering form of personality and self-consciousness in this sphere; but real love it cannot be called. We find these semblances of love not only among the lower animals, but in nature generally; we trace the tokens of its prevailing law from the metamorphosis of the smallest plant to the most general cosmical relations of the heavenly bodies; we see how all kinds of life, all formations, spring from the union and working together of distinct agencies, just as the beautiful myth of Hesiod's theogony witnesses, wherein he represents *Eros* who blends and unites differences as "the world-constructing principle." But that which nature thus, according to God's ordainment, unconsciously presages in her deepest meanings, is realized in consciousness, and raised to its full truth in the region of personal existence, and as the fundamental law of the moral world.

Here indeed also love is hidden in its beginnings; it is manifest in another and apparently different form. Indirect manifesta-
tions of love. The growth of the inner sense of justice in human intercourse, even where it demands self-renunciation on our part, what is it but the entrance of other persons and their interests into the sphere of our own personality? The recognition of the moral necessity obliging the individual to moderate his claims and to submit to the general ordainments of society, what is it but the first going forth of the man from the prison of self, in which the *ego* refers everything to self alone? The nice distinctions and separations of spheres whereby the

rights of the individual are secured, are not certainly the highest manifestations of love, yet they spring from this principle ; for while the crude, selfish impulse of personality enforces only its own boundless claim, it limits itself here by the similar claims of others. And what would a living fellowship be, how could the individual live and work for the whole, if he did not thus limit the range of his own personal rights and liberties, in order to social and combined activity ? It is not altogether false hatred of every law that resists egotistic arbitrariness, but often a well-intentioned enthusiasm, which now-a-days, in the name of love, demands the abolition of all distinctions and the resolving of all individuality in a philosophical communism. But such levelling notions are further removed from the true reality of love than is the principle of impartial and even-handed justice.* Love is the inmost soul of all moral ordinances ; and all deep reverence for law, all obedience to a higher will, all those sacred energies which hold human life together and confine its activity within accurately defined spheres, are only *love in disguise* ; † and like the Old Testament law in the history of the human race, these, when defined and embodied in the life of the individual, are *παιδαγωγοί* (Gal. iii. 24), for the kingdom of *love revealed*. Love can take root only in the soil of earnest strictness ; true liberty can germinate only beneath the closely-enveloping sheath of self-limitation and submission to law.

But love can only become the generative principle of a higher life when it makes itself manifest in its true character. It does not show itself in its fulness until it becomes conscious of God as its absolute object, and of all its other objects in their true relation to Him.

* Here we see what madness it is to think of advancing the kingdom of God by doing away with the individual rights of property. It is the bitterest satire upon the much-prized culture of modern days, that numbers of our contemporaries need to be set right regarding this primary element of moral knowledge.

† This is true even of the Kantian rigorism of law, however far removed from love it seems to be through its efforts to be formal. De Wette has clearly shown in his criticism of the moral system of Kant (*Theolog. Zeitschrift von Schleiermacher, De Wette, and Lücke, Heft 2, s. 3*), that the categorical imperative in Kant's theory implies the truth that man must grow and advance at the same rate with his fellows and the society in which he moves. But this is nothing less than the purpose of love.

Thus is the heavenly magnet found which is able, not for the passing moment of enthusiastic excitement only, but continually, to guide and sustain the life of man over the dark mysterious sea in which the powers of the deep and the burden of its own sins and sorrows ever tend to sink it.

An acute opponent of this treatise, when it first appeared, here objects that this love, which is moral only as All pious feelings are forms of love. the inner relation of the subject to God, is "a mere form or name without any definite meaning."* It has been supposed, also from another point of view, that love to God is used by the New Testament writers to denote pious sentiment and emotion.† As to the latter remark, it is perfectly true, though in a different sense from that here meant. Love to God, in the full conception of it, is the beginning and the end, the first and the last, of all pious feelings; so that if this love, as the inner relation of man to God, be called an empty form, the substance of religion generally is denied. All the relations in which man stands towards God, and which are realized by an act of his own freewill,—child-like reverence, humility, self-denying obedience, self-surrender, trust, firm hope, are summed up in LOVE, and are only different forms of love. Faith, moreover, in the strictly Christian, *i.e.* Pauline, sense of the word, must be looked upon as a constituent part of our conception of love to God—(both words, *Glaube* and *Liebe*, have apparently the same root in our language)—for it is an assurance of the heart in the complaisant love and grace of God, and this is manifestly a kind of love to God. Love is the deep-felt breath of life, distinguishing living faith from that mere belief which is indeed the objective foundation of true faith, but which, without the breath of love, is but a *πίστις νεκρά*. We must also regard the scholastic notion of a *fides caritate formata*, with its correlative a *fides informis*, as

* Vatke, Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und Gnade, p. 427. Compare Vatke's Review of "the Doctrine of Sin," Hallische Jahrb., 1840, p. 1039–40. When, in opposition to the view here given, Vatke makes the principle of freedom the aim of all moral life, we do not really differ from him, except that we know no real freedom save in the love of God. In its beginning, as *implicitum*, love is the productive principle; in its completion, as *explicitum*, it is the end and result of moral life.

† Baumgarten-Crusius, Lehrbuch der Christl. Sittenlehre, p. 169.

altogether a mistake, because it makes the living power of love an addition to faith; whereas it is the very life of faith.*

Love to God is realized by an inward and primary act of the heart which, on the one hand, receives the proffered grace,† and, on the other, surrenders its whole life, so as no longer to live unto itself, but to Him and to His service; and, so far from being the product of other virtues, all these really follow from this love as a matter of course wherever it truly is, and are contained in it as their germ. This surrender of self to God is really the adoption of His purpose to develop the kingdom of heaven among men; if this surrender were only something self-contained and without love, how could it be the principle of all moral resolves? That only is true surrender to God's will and purpose which springs from an actual living and personal relation to Him already begun. This primary act, as it is accomplished by the man himself—both priest and offering in the “Holy of holies” of communion with God—is both affirmative and negative; it is the death of the life of nature and resurrection to the new life of grace; and whoever has experienced this change, in its true import, must think it strange indeed that any philosophy should deny its reality and call love to God an empty form. We can easily see how a philosophic theory that regards God in His relation to man only as a principle which gives personality,† and not as Himself a Person, may have no place for love to God as a living fellowship between personal beings. It may make love between God and man to mean no more than a process whereby the ideal or intelligible continually enters the finite or actual, and then goes forth again as conscious spirit. We can understand also how this doctrine arrives at the conclusion that God and

* See the profound, yet simple, exposition of this relation between love and faith in Neander's *Apost. Zeitalter*, 4th ed., pp. 747 f., 758.

† That this reception is here described as an act, will require no justification for those who understand the difference between receptivity and passivity, between a living appropriation and a passive retention. Appropriation is essentially an act.

‡ Vatke, *Die menschliche Freiheit*, pp. 122, 125, 210. Here we are told that as the pure conception of personality God first becomes a Person by His union with reality, i.e. with humanity; and in support of this view, which is directly opposed to Christianity, reference is made to the fundamental doctrine of Christianity—the Incarnation of the Son of God.

man became personal only by love,* an opinion which must be rejected as self-contradictory from any point of view, if real love be meant, for real love obviously presupposes personality—the distinction between the *thou* and the *I*, which by it are united in one.

Man's love, in relation to its absolute object, God, cannot manifest itself as love between equals, by a reciprocal giving and receiving; it seems rather a *receiving* only. God's love to man is absolutely spontaneous, for it must first give being to its object. When the creature is united to the Creator by holy love, what is this but that he opens his heart to receive a communication from God, in order that his whole life may be penetrated thereby, and consecrated to God's service? Herein consists his love to God, that he surrenders himself wholly to God's disposal, and rejoices in the consciousness of being His. Just so; and thus this self-surrender to God is, as the word intimates, a true giving on man's part, and a true receiving on God's.† Herein is the mystery of this love, inexplicable indeed, yet manifest to every Christian heart, that God can never, by His almighty power, compel to that which is the very highest gift in the life of His creatures—love to Himself; but that He receives it as the free gift of His creature; that He is only able to allure men to give it to Him in a free act of their own, by the power of His own boundless love (1 John iv. 19).‡ The early Fathers, like our

Love man's
only real gift
to God.

* As before, p. 210.

† I cannot see any insuperable difficulty in the application of the term *receiving* to God, on the ground that in human relations it implies a previous non-possession (RITTER, über das Böse, p. 38). Without letting go the fact, we must, as in all such cases, remember that the limitations of time do not pertain to God, to whom all the successive events of time are eternally present. Our giving is an act in time; His receiving is eternal,—but yet not the less really a receiving, for eternity is not the negative doing away with time, but involves its entire fulness.

‡ The reader may here be reminded of similar expressions from the angelical wanderer of Angelus Silesius, especially the well-known

“God has need of me, even as I need Him,
His nature I help Him to guard, even as He helps me.”

But these apparent parallels need only to be quoted to be at once rejected. This wanderer's turns of thought, in their strange intermixture of pantheistic speculation and religious mysticism, are altogether different from those here laid down. The above sentence is the mystical and poetic expression of the

own HAMANN * in more modern times, described the creation of the world as a work of divine condescension and humility ; and however paradoxical it may seem, the expression is appropriate, in so far as God calls into existence, as the highest and noblest of His creatures, those who are self-conscious and free.

True love among men has sometimes regarded the difference of personality between those united by its ties as a hindrance to its perfect realization, and in moments of rapture it has longed to become one with its beloved. The wish springs from a noble impulse, but it means something different from what it says. As love is not the relation of the subject of it to itself, but necessarily to another with whom it is in fellowship, to take it at its word would be to destroy it. What is really longed for is susceptibility of unlimited communion, the power of making its own being perfectly transparent to its beloved, and of similarly possessing its beloved in return ; thus understood, there lies in this wish a presage of a power of perfect union, which love will reveal in the consummation of God's kingdom. ∴

Love to God has often been apprehended by the Mystics of the East and West as analogous to this longing of love among men. That only is supposed to be perfect love when the creature longs to lose himself in God, like a drop in the ocean, and thus to resolve his own being and consciousness in the being and consciousness of God.† If this were true, man could only attain

Perfection of love according to the Mystics.
 first article in the philosophic *Credo* of the day, that God first comes into existence in the world and in man.—Rahmund von Sabunde [a Spaniard by birth, physician and theologian, flourished circ. 1430] has similar thoughts to our own regarding man's love to God as the only thing that man can really give to God. See his *Theologia Naturalis*, caps. 109, 111.

* A deep thinker and writer, born 1730 at Königsberg, died 1788. He led a strange and wandering life, and called himself "the Magician of the North."

† Tholuck's admirable *Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik*, gives abundant evidence of this error in the Mysticism of the East, especially in the quotations from Saadi's *Baumgarten* and Feridoddin Attar's *Kleinod der Substance*, and from the *Vogelgesprächen* of the same poet. In Saadi, in particular, the representation given of this mystical and senseless desire for self-annihilation is tinged with the most glowing colours of Oriental poetry. See also Tholuck's *Sufismus*, pp. 76, 130 f., and the description of Buddhism in Stuhr's *Religionssystemen der Völker des Orients*, pp. 163, 167. As to Western Mysticism, we meet with this tendency chiefly in Meister Eckart (see Schmidt's

the perfection after which he is to strive by ceasing to exist as man,—in other words, he would fail to attain it altogether; and such a conception of man could not be realized by a personal creature, for it would absolutely contradict his nature. It makes no real difference whether Mysticism puts this absorption into God, which it makes the highest end of man, at the end of life, or holds that it may be attained during life by the ideal death of mystical ecstasy. We behold in its views a religious tendency, which had far outstripped others in the inner longings of the spirit, and in its perception of the infinite significance of love, shipwrecked when almost in the haven upon those cliffs of Pantheism, which threaten alike excess of religious feeling and unbridled speculation despising every instinctive certitude of the spirit.

The serious misconception from which this view arises is evident from what has now been said. x
 Personality indivisible. existence is indivisible (*in-dividual*), it is bound together in a central point, and is insusceptible of assimilation. That only can be assimilated which is destitute of individuality; its existence is transitory when compared with personal being. But individuality, in its highest form of personality, is essential to love; and love is only possible between personal beings. x Take away the distinction of persons in love, and the living unity of the individual also vanishes. If love to God thus annihilated itself in its perfection, if the effort to

able dissertation in the *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1839, part 3, p. 933 f., and Martensen, Meister Eckart, 1842), and in “the brothers and sisters of the free spirit,” to whose family most probably the Mystics belong whom Ruysbroech opposes on account of their Antinomian and Pantheistic extravagances (see *Engelhardt's Richard von St. Victor u. Joh. Ruysbroech*, p. 231). Even Tauler and Ruysbroech themselves do not always know how to avoid this abyss of absorption into God, though they rightly suspect that not only man but God Himself would be swallowed up in its terrible darkness; see *e.g.* what the latter teaches concerning the fourth stage of love (pp. 246, 249); and for Tauler's wavering views, see Schmidt's *Joh. Tauler*, p. 126. The paths of Mysticism recklessly pursued all alike plunge into this abyss; and when several Mystics of the Middle Ages—as Liebner justly remarks concerning Bernhard and Hugo (Hugo St. Victor, pp. 346, 347)—maintain the distinction between a mystical union with God and a union of natures, this witnesses to the practical wisdom of their heart, but not to any logicalness in the carrying out of their principles. Gerson's well-known attack upon Ruysbroech is principally directed against this logical result (see Engelhardt's work, as before, p. 265 f.). We find the same tendency very apparent in quietistic Mysticism, especially its doctrine of mystical death.

annihilate itself thus belonged to its true essence, love would be a perfect contradiction, "mysterious alike for wise men and for fools."

There is nothing, therefore, which we should more jealously defend from every rash attempt to annul the distinction between God and the creature, than the clear perception of the imperishable nature of love, which unites both. So far from the man's individuality being lost in perfect love to God, it is elevated to its full truth, and revealed in its eternal significance, as alike the subject and the object of a love between God and His creature; when man thus gives himself up to God, he then for the first time, in the truest sense, gains possession of himself, for "he who loses his life, the same shall find it." What true love covets is not abstract identity, not a dissolution into the divine being, but perfect and undisturbed fellowship with God,* just as it is promised in Holy Scripture as the highest blessing, not to become God, but "to see God face to face," 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 2 Cor. v. 7; 1 John iii. 2; Matt. v. 8. It is a wanton confounding of living and free unity with sameness of nature, to adduce the expression by which the Apostle Paul describes the final goal of the divine development of man—*ἵνα ᾗ ὁ Θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, 1 Cor. xv. 28,—as if it proved the final dissolving of all personal existences into God. The expression really proves the very opposite; for how could God be "all in all," how could He penetrate and fill all beings with His Spirit, so that every act of their resolve would be a guidance from Him, if this "all"—all these beings—no longer existed, but He Himself alone, and none other beside Him (*praeter Deum*)? And what would the divine development of our race in the history of the world be but a meaningless game, cruel as it was aimless, the most terrible mockery on God's part of His own creation? Could there be a more glaring

* A prayer of one of the worshippers of Vishnu, which Tholuck quotes from Ward's *Religion of the Hindoos*, curiously confesses this: "O Vishnu! Grant us, not an absorption, but a state of being wherein we shall for ever see thee and serve thee as our Lord, wherein thou shalt ever be our dear Lord, and we thy servants" (Lehre von Sünde u. vom Versöhner, p. 198, 7th ed.). This, in the language of the Eastern Mystics, is only a longing to remain under the yoke of the law and of the letter, for in their view God is absolutely without the power to create or sustain spirit and will external to Himself.

perversion of God's love to man than the belief that, instead of accomplishing its design in its true sense, it consumes and annihilates it? For vague, mystical, and meaningless expressions about "the dissolution of individual personality into the divine essence," and the like, if we are to understand anything at all by them, can only refer to absolute annihilation.

Were love to God involuntary in man, a fixing of his affections apart from the direction of his will, it could not be the principle of morality, for morality rests in and proceeds from will. If, however, our description of the nature of love be correct and true, we have no need to prove that we are right in regarding it as a sentiment which is dependent upon man's free will. It would never enter our thoughts to doubt that the more perfect love is, the more fully does it embody the deepest stirrings and impulses of the soul, and the inmost desires of the heart. Neither could we suppose that the beginning of this love in us could be the result of an isolated resolve. It can be a matter of command and exhortation only so far as its rise and progress in the soul depends upon a persevering desire and effort upon man's part. And if this holy love can be begun in sinful man, estranged from God, only by the agency of His Spirit, we must at the same time remember that there is a yielding to this influence on man's part which proceeds from the innermost centre of his will.

We need not here enter minutely into the inquiry suggested by Kant's division of love into *pathological* and *practical*. It is said that we cannot feel pathological or passive love toward God, because He is not the object of sense, and practical love to Him is nothing more than ready obedience to His commands, *i.e.* to duties which are as if (*instar*) divine commands.* If this be so, it is of course the merest tautology to call this love the principle of morality. The distinction is quite erroneous; it is not exhaustive, nay, it even leaves out the real nature of love. It is evident that love to God is not pathological in Kant's sense of the word, for it has its origin, not in the natural, but in the

* *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, p. 13 (ed. 1791); *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, p. 121 f. (6th ed.). In the latter reference Kant admits what he seems to deny in the former, *viz.*, that practical love to God cannot, strictly speaking, be a matter of command.

spiritual life, and the spirit, so far from being trammelled by sense when it begins to love, now for the first time becomes conscious of its true freedom. But it is equally evident that this love is far more real and living than that abstraction of "practical love," wherein there is no real relation of person to person, and which, therefore, can only in a very indefinite sense be called love. Who can believe for a moment that Christ meant no more than this so-called "practical love," when He commanded us to love God "with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our mind"? And as regards love to man, Paul says concerning such merely outward action as this "practical love" is defined to be, that though it amount to the giving up of one's life for another, if that inner love be wanting which feels a real interest in the welfare of our brother, "it profiteth nothing," 1 Cor. xiii. 3.*

* What we have thus far developed essentially coincides with the conclusions of a highly-esteemed theologian (Dr. Hase, Professor of Theology at Jena, b. 1800), who in his *Theology* lays down the following propositions amongst others: "The surrender of free personality would be the destruction of love, whose unity consists in a duality of persons. Therefore our love to God involves the belief that we shall never be dissolved into the Absolute, but shall always retain our freedom and personality in order always to love God." (See Hase's *Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik*, 2nd ed. §§ 59, 101.) Though I cannot adopt this line of argument, a brief explanation is due from me, because a polemical remark of mine regarding Hase's theory, in the first edition of this work, elicited from him an elaborate reply (see *Jena-ische Literaturzeitung*, 1842, Nos. 109, 110). The aim of humanity is defined (§ 52), "the continual evolution of the infinite from the finite," *i.e.* (according to the explanations of the following §§), the effort of the spirit to realize the infinite, to become itself infinite. What is infinite in man is the effort, and the goal to which it tends; what is finite in him is only the starting-point, wherein man possesses only a limited energy proceeding from a power above him, and a relative freedom. But according to § 54, the finite is the simple negation of the infinite, and would therefore destroy itself if it became infinite. (This principle is thus expressed and applied in his *Christologie*, § 170: "God and man differ only quantitatively, *i.e.*, man aims after the infinite while God is the Infinite; hence the union of both is a contradiction, for each of the two natures differs from the other in the negation of that which by such a union it would appropriate, and by the appropriation of which it would necessarily become the other.") The solution of this mutually destructive contradiction lies (according to §§ 55-57) in the essence of religion, which is love to God. By love man makes the Infinite his own, without actually appropriating it, and thus without losing his individuality. But is the contradiction really solved by saying that this effort after infinity which constitutes the essence of man, and out of which the contradiction arises, must be virtually given up, and that man seeing the vanity of it, must content himself with something less, and as he cannot *be* God

If we had now fully to present the truth of our position that love to God is the main principle of the moral law in which all its contents centre, we should be obliged to demonstrate it scientifically, *i.e.*, to sketch in outline an ethical system which would include all moral determinations in the unity of this love. For though the setting up of this principle is by no means new, but as old as the Christian Church itself, we do not know of any

§ 3. A system of Ethics based on the principle of love.

must *love* God? Certainly not; the weakening and softening down of one of the terms of a contradiction is not its solution. And therefore we find in Hase himself, that notwithstanding the introduction of love, the contradiction reappears in the following sections. Together with love the effort of man to realize in himself the infinite again appears (§ 59), and Hase attempts a second solution of the contradiction, which (§ 61) is an adjunct to the first, being a second kind of approximation of the finite by love to the infinite. It is the path of holiness or a becoming Godlike, assimilation with God in never-ending approximation. Here, besides the former contradiction—that man must strive after a goal, the reaching of which would be the destruction of his being—a new contradiction is added; for an endless approximation which is always at the same, *i.e.* an infinite distance from the goal, is no approximation at all. This, indeed, is confirmed by the statement that this very approximation, whose reverse side is an endless distance of man from his goal, must (§ 78) at every point of his development be a state of sinfulness. Hase so far forgets the principle laid down by himself for the solution of the contradiction, that he begins his philosophic inquiry concerning the immortality of the soul (§ 98) thus:—"The contradiction that the infinite must be aimed at in finite life can only [*only*] be solved by the doctrine that this finite life is of infinite duration, during which the reality can never fully attain its ideal, but ever approximates thereto." If, on the one hand, the notion that the essence of man consists in his evolving the infinite from the finite—in his effort as finite to become infinite—be so self-contradictory and lead to such further incongruities, as this acute theologian himself perceives; and if, on the other hand, the principle of love to God is not only free from contradiction, but proves itself everywhere the key to the riddle of human life; surely our only logical course is to leave that notion to its fate, and to start from this principle in our philosophic treatment of theology, modifying by it our conclusions regarding the nature of man and his relation to God. Taking for granted the fact of our consciousness of God as the really existing One who reveals Himself as He is to His creature man, we need not resort to that strange contradiction between a longing for the infinite, and an inability to become so, in order to explain man's love to God. We should only require it if we had to show how the human spirit generated for itself the idea of a God as the object of its perfect love. The result of such a task would, after all, be nothing but a human ideal, the thought of a perfect man. The principles of Hase's theology seem to compel him actually to identify man with God; yea, this is already involved in them; and yet such a doctrine can never be truly held by a theologian who considers the Incarnation of the Logos impossible, because man's dwelling-place is only a subordinate planet, a transitory speck in the universe (*Jenaische Literaturzeitung*, 1842, p. 459).

systematic tracing of it out in all its parts to which we could refer. As we have no room here for such an exposition, we shall confine ourselves to a few general hints regarding the possibility of forming such an ethical system upon the basis named.

The tendency to mysticism as it develops itself in the growth of Christian consciousness has this characteristic :
 Mysticism in its relation to Christian Ethics. It is not content with making man's relation to God the highest and all-determining one, it makes it in fact the only one of which it takes any notice.

Herein it stands in striking contrast with the philosophy of our day ; for while this assigns quite a subordinate place to that which concerns the being of man, subordinating religion to philosophy and sentiment to logic, mysticism passing by what is subordinate, firmly maintains our relation to God in all its directness. While philosophy holds that the religious tendency in our consciousness is only an undeveloped starting-point of man's spirit, which must be subdued in order to his attaining real knowledge, mysticism makes this immediate reference to God the all in all. The tendency of mysticism, if logically carried out, is to turn its back upon the manifold relations of man to the world, upon his endeavours morally to construct and uphold these relations, and upon the various forms of social life wherein these endeavours are realized. Mysticism discards all these things, as far at least as they in any way concern this world ; and to destroy the reality to which they lay claim by plunging into the mere essence of God is the task of mystical contemplation.* But as it cannot wholly avoid

* The error of Mysticism, logically considered, consists in making all which is not actually God a negation of God. This doctrine is expressly stated in one of the remarkable positions of Eckart which the Bull of Pope John XXII. condemns. It is there said, *Petens hoc aut hoc malum petit et male, quia negationem boni et negationem Dei petit et orat Deum sibi negari.* See Gieseler's "Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte," vol. ii., part 2, p. 630, 3rd ed. Martensen calls this negation of the finite on the part of Mysticism by the well-known term applied by Jacobi to the system of Spinoza, "the Acosmism of mystical theology," Meister Eckart, p. 34. He endeavours to show that this Acosmism, looked at from another side, is Atheism (p. 40), and as regards Eckart, we must allow that he is right, for in his view God is absolutely predicateless being, "pure nothing." But Martensen himself can become enthusiastic about this continual alternation from nothing to nothing, which has a wonderful appearance of reality, and can discern in it something very profound and really philosophical : and this is

having something to do with the reality of things in active life, it endures it as a necessary evil, instead of regarding it with true and living sympathy. Among the noblest men of this type of mind the moral sentiments seem ever to be in a state of extreme contraction, wherein the tenderness of a life spent solely in private communion with God timidly shrinks from contact with the world ; and in determining their religious principles they forget to take possession of the world by spiritual conflict and untiring toil, and to direct and form all their relations towards it with a heart devoted to God. The moral life, instead of becoming a tree with a thousand beautiful flowers and fruits well-pleasing to God, growing out of the root of love to Him, thus remains buried in its root. Though mysticism, as distinct from speculative philosophy, makes the direct relation of God to the *ego* the practical principle of the inner life, we can never expect by it to build up a comprehensive and really complete system of Ethics. Strictly speaking, it excludes the possibility of such a system.

For the development of Christian Ethics some *motive power* of progress is required in order that, starting from the inner centre of love to God, it may go forth into all the minute and manifold ramifications of duty. This motive power cannot be derived from these external ramifications themselves, it must emanate from the centre, which cannot correctly be called the *principle* of morality unless it possess it. Now as love to God is an unconditional surrender of one's self to Him, and as God Himself is the primary and only absolute fountain of obligation for us, it is manifest that we can only attain that progress by taking cognizance of the fact that God has produced other beings beside Himself, and

evident from the affinity between his view and that of Eckart. When, for example (p. 100), he says, "the soul of all religious and speculative Ethics is the cognizance of the truth that, rightly understood, the demand that man shall do the will of God is nothing less than the demand that he shall realize God, shall embody God's nature in his own life ;"—it is evident that God can be delivered from that unreality in which He exists, according to the logical ideal, only by man, by passing over into the realm of the finite, wherein being is ever resolved into nothing. All forms of speculative mysticism, however they may differ in the principles from which they start, coincide in this philosophic view ! This logic of Martensen's, like Eckart's mysticism, makes all out of nothing, in order again to make nothing out of all.

has placed them in so close a relation to Himself, that they too possess the power of imposing obligations upon us. Christian Ethics, accordingly, finds this motive power of progression in the *Divine acts* alone. They are the exciting powers and developing principles in the growing system of Ethics which, like every science imbued with the spirit of Christianity, has to trace out and pursue the ways of God; upon them the introduction of every new duty depends. It is thus, by the coincidence of its several conclusions with its central principle, that any system of Ethics can set forth the real connection between the Being who is the primary source of obligation and other beings and spheres of fellowship towards which we have duties; but that connection is not one of substantial immanence or identity, as Pantheism would make out. ✓

God having by His creative will called a world into existence, and this world possessing, in virtue of its creation by God (for God cannot create a nonentity, an unreal shadow), a derived reality, as distinct from God's essence as it is dependent on His will, it certainly behoves us not wilfully to deny as far as possible this reality to the world, and to ignore the inexhaustible fulness of its relations toward us; but, on the contrary, to mould these relations into a moral system upon the principle of love to God. The first great central conception here is that of *creation*. According to its true import, the origin of the world from God is on the one hand no mere necessary evolution of God's essence, but God's free act, whereby alone other finite beings can have any existence distinct from Him, the infinite and absolutely self-contained spirit; and on the other hand, no arbitrary setting up of something wholly foreign to and destitute of any inner relation to God, but a true self-manifestation of God in His works, a permanent embodiment of His Ideas. All terrestrial beings, therefore, possess a certain dignity as the creation of God, a dignity which is antecedent to the possibility of a moral relation to Him, and which makes them the objects of certain duties on our part. It is worthy of remark here, that true Mysticism is wholly wanting in a right understanding of what creation is; it has reduced the

What these
Divine acts
are.

Creation.

world, if not to nonentity, at least to a mere shadowy existence,* and instead of creation it entertains the notion of indistinct emanations, confounded partially with a dualistic element. When applied to practice, we often find (as has been above remarked) these opposite views coming into collision with each other in Mysticism :—thinking to resolve the world into mere nothingness, in its anxious dread of it it sets it up face to face with God in a dualistic manner wholly impenetrable by Him. The truth which Revelation declares, that God contemplates the existence of the world with complacency (Genesis i. 31), is of incalculable importance for Ethics.

The second great central conception is the divine act of making beings who, as personal, *bear the image of their Creator*. This truth is beyond measure fruitful in the development of Christian Ethics ; a wide and rich sphere of moral states and relations is opened up by it ; herein consists the specific dignity which belongs to man as man, and the most comprehensive basis for the building up of human life in the relations between man and man and in society generally.

The third great central conception, implied as it is in the second, is the highest act of God's love in the *Incarnation of the Logos*, in the *redemption of fallen humanity* by the Son of God, in the *establishment of a divine kingdom* upon earth. The conception of a Divine kingdom is of the highest importance in an Ethical system, but the establishment of such a kingdom can only be accomplished in our sinful race by Redemption, and Redemption again is possible only through the Incarnation of the Son of God.

It is quite natural that these successive acts and inferences should, upon the Hegelian system, be subject to the reproach of formalism. It is clear, that from such a quarter, every religious system of Ethics is liable to this reproach, for it is theistic, and rests upon the conception of creation ; whereas that system thinks to obtain real transitions and inferences by making the world the self-realization of God, and the moral principles of

* As in the 26th of Eckart's propositions : Omnes creaturae sunt unum purum nihil ; non dico quod sint quid modicum vel aliquid, sed quod sint unum purum nihil. See Gieseler, as before, p. 633 ; Schmidt, as before, p. 675.

human life mere momenta in the process. In order to satisfy such a claim as this, we must forego nothing less than that which alone can raise us above this transitory world,—fellowship with a personal God.

Division B.

The real principle of Sin.

Having by our investigations thus far discovered that LOVE
 § 1. Man's TO GOD is the real principle of moral good, it is
 estrangement evident that moral evil as the antithesis to moral
 from God. good must have its inner principle in the want
 of this love, in the *estrangement of man from God*. Sin is
 certainly a perversion of our relations to the world also; but as
 our true relations to the world arise out of our true relation to
 God, the derangement of the former is necessarily involved in
 the derangement of the latter.

That this estrangement of man from God is in itself the
 This taught primary sin and the source of all other depravity, is
 by St. Paul. intimated by the Apostle Paul himself, for (Rom.
 i. 21–23) he derives the awful degradation of the heathen as
 sunk in vices of all kinds, from their apostasy from the wor-
 ship of the true God to the idolatry of the creature; and he
 describes it as a righteous ordainment of God that those who
 will not hold fellowship with Him can no longer maintain the
 supremacy of the spirit over nature, but sink into the most
 ignominious servitude to fleshly lusts. The immediate punish-
 ment of that one sinful deed whereby they have degraded the
 pure and godlike into the contrasts and contradictions of
 natural and human life, consists (v. 25) in their becoming the
 prey of vile affections (πάθη ἀτιμίας, v. 26). And in this state
 man misapplies and debauches that very power of will and of
 reflection which distinguishes him from the brutes until it
 becomes the instrument of degrading him below them by the
 unnatural distortion of natural affections, and the invention of

fleshly lusts which contradict alike the order and the end of nature (v. 26, 27).

But the apostle declares the most grievous fall of the human race to be their *inner apostasy from God*, that they do not reverence Him, nor are thankful, but turn the truth of God into a lie, and, forgetting the Creator, honour created nature and humanity more; and those immoral abominations are in his view the natural exponents of this fundamental sin, the revelation of this inward perversion. The whole argument of the apostle involves the presupposition that a strong bias towards God has been naturally implanted in the spirit of man,—an inclination “to feel after Him and find Him,” Acts xvii. 27. This presupposition of the original nobleness of human nature cannot be more insultingly trodden under foot than by the notion that it has from the beginning been natural to man to render divine honours to the powers of nature. Far rather is it true that as God’s work of creation first rested in man when He had created him in His image (Gen. ii. 2), so man can only find rest in God; as it is well expressed in a beautiful saying of Hugo of St. Victor,—“it is the glory of man that he is satisfied with no good below the highest, namely God.” Indeed, this tendency of man’s spirit towards God is inseparable from the conception of his divine origin, and what has been stigmatised as naturalism in the doctrines of the Reformers concerning man’s original righteousness is the very thing which elevates it above the teaching of the Catholic Church. When the individual stifles within him this tendency, the religious principles of society may still hold him up and preserve him by moral force from grosser degeneracy; but when society breaks loose from this basis, the simplest principles of moral truth lose their binding power, and moral disorder inevitably ensues.

The important distinction, however, between a developed and an undeveloped consciousness in man must not be overlooked. We have already seen regarding moral goodness that the full force of its obligation is not manifest from the outset, and the same holds true with reference to moral evil. In multitudes the consciousness of God is weakened and depressed, and appears only as an indefinite impulse after something higher and more satisfy-

Man’s
consciousness
of God often
undeveloped.

ing, as a vague presentiment of an eternal destiny beyond this transitory world. No man who is not given over to obduracy can get rid of the conviction that he has by sin violated these inward stirrings and impulses. But he may not yet be conscious that thus he has also become an alien from the living God, for his consciousness of God may still be only an indefinite and glimmering presentiment.

Sin, therefore, is manifest in its true character when the demand of holiness in the conscience, presenting itself to the man as one of *loving submission to God*, is put from him with aversion. Here sin appears as it really is, a turning away from God; and while the man's guilt is enhanced, there ensues a benumbing of the heart resulting from the crushing of those higher impulses. This is what is meant by the reprobate state of those who reject Christ and will not believe the gospel, so often spoken of in the New Testament; this unbelief is just the closing of the heart against the highest love. The manifestation of Christ in the history of the race and of the individual involves a *κρίσις*. Not only does it work salvation in one and not in another, but in whomsoever it does not lead to "a rising again" it produces a deeper "fall" (Luke ii. 34); to him who does not receive Christ as the corner-stone of his hope, He becomes a stone of stumbling on which he shall be broken (Matt. xxi. 42, 44; 1 Peter ii. 6-8).

But sin is not only the absence of love to God; for with the negation of our true relation to Him there is the affirmation of a false one. Unbelief in the true God and the revelation of His holiness always involves a contrary belief, if it be only in the sufficiency of one's own critical and sceptical understanding. Upon the disappearance of the divine principle, there immediately ensues the entrance of a principle opposed to God, according to the saying of Christ, "he who is not with me is against me." Man cannot abandon his true relation to God, without setting up an idol in God's stead. What is this idol? Christian theories of sin have often answered, *the creature generally*. They have made the essence of sin to consist in the love of the creature in place of the Creator, in a perversion of the due relations in which the objects of our desire should stand

Sin a wilful
turning away
from God.

Sin defined as
love of the
creature.

to each other, whereby a relative good is preferred to the absolute one. This view of evil often appears in early Christian theology, especially in Augustine,* who describes it thus: — *Conversio a bono majori ad minus bonum, a bono incommutabili ad bona commutabilia, defectio ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est, perversitas voluntatis a summa substantia detortae ad infimam*. It appears, too, in many of the Fathers, and still more clearly expressed during the Middle Ages in the works of the Schoolmen and Mystics; in more modern times, also, it has been advocated variously,† for example, by Leibnitz in his *Theodicée*.‡

Let us review the results of our past inquiry, in order to test this definition of the nature of sin. We have found that the inner essence of moral good is love to God. We saw that the true import of love was the surrender of self—the man's coming out of himself, in order to live in and for God. Now, in the view of evil above described, love of the creature usurps the place of this love to God. The creature is a very wide term, but in the entire sphere denoted by the word no distinction is more general and universal than that of personal and impersonal. This distinction seems to correspond with the twofold tendency of sinful inclination and of fleshly lust. According thereto we have in the first class perverted inclinations or sins of vanity,

* *Contra Julianum Pelagianum*, lib. i. cap. 3; *De libero arbitrio*, lib. i. c. 15, 16, lib. iii. c. 1; *De civitate Dei*, lib. xii. c. 7, 8; *Confess.* lib. vii. c. 16. We find a similar thought in Augustine's definition of human perverseness; *est uti fruendis et frui utendis*. By comparing *De civit. Dei*, lib. xi. c. 25, and *De doctr. Christ.*, lib. i. c. 3, 4, it is evident that the *frui* refers to the *bona æterna*, and the *uti* to the *bona temporalia*.

† If the primary conception of the old High German *pōsi* (böse) really were, as Graff (*Sprachschatz*, part 3, p. 216) seems to think, weakness, insignificance, nothingness, the derivation of our German word would favour the view above stated. But it is much more probable, as the brothers Grimm in their German *Wörterbuch* suggest, that the word *posi* was originally akin to the Middle Age Latin *bausiare*, *fallere*, *decipere*, *bausia*, *felonia*. The Gothic *bausis* answering on this supposition to *pōsi* would indicate an affinity with the Lithuanian *baisus*, "horrid," "frightful," and with *besas*, "Devil," for which analogous forms occur in the Slavonic languages. What is said in the *Wörterbuch* (vol. ii., p. 259), that *böse* primarily denotes "boiling indignation," does not agree with this.

‡ See, for example, part 1, sect. 33. According to Leibnitz, this view of sin harmonizes with its being traced back to a mere privation, and also with his abstract derivation of moral good from purely metaphysical conclusions.

love of approbation, ambition ; and in the second class longing after the pleasures of sense in their manifold forms,—covetousness, and so forth. When applied to the inquiry concerning the nature of sin, however, the tendency towards the impersonal does not stand the test. External things, in their true and normal relation to personality, are only *means*, and they remain so, though their use may be perverted. The man who loves earthly things instead of God, really loves himself in them—seeks, by means of them, his own gratification. It may indeed happen that the things to which he enslaves himself by sin, instead of procuring for him that self-gratification which he seeks, increase his restlessness, want, and pain, and yet he cannot forsake them. This, however, is experienced chiefly in the more advanced stages of moral corruption, and in some one evil tendency, and being narrow in its range, and not of universal import, we cannot determine by it the fundamental principle of sin.

Again, it is maintained that the perverted disposition which in sin takes the place of love to God is an inclination or affection towards *personal* creatures, that sin positively defined is inordinate love to mankind, they being made the highest objects of affection and effort, whose fellowship is only a *bonum commutabile et minus*. Is this, we ask, possible? The only true and permanent bond of union between mankind and the individual man is our common relation to God ; all true fellowship among men has its foundation in God (1 John i. 3 ; iv. 7, 12, 16) ; the recognition of man's relation to God, which (as we have seen in the first part of this chapter) is his true dignity, is necessary to all true love, and how can the man who shuts his heart against Him who is Himself Love, give up that exclusiveness for the sake of his fellow-men ? Man having by sin turned away from God, and become estranged from his fellowship, belies, at the same time, all true fellowship with his species, and opposes himself to them, as if he existed solely for himself. Sin, indeed, in some of its forms, seems to promote fellowship ; vanity seeks a circle of friends by whom it may be admired, sensuality makes alliances for the gratification of its passions, and ambition cannot accomplish its plans without forming associations with others. But it is clear as noonday that such

All true love
of man
springs from
love to God.

fellowship is only apparent, unreal at the core, and even in these forms of evil the sinner almost always has self for his end. Sin may urge him to form connections with others, but it is only to use them as means to his own selfish end, and without his ever coming out of his selfish isolation. We cannot, moreover, gainsay the well-known testimony of experience, that alliances, arising merely out of lust, beget, at least on the female side, a kind of tender affection, which does not shrink even from the greatest dangers and sacrifices, in order to shield the object of its desires from injury or to comfort him in sufferings. The physical impress which such facts bear betrays only too plainly their affinity with similar phenomena among the lower animals, so that we cannot recognize in them any purely human fellowship. If sin could beget true fellowship, it would teach men to live in and for others, but this can be done by holy love alone, which, wherever it be found, has its origin in God. Whoever has the power to deny himself, and in genuine self-surrender to live for others, he has it from God, and he lives in God, however undeveloped his knowledge of God may be.

The idol, therefore, which man in sin sets up in the place of God can be none other than *himself*. He makes self and self-satisfaction the highest aim of his life. To self his efforts ultimately tend, however the modes and directions of sin may vary. The innermost essence of sin, the ruling and penetrating principle in all its forms, is *selfishness*.*

Man must be a personal being, an *ego*, if he be capable of holy love ; and if he excludes holy love from his inner life, his natural self-love degenerates into selfishness, the disease of self, the corruption of self-love.† Our very conception of life implies aims and interests which give it spring and activity. Not even the most passive disposition can endure the millstone of empty objectless existence, devoid alike of wants and their

* Among modern writers upon the doctrine of sin, Tholuck, in particular, determines in like manner the essence of sin. See his work, *von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, p. 27, ed. 7.

† According to the derivation of our German word, *Selbstsucht* = *Seuche*, "malady," *der Selbstheit*.

supply, of desires and their satisfaction, of efforts and their attainment; the will that wills nothing, the movement which is directed to no goal. Now, if love with the various aims and interests which spring from it be not the ruling principle of life, the want of something else to fill the void is itself a very strong incitement to the development and strengthening of the selfish principle, causing it to pervade the entire life.

This impulse to adopt one or other of these contrasted moral principles as the spring of action, and to subordinate our conduct in life to it, is somewhat modified by the following circumstance. Between the ranges of these two principles there seems to be a neutral sphere of action embracing a variety of employments, in the discharge of which the individual is actuated neither by selfishness nor by love, but perhaps simply by the effort to do his duty faithfully. The motive power here consists in the endless variety of the several tasks themselves which excites the physical or mental energies of the worker in each particular case; the labour is prosecuted by good and bad, by pious and godless alike. This intermediate sphere of life, whose elements possess the incitement to their right performance, apart from the moral sentiments of the agent, widens and encroaches upon those other spheres, wherein selfishness or love is the ruling principle in proportion as the organization of society becomes more manifold and complicated. But it is only the outside of life which seems thus devoid of any moral qualities, and they alone who confine their attention to particular instances are liable to be deceived by it; no one who has not sunk into weak stupidity and dull artificiality can be wholly without stirrings of mind wherein one or the other moral motive, selfishness or love, makes itself felt, and determines those courses of action, right or wrong, thus making them constituent parts of a correct or perverted moral life.

If the practical relation of the man to himself, to his own separate interests, be the point wherein all his sinful impulses and efforts, however they may radiate and cross one another, centre, it becomes clear that sin is not a mere want of principle, but in itself a perverted principle, not the breaking up of unity,

but a false concentration of human life as a whole. The true unity is dissolved in order to set up a false one in its place. If sin had only the negative meaning of *ἀταξία*, "disorder," the particularizing and carrying of it out in various wicked acts would still be only the evolution of the good principle within; each sinful deed could be realized only by the negation or rejection of a good impulse which was still developing itself. That this is not the case; that sin, as we shall presently see, develops its own principle in the manifoldness of particular aims and acts, is strong evidence that there is a *positive element* in evil, however negative may be its form.

If we once become cognizant of this, sin can no longer be looked upon as a disorder which concerns only the outward sphere of life,—a slight soiling of outward life which might be shaken off like dust from the feet,—nor as a hindrance which checks the endeavour of the *ego*, in itself pure, to realize itself externally; it must be regarded as a positive derangement which has penetrated to the very centre and core of our life.

That which makes sin to be sin, and which is the evil of evil, is the *selfish isolation* of the man, which it involves. There are cases—with some it is the rule of life—where a man keeps himself free from wild ungovernable passions, and only seldom is guilty of overt acts which conscience recognizes as sins; yet, in his inmost heart, "the *I*, that gloomy despot," rules supreme; he stands alone in the world, shut up within himself, and in a chaos of selfish endeavours, preferences, and antipathies;—without any true participation in the joys and sorrows of mankind;—estranged from God. When the heart that has long been in this state comes to know by experience the sweets of fellowship with God, and is thus awakened to a higher consciousness, it looks back upon its past condition as one of the deepest darkness and basest depravity, even though its outward life had been throughout upright. And this is a true instinct, because, in such a state, the principle of sin, though shut up within, rules with no less real power, than where its dominion is manifest in glaring wickedness and vice and a wild disordering of the outward life.

The essence
of sin is
selfish
isolation.

Against this tracing of sin to selfishness as its root it has

been objected, not only that, in spite of its claims to reality,
 Objections. in contrast with the description of sin discussed
 1. above, it is merely formal,* but also that though
 professing to express what is positive in the nature of sin, it is
 2. // nothing more than a negation in disguise.†

As to the first objection, we must partially admit it. What
 This view we have here described as the perverted principle
 neither in all sinful beings seems to be only formal and
 merely abstract when contrasted with the multitude of
 formal ; special interests and endeavours, desires and
 pleasures, in which it is continually embodied. But is not
 this always the apparent relation of a principle viewed by
 itself to its outward manifestations ? At the same time, we
 firmly maintain that this selfishness, which is so obvious in
 direct self-seeking, is not merely the formal basis of all sorts
 of sinful actions, but is in itself a reality ; in other words, that
 besides its outward manifestation in various and multiform
 acts, it is itself present with unvarying certainty as an element
 in all,—present in the form of an effort after a state of satis-
 faction, and a desire to remain in such a state when it is once
 attained. Man may deliberately make self and self-interest
 his motive and aim and the unconditional rule of his conduct
 in the midst of all his varied purposes and acts. We say he
 may do so, because life teaches us that he really does so con-
 tinually. And when he does so, we say that he has entirely
 given himself up to moral evil, though perhaps his boundless
 selfishness is concealed beneath a behaviour and course of
 action higher and more spiritual. What is known and definitely
 manifest regarding this tendency helps us to understand what
 is unknown and indefinite.

This consideration is, we think, a reply to the *second* objec-
 Nor merely tion likewise, so far as it pertains to this part of
 negative. our inquiry to examine the ground of it. When
 man makes the satisfaction of self the highest and sole aim of
 his life, so that every other aim whatever be its name is only
 a means thereto, it is clear that this is not a mere negation,
 but something really *positive*—a perverted affirmation of self.

* Vatke, Hall. Jahrbücher 1840, No. 132, p. 1049.

† Ritter, Ueber das Böse, p. 11 ; compare pp. 4, 5.

From what has now been said, it is hardly requisite to guard
 § 2. DISTINC- against the misunderstanding that this view of the
 TION BETWEEN nature of sin makes the natural desire for our own
 SELF-LOVE welfare wrong. Belief in the reality of God's
 AND SELFISH- government of the world, and in its power to
 NESS. realize itself in actual life, must lead man to the conclusion
that a life spent in obedience to the truth ever conduces to his
own most thorough and lasting satisfaction. But it by no
 means follows that as in evil so in well-doing this satisfaction is
 the end and motive. We must here bear in mind the difference
 between a true and a false perception of the nature of happi-
 ness and the best means of securing it. It is an arbitrary
 begging of the question to put that desire of happiness which
 is inseparable from the striving after holiness in the category
 of *aim* or *end*, as if it were the actuating principle. But
 apart from this there is an immeasurable difference between
 the pursuit of a happiness which the man knows to be universal
 in its range, and that maxim which makes the happiness of
 man's own self his highest aim. It is very easy, by leaving
 out one qualifying consideration after another, to arrive at last
 at a point where the most striking contrasts meet, but no one
 should fancy that he has thus defined or settled anything.

These remarks have brought us face to face with a prevailing
 conception in morals which, viewed in the light of
 Self-love is more than the instinct of self-preservation. our investigations as to the nature of sin, seems to
 be rather a knotty point. I refer to the concep-
 tion of *self-love*. As an ethical conception it must
 be carefully distinguished from that merely natural impulse
 towards self-preservation which man has in common with the
 lower animals. The relations of the subject to himself involved
 in self-love are of the nature of moral obligation ; whereas the
 instinct which every living creature feels to preserve its life,
 and keep itself in a state conformable to its structure, is merely
 a necessity of nature. Now if selfishness, wherein the *ego*
 makes self the highest and final aim of all its efforts and acts,
 be the essence of sin, how can any effort or action which makes
 self its aim be in any true sense moral ? If this were granted,
 would not the logical inference be that evil consists in the
 excess of something which is in itself good (*nimius amor sui*) ?
 Thus the difference between good and evil would be made only

one of degree, and holiness would be nothing more than a moderating and controlling of a natural tendency in itself good. It is evident how varying and uncertain the boundary would in this case be between good and evil, especially when we remember that only a few of those who are ruled by selfishness ever arrive at any definite consciousness of it as, in the manner above described, the principle of their life; most people blindly follow it, for when self-interest and duty clash they sacrifice the latter to any particular aim which lays claim to their attention, without referring their act to the general rule which lies at the foundation of it.

These considerations threaten almost to exclude self-love entirely from Christian ethics, as an impure conception, and derived from a suspicious quarter. Self-love a means to an unselfish end. And it tells but little in its favour that in everyday life we find it spoken of as that which every one owes to himself. For how many an opinion, which morally viewed is more than doubtful, drags out its existence with invincible tenacity as a traditional principle from generation to generation! And how conflicting and contradictory, according to the ordinary view, are the principles which pertain to the sphere of rights when compared with those that belong to the sphere of duties! A course of action which concerns the man himself, and which is usually looked upon as proceeding from a justifiable self-love, from a becoming anxiety for one's own culture, for life and health—the duty of preserving the dominion of the spirit over sensational nature, or the duty of guarding one's own person from wanton injury, and so forth—how can all this be allowed a place in ethics save in so far as a moral value can be assigned to it from another point of view, in so far, for example, as the moral activity and influence of the man in and for society is dependent upon it? Thus Fichte, for instance, explains these duties, and he logically demands that to each individual every one else should be an aim for his own sake, but that each should be to himself only a means and instrument of fulfilling the moral law.*

Yet were we to allow that all the demands which conscience, enlightened by Christianity, makes upon a man in the way of duties towards himself, could fairly be

Difficulties of this view.

* System der Sittenlehre, p. 341 f.

deduced from some such principle as Fichte's, we could not rest satisfied with the result. For, first of all, it is plain that the moral duty of self-denial is thus transformed into an ideal self-abnegation such as we find in mysticism, especially in its doctrine of pure love. And as this moral principle applies to every one it becomes an obvious contradiction; for individuals are ever to deny themselves a dignity which they know that every one else is morally bound to recognize in them. But we cannot allow that this explanation is by any means adequate in order rightly to justify the duties referred to. Circumstances continually arise wherein the so-called duties to self, rendered justifiable and obligatory on these grounds, would no longer be binding; *e.g.*, when any such activity for the sake of society is for ever put an end to by imprisonment for life or involuntary solitude.

In Holy Scripture, moreover, we find that self-love is not only justified but enjoined; *e.g.*, Matt. xxii. 39; Romans xiii. 9; Gal. v. 14; James ii. 8. If in these passages it is not expressly commanded, its obligation is recognized, for we are told that the love of our neighbour is to equal our self-love.*

From what has already been said concerning the nature of love, it is unnecessary to prove that the conception of *self-love* is in some degree inconsistent because the expression is a figurative one. The New Testament uses it only in quotations from the Old, and then in a cursory and matter of course way. If we look closely into the matter, the conception implies that the subject is for his own sake and at the same time the object of a moral duty; there is something which each man owes himself.

* Sartorius (Lehre von der heiligen Liebe, i., p. 65) remarks concerning this precept, "It does not say, *as thou lovest thyself so love thy neighbour*, but it calls upon us to make not *ourselves*, but *ourselves with others*, the object of our human love." If I rightly understand this opinion, it means that ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν is to be understood not in the sense of a comparison or parallel, but that we are to put our neighbour in the place of ourselves as the object of love, in which case the thought shall be expressed, "henceforth love thy neighbour as hitherto thou hast loved thyself." But such an interpretation is altogether forced, it is indeed distinctly excluded by the manner in which the apostle (Eph. v. 28-33) explains the words, ἀγαπᾷ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα ὡς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα, or ὡς ἑαυτόν. To the ὡς σεαυτόν we can supply nothing but ἀγαπᾷς.

Whence arises this obligation towards one's self?

It surely cannot arise from the claims of the individual *ego* in and for itself, and as we find it by experience True basis of self-love. in a state of sin and estranged from God. It may indeed assert itself and maintain its right to make itself felt in its natural wants and endeavours, but there is nothing of a moral character in this, it is only the natural instinct of self-preservation which is thus made the object of reflection.

As all moral relations and duties owe their reality to their connection with one primary duty to God, namely, Man's own relation to God. our love to Him, man cannot truly be the object of moral duty on his own part, save in his relation to God and by his moral dignity arising therefrom. This sense of one's own moral dignity can only arise from the knowledge that man was created in the image of God and is appointed to realize in his individual life God's eternal designs. And since the entrance of hindering and restraining sin, this sense of self-respect can be raised again to its true reality only by the power of redemption. It is therefore not his natural self, but "his better self" adopted into fellowship with God, and thereby sanctified, whose dignity man has to recognize and to reverence in the duties which he owes himself. He must first lose himself—give himself up to God—in order to receive himself from God as the object of well-grounded moral duty. It is only so far as a man's conduct towards himself is directed and controlled from this point of view that it can form a part of a system of morals.

It appears, therefore, that man's relations towards himself may be threefold. First, there is the natural instinct Three stages of self-love. of SELF-PRESERVATION, which is not, to begin with, of a moral character, but the conception of which includes the natural desire of man for a state of satisfaction conformable with his individual nature. Upon the awakening of his moral consciousness two contrasted paths present themselves to this natural impulse, the one downwards, the other upwards. It may sink down into SELFISHNESS, or it may rise into MORAL SELF-LOVE by self-denying obedience to the divine law, whose germ is love to God.*

* The problem here discussed is alluded to also by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa* in two places, viz. p. ii. 1, qu. 27, art. 4; p. ii. 2, qu. 25, art. 7; but he does not enter minutely upon the investigation of it.

Holy Scripture confirms the principle that selfishness is the root of sin in various ways. When Christ would testify of His own perfect sanctity, He declares that He sought not His own will, not His own glory, but the will and glory of His Father, John v. 30, vii. 18, viii. 50; see also Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 39. The Apostle Paul also, when he points to Christ as our pattern, declares that "Christ pleased not Himself," Rom. xv. 3. Accordingly, in several sayings of our Lord, and of the Apostle Paul, the great turning-point between the old life, under the prevailing principle of sin, and the new life originated by the divine Spirit, is described as a man's ceasing to live to himself, to seek his own, to love a worldly selfish life, Rom. xiv. 7, 8; Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. v. 15; Phil. ii. 3-8, 21; 1 Cor. x. 24, 33; Luke xiv. 26; John xii. 25; in a word, that the power of selfishness must be crushed and broken in the man. Now, what is to be broken down and crushed in a man when true holiness begins, must be the real principle of sin. So likewise in that simple yet profound parable of the Prodigal Son, his fall begins with the significant fact of his demanding that his own portion of goods should be separated from his father's, and he separates himself wholly from his father and his father's house, Luke xv. 12, 13; moreover, the true and normal relation of the son to the father is afterwards described (v. 31) as being ever with the father, and all that the father has being his. The account of the fall also in Genesis coincides with this, where we find just what beforehand we should have expected, that the true nature of sin was distinctly revealed in its first beginnings. The examination and confirmation of this, we must, however, postpone to a later part of our inquiry.

There is a singular correspondence in Holy Scripture between its account of the beginning of human evil in the fall, and its description of evil in its perfected state, as the culmination of the development of ungodliness at the end of the world's history, representing it both as the solution of the complicated enigma, and as the revelation of an awful mystery which shall be punished by the Lord, 2 Thess. ii. 8. When Paul says concerning this *ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀμαρτίας*, this *ἄνομος* and *ἀντικείμενος* that "as God he sitteth in the temple of God" *ἀποδεικνύς ἑαυτὸν ὅτι ἐστὶ θεός* (2 Thess. ii. 3, 4), he characteristic-

ally describes the highest possible ambition of selfishness, wherein the creature appropriates to himself unbounded dignity and independence, and lays claim to the worship that belongs to God. And history abundantly testifies how nearly human pride has sometimes approached this standard. No one can fail to notice the close and striking correspondence of this *mysterium iniquitatis* with the words "Ye shall be as Gods," in the account of the fall, and with the third temptation put before our Lord at the beginning of His public ministry as recorded by St. Matthew.*

The Fathers and the schoolmen, referring to Sirach x. 15 (according to one reading of that passage), usually make *superbia* *ὑπερηφανία* the beginning of sin in our first parents, and the fruitful root of all sinfulness in this posterity. This is the view of Augustine† and of Thomas Aquinas.‡ The latter, however, in order to harmonize the various authorities which he quotes, distinguishes between the principle (*causa interior principium*), the root (*radix*), and the beginning (*initium*) of sin,§ and makes the last only to be *superbia*. But all these theologians define this *superbia* to be the presumptuous desire after unrestrained independence, as the effort to usurp the place of God, and it is evident that they have selfishness in view as the essence of sin, though in rather a one-sided aspect of it, regarding it rather too closely in the light of the first sin. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, moreover, in other places, expressly name

* See Ernesti's remarks regarding the passage above referred to in his work upon the "Origin of Sin," according to the Pauline view (vol. ii. p. 17-33). Regarding my remark in earlier editions of this work, that Paul places selfishness at the head of a long list of sins (2 Tim. iii. 2-5), I grant the force of Ernesti's remark, that neither completeness nor systematic unity should be sought for in those passages. What Ernesti says, regarding the applicability of the other passages cited, depends, for the most part, especially regarding Rom. xiv. 7, 8, Phil. ii. 3-8, upon an interpretation of these Pauline declarations which I cannot adopt.

† *De civitate Dei*, lib. xiv. c. 13, 14; *Enchir.* c. 45; *De Genesi ad litt.*, lib. viii. c. 14; lib. xi. c. 30; *De pecc. meritis et rem.*, lib. ii. c. 17; *De spiritu et littera*, c. 7; and in many other places.

‡ *Summa*, p. ii. 1, qu. 84, art. 2; p. ii. 2, qu. 162, art. 6, 7.

§ See p. ii. 1, qu. 77, art. 4; qu. 84, art. 1 and 2. From what we have already said (p. 95), it is evident that a distinction must be made between the principle of all sin, and the beginning of human sin, which as a phenomenon in time, must have been a particularizer of this principle. This will become more evident in the second part of our inquiry.

amor sui in contrast with *amor dei* as the source of sin,* and the profound Maximus names φιλαυτία.† We find this true view of the nature of sin, as we might expect, among the theologians of the Middle Ages, and especially among the Mystics; the germ of it, as stated in Hugo and Richard a St. Victore, is more accurately developed in Tauler and in the *Theologia Germanica*.

The Reformers Luther‡ and Calvin,§ and the oldest Protestant theologians, made *unbelief* the beginning and root of all human sin; but this unbelief, as we have already seen, involves a turning away from the love of God to love of self, and is thus one of the earliest manifestations of selfishness; so that there is hardly any difference between their view and our own. Some of the older dogmatists of our Church rightly name disobedience as the primary sin, but to put this forth in opposition to selfishness or pride is to confound the form which all sin assumes with the generating principle of sin. Baumgarten-Crusius supposes a twofold source of evil in man, our fleshly nature and self-love,|| and the fact that we often meet with similar views to this in our modern philosophical and theological literature witnesses how readily it occurs to those who reflect upon sin. Yet in the fuller carrying out of this theory, which is rather vague and mistaken as to its historical bearings, it is admitted that whatever excites the one principle excites the other also, and that in the manifestations of the one the other also appears,¶ so that the out-

* *E.g.*, *De civ. Dei*, lib. xiv. c. 28. *Summa*, p. ii. 1, qu. 77, art. 4.

† Κεφάλαια περὶ γῆς ἀγάπης, c. 4, § 26.

‡ Commentary on Genesis, chap. iii. ver. 1. Elsewhere, however, Luther often names selfishness and pride as distinct and primary sins.

§ *Instit. Relig. Christ.* lib. ii. c. 1, sec. 4. Bellarmine strongly combats this view as opposed to the theory that pride is the root of sin, *De amissione gratiae et statu peccati*, lib. iii. c. 5. And we coincide with what he says regarding unbelief, that it cannot be regarded as the actual beginning of sin, but presupposes a motive which already must be sinful. Bellarmine rightly makes pride this motive.

|| Lehrbuch der Christl. Sittenlehre, § 43, p. 219. Among more recent dissertations upon this subject the treatise of Klaiber, "The New Testament Doctrine of Sin and Redemption," traces it back to selfishness and sense, yet without further developing the thought; for this very useful work sketches the doctrine of sin, only in its general outlines. *Krabbe's* treatise, "the doctrine of sin and death," p. 84 f., is more accurate.

¶ As before, p. 226.

ward distinction of the two is removed and the necessity of uniting them is recognized. It would indeed make our conception of evil uncertain and fluctuating were its nature to be traced from two independent sources, for its unity depends upon its principle. And there is no reason why these two forms of human desire should be included under one name, nor is there any security that in addition to them a third and then a fourth element may not be added with equal reason as fundamentals of depravity. We could not maintain any truly scientific conception of evil did we abide by such a result as this. If, therefore, this supposed mutual working of "self-love" and "sense" can be proved to be one and the same, the unity of both may be found in a third principle which is above both. All careful observation of the manifold forms of sin witnesses that whenever we see manifestations of unbridled sensuality, selfishness is always there;* but we do not find

* Nägelsbach's "Homeric Theology," in the sixth section, concerning "Sin and Atonement," presents a striking parallel to this argument. Testimonies regarding sin in the classics. According to him, the Greeks, and Homer in particular, looked upon the essence of sin as twofold—infatuation, *ἄτη*, and selfishness, *ὑβρις*. See K. O. Müller's *Eumenides of Æschylus*, pp. 129, 136. Nägelsbach understands this not of two different kinds of sin, but of two aspects of it, and he therefore considers that in Homer's view selfishness is the original source of sin (pp. 284, 288). *ὑβρις*, however, among the Greeks, expressed a much narrower conception than selfishness in Christian Ethics.

None of the ancient philosophers investigated the nature of evil so thoroughly as Plato. In the *De legibus*, v. 731, he derives all kinds of sin from excessive self-love; τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς γὰρ πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστω γίγνεται ἑκαστότε; this statement, however, while it fairly represents the Platonic view of the nature of sin, is too isolated to warrant us in adducing Plato as a witness for the view of evil here unfolded. This we find more clearly indicated in the *Timæus* (86), where Plato speaks of evil as *ἄνοια*, and divides it into two kinds, *μανία* and *ἀμαθία* (Bekker, 3rd ed., ii. 129). The explanation given in his *Sophista* is analogous to this, according to which the wickedness of the soul κακία περὶ ψυχὴν is twofold. The one γένος, what men call *πονηρία*, is described as *disease*, and here the Platonic doctrine κακὸς ἐκὼν οὐδείς comes in; compare the way in which Plato reduces the moral to this conception of the νόσος in the *Timæus* (as above). The identity of this disease with the inner sedition (στάσις) of the soul is then shown, and cowardice, licentiousness, and unrighteousness are included in it. The other γένος is *ignorance* (ἄγνοια corresponding to *ἄσχος* in the physical sphere). Here appears the Platonic conception of the *ἄμετρον* as a designation for evil; see concerning this Ed. Müller's *Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten*, vol. i. p. 64 f. In this passage, indeed, Plato only applies it to one kind of evil, the *ἄγνοια*, but these conceptions, like that of νόσος in its ethical sense, are not accurately defined by Plato.

that where there is selfishness sensuality is also at work. Even this theory, therefore, is obliged to recognize self-love, or rather selfishness, as the source of all sin.*

But how could he have failed to perceive that the other γένος, also the σπάσις, which in his Timaeus answers to the μανία, is itself also ἄμετρον? As the good is with him the fitting or conformable (ἔμμετρον), the ἄμετρία is often used by him of evil generally; so that we may regard this as the fundamental thought of the Platonic doctrine of evil. (See Ritter's Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ii. p. 466, 1st ed.) The rudeness of the untutored mind, the ἀμαθία or ἄγνοια, is the defectus in this want of conformity; the wild uncontrolled power of the πάθη, the μανία or σπάσις, is the excessus. But as where the defect exists the excess will generally follow, Plato usually describes the nature of evil as ἀμαθία; e.g., *Protagoras*, 359, 360; *De Legibus*, iii. 689, though ἀμαθία as frequently occurs to denote one kind of evil. The general presupposition is involved in the dualistic view of the primary ἀταξία, from which the present order was evolved (ὁ νῦν κόσμος), of the old nature (ἡ πάλαι ποτὲ φύσις, ἡ ἔμπροσθεν ἔξις), wherein the soul and all living beings derive everything adverse and unjust (*Timaeus*, 30—Bekker, ii. 25; *Politicus*, 273). As to the Platonic theory of evil generally, see Ritter's able and judicious treatise upon the subject;—as before, 303 f., 387 f., 401 f.; also Ackermann, "Das Christliche im Plato," p. 51, 59 f., 303 f.: Kern, über die Lehre von der Sünde (*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1832, p. 3, p. 100 f.). Märker treats of this point in the Platonic doctrine in a very copious, but not unbiassed, manner in his work, *Das Princip des Bösen nach den Begriffen der Griechen*, pp. 319-330, and often elsewhere.

* Rothe (*Theologische Ethik*, vol. ii., pp. 181-187) argues strongly against the derivation of sin from selfishness, and maintains in its stead a theory of evil which attributes its origin to the preponderance of our sensational nature. But he sets up two forms of abnormal self-determination, sensuous and selfish sin, and thus he recognizes selfishness as one department at least of sinful development and action. It requires, again, on our part, but a superficial knowledge of human depravity to perceive how great an influence the preponderance of sensationalism has, although we deny that this is the mainspring of human depravity. Thus it would appear that the strongly marked difference of view between Rothe and ourselves is capable of reconciliation. But while we trace this undue preponderance of sense to selfishness as its root, Rothe traces selfishness to the materiality or sensuousness of man's nature,—and thus our respective views are radically different. The way in which he would reduce sins of selfishness to the mere preponderance of our fleshly over our spiritual or personal nature is described in the following sentences (p. 175 f.):—"In sins of selfishness the man in his fleshly nature considers only the relation of everything to his own individual person, instead of reflecting upon the relations in which he as a personal being stands to everything. To man in his fleshly nature—to the natural man—selfishness is natural. In his merely natural state, which is the outgo of his material organism, his personality is merely that of an individual creature, and it turns in upon itself as individual and alone. . . . For the merely material organism, even of man, works only for itself, and goes forth in its movements beyond itself, only for its own sake, and to perfect its own central life in the complexity of the natural elements of which it is composed;—i.e., fully to satisfy the individual ego merely."

We cannot examine the conditions to which the development of sin in individual experience is subject in our present state, until in our inquiries we come to the doctrine of original sin. If we now, therefore, attempt to describe the manifold forms of sin in their relation to the principle of selfishness, our aim is only to point out the inner and essential con-

§ 3. DERIVATION OF VARIOUS FORMS OF SIN FROM SELFISHNESS.

We can understand how much deeper and more comprehensive a meaning is given to the derivation of sin from the autonomy or self-rule of the fleshly nature by thus combining it with selfishness, and how cleverly Rothe is able from this point of view to present many phenomena of sin in a new light. But as for the tenableness of this view, it rests upon Rothe's theory of moral good, which consists, according to him, in the government of man's material nature by his personality, and upon the bold Gnostic theory by which he derives the various ranges of terrestrial existences up to the highest, that of personality, apart from God. A speculative system which holds that this process begins with matter,—“with that which is not definitely willed by God, but is the direct antithesis to God, for the removal of which God's creative activity has ever been directed since the first creative act” (p. 179), may well make sin to consist in the submission of the will to the material principle “as the principle directly opposed to God.” A critique of Rothe's theory of evil would have to test this doctrine, but this is beyond our province here. Yet he will allow me frankly to make a remark controverting the kernel of his argument, the more readily as he in the main agrees with me in his explanation of the absoluteness of the divine personality.

This kernel I take to be his way of deriving the *non-ego* out of God (vol. i., p. 85). If this “contra-position” means anything, it means that God makes the beginning of all things by the setting up of that which is furthest removed from the divine *Ego* as absolute Spirit; namely, of matter (p. 126). It might, indeed, be expected that the author of a theological system of ethics would have avoided thus making matter in a dualistic sense virtually an *ἀντίθεος*, a principle “to which God must ever be contradictory, absolutely antithetic and repellent” (vol. ii. 194). Matter here seems to be viewed in the Neo-Platonic manner, as, according to Plotinus, the ground of evil, and as that which, by gradual deprivation (*στέρησις*), is to be made the last, the furthest removed from the *ἀρχή*, and having the least reality. But it is just the derivation of evil from matter which obliges Rothe to adopt this dualistic view; only thus can he upon his principles make sin a positive contrast to God. But as to this method of deriving the *non-ego* out of God, the *non-ego* is said to be, not indeed the condition, but the necessary result of God's self-realization, in virtue of which He is a personal Being. “God, thinking and appointing in one and the same act, determines Himself as a Person, i.e. as *Ego*: and, *eo ipso*, He thinks and appoints at the same time His *non-ego*” (vol. i. 85). [His conceiving Himself as an *Ego* necessarily involves the setting up of a *non-ego*—i.e. matter.] But, as Rothe himself grants (p. 86), God's absoluteness is thus destroyed, so that He must be absolute only *in abstracto*; in action He must become so by gradually destroying the *non-ego* which negatives His absoluteness; and this is the task being accomplished in the entire world-process, including pre-eminently the

Sin not merely sensationalism.

Error in Rothe's theory.

nection of the various sinful tendencies therewith, and thus to show that the principle of sin has been rightly defined. We can make no use of the customary divisions of sins of act in theological text-books, most of which have been handed down from the Fathers. These divisions very well exhibit the various ways in which man may pollute himself with sin; some of them, which we shall refer to hereafter, describe the different degrees of guilt attaching to different kinds of sin, and arising from the different ways in which it is realized; but any one may see that, taken together, they are not arranged genetically, as branching forth from any fundamental principle. Seeing that they refer only to sins of act, the principle upon which they are drawn up is too narrow for

moral process. And then what guarantee is there, from a speculative point of view, that this work will be successful,—that the non-ego will be removed? for the setting up of it is a necessity with God, and it is primitive matter, and matter, as the “direct antithesis of God,” necessarily resists its destruction by God. In fact it is not successful; for in restoring the Divine absoluteness imperfect success is a failure; and imperfect success it is, if this resistance of the *non-ego*, in some personal beings, can be done away with only by their annihilation (vol. ii. 332 f.). And so far as the removal of it is successful, is it not *we* who accomplish it by our moral acts, aided of course by divine grace? Is it not *we*, in fact, who make good what God of necessity had made evil? The production of matter involves this necessity, for it is (according to Rothe) the production of something which exists only to be destroyed, and which, being in contrast with God, necessarily hardens into hostility against Him, into direct opposition to the idea of His freedom and absoluteness. God is thus in a worse position than a human work-master, for the latter has at least the power of declining to begin a work, when he foresees that he cannot set the forces necessary thereto in motion without calling forth a disturbing activity. Rothe will thus see that as his theory makes matter “merely set up through God,” yet in principle “directly opposed to God” (vol. ii. 221), I cannot exclude it from the category of dualistic views. Indeed it may be regarded as a heavier fate that God should be obliged to set up such a dismal contrast to Himself, the gloomy shadow which darkens all His works, than that He should find it already existing; as, for instance in Plato, whose thoughts above referred to, especially as presented in his *Politicus*, remind us of Rothe’s theory.*

To return to the question concerning the derivation of sin from the *autonomy of the fleshly nature*, I agree with Rothe’s remark, that “the merely material organism, even of man, goes forth in its movements beyond itself merely for its own sake, to perfect its own central life in the complexity of the elements of which it is com-

* See the acute remarks of Dr. Kym from another stand-point against this “contra-position,” in his treatise, *Bewegung, Zweck und die Erkennbarkeit des Absoluten*, p. 46 ff.

our present purpose, which is to point out the connection of the various fundamental tendencies of sin with its principle.

In naming selfishness, which alienates man from God as the distinctive principle in our conception of sin, it is by no means implied that man in sin has always the express intention of asserting and satisfying self. Such an avowed adoption of selfishness as the principle of life is occasionally to be met with, but this avowal of selfishness, apart from particular affections, implies a degradation of consciousness and an increased energy in willing evil, which, to say the least, cannot be regarded as the earliest manifestation of the selfish principle. For the *ego* first of all satisfies self by a definite mode of life in which it finds enjoyment, and in relation thereto it assumes that unlimited self-assertion whereby self-love becomes selfishness, though this mode of life itself gives the *ego* this self-satisfaction,—this increased sense of its own existence.

Let us more minutely analyze this relation, in order to dispose." But I cannot see how it follows from this that selfishness—which exists only where there is a personal will—is natural to humanity, not as pertaining to his *altera natura*, which is tainted with sin, but as belonging to his *natura prima et integra*. If, whenever the tendency to self-centralization came into collision with moral order, the conflict were perceived by consciousness and put a stop to at the same moment by a decision of the will against it,—this would, in the true sense of the word, be natural. How far the development of this consciousness may be influenced by tuition, and what difficulties may arise from the want of culture, are questions which do not concern us now, because we have nothing here to do with the primitive introduction of sin. The attempt, therefore, to deduce selfishness from the natural promptings of our sensational nature by the train of thought now discussed, I hold to be a failure.

In Rothe's judgment, our Inquiry as to the nature of evil fails to distinguish between the essence and the principle of sin (vol. ii. 184). But whatever objection may lie against our Inquiry, this certainly does not. By the *principle* of sin, Rothe understands what conditions and occasions the entrance of sin. Now this is not the question in this part of our Inquiry. The question as to the *origin* of sin will follow our investigation as to the nature of human freedom. But in the present treatise the *principle* of sin bears another meaning, which is fully explained in this second edition as the central point in the nature of sin, the fundamental tendency from which all others may be derived. With Rothe *principle* means the concept of existence (the determining cause of existence), here it means the concept of essence, so that the question as to the principle of sin is identical with that concerning its essence.

With other strictures of Rothe I thoroughly agree, as is evident from the fact that the things excepted to are to be found only in the first edition, and in the second are withdrawn or modified.

cover the particular forms of sin which spring from selfishness in this direction.

Our organic and self-developing life is continually stirred and impelled forwards by manifold instincts or impulses. The silent formation and almost vegetative impulses which direct the growth of our corporeal nature, and carry on their work therein beyond the sphere of consciousness, do not concern us here. We have only to do with those impulses which we consciously perceive,* and which are gratified by an act consciously tending to this end. It is an error to suppose that instinct necessarily implies an internal disturbance and variance. But all instinct implies a want, a partial or entire absence of that which is needed in order to its satisfaction, and when it expresses itself in lust or inclination, it becomes the manifestation of that want. Instincts or impulses are the active stimulants of that progressive development in man, wherein the outgo of self, and the constant reception and appropriation of something objective, alternately limit and supplement each other. If man is intended for development, and can only thus realize the ideal of his being, manifold instincts and impulses are necessary for the continual rousing and movement of his life.

These impulses belong partly to the sensuous and partly to the spiritual nature. When created, the spirit is instinctively roused to self-development; were it without impulse, it would be without wants, resting like the Creator in itself. The opinion that man's spirit can be raised above nature only by identifying it with God's, may be consistent with the genius of an ideal Pantheism, but is wholly contrary to the principle of Theism. The fact that finite spirit is above nature, by no means does away with its created dependence. The fact that it is spirit, separates it infinitely from nature; the fact that

* So far as an impulse, in its direction towards its object, is perceived by the man, it becomes desire or passion, inclination or propensity,—according to Spinoza's definition, *Cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia* (Ethic, pars iii., prop. ix., schol.). The maxim therefore is true,—*ignoti nulla cupido*; but it would be incorrect if applied to the mere impulse. Impulse is desire or passion, so far as it involves a definite movement of sensational perception or of feeling at a given time. It is inclination or propensity as a continuous state realizing itself in the one sphere or the other. Thus passion differs from desire, and propensity from inclination, as including the notion of excess.

it is created, separates it equally from God. If then the spirit of man has its origin not in itself but in God, and gradually develops itself not only in the individual, but in the race, it must be roused to this development by primary and indwelling instincts.

Human impulses branch forth in two directions. In the one branch, individual existence asserts its claims, its satisfaction is the natural end which it pursues; it will assert itself, strengthen itself, spread and free itself from hindrances and disturbances, and it tries to appropriate all that will enhance its self-satisfaction. On the vitality of these instincts the energetic self-assertion of the man as a living being depends. Their exercise therefore is in behalf of self. And to this class belong not only those fleshly instincts which man has in common with the lower animals, but some impulses of a spiritual nature; as, for example, the impulse to know, so far as this is a natural appetite for mental food,* and the corresponding impulse to mental activity.

That is a very inexact use of language which with Daub† and others attributes selfishness to these natural impulses. Selfishness implies a perversion or disease of self which is possible only in the moral sphere, in the sphere of self-consciousness and will. All these impulses are certainly directed towards the satisfaction of self, but they are necessary in order to individual existence; the self which asserts itself in them is the indispensable basis of all higher life, and without it even love would lose its worth; nay, more, without such an energetic individualizing and self-centralizing tendency, there could be no such thing as love between created and personal beings.

* This limitation guards against the misconception that our longing after the knowledge of truth is to be reckoned among these impulses in behalf of self. In this longing there is a religious element, for it does not spring from the unnatural disease of a merely logical enthusiasm which has no motive, and appropriates anything; it clearly arises (whether the inquirer be conscious of it or not) from faith in the reality of truth, which guarantees that sense and understanding are in every reality. The germs of religion are not scattered so sparingly in human life, that we can only venture to recognize them when we discern the definite thought of a personal God in the self-consciousness of man.

† Vorlesungen über die philos. Anthropologie, p. 127. Daub accordingly ascribes selfishness to the lower animals. See his *System der theol. Moral*, vol. ii., part 2, p. 16. But where there is no self-reflecting self-hood, we cannot correctly speak of selfishness.

This class of impulses, accordingly, may be regarded as modifications of the general instinct of *self-preservation*, or as Spinoza* defines it, the *conatus quo unaquaque res in suo esse perseverare conatur*. For self-preservation, when applied to living creatures, must be taken as including growth. Every living thing as it exists in time, exists only in proportion as it grows, it can keep itself alive only by the further development of life. Indeed, it is self-evident that it endeavours to advance its life not merely for the sake of existence, but in its distinctive individuality, and according to the tendencies peculiar to it. Even the impulse to destroy things, so often met with in children, is an instinct of self-preservation; it frequently arises from curiosity, and is thus a form of the impulse to know, but more commonly it springs from the child's endeavour to perceive things as distinct from and subject to its own independence and superiority.

The instinct of self-preservation urges man to action in relation to the world, though this action be in part nothing more than opposition; indeed his entire activity in the world springs originally from this impulse. The individual aims only at self-satisfaction, yet the impulse urges him out of himself. For the good things which he instinctively seeks, are not to be found in self, and he therefore goes out of himself in order to find objects which will satisfy him, thus making the world subservient to himself. Hence there arises a restless effort to subordinate and appropriate external things, and the instinct of self-preservation becomes a world-subduing instinct. The man develops his own being in this endeavour to appropriate the external to himself; and his latent energies and talents can be brought into play only by their employment upon the manifold materials presented for their use in the world.

The principles of *moral consciousness* and the *consciousness of God* are raised above this class of instincts. Both are in the spirit of man not merely in the form of abstract thought and passive feeling, but as

* *Ethic*, p. iii., prop. vi., vii. In like manner, Thomas Aquinas says:—*Quaelibet res naturaliter conservat se in esse et corrumpentibus resistit quantum potest*. Secunda Secundae, qu. 64, art. 5.

living impulses; moral and religious effort is involved in moral and religious consciousness, — effort which prompts to action, though this action may, to begin with, be purely inward.

If we analyze the moral impulse as a phenomenon of the inner life, we find in it a threefold tendency, namely, the impulse to obtain moral dominion over nature,* the impulse to discern, distinguish, and maintain personal rights and duties in their various spheres of life, and the impulse to blend these spheres together by goodwill and love.† This division is not a merely formal or abstract one, it is manifest in life as experience testifies, and is so strongly marked, that we sometimes find one impulse very fully developed, while the other two are almost wholly wanting. But where this occurs, the broken unity of the moral principle avenges itself by manifesting a deficiency in stability and purity. These two higher impulses, moral consciousness or conscience and God-consciousness, differ essentially from the instincts to self-preservation, because their aim is not the satisfaction of the individual, but the submission of self to a universal order, the surrender of self for the sake of others. We must not allow ourselves to be led astray by the argument that these impulses also, when fulfilled, produce inward satisfaction, yea, a higher satisfaction than those other instincts; they are indeed accompanied with the inner satisfaction, but this is not their *aim*.

* This dominion is to be understood in so comprehensive a sense as to include in this division three out of the four cardinal virtues of the ancient Ethics, σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις, and ἀνδρεία.

† Spinoza, on the contrary (in the 3rd part of his Ethics), derives not only the affections of anger, resentment, jealousy, ambition, sensuality, covetousness, etc., but love, benevolence, compassion, and the various forms of the two active affections *animositas* and *generositas* from the one fundamental impulse, viz., *appetitus uniuscujusque rei in suo esse perseverandi*. The unsophisticated reader, who has not learnt to reverence Medusa's head as the model of scientific accuracy, will not fail to observe the formal and sometimes unbearable tautology by means of which Spinoza, "*more geometrico*," obtains his conclusions. The effort to preserve one's own being is made the first and only principle of virtue (p. iv., prop. xviii., schol.;—prop. xxii., coroll.). The more one seeks his own advantage, i.e., endeavours to preserve himself, and succeeds, the more virtuous he is (prop. xx.). For virtue is the power of the man, p. iv. defin. viii.; but the power of man really means the being of man, i.e., the effort of man to preserve his being.

Instinct impels the animal involuntarily towards the object in which it finds satisfaction, it leads to action whereby the object is obtained. If it were thus with the impulses of human life, considering their multiformity and complications, we could only imagine as the result a confused mixture of different elements and tendencies, without form and void, without any fixed centre. But it would be contradictory to suppose that in a personal being in whom the *ego* asserts itself, the impulse immediately generates corresponding activity. Here the relation of impulse to action depends upon the will. The incitements of impulse to action must go down to this foundation of all action, the will, in order, if ratified there, to ascend again as incentives to an activity generated by the will itself. The will is the bond which holds in hand these affections and gives to their working a certain character, either good or evil. It is only of men who seem wholly devoid of any character or aim that this seems not to hold true, men who, as Fichte says, "seem to will nothing, but suffer themselves to be goaded and driven on by some blind propensity; who have no real consciousness, simply because they never create, or determine, or direct their views and movements for themselves, but dream through life a long dream, which blindly pursues its rambling course according to the association of ideas." *

But no one can fall into this imbecile condition without wilfully surrendering his power of will,—this meagre and miserable existence being the necessary result of such a surrender.

It is a negative and false morality, which, if carried out, would lead to Manichaeism, which, in the spirit of asceticism and with the idea of perfection, would weaken and crush every impulse in man not directly religious or moral.† Far rather would we call that a healthy condition of life, wherein those highest impulses in their full import go hand in hand with the other instincts which bring life into conformity with nature, the demands of both being harmoniously fulfilled. In order to this harmony, it is of course necessary that the latter instincts, and endeavours

* *Sittenlehre*, p. 175.

† The relative right which the negative treatment of these impulses acquires, in relation to a diseased condition of human nature, is explained in the second volume.

connected with them, be unconditionally subordinated to those which spring from conscience and the consciousness of God. Thus in progressive development they may be elevated into close and positive union with those all-embracing and all-sanctifying energies—a goal which St. Paul sets before us in 1 Cor. x. 31, and other passages. This is not a mere subordination of the less to the greater, however calculated this may be to guide the working of the impulses directed to finite objects in conformity with higher aims : between the conditional and the unconditional there exist no degrees. Can we for a moment believe that these barren categories of less and greater will suffice to explain the relation of these relative impulses in Christ to his uninterrupted fellowship with the Father? The consciousness of this fellowship, and the longing of holy love inseparable therefrom to bring the human race into this fellowship, was the sole determining principle of His life, so that no natural impulse could excite Him to action unless it had been apprehended and penetrated by divine principle, and appropriated to be its organ. Herein is set before us the highest task which can be assigned to man. Now, as these impulses together constitute man's relation to the manifold good things of the world, the conclusion at which we have arrived concerning their due order tells us at the same time what is the true and perfect character of our relation to the world in the sphere of our spiritual and sensational life. This cannot consist in man's separation from the world, or in his estrangement from its manifold interests ; it consists in his fulfilling the call, taken in its highest sense, which was given him at the beginning, Genesis i. 26, 27, that as created in the divine image and called to self-conscious fellowship with God he shall have dominion over the world, and shall subdue it to himself.

In order to this dominion man must be free from the tyranny of the world, and this freedom consists in his having his true home in a region above the world, in habitual fellowship with God. Here the *δός μοι ποῦ στῶ* of Archimedes applies ; in order to have dominion over the things of the world man needs a standing-point,* independent of the world and beyond the range of its

* This beginning of man's dominion over the world by inner freedom from the world, is simply and beautifully expressed in the saying of Racine in one of his tragedies :—*Je crains Dieu et n'ai point d'autre crainte.*

movements. He thus attains the true guiding principles of his manifold relations to the world, the sure ground from which what is positive and practical in his ruling and subduing the world springs. On the one hand, there is the theoretical point, that the world is perfectly clear to man's consciousness, so that he sees God present and ruling everywhere; and, on the other hand, there is the practical point, that he moulds the actual state of the world by his activity, so far as lies in his power, into harmony with the divine ordainments and aims. This alone is man's true dominion over the world; he can be king of nature only as he is God's priest.* That which now-a-days is generally called man's dominion over nature—its external subjugation by railways, steamships, telegraphs, and the like,—is not only compatible with a slavish dependence upon nature, but tends greatly to enhance this dependence, if it claims to be the true and adequate realization of that dominion.

If man separates himself from the eternal Source of his life

Man in sin
loses his
freedom.

in order to be his own master and to obtain satisfaction by living to himself, he incurs the contradiction of losing himself amid the things of this

world.† What in freedom he should subdue to himself, what in harmony with his destiny he should use and enjoy without allowing himself to become its slave (1 Cor. vi. 12, vii. 31; Phil. iv. 12), now becomes his lord; the natural impulses of his spirit, having lost their true centre and the symmetry of their harmonious movement, are kindled into wild desires and passions. *Passion* — suffering — this is the term whereby language denotes this disturbed and unquiet state, because it represents the life of man in a more or less unnatural condition, and thus profoundly intimates that man has by sin exchanged his *free* and *active* relation to the world for a *passive* and

* See the beautiful remarks concerning this connection in Sartorius, p. 45 f. Neander, apost. Zeitalter, p. 675 f.

† *Apol. Confes. Augustana, Art. De peccato originali*; “*aegra natura, quia non potest Deum timere et diligere, Deo credere, quaerit et amat carnalia*” (ed. Francke, p. 59). *Carnalia* in the *Apologia* are not merely the objects of fleshly lust, but all worldly and selfish strivings. It is a striking feature in the parable of the Prodigal Son, that, far away from his father, whose servants have bread enough and to spare, he seeks his satisfaction in a reckless life—at last in animal appetites, and in hunger discovers his want and weakness.

slavish dependence upon the things of the world as the objects of his desires.* Man having wandered from God makes the things of this world—separated from their essential relation to God, and no longer revealing His holy love and wisdom—the *κόσμος* in the sense in which the word is used in 1 John ii. 15,† the objects of his efforts, entangles himself in them, and becomes hardened by them; he thinks to obtain the mastery over them; in reality they master him.

Thus with the stirrings of selfishness there always arises some special tendency of *worldly affection* (*ἐπιθυμία* is selfishness. *τοῦ κόσμου*, 1 John ii. 17; compare *ἐπιθυμαὶ κοσμικαί* as *ἀσέβεια* the negative side of selfishness manifests itself in them, Titus ii. 12), which is the direct contrast to true freedom in the appropriation and use of worldly things. Direct acts of sin soon seem to be brought about by the action of the *ἐπιθυμία*, which, beginning to work in the lower sphere of life, apart from the determining *ego*, decoys and entices it to adopt it, or to surrender itself more or less to it, and by this acquiescence of the *ego*, i.e. of the will, with the *ἐπιθυμία* sin is brought forth (*ἕκαστος πειράζεται, ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος. εἶτα ἡ ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν*, James i. 14, 15; compare Rom. vii. 7, 8).

Selfishness must be embodied in some one particular description of worldly affection in order to the progressive development of sin; every earthly relation, every finite interest serving as material for that principle to realize itself in—worldly happiness being in

* It was a matter of dispute among the Stoics and Peripatetics, as we learn from Cicero's *Tusculan Disput.* (Book iv. caps. 17–21, where are many remarks upon the present topic), whether the *perturbationes animi*—as Cicero renders the *πάθη* of the Greeks, see cap. 5,—are to be wholly extirpated or only moderated. If the definition of *πάθος* cited from Zeno be adopted—"aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio,"—the question is of itself answered in favour of the Stoics, and we must assent to the same if we adopt the same definition for our conception of "passion." But if we limit the question to the *motus animi* as the actual outgo of the excited impulse, it is clear from what has been said above that true Ethics cannot abide by the Peripatetic demand of mere moderation. If regarding natural impulses Ethics had nothing to offer but this negation, there would be no reason, upon its own principles, why this negation should not be carried so far as to require the subjection and extirpation of these impulses to the utmost of one's power.

† See the admirable exposition of this passage in Lücke's *Commentary*, pp. 176, 177.

all its branches the direct opposite of the blessedness which is in God, James iv. 4; 1 John ii. 15, 17.* And yet it is quite possible that owing to the peculiar place divinely assigned to man in the scale of being, involving the union of soul and body in some distinctive way, that amid the multiplicity of worldly affections *fleshly lust* should become specially dangerous to him, and should pervade and govern his life. This union of two natures, this duality that underlies the unity of human nature, whereby (as Theodorus of Mopsuestia recognized †) it becomes the bond of the created universe and its various ranges of existence, is at the same time the most vulnerable point, the point which is most exposed to the attacks of sin in its efforts to destroy that unity. And thus man's separation from God involves at the same time, though in different degrees, a variance between the two parts of his own nature, the spiritual and the fleshly. If man's spirit be alienated from God, nature becomes alien to his spirit; if man's spirit no longer surrenders itself to be an instrument for God, nature, in turn, declines to serve man as his instrument. In the normal condition of man, his sensational nature promptly yielded to the movements of his knowing and willing spirit, and with readiness reproduced them; but now it has become an independent power over against his spirit, with its own law of action (the *νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι*, Rom. vii. 23), and with a series of impulses and manifestations of its own; so

* The expressions used by St. John in this difficult passage which seem more than to border upon Manichaeism, may be strictly taken, if we adopt the meaning of *κόσμος* hinted at above. The apostle explains what he means by *πάν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* in the words which immediately follow; the various tendencies of the *ἐπιθυμία*, which all relate to the *κόσμος*, properly belong to it. This inward impulse, the apostle says, does not spring from the Father, but from the world; because through man's fall from God to selfishness it has lost for his disordered consciousness its connection with God—it has ceased to be for him what it really is in itself, the instrument of God's self-manifestation, Rom. i. 20. This subjective severance of the connection of the world with God corresponds with the preceding context; now first in his alienation from God do the things of this world excite in man the various forms of false and passionate desires. See, besides Lücke, Frommann's *Johanneischen Lehrbegriff*, p. 262 ff. Düsterdieck, *Die drei Johanneischen Briefe*, vol. i., p. 254 ff. The passage in James iv. 1–4 also serves to explain the words of St. John.

† In a passage cited by Nitzsch, *System der Christl. Lehre*, § 89, from Theodoret, *Quaest. xx. ad Genes.* There is a similar thought in Augustine, *Ad Orosium contra Priscil. et Origen*, c. 10.

that the highest forces of the spiritual life and its noblest resolves have no longer the power to realize themselves, to subordinate the sensational side of life, or to break through its evil habits.*

As this derangement advances, this conflict between the spirit and the flesh ceases, and harmony is restored—but now a false and inverted harmony; the understanding and the will have now at length degraded themselves to become the ready instruments of the flesh, carrying out the demands of its impulses and desires. The understanding and the will indeed always involve a certain sequence in the movements of life, whereas fleshly desires demand immediate satisfaction, so that there is frequently some clashing between them, even in this perverted state, which convinces the man from time to time of his miserable thralldom; but the unbridled fleshly impulse usually remains master of the field.

In this usurped dominion of the fleshly nature, a twofold tendency appears. The one may be called a *positive* and negative selfishness. *positive* longing after pleasure, for it manifests itself in lust and sensuality of all kinds and in the insatiable pursuit of momentary gratifications of fleshly desires. As these satisfactions are but fleeting, they beget in those who are slaves to them impulsive restlessness and wild excess. The spasmodic efforts of the slave of pleasure to keep fast hold of the sensational enjoyment which vanishes in a moment, are utterly in vain, because its charm is dependent upon the desire which is extinguished in its gratification. The other tendency may be called a *negative* longing, because its gratification consists in surrendering itself to passive enjoyment. The sins of indolence and sloth, of cowardice and effeminacy, of laxity and neglect, belong to this class.*

While these multiform worldly lusts give selfishness its material on which to work, and by which to develop itself, it is this very connection between it and them which prevents human wickedness from becoming devilish — becoming conscious self-idolatry, and hatred of God, and all created beings. For as selfishness realizes itself in its manifold forms by means of worldly lust, these act as a kind of *veil* * to hide it from our view; in this

* The theological contemplation of evil has also suffered itself not unfre-

incessant endeavour and searching for particular objects of desire, the *ego* seldom perceives that it has made self its idol. This relative unconsciousness of the children of this world as to the real principle of their life, mitigates in some degree their guilt; but guilt attains its acme in the man who through the veil of worldly desires, recognises selfishness as the germ of all his sins, yet does not set himself might and main to destroy it. Of these various tendencies of worldly desire again, those appetites which are specially directed to sensuous gratification for the most part confirm that unconsciousness, while the affections of covetousness, love of power, ambition, and pride are but semi-transparent veils which hardly conceal the dark form of selfishness. The former are momentary only, and directly aim at their own gratification, and they do not come into collision with the rights or efforts of others so long as the means of their gratification are within reach; on the contrary, attaining their own ends, those actuated by them rather rejoice in the similar efforts of others.* The latter, on the contrary, unavoidably negative similar affections in others, and strive against them, so that instead of pursuing the impulse of the moment they assume a higher position and extend over

quently to be deceived in the same manner by this veil of particular affections which conceals selfishness, *e.g.*, in the definition of sin already referred to *conversio a majori bono ad minus bonum*, in so far as the *minus bonum* is taken to mean, not man himself as the object of his own love, but merely outward objects of desire. [We are also reminded of Bishop Butler's theory regarding self-love and particular affections, a theory with which Müller's views are in perfect accord, although he traces out the workings of selfishness in *fallen* human nature more fully and minutely than Butler, whose theory applies chiefly to man's *normal* state.—*Tr.*]

* The affections of our sensational nature are as a rule social; love of power, ambition, covetousness, pride, and hatred are unsocial. But in all sociality, even in its most degraded forms, there is always an opposing power that counteracts the advance of moral depravity to its extreme depth. Social life has an equalizing or levelling influence, hindering the highest moral efforts on the one hand, and the deepest degradations on the other. It strives after equalization and mediocrity. Man, if we omit the few exceptional cases of stronger and more independent characters, is in solitude always better or worse than in society. [Compare the remark in "Guesses at Truth," "Most men are neither so good nor so bad as they seem."] Bellarmine carries the distinction between these two classes of affections so far as to maintain that, by the former man makes himself a brute, by the latter a devil.—*Lib. ii. De statu peccati*, cap. 2. A similar thought occurs in Kant's *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, pp. 16–18, 2nd ed.

a wider range. Here selfishness acts as a central point in the wide circle, and uses various means to obtain its ends, and the relation of these means to the egotistic aim being matter of reflection, selfishness becomes clear to man's consciousness as the determining principle of his life.*

This is strikingly illustrated in the case of covetousness and its kindred affections. Covetousness to some extent implies dependence upon the determining power of sense, but only indirectly. The covetous man does not make sensuous gratification itself, but only the things which contribute thereto, the objects of his ardent pursuit. It is the dependence of a cowardly and timid soul that has not the courage to grasp the present good, but mindful only of the future, takes pains to forego the present in order to make sure of it. Anxious about the real aim, it never ventures to take possession of it, but ever strives after the means as if they were its aim; so that the very poverty and want in material life which it seeks to avoid in the future it brings upon itself in the present; and its true aim is thus hidden from the man's consciousness. Draw back the immediate power of sense and the material covering of egotism, and selfishness reveals itself in the covetousness in most revolting nakedness.

In this analysis we find the explanation of the circumstance often witnessed, that men who are subjects of the grossest sensuousness, not only oftentimes take a lively interest in the weal or woe of others, but in certain positions show themselves capable of noble-minded sacrifice of their own interests. There is truth in the naively expressed thought of Hamann, that "the fleshly wants of our nature may have preserved us while higher and more shadowy spirits may have irrecoverably fallen."† In fact, the principle of selfishness finds a limiting hindrance in man's gross and earthly corporeity, which prevents self from fully revealing its dark satanic fulness in man's pre-

* And yet, according to the unquestionable testimony of experience, men repent and turn from sins of lust more easily than from sins of ambition, covetousness, and love of power. The reason of this is, that by the multitude, selfishness, so long as it keeps within the bounds of law and honour, of a certain kind, is never really recognized as sin. This usual way of judging is by the outward appearance, and it is natural that the sins which immediately degrade a man, more easily humble him than those wherein he exalts himself.

† Werke, vol. i. p. 148.

sent state. Selfishness is a subtle, volatile poison, and in this world it receives, as it were, an alloy of coarse earthly matter, which retards and obstructs its spread through all the arteries and nerves of the inner life. In his fleshly nature man finds himself in various ways dependent upon his fellows and upon outward nature, and thus the principle of selfish isolation is prevented from maintaining that thorough firmness which it may manifest perhaps in spheres of being differently formed. The power of evil, which in energetic and perfectly conscious concentration might plunge the man who surrendered himself to it in the abyss of irretrievable destruction, is compelled by the continual urgency of our sensational life, with its manifold wants, to divide self and dissipate itself in an endless variety of perverted and vain endeavours. And thus this same weak sensational nature which counteracts the persevering and abiding union of all the powers of man on the side of moral goodness, no less hinders the energetic concentration of them in behalf of evil.

Upon the same principle we may understand how it is that in men whose whole life is a sad picture of moral depravity a remnant of good has been preserved—preserved in those very departments of life which are most intimately connected with our sensational nature, I mean, in the sphere of family life. Capable of every kind of injustice, of every crime abroad, they frequently practise a self-forgetting love, a self-sacrificing fidelity towards their own at home. Such phenomena, indeed, possess at the best but a very inferior moral worth; his family is to the man only a more extended *ego*;—yet we cannot help recognizing therein something of a moral element, for the man is thus driven to the extension of his *ego* (which, to guard against misunderstanding, be it remarked, is not involved in sexual love), to such an extension as leads him to subordinate his own selfish interests for the weal of others. Thus man's fleshly nature is itself a barrier against his utter moral ruin, and the ground of a hope for his final restoration.

Man, having by selfishness and love of the world, alienated himself from God, sinks into a false position, and his whole life is unreal and untrue. Life possesses truth in the highest and only real sense when man develops his powers in continual fellowship with God; for only

Falsehood.

then is he at one with himself, only then is the outward reality in unison with the inward ideal. This is a thought which often appears in the Gospel and Epistles of St. John, as for example in the use of the terms *εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας* and *εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ* interchangeably; compare John xviii. 37; 1 John iii. 19, with John viii. 47; 1 John iv. 4, 6. However innumerable the instances be, it must ever be a contradiction for beings wholly dependent to seek in themselves the centre of their life. And however great and powerful human life may seem, when it enthrones selfishness as its dominant principle it can never be anything but a huge lie in itself, divided and contradictory, though it assume the form of a compact and harmonious whole. Such a life can never be wholly free from the perception of its own untruthfulness. For the satisfaction which it seeks in one or another direction or form of love of the world it can never really find, and its selfish efforts become only self-consuming and tantalizing thirst. Selfishness is therefore the deepest self-deception. Man suffers himself to be decoyed from fellowship with God, in whom alone is the perennial spring of his true satisfaction, through the pretence of a satisfaction more conformable to his nature, into separation from God, and thus surrenders himself to the continual torment of having restlessly to pursue an ever receding goal. He thinks to raise himself to perfect independence and to find rest wholly in himself; he finds himself in a deep harrowing contradiction of his whole existence. Accordingly, in Holy Scripture sin is often represented as a delusion and a snare, e.g., Heb. iii. 13; Rom. vii. 11; Gen. iii. 13; 1 Tim. ii. 14; 2 Cor. xi. 3; Rom. i. 27; Rev. xii. 9, xiii. 14. Very striking, too, is that expression of our Lord's where, representing the devil as the originator of evil endeavour and murderous hate among men, He calls him "a liar, and the father of lies," John viii. 44. Compare also the appellations *ἀντικείμενος*, *ἀντίχριστος*, in 2 Thess. ii. 9, 10; 1 John ii. 22.

While we thus allow that sin possesses in itself a delusive form, holding out to men a satisfaction which it can never really give,* we must guard against the notion that the guilt

* The Hebrew form of expression indicates this feature of sin, for the sinner is called *אִיִּל* and sin *נְבִלָה*. Regarding the other names given to evil in the Old

of sin is thereby lessened or removed, occurring only by an error which a being of limited capacities cannot see through or avoid.* The deception does not consist in mistaking evil for moral good, but in man's falsely fancying that he will find his real satisfaction in what he knows to be sin. But man's chief end is by no means to seek his own satisfaction; it is to hold fellowship with God, and to live in harmony with His holy Will.

And this is a conclusive reply to the philanthropic doctrine which explains sin simply from man's preference for what is agreeable above that which is in the abstract good, as if it were not much to be wondered at that the desire after happiness is inherent in him. We must, on the contrary, simply affirm that it is the very essence of egotism to make one's own happiness the highest aim instead of submitting ourselves to the holy and necessary claims of the divine will. The perverted principle must already have obtained a footing in man's heart if he has fallen into the delusion that he can obtain perfect satisfaction in himself. Were it not so, he would have known that he can only find it for himself when he seeks it, not in himself, but in God. In the case of many particular forms of sin, such as covetousness, hatred, envy, revenge, it is itself a phenomenon of unnatural perversion that the heart should find a passionate pleasure in their exercise; and thus it becomes especially clear that the explanation of sin from this inclination to pleasurable sensations is nothing more than an explanation of sin by sin.

As selfishness, therefore, does not arise from the delusive garb of sin, that hope is evidently a false one which imagines this garb to be a nonentity and of only transient duration, and that when it is revealed to the befooled man in its worthless-

Testament, see Hupfeld, *Die Psalmen*, vol. i. pp. 138-142. Nägelsbach compares the Greek conception of the ἄτη with the Hebrew נבלה, *Homerische Theologie*, p. 271. We have already shown (p. 91) that the primary import of ἀμαρτάνειν is a missing of the mark.

* Töllner has expanded and advocated this view of sin in his *Theol. Untersuchungen*, part i. sec. iv., "Of the pleasure arising from sinful acts,"—Part ii. sec. iv., "Of original sin;" sect. v., "The good in human nature." As the eudemonistic principles of this view are unmistakably expounded in the first sentences of the last-named section, the second one named makes it apparent how destructive the logical deductions of this system are of faith in God's holiness.

ness, sin will vanish with it. This very convenient theory of redemption, according to which man's freedom from sin's power is accomplished of its own accord, originates either in a meagre and feeble apprehension of what sin is, or in an exaggerated representation of the power of thought over the inclinations and the will, such as that into which Spinoza was ensnared, and by which now-a-days many disciples of logical philosophy are deceived concerning themselves and their own real need. A deeper investigation into the nature of sin, and a more thorough estimate of the relation between will and knowledge, will convince us that no mere thinking or knowing can suffice to free man from sin's power.* Even supposing that the understanding possessed correct and clear conceptions concerning the nature of good and evil, it would by no means follow that the will would obey its dictates; such a merely negative knowledge of the worthlessness and contradictoriness of all evil which does not involve any perception of positive truth would certainly fail to constrain it; and he who does not timidly shut his eyes to the deep distraction of human life, nor disobeys the Delphic motto *γινῶθι σεαυτόν*, he alone truly knows how often a clear consciousness of the utter barrenness of sin and of the vanity of its delusions may coexist with a persistent adhesion on the sinner's part to a course of wickedness. And yet, on the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that the will, alienated from God, may possess the power in all future conditions of human existence of creating new forms of self-deception at any crisis in its history, whenever as, *e.g.*, at death one definite form of sin is necessarily destroyed (1 John ii. 17). If we would not give the lie to the plain dictates of our moral sense, we must ever maintain that the delusive garb which sin wears arises from the perversion of the will, not that the perversion of the will arises from sin's delusive garb. When once man surrenders himself to the sway of that perverted principle which makes his own satisfaction the aim of all his endeavours, there will necessarily spring from this foul root a

* John viii. 32 does not contradict this, for "the knowledge of the truth" there spoken of as "making free," presupposes the—*μίνειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, and the *ἀληθῶς μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ εἶναι*. But the thought of freedom in its rational necessity is very far removed from actually becoming free. In order to this, something more is required than human thinking.

multitude of erroneous notions as to what this satisfaction really consists in.

But if selfishness be in its essence self-deception, it necessarily begets *untruthfulness towards others*,—the deliberate neglect of the right of those whom we hold intercourse with, to have to do with us as we are, and not with an assumed character which we choose to present to them. The self-seeker, who sees nothing higher or wider than his own particular interests, soon discovers that this disposition involves him in continual embarrassments, not only with those actuated by the same principle towards him, but even with men who endeavour to order their relations towards others on the principles of righteousness, and, indeed, with the arrangements of society in general. Man, by sin, isolates himself, and yet needs the fellowship of his brethren in a thousand ways. But he would deprive himself of this fellowship and its advantages were he openly to display that principle of isolation. Hence he feels himself obliged to conceal beneath a thousand masks the real character of his thoughts and acts—first, perhaps, in personal relations and then throughout the sphere of his life. This we may maintain to be the universal rule; for though we sometimes behold confirmed selfishness vaunting its abominable motives with barefaced shamelessness when it has a fixed independence of circumstances in outward life to rely upon, yet even this only needs the temptation arising from the risk of losing its end to make it hide itself at once beneath an impenetrable veil.

Thus the process of separation and isolation which began with a self-seeking love of the world at length becomes systematic lying, for the man will now not only not *act* and *work* for others, he will no longer *exist* for them as the object of their true knowledge. Indeed, so powerful will the perverted impulse become when once excited, that the lie, originally the child of selfish effort, frequently separates from its mother in the more rapid growth of its own development, and may be met with where there is no connection whatever with the special interests of selfishness, where only the wanton desire to deceive others can have prompted it. In this manner it becomes a second nature with the liar to carry on a horrible game with the sacred gift of speech; and as he so thoroughly

separates reality and appearance in his own life, every reality becomes to him a nonentity and a phantom, so that at last he can no longer distinguish what in his life is falsehood and what is truth.

Falsehood, which no longer springs from self-interest, but from a wanton desire to deceive, brings us to a new form of selfishness, beginning with *self-esteem* and ending in hatred. When falsehood reaches this point, its true source is the liar's proud self-complacency in the belief that he is superior to those whom he deceives. He flatters himself in this belief by making them the dupes of his recklessness in word and deed.

Pride is the basest and most glaring form that selfishness can assume. In love of the world and falsehood, prompted by self-interest, it is more or less hidden, and in other wide-spreading branches of its development, in unrighteousness and hatred, the conflict of particular interests, and the passion often excited by some check from the object of hatred, serves in a measure to conceal it. But in pride the isolating principle of selfishness presents its obvious and formal type. Yet we call pride the first stage of this development, because it does not necessarily involve a hostile encroachment upon the rights of others, but only an imaginary, a self-deceptive complacency. Here the man is not urged out of himself by some restless passion directed against some outward object, but in solitary exclusiveness he fancies himself self-sufficient. He is absorbed in the enjoyment and admiration of himself, and instead of remembering that he is but one member of society, and that by humble and unassuming association with others he should seek their welfare with his own, he presumes to be quite complete in himself and for himself.

It may be, and indeed it usually is so, that the proud man in his self-exaltation prides himself upon some special possession whereby he may make good his claim to superiority. If this be of an inferior kind, pertaining to externals and to natural life, as in pride of wealth, of rank, of office — so far as such pride involves a contemptible excluding of others, for only then is it properly speaking pride—it cannot conceal the meagreness and meanness of its basis save by an extravagant infatuation of egotism. And yet, considering the outward definiteness of these possessions, it can

Forms of
Pride.

readily be understood how easily a person may come to make them the means of an exclusive self-satisfaction. On the other hand, the higher and more inward the possessions upon which the proud man bases his self-glorification the deeper must be his self-perversion, because it is in direct opposition to the nature and spirit of the things possessed. Pride of knowledge is of this kind, whether it be based upon the amount of the erudition gained or the kind of knowledge possessed. Over against this may be named pride of practical activity in the world, whether of power or of influence. Worse than either is virtuous pride, *self-righteousness*, that strange infatuation which constrains a man to dwell upon his own supposed excellence, and to regard his moral performances as fully satisfying the commandments of God. This form of pride reaches its acme in *spiritual pride*, which attaches a special significance to that which in its very nature is confessedly universal, and which is wont to rest upon a predilection for something new and strange in the sphere of religion, whereby to feed the notion of its exclusive superiority. The poison of pride must here prove so much the more destructive, because the contradiction between it and true piety is so much more obvious, and the impulse to humility and self-forgetfulness involved in the perception of our relation to God should be so much stronger. It is a striking proof of the deep-seated propensity to self-deception, and to pride in the human heart, when it is able to maintain its place within the soul, though all its outward branches be broken off, and when humility itself which contains the germ of piety is not free from the danger of also including within it the evil seed of pride, and of suffering that germ to be choked thereby.

We should altogether mistake the nature of pride were we to suppose that it consists in an excessive appreciation of the thing of which it makes its boast. Were this so, true piety would necessarily lead to pride, for it exists only where our relation to God is esteemed of paramount importance. Pride is not a passive surrender to that on which it is based, not an overweening attachment to it, in which selfishness is only indirectly and imperceptibly present, it is a rigid adherence to one's own self. It is distinct from worldly desire, even in cases where the thing of which it boasts is the object of this desire.

Pride not
love of the
world.

In worldly desire the *ego* identifies itself with the things desired; in pride it identifies the things desired with itself. To the proud man the good things aimed at or possessed are not valuable in themselves, he values them only as he himself possesses them. The esteem which he claims for himself does not rest upon an estimate of the excellency and worth of the things wherein he prides himself; but, on the contrary, this estimate of the things rests upon the exclusive importance which he attaches to himself, as the possessor of them, he has no readiness to recognize or admire the very same things when possessed by others, and if he were compelled to recognize them they would only awaken in him envious feelings.

Hence it logically follows, that pride never thoroughly
 Love of power. devotes itself to any definite principles, but relinquishes them readily upon the pressure of circumstances, in order to maintain its own self-assertion. His own *ego*, his own will, must rule, and no one can bind him to any other fixed aim. Thus, when pride emerges from its exclusiveness, and assumes the offensive towards those around, it becomes *tyrannical love of power*, which must not, however, be confounded with the natural impulse of a powerful mind to influence men in behalf of some great objective end. We see the same tendency, though in a more negative form, in *obstinacy*, wherein the *ego* presumes to maintain its own formal independence, instead of yielding to the claims of other wills or to some general ordainment.

There is a fine, yet inward sense of justice, which can only
 Injustice. spring from the endeavour to hold intercourse with mankind according to the rule of self-denying love. He who is thoroughly cognizant of the depth of selfishness in man, not only disturbing the will but falsifying the judgment, will also know how much reason he has in advocating his own claims against those of others, to fear the sophist in his own heart, keen-sighted of its own rights, but slow to recognize those of others. In order to be truly just in these complicated relations, we must resolve to be more than just. A more accurate analysis of this finer sense of justice will show that it implies the imaginative power of love, which knows the art of putting one's self in our brother's place, and looking at the case from his point of view.

Yet, even where this sense of justice, deep-rooted in love, is wanting, we often meet with a feeling of respect for the distinctive rights of others, so far as they are cognizable by the crudest moral sense. There are men who allow themselves to be ruled by selfish impulses, who yet will not knowingly neglect the claims of justice towards their fellow-men. Even with the proud man an obvious duty towards one whom he despises will act as a limit that he feels bound to respect. Accordingly, we must regard it as a further development of the selfish principle when even this restraint is broken through, when injustice allows itself to attack the rights of others provided only it be prudent. The undertaking of the French Revolution, the utopian schemes of national demagogues to plant the foot of equality upon the outward relations of mankind, must be regarded by every thoughtful mind as an insane vagary, contrary alike to the necessities of reason and to practicable feasibility ; but above the inequalities arising from the present vicissitudes of human life there is an equality, which every one in his proportion shares. Each one may claim from every one else that the rights which belong to him as a member of the community, whether his sphere of life be wide or narrow, shall be maintained intact. And it is this claim—this principle of equality in practical life—which injustice ventures to make light of, and set at nought. Here the individual sets himself up as if possessed of boundless liberty, while he regards others as having no rights which limit his own ; in a word, he sets himself up as alone personal, others are to him only things. The maxim the unjust man sets up is, that all shall be bound by the law ; and woe to them should they venture to infringe any claim to which he, according to the law of society, finds himself entitled : but as for himself, he must be exempted from law, and owes no man anything. Hence the rebellious indignation with which men are wont to resent the selfish injustice of another towards them. And apart from the injury it may do ourselves, this moral revolt is perfectly justifiable—indifference to the rights of others is one of the most repulsive forms of selfishness //

Proceeding still further in the same direction we find selfishness assuming the form of destructive *hatred*.
Hatred. Let the principle of selfishness once obtain supre-

macy in a man's life, and it only requires a sufficiently strong interference on the part of others to kindle in it the flame of hatred. Hatred is nothing more than selfishness aroused by the resistance of others to positive hostility against them. Injustice does not grudge another his rights provided they do not interfere with its own efforts and aims, but hatred wantonly wishes evil to its neighbour. The principle of selfishness appears in the one case more as self-gratification and self-interest, in the other more as pride. If, as Kant remarks,* every benefactor must be prepared to awaken the tendency deep-seated in the human heart, of disliking those to whom it is under any obligation, this aversion is only the positive ingratitude of selfishness, even as hatred is injustice in a positive form. It springs from the one or the other of these two tendencies. In the one case, the benefactor is disliked because he brings to the remembrance of the recipient obligations that are burdensome to his idleness or his self-interest; in the other case, because he awakens in some degree the feeling of humiliation.

The first stages of this growth of hatred out of selfishness correspond with the sins into which the person's irritability leads him. Among these may be named sudden anger, quarrelsomeness, vindictiveness, implacability. In its full growth hatred is manifest in fruits which fully embody the bitterness of their root—in envy and malevolence, in malice and cruelty.

But in order clearly to understand the connection between selfishness and hatred, we must bear in mind the special nature and circumstances of our earthly life. The good things which are made the objects of earnest pursuit—riches, pleasure, outward honour, power, and influence, are of such a nature that the possession of them on the part of any one necessarily excludes others therefrom. They thus afford abundant material whereby the spark of hatred concealed in selfishness may become a flame, and may spread through life. Should strong desires after any of these earthly goods be kindled in us, we should feel obliged to supplant others in order to our own aggrandizement. Thus we become involved in many collisions with the claims of others, and hatred is nourished and confirmed in our hearts.

* Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 29, ed. 2.

And yet the most obvious selfishness in this department of morals, so far from being combined with hatred, is sometimes directly opposed to it. Who does not know that egotistic desire of ease which, lest its quiet be disturbed, shuns nothing so much as the annoying complications of passionate hatred; and well knowing the impossibility of avoiding the mutual restraints of social life, exercises a kind of toleration, according to its favourite maxim, "live and let live"? Even when selfishness attains its highest mastery over the man, transforming his life into a hard calculation of his interests, and indifference to the welfare of others save as they may serve as instruments to forward its schemes of self-interest, power, or ambition, we find that the stirrings of angry hatred are checked with determination, as tending to disturb and thwart those schemes; nay, peradventure, so large are these plans, and so comprehensive the man's aims, that he does not think it worth while to give place to wrathful hatred against any one. Yet even in characters such as these it cannot be denied that hatred, though unshown, lurks deep within, and that it requires only more powerful excitements to rouse it from its lair. But as to those other easy-going people to whom we have referred, it must be allowed that hatred, as well as love, implies a certain energy of character and susceptibility of excitement. There is such a thing as a lapsing into the coldest indifference, a deadening torpor of the whole being, however it may be ruled by selfishness, which renders it too slow and drowsy to be capable of hatred.

But selfishness when roused may be kindled not only into hatred of men, but even to hatred of God. For when sin reigns within, without the consciousness of God being wholly destroyed, and when the essential connection between this and the moral sense is not wholly severed by impure superstitions or superficial views of the conditions on which God's approbation depends, selfishness finds in this consciousness its severest and most burdensome restraint; and if it be not vanquished by redemption, it feels an aversion to God, a secret wish that there were no God, so that it might give itself up with impunity to sin (compare John xv. 24 with John iii. 20). There is no contradiction involved in the

supposition that a remnant of fear towards a holy God may co-exist with determined enmity against Him and divine things. The very dignity of our nature, as created in God's image, involves the awful truth that when a man is estranged from God, more especially if he has ever experienced living communion with Him, he more readily falls into hatred of God than into lifeless insensibility and indifference. He cannot entirely rid himself of the silent stirrings of conscience, reminding him of his obligation to God; yet he endeavours to do so, and feels an impulse positively to resist them. History thus testifies that God's kingdom does not suffer neutrality in man: "He who is not with me is against me" (Matt. xii. 30)—he who will not love must hate. Though the prevailing philanthropy of last century was wont to deny the possibility of this hatred, the experience of all times, even of the most recent, has abundantly proved the fact of it. For ourselves, we cannot but regard the shocking views propounded by well-known writers in our day, as to whether man has more cause to hate God or to love Him; the horrible vows by which the members of some communistic societies bind themselves to personal hostility against God, as the natural and necessary result when once the principle of egotism has taken thorough possession of the life.

There is another form of hatred against God which must be carefully distinguished from that now described. It does not arise from the consciousness of moral perverseness in God's sight (for even that last remnant of fear has faded from the inner life), but from the burdensome consciousness on the part of the creature at variance with Him, and longing for independence, that he is surrounded by an almighty power from which he cannot escape. God is then the only barrier remaining against the wilfulness of the man, and wilfulness hates the barrier. This hatred, however, described as it is by Byron in his "Cain," seems to be impossible, at least in man's earthly life, because, if the consciousness of his moral relations to God be wholly destroyed, there is no longer any recognition upon the man's part of a personal and Almighty Being. The blind desire for independence rebels against the barriers of a fate equally blind, or against an insuperable necessity of nature, and cherishes towards these imaginary

powers the sullen resentment which would be felt towards God were His existence believed in.*

We must therefore scruple about attributing to man, in common with all finite life (as Schelling does in his treatise upon Freedom), an insuperable melancholy in consequence of the fact that he has no power over the conditions of his existence.† What is this melancholy but the result of a vain endeavour to be, like God, ruled only by one's self? Philosophy has, indeed, often maintained the right of such an effort after absolute power upon man's part, nay, it has presumptuously ventured to erect whole systems upon this principle, as, for instance, that of Fichte. But religion must ever regard such an effort, coincident as Schelling's view is with it, as essentially evil. True piety must ever delight in the truth, that the conditions of our existence are in God's hands, that we are not in our own but in God's power. That accordingly is a spirit wholly dissonant with and foreign to piety, which, in the words of Rosenkranz, calls Schleiermacher's definition of religion as "a sense of dependence" revolting to every manly feeling. This definition is in other respects inadequate; but as it cannot be borne that it is God upon whom man is dependent, not only the doctrine of Schleiermacher, but every doctrine of the faith must be negatived. When Rosenkranz‡ further argues that, according to this

* It may seem strange that we do not here enter upon the question whether this depth of moral depravity, and (what is akin to it) a hatred of the good, as such, is really possible. We may first reply with the question of our Lord, *τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*; εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός, Matt. xix. 17. Hatred, like love, has, strictly speaking, to do only with persons. Even when directed to impersonal objects, it involuntarily personifies them. The good is repugnant to many, because it is uncongenial with their desires, and stands in the way of their passions, and disturbs their pleasant dreams. It may become altogether offensive to a deeper depravity and recklessness—although this state may require the destruction of the good, in some relations, on account of its advantages,—because it perceives the irreconcilable and destructive hostility of moral good against the maxims which it espouses. Satanic wickedness may hate the good, as being the object of the divine will; and it hates God when it cannot avoid believing in Him, James ii. 19.

† Sämmtliche Werke, section 1, vol. vii. p. 399. We must not forget that, according to the view there developed, this condition of our existence arises not from a personal God, but from a bare principle.

‡ Kritik der Schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre, p. 21. See the admirable criticisms of Nitzsch in his review of this work, Stud. und Krit., 1837, part ii. p. 443 f.

definition, God is only substance, absolute power, or Lord, he forgets that even in living fellowship with God as Father, man's relation is still one of dependence and submission to the divine will. The fault of Schleiermacher's definition is, that it regards this dependence, which when viewed side by side with human freedom is a most profound and suggestive truth, as something immediate and unconditional, and fixed as if by some necessity of nature. Religion is an act of self-surrender to God, but the true consciousness of this entire dependence proceeds in the first instance from this act of surrender.

Is hatred for its own sake to be met with in human life without any exciting cause in selfish passion, and the resistance of foreign claims arising therefrom, —hatred that has, so to speak, forgotten its origin, so that the man feeling it contradicts himself, and directs it against others, and takes delight in wanton interference with their wellbeing, without any further end in view than the gratification of this feeling? We will not adopt the remark of the keen-sighted Rochefoucault, which Kant seems to adopt,* “that there is always something in the misfortune of our best friends which is not displeasing to us.” If this were as generally true as it is here supposed to be, it would still be capable of various explanations, and may arise, in some cases at least, from nobler feelings, *e.g.*, from a lurking feeling of gladness that we can now bind our friend afresh to us by helpful love. But who can ignore the numberless instances of envy and wanton pleasure at the misfortunes of others which we meet with in daily life? Who can blot from the page of history the awful instances of wild and objectless slaughter, of wanton cruelty feeding itself upon the cries of its victims? Who can shut his eyes to the atrocities of the Thirty Years' War, or the campaigns of Genghis-Khan, or his ears to sayings like that of Caligula, “*Utinam populus Romanus unam cervicem haberet*”? Alas! it cannot be denied that, as there is an inspiration of holy love, so also is there an inspiration of hatred, a savage lust, actuated by which a man may abandon

* Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 29.

himself to the principle of hatred and destructiveness.* And when the language of the common people implies an incarnation of Satan, a "devil incarnate," the fearful truth is thus implied, that man, by repeated sins of wanton wickedness, may overstep the boundary between human and satanic evil, and may disclose within himself the deep abyss of a hatred that takes pleasure in the infliction of pain and death, simply for its own sake, and wholly apart from self-interest and advantage. This hatred corresponds, in the sphere of conscious and responsible life, to the wild destructiveness sometimes manifest in madmen, as a strange power in human nature urging the man in reckless wildness against everything that comes in his way. The recognition of these facts does not invalidate the old canon, *nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali*. This maxim is as certain and as incontestable as is any tautology; for the very fact of our making anything, however bad and revolting, the aim of our desires, makes it a *bonum* to us in the formal sense, while the truly good, which we turn from with dislike, becomes in the same way a *malum* to us.† Therefore, even where evil is pursued from a diabolical lust for pure mischief and destructiveness, this mischief and destructiveness are pursued as objects of desire and means of its satisfaction, *sub ratione boni*. This it is that is so shocking, that the moral degeneracy of man is so great, that he can find a sort of sensational gratification in the wildest and most malignant outgoings of sin. Herein lies the awful connection between sensuality and cruelty; for sensuality, in its grossest excess, can as easily transform itself into a destructive furiousness against others and against its own bodily frame, as the wanton practice of cruelty can afford a sensual pleasure.

* *Il y a des heros en mal comme en bien*, says the above-named connoisseur of the human heart, in his *Reflexions et maximes morales*.

† We may see how perplexing it is to mix up the abstract ideas of good and evil in this question, from the example of Bellarmine, who is thereby led to the conclusion that *liberum arbitrium* ever seeks after the good.—*De gratia et lib. arbitr.*, lib. iii. c. xii. Such a conception of the good as would call murder, prompted by cruelty or revenge, the gratification of a lust for good, has nothing in common with the good that rightly rules the will. Bellarmine here also has Thomas Aquinas on his side (*Summa*, p. i., qu. 63, art. 1), and other schoolmen, such as Antonius. We find the same axiom, moreover, in Leibnitz. It may be traced back even to Plato.

This connection, which Novalis has already pointed out, and which is full of significance, especially for those engaged in education, is not only confirmed by numerous instances—from the history of the Roman emperors, for example, from the lives of many criminals, and from the facts of the French Revolution—it is also indicated in the savage self-lacerations and self-mutilations practised in the religious orgies of Eastern systems.* It is very easy, according to the fashion of the day, to set up a general formula, such as, that love of cruelty is the negative pole to sensuality, but it is very difficult really to explain the connection. The phenomenon belongs to the darkest and blackest side of human life, wherein moral degeneracy sinks into the realm of unconsciousness and involuntary action which we find in nature, and it has unmistakable affinities with the animal creation.

Christ makes hatred and lying the two fundamental tendencies of evil in the human heart, because he describes the Devil as on the one hand a murderer from the beginning, and on the other a liar and the father of lies (John viii. 44). Falsehood is the timidity, and hatred the daring of selfishness. They mutually give rise to one another; hatred springs from lying, for it is enmity against Him who takes the side of truth;† and lying springs from hatred, for it is the instrument which hatred uses to accomplish its designs.

We have now traced the several tendencies of sin to which its particular forms, by whatever names they may be called, may easily be reduced. A parallel may be observed between the main branches of this development and those springing from the stem of good impulse and endeavour, as before described (p. 147). If we have succeeded in proving that all these tendencies have their root in selfishness, we have solved the problem which we proposed to ourselves (p. 152). There is no need to enter into details concerning the various discords of our emotional life, which a fully developed moral consciousness looks upon as sins, ill-humour, propensity to gloominess, to despondency, to despair,

* See Stuhr, *Die Religionssysteme der heidnischen Völker des Orients*, p. 440 f., though this distinguished investigator of the Religions of the East takes a somewhat different view of the phenomena which he relates.

† Christ Himself points out this side of the connection, in the same conversation with the Jews, John viii. 37-47.

and that stolid indifference and apathy, a bosom sin of monasticism, which the schoolmen were wont to reckon among the cardinal vices, under the name of *acidia* (*ἀκηδία*). These derangements of our emotional nature are sinful, only so far as they arise from a perverted tendency of the will. There is no difficulty in applying this rule to particular cases, though sometimes complications arise, through personal idiosyncrasy which causes the same tendency of will to assume different forms in different persons. In general, it can only be said that these ill-humours, so far as they are blameworthy, are owing to a want of energy in the moral character, and in other cases they indicate a want of living and conscious fellowship with God. It is, however, the power of the selfish principle which checks that energy and hinders that fellowship.

The same may be said regarding the blameworthiness of irregularities in the sphere of intellect. The whole course of our investigation suggests the dependence of our cognitive faculties upon the will and the emotions. The answers which truth gives to a man depend very much upon the questions which he puts to truth. The manner in which he puts his questions depends very much upon the principles which rule his life. No logic, no method of thought, can do away with this dependence of our intelligence upon the inner ground of our sentiments; it necessarily brings to light what lies hidden in the recesses of the heart, and as it may be a vessel unto honour when used by an earnest heart and with a clear consciousness of its import and its limits, so may it be also a vessel to dishonour when a frivolous spirit uses it.

Moral qualities cannot always be thus attributed to the intellect in the same degree. They are most prominent, however, in relation to topics which concern the inmost centre of life, and pervade its whole range; but at the circumference, in relation to knowledge of a more abstract and formal nature they vanish. Thus, for instance, in the development of mathematical truth it makes no difference whether the student be moral or immoral, pious or godless,—the results, like the methods, are the same among Christian and heathen nations. But mathematics has no reason to pride itself upon this independence of the great contrasts in moral and religious life; its very independence of

Sins of the intellect.

them is its restriction. Its position is such, moreover, that the truth it affords stands opposed not to doubt but to absurdity. Those are the highest and most important topics of our knowledge which disappear from the spirit when it confines itself within the limits of its own self-satisfied reason, and will believe nothing which cannot be demonstrated to its satisfaction; those are the highest truths which it can make its own by living action alone, and which it can retain only by ever rising anew above itself. Divine truths, says Pascal, reach the spirit through the heart. We must love divine things in order to know them.* But if the heart be estranged from God and given over to emptiness and vanity, it is only to be expected that when the unity of heart and intellect in the man asserts itself the derangement should be felt, and the eye of the spirit should be blinded by the deceptive glitter of the world.

Selfishness
hinders our
understand-
ing of the
Gospel.

The right apprehension and understanding of the Revelation of God in Christ depends more than does any other kind of knowledge upon the moral state of the individual. Theoretical arguments, and the enthusiasm of pure logic are wholly unable to apprehend it—indeed, they tend to close the soul against it. Their avowed principle is to put practical moral interests quite aside, but the truth which pertains to Christianity affects not the intellect only, but the whole man. Its bearings in this broad light cannot be understood unless we possess an indwelling interpreter in an inclination of the heart towards God, and an abiding consciousness of the discord existing within. The truth which constitutes revelation is a holy truth; it does not flatter the pride and indolence of man, nor does it feed his selfishness; it strikes down the assumptions and reserves of self-complacency, and it demands earnest self-surrender, self-denial, and humility. Christianity reveals herself only to those who possess a sincere longing to know her. The Logos is the Light of men even as He is their life (John i. 4). In order to perceive that Christ's doctrine is of God, man must be ready and desirous to do the will of God (John vii. 17). He who is not of God cannot receive God's words (John viii. 47; 1 Cor. ii. 14).†

* *Pensées de Pascal*, Berlin, 1836, tom. i., p. 112.

† Concerning this connection between theory and practice, see N. T. Stirm's

The saying, "He that hath, to him shall be given," is true concerning all moral truth; we must will it in order to know it.* If this earnest and hearty will be wanting, the apprehension of it will be more or less indistinct. It is unutterably difficult for man to tolerate any contradiction between himself and the holy standard of his life in all its sternness. If, therefore, he cannot bring his inclinations and the bias of his will into harmony with God's law, he endeavours by a process of self-deception to accommodate God's law to his inclinations. Selfishness contributes to this obscuration of the moral consciousness, perceptibly by the fostering of insolent pride and haughty pretentiousness, which makes self the standard of life, and insensibly, by the prostration of the soul, which has now fallen to a lower level so that it cannot become consciously alive to its higher destiny.

If a man's opinions and inclinations thus affect the inner sphere of his knowledge, it remains for us to indicate what these one-sided and perverted tendencies of thought are in the region of divine realities, and in their relation to selfishness. This, indeed, has already been done in our own day, and since Fichte's time by Daub in his work entitled, *Die dogmatische Theologie der jetzigen Zeit*, 1833. He traces all the theological tendencies of the present day, of course with one exception, to selfishness, and accuses Christian theology of deviating from a philosophy which is really destruction of its fundamental truths. Such a precedent as this does not invite imitation, for it requires no little feeling of self-importance to set one's self up as a moral judge of the scientific world, forgetting how easy it would be by the same logic to turn the sword of judgment against him who wields it.

There are, moreover, methods of thought fashionable in our day which indicate a deep inward disturbance and undermining of the moral life, although the espousers of them satisfy the ordinary rules of conformity to law

Anthropologisch-exegetische Untersuchungen, Tübinger Zeitschr. für Theol. 1834, part iii., p. 7 f.; and concerning St. Paul's view of it see Neander, *Planting and Training*, etc.; concerning St. John's, see Frommann's *Johanneischen Lehrbegriff*, p. 202.

* See my *Vorlesung über das Verhältniss der dogmatischen Theologie zu den anti-religiösen Richtungen der Zeit*, 12 ff.

and uprightness of conduct. When atheistic giddiness and the delirium of self-idolatry gain the ascendancy, the law of God loses its influence; and the intellect can submit itself to a materialism which denies the existence of spirit, only when the practical consciousness of man's superiority to nature is extinguished. Such perversions bear so obviously—on the very face of them—the brand of Cain, that it is superfluous to exhibit their connection with unbridled selfishness. Where, on the contrary, the connection is deeply hidden, it is beyond the province of sinful man to analyse and decide upon it. There is but One perfectly free from error and free from sin, CHRIST. He alone could lay claim to the faith of men in Himself as one who spake the truth, upon the ground of His own moral purity (John viii. 46); and He therefore can pronounce judgment upon whatever does not receive and harmonize with Him, as a wandering in the paths of darkness; He alone can analyze its connection with a depraved bias of the will. That which Protagoras the sophist said of man subjectively, that he is “the measure of all things,” is objectively true of the MAN who is our Lord and our God (John xx. 28). But as for us, seeing we are never free from sin, and are therefore continually liable to error, it is our highest wisdom not to trust to ourselves, still less to make ourselves the “measure of things,” but to rise above ourselves to Him who alone is holy, and who as He is the life, so also is the truth.

As to the perversions of our knowledge in its practical sphere, we may venture with less hesitation to point out the connection in which they stand with selfishness.

The perfection of practical knowledge consists in two things, wisdom in the choice and conception of our aims, and prudence in the use of means to realize these aims. Now folly stands opposed to wisdom as a perverted choice and conception of aims, and its essence accordingly lies in its making the gratification of self and of selfish desires the end of life. However accurate and shrewd its calculations, however circumspect it be in carrying them into practice, its egotism ever prevents its bearing the true stamp of wisdom; and however great an adept the man may be in the art of moulding individuals or nations according to his selfish plans, he is no less a fool. Leaving out the relation of his motives to the

holy and loving plans of God, and viewing his conduct simply in the light of his own consciousness and striving, it can never free itself from an aspect of ludicrousness, arising from the strange contrast between the enormous expenditure of means, and the littleness (not to say unattainableness) of the end in view.*

But as to imprudence or want of judgment in the means devised in order to attain the end, however good, a
 Imprudence. superficial observation may conclude that it arises simply from the want of that gift of nature, a sound understanding. But if we analyse it more closely, we shall find that a limited understanding—apart, of course, from aberrations of mind, imbecility, and so forth—will never oblige a man to be imprudent and indiscreet. If the man of limited understanding is conscious of this defect, he will not undertake duties and situations in life which he cannot adequately fulfil. But if he wants this self-knowledge, this consciousness of his real power, his imprudence is owing not to his limited understanding, but to his slothful indifference or to his self-conceit in fancying that he has capability. Imprudence, therefore, in the use of means, as a moral defect, is of two kinds; it is a lazy loitering carelessness, or haste and want of deliberateness in judgment. And it is easy to see how the former arises from a self-indulgent indolence and sloth, rendering the man incapable of any continuous mental exertion, and how the latter springs partly from assumed self-confidence and conceit, and partly from the disturbing force of passion; both having their original source in the power of selfishness.

SIN, in its widest acceptation, presents itself in a twofold
 § 5. HABITUAL AND ACTUAL SIN. form, either as a prevailing tendency and habit of the inner life, or as a particular and momentary act, *peccatum habituale* and *actuale*. The New Testament recognizes both these forms. It has been in

* Machiavelli's ill-famed book *Del Principe*, awakens this feeling in the unprejudiced reader. The violent and restless efforts of power, to which the Prince is urged, not to restore order in a troubled kingdom, but to secure his own sovereignty, while revolting, are somehow comical; a sovereignty too which at last, like that of Machiavelli's model prince, Cesare Borgia, vanishes in smoke some fine morning by a little mishap which had not been calculated upon.

modern times asserted by several theologians that *ἁμαρτάνω*, *ἁμαρτία* in the New Testament never means the sinful disposition of the man, but only the definite sinful act; see, *e.g.*, Bretschneider,* Reiche,† K. F. A. Fritzsche.‡ The question as to the correctness of this opinion may be important in the exegetical argument for original sin, but it does not affect our present question. For supposing that *ἁμαρτία* were only thus used, there are passages, such as Matt. xii. 33, xv. 19, 1 John ii. 15, in which the word *ἁμαρτία* does not occur, and which leave no doubt that the New Testament recognizes sin as a perverted habit of mind from which particular acts of sin may spring. We must certainly agree with those expositors, who assert that the verb *ἁμαρτάνειν* refers directly to acts of sin. And as to the substantive, it cannot be denied that the rendering “a state of sin” has often been adopted in passages where it is clearly inappropriate, *e.g.*, John viii. 34, ix. 34; Heb. ix. 28. But in that passage, which gives us the fullest and minutest description of sin and of its development in man, Rom. vii., *ἁμαρτία* clearly implies a power dwelling and working in man, including a sinful bias, a perverted state. Rom. vii. 8–11, “Sin which before was dead, by the entrance of the law revived, and took occasion by the commandment to slay man;” this has no meaning unless we take *ἁμαρτία* to mean a power dwelling in the man though in a hidden manner. The *ἁμαρτία ἐν ἐμοὶ οἰκοῦσα* (v. 17–20), and the *νόμος ἁμαρτίας* (v. 23), imply the same truth. We cannot explain these expressions away by having recourse to the notion of a poetical personification of sin, for such a lengthy personification, extending from Rom. v. 12 to viii. 3, would not only be very prosaic and without parallel in the New Testament; it is quite out of keeping with the

* Bretschneider (born 1776, died 1848), *Grundlage des evang. Pietismus*, pp. 144, 176. Yet in the former place, and in his *Lexicon*, he includes in the word the idea of guilt ensuing upon one or more sinful acts.

† Ausführliche Erklärung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, vol. i. p. 359. Yet this scholar, while strongly objecting to the rendering “habitual sins,” admits that *ἁμαρτία* denotes “condemnable activity of life,” not only in deed, but in thought and inclination, “so far as these are in the power of man’s free will,” p. 359, note. However it may be as to the last part of this statement, it is certainly recognized that *ἁμαρτία* may also denote a *habitus*, for disposition and inclination are habits.

‡ K. F. A. Fritzsche (born 1801, died 1846), *Pauli ad Romanos Epistola*, tom. i. pp. 290 ff.

character of the apostle's exposition throughout this part of his epistle, and with many of his statements regarding the power and activity of sin.*

∴ Actual sin, as the name itself indicates, implies a deed. If

Actual sin. our conception of a deed included a determination

of the will, it would seem that we must adopt the scholastic maxim regarding *peccata actualia*, *omne peccatum est voluntarium*, which is defended by Bellarmine† as strongly as it is condemned by the Reformers, especially by Melanchthon in the Apology, and elsewhere,‡ and that we must give up the old Protestant division of these sins into *voluntaria* and *involuntaria*. It is obvious that we must not limit our conception of actual sin as distinct from a state of sin to the merely outward embodiment of the sin in word or work. The act may be wholly inward, the intentional cherishing of sinful lust, the calling up in the mind and entertaining of lustful thoughts, yet it is certainly an act of sin. Those also are acts of sin which may be included under the well-known division *factum, dictum, concupitum*, or *peccata operis, oris, cordis*, according to one of the oldest and most distinguished advocates § of this

* Fritzsche ought not to have adduced the classical use of the word ἀμαρτία, which certainly excludes the notion of habitual sin and inner depravity of disposition, as evidence against this application of the term in the New Testament, for in its transition from the sphere of heathendom into Christianity, its import must necessarily have been widened and spiritualized. The same restriction applies to the parallel drawn from the use of the word חטא in the Old Testament.

† *De amissione gratiæ et statu pecc.*, lib. i. c. 1 and 8. *De gratia et lib. arbitr.*, lib. ii. c. 7, and elsewhere. Bellarmine applies the principle not only to sins of deed, but to sins generally, including the *peccatum habituale*, which he endeavours to represent as wholly different from the *vitiosus habitus*, as before lib. v. c. 19. In defence of his maxim, Bellarmine makes ample use of an expression of Augustine's in his treatise *De vera religione*, c. 14; *Usque adeo peccatum voluntarius motus est, ut nullo modo peccatum sit, si non sit peccatum voluntarium*. Augustine explains this position in his *Retractationes* thus, *peccatum quippe illud cogitandum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam poena peccati*, lib. i. c. 13, 5. After such a forced explanation as this, Augustine cannot complain of the violence Bellarmine does to it, when he identifies it with his doctrine of *peccatum voluntarium*; *De gratia et lib. arb.*, lib. v. c. 27.

‡ Apol. Confess. Augustana, art. de pecc. orig.—*Loci Theol. de pecc. orig.*, p. 110; *de discrim. pecc. mort. et ven.*, p. 335 (ed. 1569). Melanchthon recognizes in that maxim an unwarrantable transfer of a judicial view of sin into the sphere of religion. We find similar polemics against the maxim in Chemnitz, Hutter, and Gerhard.

§ *Augustinus contra Faustum Manich.*, lib. xxii. c. 27. The division also occurs in Lactantius, *Div. Instit.*, lib. vi. cap. 13.

division. Concerning *sins of omission*, which ancient and modern theologians have been wont to reckon among the *peccata actualia*, they may easily be shown to be *voluntaria* and inward acts, inasmuch as they are the rejection of a command in conscience for the performance of a duty. If this inward act of refusing to obey the dictates of conscience be absent, as in the case of a call of duty coming from without yet finding no response within, this indicates very deep moral depravity, a perfect searing of the moral sense; but seeing that no definite act has occurred in the man, nor anything done by him externally, there seems to be no ground for designating it a *peccatum actuale*, nor any, indeed, for calling it a sin of omission.

If we are right in calling all actual sins *peccata voluntaria*,
 Peccata voluntaria. we must show that every act of life which bears a
 sinful impress, though it cannot be called a state
 of sin, yet involves a movement of the *will*. We will not here
 refer to the involuntary promptings of sinful desire, the *motus*
primoprimi according to Scholastic terminology. It is respect-
 ing these that the dispute about the maxim above-named has
 chiefly arisen, and they who maintain it of course refuse to
 regard these as really sinful. But when the affection of
 sudden anger, for instance, has attained such power over a man
 that every vexation rouses him to more immoderate wrath and
 grosser acts of violence, even the just judgment of civil law
 would condemn him as a transgressor, and we cannot hesitate
 to describe his conduct as sin. The conclusions at which we
 arrived in our first chapter lead us to do this, for the law has
 in this case been broken by a man in duty bound to obey it.
 And yet, when we analyze the act itself, where shall we find
 any movement of will and resolve?

If, then, there are acts in the moral sphere of life which we must regard as sins, though we can trace no movement of will in them, what becomes of the canon *omne peccatum (actuale) est voluntarium*? The answer is that we must view such sins as belonging to the class of *peccata habitualia*, somehow as Bellarmine does not hesitate to speak of *peccatis originalibus* when dealing with the *motus primoprimi*. But if this be thought contradictory, we must let go the old canon, and adopt the interpretation of the older Lutheran divines, who widened

the term *peccatum actuale*, so as to denote by it every occurrence bearing the outward or inward mark of sin which takes place and passes away in any given point of time, and apart from the consideration of guilt. We may include sins of omission in this definition, not a majority of them only, but all; for where, owing to moral insensibility, the actual refusal of an inward call of duty does not occur, the omission may be regarded as an occurrence or phenomenon which is sinful, though purely negative. For to be so insensible to the call of duty arising from the circumstances of any given moment as not even to be conscious of it, is—presupposing, of course, our being in a state of accountability, and responsible for our conduct—in itself a definite sin.* A sin of omission is a neglect, not only in the fulfilment of the moral law generally, but in the discharge of a defined duty; it is therefore an act of opposition to a defined duty (see p. 69).

Adopting this explanation, which gives to our conception of actual sin the range requisite to include therein all sinful acts which do not belong to the other class of habitual sins, our hesitation about adopting the distinction of actual sins into *premeditated* and *unpremeditated* is removed.† It has already been shown (p. 42), that opposition to the moral law implies that all sin has its primary source in the will, though in its particular manifestations a direct action of the will is by no means necessary. Not only violent outbreaks of unbridled passion, but involuntary stirrings of unlawful desire must be regarded as sins. When, for instance, a feeling of vindictiveness, or of envy at

* Thomas Aquinas explains the conception of sins of omission thus: It does not, according to him, require any *actus*, not even an inward one, to make them sins, and he endeavours to reconcile this with the maxim, *omne peccatum voluntarium*, by asserting that in such cases it was, at least, in the power of the man to have willed and he did not. *Summa*, ii. 1, qu. 71, art. 5. Compare ii. 2, qu. 79, art. 3.

† Objections of another kind, arising from cases where superficiality of judgment is found connected with moral earnestness and high integrity, are urged against this by Töllner (died 1774), in his "Dissertation upon the distinction between premeditated and unpremeditated sins" (Theol. Untersuchungen, vol. i. part 2, pp. 214–259). What is called unpremeditated sin, according to him, is not, properly speaking, sin at all. The *πρωτον ψεῦδος* of his argument lies in his analysis of the subjective momenta in sin, which finds its refutation here and in Book 3 of our Enquiry.

another's good fortune, arises in the mind, it is an outward sign of the predominance of the selfish principle within, and must therefore be designated in the wider sense of the term an actual sin; and this, indeed, is witnessed to by the inward sense of self-reproach which a tender conscience will feel on account of it.

To dwell a little longer upon this subject in consideration of Views of our subsequent inquiries, we may remark that the theologians older theologians were wont to sub-divide unpre- on this distinction. meditated sins into two classes, sins of precipitancy or infirmity (*peccata praecipitantiae seu infirmitatis*), and sins of ignorance (*peccata ignorantiae*).* The *peccatum voluntarium*, in the true conception of it, implies not only the willing of what is wrong, but the consciousness that what is willed is contrary to the Divine law (*perpetratur a sciente et volente*, and therefore *peccatum contra conscientiam*). This, if correct, justifies their division of the *peccata involuntaria*. If the act of will prompting to the sin be wanting, it is a sin of precipitancy, the excessive violence of the impulse not suffering the will to discharge its office. If the consciousness of the act as a violation of God's law be wanting, it is a sin of ignorance.

But when the older theologians denote sins of precipitancy Sins of as also sins of *infirmity*, we maintain with infirmity. Töllner† that this term must be transferred to a class of premeditated sins of which those divines were not sufficiently cognizant. Sins of infirmity must accordingly be regarded as sins of premeditation committed in opposition to a better prompting of the will, on account of the weakness of this prompting and the strength of the temptation. We can only explain this upon the supposition of *two conflicting tendencies of the will* in the man at one and the same time. The one tendency of the will is towards the will of God and the revelation thereof in conscience and His Word, the other is in league with the inclinations and desires claiming satisfaction at the time. The one is the willing of the inmost *Ego*, the inner man of the heart which the individual possesses only so far as

* See, for instance Quenstedt, p. ii., c. ii., sect. i., *thesis* 75 seq.

† As before, p. 239 f.

a higher bias has not wholly vanished from his consciousness or has been awakened therein, the other is the will of the man who is not himself, who loses himself in the things of the world. But the former is a mere *velleitas*, a willingness and wish which cannot accomplish itself, whereas the latter as the stronger, rules the conduct and determines the act; and hence it is that the whole host of sins of infirmity arise. When St. Paul, in the very affecting picture which he draws of this state, wherein a better consciousness and effort contends in vain with the long-established dominion of sin, describes the deed as so opposed to the will, that it seems to be accomplished wholly without will (Rom. vii. 15, 17, 19, 20), he means that will of "the inward man" which he describes as the true *Ego*. Premeditated sins of other kinds may be called sins of malice or of wantonness, a name applied by the older theologians to sins of premeditation generally.

In proving selfishness to be the ruling principle in all sinful
 Does every transgression of the law spring from selfishness? natures, we have regarded sin as a permanent state, and we have traced the various tendencies of perverted disposition and character usually embodied in corresponding action to their development out of that principle. Let us now give our attention to distinctive acts of sin, and inquire whether every act which must be described as immoral, either directly by God's Word or by the moral consciousness enlightened thereby, necessarily springs from selfishness in the sinner? And if the answer be in the negative, let us ask, How then can selfishness be the principle of all human sin? Should we not then be obliged *either* to explain such actions as justifiable, and thus contradict the verdict of the moral consciousness and our own development of the nature of sin,—seeing that it could be reconciled neither with our definition of sin as transgression of the law, nor with our derivation of it from selfishness; or to seek another principle for sin, seeing that this is inadequate.

Two questions are involved in this problem, which we must be careful to distinguish: (1) Does every act which is objectively opposed to the moral law necessarily spring from selfish motives? and (2) Is such an act which does

not spring from these, but from contrary motives, morally justifiable on this ground?

As to the first question, we cannot answer it in the affirmative without reservation. Thomas Aquinas moots it in his *Summa*, and replies in the negative that sins may sometimes be committed through inordinate love of our neighbour.* Who can deny that thousands of instances of this are to be met with in daily life? That not only the impulses of mistaken kindness, obligingness, and pliability of disposition, or a mistaken zeal for God's glory, but motives in themselves noble may involve a man in opposition to the definite commands of the moral law? This want of coincidence between the objective principle and the subjective motive is frequently observable in the sphere of moral good; can it then seem strange to us in the sphere of moral evil? But we have only maintained the objective connection of all sin with the principles of selfishness; and no one can doubt that stealing, for instance, springs essentially from selfishness, although a person may take a fancy to steal out of love to his neighbour—to take leather, for example, from the rich in order to make shoes *gratis* for the poor. Thus in the act both views of sin as transgression and as selfishness coincide; but in the actor, the acting subject, they may occasionally be separated. Whatever be the inner nature of sin, if it has a definite import, and denotes a definite tendency of the inner life, considering human arbitrariness and its strange combinations, there will ever be particular acts naturally proceeding from this tendency which in special cases break away therefrom, and spring from other motives. Such cases must happen unless we adopt an utterly formal and vague definition, as, for example, the derivation of sin from moral disorder.

This is just the point whereon Jacobi's polemic † takes its stand, in opposition to every attempt to elevate
 Jacobi's protest. ethics into a universally applicable and strictly scientific system. For if an act directly contrary to a definite precept of the moral law may spring from a good motive, and

* *Prima Secundae*, qu. 73, art. 4. He suggests the following very inadequate solution:—*Dicendum, quod amicus quasi est alter ipse, et ideo quod peccatur propter amorem amici, videtur propter amorem sui peccari.*

† Sendschreiben an Fichte, pp. 32 f.

therefrom be justifiable, the letter of every moral system stands in an arbitrary and irrational relation to the spirit of moral good, not only on account of the narrowness of our present knowledge, but from the very necessity of the case. The letter is wholly inadequate to represent the spirit; the spirit cannot, according to its true nature, stir nor act without violating the letter. The only course accordingly seems to be for the spirit, relying upon itself, to make this its self-certitude and freedom its letter, by setting up a system whose principle is will—a Will that wills nothing but its own perfect independence. But this daring attempt (says Jacobi), instead of elevating the letter into pure spirit, ossifies the spirit in the letter of a stiff formalism.

And when this formalism accuses every one who refuses to reverence that Will as in itself good, of atheism, of actual godlessness, Jacobi's pathos breaks forth in the famous words:—"Yes, I am the atheist and godless man, who will lie against the Will that wills nothing, even as Desdemona dying lied; who will lie and deceive, even as Pylades representing himself to be Orestes; who will murder, even as Timoleon; who will break law and oath, even as Epaminondas and John De Wit; who will resolve upon suicide even as Otho; who will commit sacrilege, like David; ay, and who will pluck the ears of corn on the Sabbath, though only because I am hungry, and because the law was made for the sake of man and not man for the sake of the law. I am this godless one, and scorn philosophy,—scorn her because she calls me godless on this account, scorn her and her highest essence; because by the sacred certitude that I have within, I know that the *privilegium aggratiandi* on account of such transgressions of the mere letter of the absolute and universal law of reason is the royal prerogative of man, the seal of his dignity and of his divine nature."

And yet in the midst of these strong protestations by which Contradiction here. Jacobi asserts the universal authority of the individual moral consciousness, he unwittingly betrays his own uncertainty. The protest begins with the claim of a formal recognition before the judgment-seat of conscience of those deeds wherein the man, actuated by a noble impulse, breaks through the letter of the moral law, and it ends by claiming on their behalf from man the prerogative of mercy.

We do not at all object to this claim as far as man can here be a judge of such actions ; the narrowness of human knowledge, and the urgency of the moment demanding quick resolve, forbid us, remembering our own weakness, to exercise a severer judgment, when one of our fellow-labourers in extraordinary emergencies involving great moral perplexity cannot, perhaps, find the true solution. But for the conscience of the man to transgress laws—actual precepts of the Divine law—definite duties, in order thus to attain *something better* than their fulfilment, is really the adoption on the part of conscience of the maxim that makes the devil the helper of God. And where is there a halting-place between this and the Jesuitical maxim that the good end sanctifies the means ? * Manifold subjective excuses may indeed be urged in behalf of those who act as is described, but for the objective maintenance of goodness and holiness in the world, they who do evil with however good an intention, equally with those who do good from bad motives, are more dangerous foes than the multitude in whom bad motive and bad action go together—far more dangerous, I say, because this arbitrary juxtaposition of contradictoriness, this linking of good and evil as means and end, is the very thing to weaken the consciousness of that war of extermination which moral good incessantly wages against moral evil. †

From this turbid source there flows an ever-increasing enervation and deadening of the moral judgment, which can no

* It is well known that a dispute has again arisen whether this maxim is to be found in so many words in the writings of the Jesuits ; and the decision of it is very difficult on account of the character of the Jesuitical works now extant. But though we may not be able to prove that the above words are actually used by the Jesuits, they correspond completely with the spirit of the Jesuitical treatises on Ethics ; just as, for example, the saying *virtutes paganorum sunt splendida vitia*, corresponds with the spirit of Augustine, though it can be proved that the saying thus expressed cannot be found in Augustine's works.

† The moral law stands in the same relation to these two classes of persons as religion does to its false friends and its avowed foes. Christianity has her most dangerous enemies, not in the latter, but in the former ; by far the most dangerous, for they find it always easy to bring their principles, which are diametrically opposed to Christianity, before the multitude, seeing that they only need to be uttered with spirit and taste ; and a host of “good Christians” of spirit and taste may be found to “accommodate” these principles with Christianity, taking care to make the poison a saleable article by interloading it with a sufficient number of innocent thoughts and pious phrases.

longer feel any energetic hatred even of the grossest worthlessness, unless perhaps of robbery and murder, and such crimes as invade the outward order of life, violently disturbing and destroying it. For who would have any difficulty in discovering something or other to justify the vilest act which has the shadow of a good intention?

The answer to the second question lies in what we have now said. An action which contradicts the moral law is not justified by the mere fact that, by an anomaly within an anomaly, it happens to proceed not from selfish but from good motives in some one particular case. Man is to regard the objective connection of a mode of action contrary to the law with the principle of selfishness as an unconditional *veto* against that action, even though he may imagine that he has in some special case the most excellent motives prompting him thereto. Indeed, in the very self-assertion of his own subjectivity as the determining and deciding power in the face of the plain declarations of the moral law there is an arrogance, side by side with noble-mindedness, enthusiasm, and what not, whose real source is selfishness.

In the discussion of this problem we have viewed actual sin as embodied in outward conduct rather than in thought, but the same conclusion may easily be reached in relation to all involuntary outbreaks of selfish impulse which must be regarded as *peccata actualia*, whether they be wholly internal or be manifest in rash and unmeaning action. Unbridled selfish impulse, so far as it is sanctioned by any will, is undoubtedly a form of selfishness. The impulse would have been controlled and subdued, if the will had not surrendered itself to that principle.

PART II.

THE IMPUTATION OF SIN.

CHAPTER I.

GUILT ; AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT.

As the result of our inquiry at the beginning of Part I., we may in a general way describe the antithesis between good and evil thus :—Good is not merely that which is, but that which ought to be ; not reality alone, but necessity also belongs to it. Evil, on the contrary, while possessing an empirical existence, is that which ought not to be ; it exists only as an infringement of, or opposition to, an ideal law.

But upon closer consideration we find that sin is not hereby sufficiently distinguished from other striking phenomena in human life ; the condemnation which conscience compels us to pronounce against it is not yet fully defined. Deformity or ugliness may be described as that which ought not to be, for it is not merely the absence of beauty, or of æsthetic qualities generally, but the perversion and positive negation of beauty, a contradiction of its law.*

It certainly cannot be denied that there is an affinity between deformity and moral evil, even as there is a coincidence between the beautiful and the good. That which violates the law of moral good may indeed sometimes find an appropriate place in a complex work of art, contributing by way of contrast to the beauty of the whole, but viewed by itself it can never truly correspond to the law of beauty. Language itself—not that of the Greeks alone, among whom beauty was most akin to the spirit of the people, but Latin and German also—bears witness to this affinity, for the same

* See the fuller development of this conception in Weiss's *Æsthetik*, vol. ii., pp. 173–207.

word (*turpis*, *hässlich*) is used to denote both physical and moral deformity. Man instinctively feels that there is an incongruity, if not a violation of order, when what is well-favoured does not embody and represent the good, and what is ill-favoured is not used to represent the evil; and we cannot regard it as in any way strange or inconsistent that the genius of the Greek language should have associated shame not only with sin, but with deformity.* How the philosophic spirit of Greece in the zenith of its development—in the Dialogues of Plato—described this order and affinity, is too well known to require illustration here. Yet nothing could be more prejudicial to the interests of moral truth, than to resolve our moral judgments into merely æsthetic principles.

The peculiar way in which our idea of morality reveals itself in consciousness requires more careful investigation than it has hitherto received. Kant pre-eminently led the way in this inquiry; and if the results did not answer the expectations which his earnest genius for truth warranted, this arose from the merely logical formalism of his Ethics, and from his belief in the autonomy of the practical Reason. It must here suffice for us briefly to name two distinctive features of the Moral as contrasted with the Beautiful. We speak of course of the beautiful only so far as it has to do with human action. The cultivation and exhibition in conduct of what is beautiful depends upon individual talent and taste; if a man be deficient in these, it is because he has no gift or inclination thereto, and he is not on this account to be blamed. But the call of morality is universal, and wholly independent of individual gifts and tastes. Morality requires of the individual the universal realization of its demands; it does not suffer any partition of duty, whereby a person may compensate for the omission of one virtue by practising another. Indeed, it is a wanton violation of the majesty of duty to fancy that its claims can be satisfied by any such compensation on the part of mankind,—as if the faults of one could be counterbalanced by the virtues of another.† This notion is a natural product of the old error,

The distinctive idea of duty.

* *Αἰσχρός*, derived from the same root as *αἰσχύνω*, *αἰσχύνομαι*.

† FEUERBACH (b. 1804), "*Wesen des Christenthums*," p. 205 f. ULLMANN has analysed this peculiarity of morality more minutely than any author that I

which regarded sin as the necessary consequence of human finiteness and idiosyncrasy. To measure duty and its claims by the standard of æsthetics is really to deny it. Violation of duty, moreover, when perceived, affects our consciousness and moral sense far more deeply than any disregard of the laws of beauty, and in a very different way. If it be otherwise in any one's experience, if a man finds it more difficult to forgive himself a breach of good manners or good taste than a sin, this is only a sign of his moral derangement. Of deformity or want of beauty we can only conditionally say, that it ought not to be, because the beauty embodied in human works can be only conditionally necessary;—a glory of outward form, which becomes a consuming fire if made the all in all of life;—but the "ought not" of evil is unconditional, because the necessity of good is universal, and demands from every one without exception recognition and obedience.

The peculiar way in which sin bears upon him who commits it is embodied in our conception of guilt. In æsthetic judgments we find fault with the unbecoming, in and for itself, and without reference to results or ends; whereas, when the *moral* judgment disapproves, there is always implied the presence of personal guilt.

The conception of guilt implies, *first*, that the sin in question must be attributed to the man in whom it is, as its author. In our conception of *sin* we include only what is objective,—a fact which is contrary to the Divine will, whether it be act or state;—but our conception of *guilt* has a subjective bearing; it points to an author to whom the sin may be attributed. However it may be with other disturbances of life, regarding *sin* we have an immediate consciousness that it is not only *in* us but *of* us.

know of, in his "*Polemisches in Betreff der Sündlosigkeit Jesu*," p. 70 (published also in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1842); and yet I cannot disguise the conviction that this view of morality, accurately defined, will not admit of the use to which Ullmann applies it, viz., to demonstrate *a priori* the necessity of a sinless individual in history, from whom a new development of holiness springs. If we contemplate the divine ideal we must conclude that there will be a divine kingdom of perfectly holy men at the *end and goal* of history, and for this very reason Ullmann's argument is hardly logical.

Human causation of sin. Causation, therefore, forms a necessary part of our conception of guilt, and this is exclusively expressed in the Greek word for it—*αἰτία*.* If we contemplate the relation of sin to man's nature, we may describe it as a diseased *affection* of the soul,—as something foreign and contrary to man's true nature; if we regard it as it occurs in its relation to actual life, it is not an affection but an *act* of the soul, either immediately an act, or at least embodied in an act. Plato regards evil as a mere affection, for in his ethical inquiries he often repeats the principle that no one is willingly (*ἐκὼν*) sinful or wicked.† And if it were certainly true that good is the activity, but evil the passivity of the soul, there would, as Plato himself shows in the end of the *Hippias Minor*,‡ be the strangest contradiction involved in the supposition that any one is willingly sinful. The inferences which he himself draws, however, abundantly show how destructive this view is of the imputability of sin. It compels him to seek its cause in bodily malformation or in perverted education, to complain of evil because it is evil,§ and to represent it as the cause rather than the effect, the educator of man rather than the result and fruit of his nature. Plato's view of sin really arose from his not sufficiently distinguishing between physical and moral evil.

The forensic view. The juridical aspect of guilt rests upon its causal relationship. In the first instance it simply denotes the fact that the deed in question had its origin in the will, and there is another term to express the connection of the deed with the intention of the acting subject. The rights of an individual or of a community have been violated by an act of some one. If the question be concerning the author of this

* The popular application of the idea of guilt to the sphere of nature means nothing more than that the thing blamed is the cause of an undesirable effect. In Latin the distinction between a responsible and an irresponsible cause is very accurately expressed. See Döderlein's *Lateinische Synonyme über culpa und noxia*, vol. ii. p. 152.

† *E.g.* *Protagoras*, 345, 358; *Gorgias*, 468; *Timaeus*, 86; *De legibus*, lib. v. 731.

‡ 376. Concerning the genuineness of this Dialogue see K. Fr. Hermann, "*Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*," vol. i. p. 487, and the notes there.

§ *Timaeus* as before. Here Plato expressly says: *ταύτη κακοὶ πάντες οἱ κακοὶ διὰ δύο ἀκουσιώτατα γιγνόμεθα.*

violation, we have to consider the distinction between *culpa* and *dolus*. If there be only the outward fact of the effect being produced by the careless act, or the neglect of any one, so that this person knew or might have known this as the possible consequence of his conduct, without designing it as his aim, in this case we find only *culpa* (*lata* or *levis*), conformably to the sense of the word as used by classical writers ; but where, on the contrary, the injurious act springs from the intent to injure, there we charge the actor with *dolus*. But besides this narrower definition jurisprudence applies the conception of guilt in a wider sense. When there is a violation of right and a personal actor possessed of consciousness and will, to whom it is ascribed as the author of it, whether it be as *culpa* or *dolus* he is described as *guilty*.

Akin to this wider sense is the ethical aspect of guilt which intensifies it. In the Forum of law that only is looked upon as guilt which is an overt violation of right ; and there, too, it is not the sinfulness of the act which makes the man guilty, but the fact of its infringing the legal rights of citizen life. But in the Forum of Morals everything is regarded as guilt which contradicts the moral law,—in beings of course who are subject to the law, and according to the conditions of life in which they are (compare p. 42) ; all disturbances, therefore, and perversions of the inner life which have their root in the will are also guilt.

This relation to the will, however, which is implied in the imputation of guilt, must be more accurately defined. It was not the *peccatum voluntarium* merely, but the consideration of sin generally, which at the outset led us to the conclusion that its seat is in the will ; our conception of the moral law as that to which sin stands opposed, cannot be explained without showing its bearing upon the will, and representing the will as the real seat of this opposition. But the will may be this, and at the same time only the channel carrying forward into act an impulse given to it by a foreign, perhaps a superhuman power. That it is not only the seat of the opposition, but also, by its own determining power, the originator of evil in human life, we learn from the consciousness of guilt. This it is which makes us personally answerable for our sin. No one can say, “ When my conscience condemns my sin, it does not necessarily

condemn me ;” the sinner himself is inseparably identified with his sin, and the condemnatory judgment of conscience concerns himself.*

This *condemnatory judgment* is the second principle involved in our conception of guilt when we view the objective sin in its relation to a responsible subject. There is a twofold condem-

Desert of
punishment.
1, Negative. nation : there is first, the *negative* result of sin, the separation of the sinner from fellowship with God.

It will be remembered that we have found the essence of sin to consist in man’s departure from God, and hence the present thought may seem tautological. But its distinctive import consists in the fact that this separation from God ensuing upon sin, cleaves to the sinner as an abiding sense of unworthiness. He has committed sin ; he is guilty. So long as the desire after God is dormant, the sense of guilt is dormant too ; but when the sense of guilt awakes, the man finds that he is separated from God, and unworthy of any revelation from God save only the revelation of His wrath.

2, Positive. This leads us, secondly, to the *positive* result of sin attaching to the man as guilty. It is this. He

has thus incurred the punishment due on account of His offence against God’s sacred order of the world. It will appear further on in our inquiry how sin, as an act, produces a sinful state, which in turn gives birth to manifold acts of sin. Together with this actual consequence—wherein the life is chained to the power of the sin with which it forms an alliance—there is closely connected an obligation created by the sin to satisfy that injured majesty of the moral law which (as we have proved in the second chapter of the first part) is inseparable from the majesty of the Lawgiver.

The New Testament expresses this conception of guilt as Words in N.T. involving an obligation to render satisfaction on for guilt ; account of sin by the words, *ὀφείλειν, ὀφείλημα, ὀφειλέτης*, Luke xiii. 4 ; Matt. vi. 12. The expression is figura-

* If this seems contradictory to the Apostle’s words, *οὐκ ἔτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ (τὸ κακόν), ἀλλ, ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία*, Rom. vii. 17–20, it must be remembered that this whole passage does not treat of men in general, but of one in whom aspiration and even struggling after righteousness are already begun (*οὐκ ἔτι*). What the *οὐκ ἐγὼ* means, and how it is explained by other statements of the Apostle in the same connection, will be shown further on.

tive, implying a debt incurred by sin, against God as the creditor (Matt. v. 26; Luke vii. 41, 42), a comparison which, as is well known, Anselm adopted as the basis of his theory of the Atonement. Arraignment under the law as following upon sin is expressed by the words *ἐνοχον εἶναι*, which, governing the genitive, sometimes refers to the law itself (James ii. 10), sometimes to the punishment ordained by it (Matt. xxvi. 66; Mark iii. 29), sometimes to the object against which the sin is committed (1 Cor. xi. 27); and which, governing the dative, refers to the arraigning power of the law (Matt. v. 21, 22). The conception of guilt in its religious aspect is more accurately expressed by *ὑπόδικον γενέσθαι τῷ θεῷ*, Rom. iii. 19, to which the designation of the guilty, *τέκνον ὀργῆς (τοῦ θεοῦ)*, Eph. ii. 3, corresponds.

Old Testament phraseology seems hardly to coincide with the conception of guilt as above described. It is O. T. words for guilt. universally allowed that the word *חַטָּאת* denotes this conception. But, first of all, the frequently recurring formula to express the demand for punishment or expiation on account of sin is a striking one. We might expect to find *חַטָּאת חַטָּאת*, but this never occurs. Instead of it we almost always meet with *חַטָּאת חַטָּאת* or *חַטָּאת חַטָּאת*, implying either that the sin has not yet been expiated by a sin-offering, as it should be, according to the theocratic relations of the sinner; or that it cannot thus be expiated.* It is akin to the expressions “to cover sin,” “to take away sin,” “to atone for or forgive sin,” which also have *חַטָּאת*, *חַטָּאת*, *חַטָּאת* and not *חַטָּאת*.

The much discussed difference between “sin-offering,” *חַטָּאת*, and “trespass-offering,” *חַטָּאת*, may perhaps throw Difference between sin and guilt-offering. light upon this matter. The ordinances regarding these (Lev. iii.–vi., xix., xx.–xxii.; Num. v.–vii., xv., xxviii., xxix.) show that not only were trespass-offerings sometimes made apart from sin-offerings, but sin-offerings

* With the first import, *e.g.*, Lev. v. 1, 17, xxii. 9, Num. xxx. 16; with the second, Gen. iv. 13, Lev. vii. 18, xxiv. 15, Num. v. 31, ix. 13, xiv. 24. The same form of expression is used for the *vicarious* bearing of sin, Isa. liii. 12; Ezek. iv. 4, 6, xviii. 19, 20; Lev. xvi. 22. The further meaning which Gesenius, in his Thesaurus, gives to *חַטָּאת*, “to atone for sin,” seems nowhere to be proved, and arises from the confounding of the necessary consequence of the act with the act itself.

also apart from trespass-offerings. The union of both in one act of expiation occurs only in the purification of the leper and of the Nazarite, Lev. xiv. 1-31; Num. vi. 9-21. We may therefore with certainty conclude that "sin" and "trespass" or "guilt," do not denote merely different aspects of the same transgression, but different kinds of offences against the theocratic law. And seeing that in the detailed descriptions of offerings given in Leviticus viii.-x. burnt-offerings, sin-offerings (offerings of consecration), thank-offerings (meat-offerings) are mentioned, but not trespass or guilt-offerings; seeing, moreover, that in the minute directions given in Numbers xxviii., xxix., concerning the feast-offerings, and in the circumstantial account of the offerings of the princes of Israel upon the setting up of the tabernacle, Numbers vii., guilt-offerings are passed over in silence,* we must conclude that the זָכָה did not belong to the regular sacrificial service, but was offered only in particular cases for defilements, which did not so often occur.

The passages in the Pentateuch relating to these guilt-offerings do not throw much light upon the question as to the distinctive difference between these trespasses and the rest, and the reason of their being called κατ' ἐξοχήν "guilt," זָכָה.† Hengstenberg's view, according to which the sin denoted by חַטָּאת is an inward disturbance, a fall of the man from himself; and the sin denoted by זָכָה is transgression against the Holy God and His Law,—a robbery of God, demanding restitution,‡ —is contradicted by the use of these words in Hebrew. For we find לִיהוָה חַטָּאת or לֵאלֹהִים (e.g., Gen. xx. 6, xxxix. 9; 1 Sam. vii. 9) as well as לִיהוָה זָכָה; and a fixed distinction of this

* Here one "kid of the goats" for a sin-offering is repeatedly named, but not "the ram" of the guilt-offering. See also Lev. xxiii. 9-20.

† The guilt, or trespass offering, may be more easily explained regarding "the trespass in the holy things of the Lord," Lev. v. 14-16; the withholding of that delivered to one to keep, or taken away by violence, Lev. vi. 1-7; adultery with a betrothed bondmaid, Lev. xix. 20-22; the purification of the leper, Lev. xiv. 10-32, and of the Nazarite, Num. vi. 1-21. But there is great difficulty in explaining it in Lev. v. 17-19, on account of the very general nature of the sin for which it is prescribed. We cannot make the יְדִיעוּת (v. 17) the *differentia specifica* of the trespasses meant which specially demanded the guilt-offering, for in the case immediately following (ch. vi. 2, 3) this "ignorance" cannot be supposed.

‡ Die Authentie des Pentateuchs, vol. ii. p. 214 f.

kind does not harmonize with the fundamental view of the Old Testament concerning sin, nor with the idea of sacrifice which it contains ; * out of the six or seven cases cited in which a guilt-offering is prescribed, only one (Lev. v. 15, 16) describes the sin as distinctively a robbery of God. The hypothesis adopted by Winer, who follows Reland, is, that the guilt-offering refers to transgressions which have no witness except the man's own conscience ; and the sin-offering to transgressions of which the persons had been convicted, or which might be presupposed according to the general constitution of human life.† This is strongly supported by the similar view of Josephus.‡ And yet the nature of the two classes of transgressions, as the Pentateuch describes them, is opposed to this view also. Most of those trespasses for which the guilt-offering only was to be offered, imply a cognizance of the offence on the part of others ; § and many of the transgressions for which the sin-offering was appointed afford no hint of such a cognizance.|| As the older attempts to explain the difference between the sin and the guilt offerings are still less tenable, we must regard it as, down to the present time, an unsolved problem.¶

A careful examination, however, of all the passages bearing upon the question, clearly proves that besides the wider meaning of חַטָּאת , narrower meaning of אֲשָׁמָה , guilt, on account of which the guilt-offering as distinguished from the

* Hengstenberg might be justified in regarding this difference as arising only from different ways of looking at the same transgression, if his assumption that a guilt-offering was connected with every sin-offering were well grounded.

† *Biblisches Realwörterbuch*, Art. Schuld- und Sünd-opfer.

‡ See the places cited by Winer,—*Antiq.* iii. 9, 3. Buddeus (died 1729) adopts this explanation, *Hist. Eccles. V. T.* tom. i. pp. 723, 724.

§ Winer maintains the opposite ; but in the retaining of what was entrusted to one, and in illicit intercourse with a betrothed bondmaid, must not the injured person have been cognizant of the sin ? Sin also against what was holy to the Lord could not as a rule have escaped the knowledge of the priests and Levites.

|| This is true especially of many of the defilements named in Lev. v. 1–13, and regarding this section Winer himself admits (with his wonted candour) that his proposed principle is not borne out.

¶ This, too, is the judgment of Bähr in his inquiry regarding the sin and guilt offerings, *Symbolik des Mosaischen Kultus*, vol. ii. p. 410 f. ; and he rightly rejects the assumption of confusion or arbitrariness in the use of the words, and of a later origin, for this part of the Pentateuch.

sin-offering was ordained, a *wider* signification must be recognized, in accordance with which אֲשָׁם is sometimes used when no guilt-offering, but only a sin-offering was to be presented, see especially Lev. iv. 3, 13, 22, 27, v. 2-5. The Mosaic ordinances regarding the sacrifice of expiation (in its strict sense; for, in a wider sense, every offering had an expiatory import), involve this fundamental thought—Every sin* is an offence against God, an infringement of His prerogative, and involves, therefore, a guiltiness or a condition which needs to be atoned for, requiring in one case a sin-offering, in another a guilt or trespass-offering, and in a third both these. In this chain of thought the guiltiness is the necessary consequence of the sin, as is implied in the passages above referred to in Leviticus, and by the position of the אֲשָׁם or אֲשָׁמָה , after $\text{הָטָא$, the arraignment of the sinner arising from the sin obliging him to render satisfaction.† Thus we find אֲשָׁם and אֲשָׁמָה used in Gen. xxvi. 10, xlii. 21; 1 Chron. xxi. 3; 2 Chron. xxviii. 13; Ezra ix. 6, 7, 13, 15, x. 10. In the view here given, according to which the sin-offering itself may be called אֲשָׁם , i.e., not a guilt-offering, but guilt for which restitution must be rendered to God, we have the key to that apparently confused passage in Lev. v. 1-13.‡ The difficulty above referred to in the use of the expressions נִשְׂאָה עוֹן , or הָטָא , disappears when we remember that the conception of

* Mention is made only of שְׁגָגָה , sins of “ignorance,” in directions given for offerings and presumptuous sins— בִּיד רָמָה are expressly excluded, Num. xv. 22-31. But according to the instances of sins given in Leviticus, שְׁגָגָה must be taken in a very wide sense.

† Compare Hengstenberg's remarks in the place before cited concerning the meaning of אֲשָׁם .

Strongly as the conception of guilt is set forth in this passage, there can be no doubt (according to verses 6, 7, 9, 11, 12) that it treats of Lev. v. 1-13. the sin-offering. אֶת-אֲשָׁמוֹ is neither in ver. 6 to be rendered “his guilt-offering” (De Wette), nor in ver. 7 “for his guilt,” “on account of his guilt” (De Wette and Hengstenberg), but in both places “as his guilt,” compensation which was to be rendered to the Lord on account of the sin committed (אֲשֶׁר הָטָא), answering to the $\text{אֲשֶׁר-קָרַבְנוּ אֲשֶׁר הָטָא}$, ver. 11, as an offering which, as it is more accurately explained in the same verse, was to appear as a substitute, when through poverty the proper אֲשָׁם , the appointed sin-offering, could not be brought.

guilt is already contained in the verb נִשָּׂא. Guilt ensues precisely because the sin does not pass away with the moment in which it is committed, but abides upon the sinner, and he must bear the burden of it. Thus the forms of expression בָּפֶסֶה הִטָּאָה בְּפֶר עֵין, may be taken in their natural sense according to the true meaning of the verbs without warranting lexicographers in including the conception of guilt as part of the meaning of the substantives.

This guilt which attaches to sin is included in Melanchthon's definition of sin so often quoted by the older theologians of our church;—*peccatum est defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei, offendens Deum, damnata a Deo, faciens reos aeternae irae et aeternarum poenarum, nisi sit facta remissio.** Many of our theologians further distinguish between the *reatus culpae* and *reatus poenae* in explaining the imputation of sin, and, though the expression is awkward, the distinction is justifiable, for in its true import it corresponds with the two elements specified above, which our conception of guilt includes.†

Melanchthon, when speaking of the different degrees of § 2. DEGREES OF GUILT. guilt attaching to actual sins, strongly repudiates the stoical doctrine that all sins are alike in this respect.‡ And herein he is confirmed, not only by the testimony of the Old Testament—most particularly by the Mosaic

* *Loci Theol. De pecc.*, p. 97.

† BAIER, who is distinguished among our older Dogmatists for the precision with which he defines dogmatic formulæ, thus explains the *reatus culpae*:—*obligatio, qua quis sub peccato, per ipsum peccatum constrictus, tenetur, ut revera sit et dicatur peccator.* It is the immediate devolving of his sin on the personality of the sinner by imputation. See also his definition of the *reatus poenae*; comp. *Theol. positivæ*, p. ii., c. 1, § 15.

‡ *Loci Com.*, p. 119, and in like manner the second Helvetic Confession, cap. viii. (Coll. Confess. Niemeyer, p. 478). Strictly speaking, however, Melanchthon rejects the doctrine in relation only to sins of the regenerate; as to the unregenerate, with Luther, he grants it so far as to regard all their sins as alike deadly sins; and hence some Catholic controversialists—Bellarmine, for instance, *De statu peccati*, lib. i., cap. iv., charge them both with maintaining, *omnia peccata esse paria.* Their train of thought on the subject is as follows:—Every sin is in itself a deadly sin, making the transgressor liable to eternal condemnation, and it is only by regeneration and its principle of faith that any sin can become venial. Now some sins, if committed in a state of regeneration, involve the destruction of faith, and the contradiction of that state, though not

regulations concerning the sin-offering now described, which obviously imply different degrees of guilt attaching to different sins,—but also by passages in the New Testament, *e.g.* Matt. v. 21, 22, x. 15, xii. 31, 32; Luke xii. 47, 48; John xix. 11; 1 John v. 16. These different degrees of guilt cannot, as Schleiermacher thinks, be resolved into different degrees of responsibility and of privilege in those who commit the sins.* This view arises from Schleiermacher's regarding actual sins merely as the effects of sinful habits; he overlooked the fact that they are not only effects but causes, for habits spring from acts; and if we are seriously to maintain guilt as attaching to sin, sin must, in the first instance, always be actual. And if actual sins be thus the causes of habitual states of sin, there is no reason for confining degrees of guilt to these habitual states alone,—no reason why degrees of guilt should not be predicated of the sinful acts themselves according to their kind.

Mortal and venial sins. The old division of sins into mortal and venial, with its littlenesses and externalities, has been the inexhaustible source of mischief, and even of misery in the Confessional of the Roman Catholic Church. They only deceive themselves who think that they can by certain signs discern the exact degree of guilt attaching to every sin;—still perversions and abuses such as these do not destroy the truth of the principle, that different sins involve different degrees of guilt.

On what do these differences depend? Guilt is the recoil of sin upon him who commits it, but the force of the recoil depends not only upon the tension of the spiritual energy from which it first sprang, but also upon the objective magnitude of the sin itself. It is dangerous, and if legitimately carried out it might resolve sin

irretrievably—*peccata mortalia*;—other sins do not destroy faith, and these cannot fail of the divine forgiveness, for faith still exercised secures it—*peccata venialia*. Principles essentially the same were adopted by the theologians of the Reformed Church; see Calvin's *Institutio*, lib. ii., c. 8, § 59. *Declar. Torun. De peccato*, 8, 9.

* Glaubenslehre, § 74, i. (vol. i., p. 451). As to the distinction between mortal and venial sins, the Reformers and the older Theologians of our Church agree with him so far as to lay down the principle (according to the former note) "*peccatum mortale et veniale distinguitur non secundum substantiam facti, sed secundum personam sive propter differentiam peccata admittentium.*"

into a merely subjective feeling, to make the degrees of guilt formally dependent upon the manner in which the sin was resolved upon within the heart. Degrees in guilt are contingent not only thus upon what is formal and subjective, but also upon what is material and objective. The latter depends upon the strength or weakness of the principle of selfishness which works in all sin; the former upon the more or less deliberate committal of the sin by the individual himself.

In order to complete responsibility in the committal of sin, the act must be realized by the will, and with the consciousness that it is sin. The absence, either of this consciousness or of the decision of the will, must, therefore, affect the completeness of the responsibility. And thus we have before us again the two kinds of unpremeditated sins already mentioned, sins of ignorance and sins of haste. Melancthon,* followed by his pupil Chemnitz,† Hutter,‡ and others, resolves the different degrees of guilt in sin in the case of the regenerate, and even the distinction between mortal and venial sins, into this division of sins into premeditated and unpremeditated. We indeed, as above remarked, make degrees of sin in part dependent externally upon the varying strength of the selfish principle in the act; yet the result is pretty much the same in both cases. For if a man, when committing sin, is conscious of it as sin, his consciousness must offer resistance against it, and this must, in turn, be overcome and crushed by a higher degree of firmness influencing the will to yield to selfishness. And as a rule, it is really so. But there are sins wherein the principle of selfishness is remarkably active, and yet the sinner, on account of the gross darkness wherewith the very act overshadows his soul, never realizes it in consciousness as sin. We must therefore allow that differences of degree in the guilt of actual sins do not always coincide with the division of sins into premeditated and unpremeditated. This is especially true regarding

Degrees of guilt in pre- meditated and unpremedi- tated sins ;	sins of infirmity, violating the law of conscience, in which, notwithstanding that the person is com-
Sins of infirmity.	

* *Loci Communes*, p. 117. *De Discrimine pecc.*, p. 276.

† Died 1586. *Loci Theol.* p. iii., *loc. de discr. pecc. mort. et venialis*, fol. 122 f.

‡ *Loci Comm. De discr. pecc. mortalis et venialis*, p. 356.

pletely cognizant of his act, a less degree of selfishness is apparent than in wilful sins, and in sins of ignorance committed almost unconsciously, and through a reckless desposal of the still small voice of conscience.

It is upon the same principle that we must estimate the truth of the common opinion that in sins of ignorance, the fact of ignorance obviates guilt, because though there be a distinct act of will, there is no cognizance of any sin therein. Moral guilt, at least, is in this case said to exist only in the act which objectively violates the moral law, and which is committed by a person who might, had he chosen, have avoided his ignorance in this particular. When this is the case, guilt attaches even to a sin of omission arising from moral indifference or from carelessness.

There are certainly so-called "sins" of ignorance, wherein the ignorance wholly does away with the guilt, and therefore with the sin. But here we must bear in mind the well-known distinction between ignorance of the law as binding, and ignorance of the act in its consequences (*ignorantia juris et ignorantia facti*). Our knowledge of the act pertains to what is external, to manifold relations and circumstances of time and place wherein it is committed. Ignorance and mistake may easily occur in this sphere, and error in act may ensue simply from want of discernment and observation, without the least guilt attaching to the actor. If a man, for example, disposes of the property of another as his own, in the belief, fully warranted by the circumstances, that it is certainly his, there is in this a violation of civil right, but no moral guilt. The decisions of the Mosaic law, according to which guilt arose from Levitical impurities, even where there was *ignorantia facti* (e.g., Lev. v. 2, 3), cannot be urged against this view. The whole conception of Levitical uncleanness, though destitute of permanent moral and religious significance, was perfectly adapted (in the historical circumstances of the people) to fulfil the design of the Mosaic law, and to work in Israel a consciousness of sin and of their need of redemption. In carrying it out, therefore, the fact of defilement had to be maintained, without suffering the difference between knowledge and ignorance of the law to decide more than the degrees of theocratic guilt ensuing thereupon.

Sins of this kind, however, do not concern us; but sins which spring from inordinate self-love contradict the moral law and have guilt attaching to them, whether the doer be cognizant of this contradiction or not. Certainly, if it were utterly impossible for any one to know the precepts of the moral law, and if it were out of his power to know that such selfish conduct is wrong, he would be freed from the guilt and charge of sin; but the incompleteness of his moral nature would thus be implied. The distinction, too, between superable and insuperable ignorance at the time of resolve and action will also affect our calculation of the degree of guilt, though it cannot imply its entire absence. A man cannot be reproached on account of ignorance or mistake regarding things accidental and changeable; but to be ignorant of those fundamental truths whereof conscience informs him, and of their bearing upon conduct, is the sign of a sinful disturbance and perversion of the inner life. If, from the moment when first he heard the voice of conscience, his aim always had been simply and solely to know what that voice tells him, and unconditionally to obey, there would be no sins of ignorance, no sins arising from *ignorantia juris* to be laid to his charge. His moral consciousness would be developed to so high a degree of strength and clearness in the man that the right counsel would never fail him. But the sinfulness of human nature in this respect, as we shall see by and by, prevents our freeing him thus from the guilt of particular sins. It is the unrighteousness of man that hinders the growth of truth in his consciousness (Rom. i. 18). And hence we find that savages, when they have been converted from the abominations of idolatry,—from lust and murder, and unbridled selfish impulse,—to the faith of Christ, never excuse themselves on the ground of ignorance, but in deep humiliation feel the reproaches of an awakened conscience.

St. Paul recognises the mitigation of guilt in the case of the ignorant heathen, when he says regarding the *χρόνοι τῆς ἀγνοίας*, “God overlooked them” (Acts xvii. 20; compare Rom. ii. 9; Matt. xi. 21–24). But he by no means considers the sinful heathen to be free from guilt. On the contrary, he speaks of the original consciousness of God in the human heart, and of its being further roused by the

*Ignorantia
juris.*

St. Paul's
view of sins of
ignorance.

revelation of God in nature; and he traces the perversion of the religious life to the wilful suppression of that consciousness (Acts xvii. 27-29; Rom. i. 19-21, 28). He refers with equal distinctness to the power of conscience in the hearts of the heathen (Rom. ii. 15), and to the fact that in social life they "not only did such" horrible crimes as he depicts, but "took pleasure in them that did them,"—and yet knew that such things merited death (Rom. i. 32). From both these facts he concludes that they could by no means justify or excuse themselves in their sins (Rom. i. 20, ii. 1, iii. 23). He at the same time speaks of it as an instance of the Divine long-suffering, that he who had been before a blasphemer, persecutor, and injurious—though he did it ignorantly and in unbelief—"obtained mercy;" and in obvious reference to that part of his life he calls himself "the chief of sinners" (1 Tim. i. 13-15).

St. Paul, in Romans xiv. 23, teaches that whatever is disapproved by the inward moral testimony of a man's own conscience must be imputed to him as sin if he commits it; and it has been from this inferred that (according to the Pauline view) the imputation of guilt depends solely upon the subjective witness of the man himself as to whether the act be right or wrong. De Wette, in his *Ethics*, thus understands the passage, and infers from it a doctrine of guilt of a wholly subjective character, leading him to reject the division of sins into sins of ignorance and sins of knowledge, because the former are not sins, and because the anxiety of the conscience regarding unknown sins (Psalm xix. 13) applied only to the case of the Hebrew, bound by an outward law.* But this could not logically be inferred from the Apostle's words unless he had written not only *πάν ὃ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως ἁμαρτία ἐστίν*, but *πάν ὃ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιόν ἐστιν*. Can this affirmative judgment be logically deduced from the negative one? No, certainly. Of course a man's moral conviction, though erroneous, possesses the power to oblige him to that which it represents as his duty, but it has not the power to free him from the authority of the truth, and to set itself up in its place. It is the curse of moral error that it condemns a man when he acts in opposition to his subjective convictions,

* *Sittenlehre*, part i. p. 111; compare pp. 308-10.

but yet does not justify him, if in following them he does what is wrong. The persecutors of the apostles possessed the most decided conviction that by so doing they were fulfilling a duty towards God (John xvi. 2), and for this very reason they would have been deserving of punishment whether they forbore or carried on the persecution.

Christ says concerning those Jews who hated Him, "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin" (*i.e.*, the sin ὅτι οὐκ οἶδασι τὸν πέμψαντά με), John xv. 22, 24; and though ἀμαρτίαν ἔχειν denotes only the actual presence of the sin,—the ἀμαρτάνειν or ἡμαρτηκέναι,—yet, considering the contrast—*νῦν δὲ πρόφασιν οὐκ ἔχουσι περὶ τῆς ἀμαρτίας αὐτῶν*—the words certainly contain a conditional negation of guilt. But we must not understand this negation as absolute, but only as relative, for throughout the New Testament, and in St John's Gospel in particular (*e.g.*, John i. 29, iii. 36, ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μένει ἐπ' αὐτόν; xx. 23), the sinfulness of the world through estrangement from God is spoken of as involving guilt. The similar contrast, which is drawn by our Lord in Matt. xi. 21–24, recognizes only a mitigation of guilt. The similar words of our Lord, addressed to the Jews (John ix. 41), tell strongly against a negation or even a mitigation of their guilt. They may be paraphrased thus:—"If ye were wholly unable to comprehend my message, the rejection of it would not have been your sin; but now you yourselves acknowledge that you do understand it, and therefore the rejection of it rests upon you as sin."* Christ, however, expressly declares it to be a universal rule that the sinner's knowledge or ignorance of the divine law which he has broken causes a difference only in the *degree* of his guilt and desert of punishment (Luke xii. 47, 48). The same truth is expressed in Christ's prayer for His murderers as He hung upon the cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," Luke xxiii. 34. If this ignorance wholly freed them from guilt, they had no need of forgiveness; if it did not lessen their guilt, it could not have been used as a plea. Thus the prayer which we find in Psalm xix. 13 is confirmed as still needful and appropriate, not only by Christian experience, but by its full confirmation in the New Testament.

* See in both places Lücke's observations in his commentary.

In our inquiry thus far we have considered guilt independently of its realization in the consciousness of the sinner. And this is no mere abstraction, for guilt is originally objective; it cleaves to the sinner as an unavoidable "thou oughtest," following upon a primary "thou shalt,"* which had been left unfulfilled. It demands, moreover, an expiation, though the sinner be himself unconscious of the relation in which he stands to the injured majesty of the divine law. The reality of guilt is by no means dependent upon the sinner's cognizance of it. But is an entire absence of this cognizance possible in the case of a guilty man? It might be so if the consciousness in man of a rule governing his whole life by its unconditional demands were ever wholly extinguished. Experience furnishes us with instances of the utter stifling of this consciousness, as well as of its being clouded and perverted; but it does not justify us in entirely denying its existence at any stage whatever of man's moral depravation. Bolder spirits may, having thrown off the authority of God and of His holy law, try to persuade themselves and others that they are free from such an inward accusing faculty; but in his heart of hearts man can never be indifferent to the moral distinctions of good and evil;—he can never help *disapproving* acts of hatred, of injustice, of lying, and *approving* acts of benevolence, justice, and truth. Even the most hardened villain, whose maxim is to follow the promptings of his own evil and corrupt heart, and never to trouble himself about duty, finds that there are acts of wickedness against which, when he is tempted to them, his moral sense rebels.

Still it by no means follows that the consciousness of guilt in human life is as universal as is sin. All we can infer from these witnesses to the existence of an indestructible moral nature in man, is, that there are some acts of villany which no one can ever venture upon, without rousing conscience secretly to resent and punish the crime. Experience does not warrant the belief that more than this exists universally among men. Multitudes allow themselves

* Language very obviously expresses this indissoluble connection. Man, in the first place, owes obedience to the law; if he does not fulfil this obligation, he is again a debtor to the law. This twofold "ought" is also expressed in the Greek *ὀφείλειν, ὀφείλημα*.

without compunction to be wholly ruled by impulse and selfishness, and in the utter crudeness and barbarism of their moral state they never think of reproaching themselves. Others pride themselves upon a refined and cultivated moral consciousness, but their moral sense is so infected by the sophistries of desire and passion that the ordinary impulses of their egotism no longer awaken in them a sense of guilt. Heathenism, even in its highest and purest development, indicates the limits of man's moral judgment in those very elements of its religious teaching, wherein a strong moral consciousness makes itself heard. The Eumenides who show their power in the upbraidings of conscience, exercise the solemn functions of their august office only on occasions of gross violations of the most sacred and obvious rights,—when, for instance, a crime of bloodshed has been perpetrated.

It must certainly be acknowledged that guilt among men is far greater and wider in its range than the personal consciousness of guilt. It is not always felt even where it acts as a restraint and outward obligation upon a man ; in multitudes it is dormant, and can be awakened—not merely as an accuser on account of some grosser crimes, but as a witness against an all-pervading opposition to the sacred rules of life,—only when the soul is freed from the icy fetters of moral insensibility and indifference. But even when the sinner is destitute of a clear moral conviction of his crime, he is not without a misgiving which must be regarded as the germ of this conviction. Though he be free from more glaring crimes, yet so long as he spends his life in the service of fleshly desires and selfish interests, he does not feel at one with himself ; he has a hidden presentiment that the sphere in which he lives is not his true home. There are moments too when a feeling of uncertainty warns him that the ground on which he stands is hollow and undermined. The service of sin never suffers man's heart to be free, it invariably enthralls it.

But when the actual consciousness of guilt springs forth from these hidden misgivings, a practical proof is given us that sin has not yet wholly penetrated man's moral being ;—the self-accusations even of an evil conscience are the outward signs of an acquiescence which man in his inmost heart spontaneously

The sense of
guilt implies a
limit to human
depravity.

and even against his will must yield to God's law. Even when man has wholly surrendered himself to the service of sin, and onwards till he reaches the lowest depth of moral obduracy, evil presents itself to his moral sense as a foreign power, which though it dwells within him by his own permission and will, yet causes an inner discord, and sets him at variance with himself. Our consciousness of guilt has two strange and contracted bearings; on the one hand it attributes sin to the *ego* of the man, and makes him personally answerable for it, and on the other hand, yet at the same time, it brings to light a hidden bias within him which inclines towards the law of God, and which (as if in a self-contradictory way) resists the efforts and acts of the selfish *ego*. The true *ego* which can realize itself only in fellowship with God, and which separates sin from itself as a foreign element,* is at variance with the state of the *ego* as a matter of experience according to which sin must be recognized as its own.† Conscience, therefore, is the divine bond which unites the created spirit—however deeply sunk in apostasy—with its original. The essential dependence of our spirit upon God, the *γένος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Acts xvii. 28, asserts itself even in the consciousness of guilt, however misapprehended this truth may be by man so long as he has nothing higher than his evil conscience. The pain and anguish arising from the upbraidings of this consciousness, the inner uneasiness which sometimes takes possession of the servant of sin, are witnesses that he is not yet wholly estranged from God. Sin is an effort of the creature to separate himself from God, and this effort, while it must ever be objectively fruitless and vain, must be so subjectively likewise, provided that the consciousness of guilt within is not utterly extinguished.‡

While thus recognizing the moral import of this consciousness

* Εἰ δ' οὐ θέλω ἐγὼ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία, Rom. vii. 20, compare verses 9, 10.

† Οἶδαμεν ὅτι νόμος πνευματικός ἐστίν, ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός εἰμι, Rom. vii. 14. If we compare with this the Platonic doctrine which makes evil something that cleaves to a man wholly from without and apart wholly from his will, and that tyrannizes over him, we must confess that Plato here sacrifices the experimental truth of the matter, with which the question of guilt has entirely to do, to a merely ideal view.

‡ Goethe, in his *Faust*, puts the reproaches of an awakened conscience into the mouth of the evil spirit, and parallels to this may be found in the writings of the chief Doctors of the Church, Luther for example. And the poet's con-

of guilt, we must not forget the difference between it and *repentance*. The varying degrees of human susceptibility in regard to that consciousness, depend upon the general moral condition of the individual. But its manifestation in particular cases—the awakening of the conscience—is at first spontaneous. It asserts itself even when the man endeavours to suppress it. He does not himself retain this consciousness, but it retains its hold on him; it pursues him when he would flee from it, and resists his efforts to ignore it. When the *ego* in unbridled selfishness imagines that it will overleap all the divine commands, it finds that the insuperable power of these laws within him, mocks his vain endeavours. The consciousness of guilt is thus a power *over* the man in his present condition, so wonderful a power, that it often compels the most reckless criminal as if by a spell to confess his crime and to deliver himself up to the sword of justice from which a persistent lie would have permanently shielded him. It is only by repeated resistance and persistent obduracy, that a man can entirely free himself from these inner self-upbraidings. But his gradual searing and silencing of the inward monitor, so far from exculpating the sinner, involves the responsibility of a long course of guilt of which it is the fruit.

Repentance, on the other hand, is not only a passive feeling, it is an inward act, not a mere verdict of conscience, but an act of will; it differs from the bare consciousness of guilt by involving an actual and free surrender to this inward punishment as deserved. Repentance is an element in the work of salvation, a step in the way back to God, whereas the tortures of an evil conscience must have been felt by such monsters of iniquity as Tiberius* and Nero.† We cannot require of a man that he shall feel the consciousness of guilt and the stings of conscience, since these are spontaneous, but we can call upon him to repent. Repentance, therefore, necessarily includes the endeavour to be free from sin and to do God's will. Sorrow for sin without the stimulus of this endeavour, is not "godly sorrow" (2 Cor. vii. 9, 10), nor can it properly be called *ception* is justified by the fact that while the consciousness of guilt is holy in its origin, yet in its workings it leads to one of two contrasted issues. While in a Peter it rouses to conversion, in Cain and Judas it urges on to ruin.

* Tacitus, Annals, Book vi. 6. Suetonius, Tiberius, 66, 67.

† Suetonius, Nero, 34.

repentance. This inner unity is expressed in the language of the New Testament; for both sorrow for sin and the longing after a life well pleasing to God, are included in the conceptions *μετάνοια*, *μετανοεῖν*; and this is the more clear from the significant construction of the words on the one hand with *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν φόνων, ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων, ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας* (Acts viii. 22; Heb. vi. 1; Rev. ii. 21, 22, ix. 20, 21, xvi. 11), and on the other with *εἰς τὸν θεόν* (Acts xx. 21).

Luther, in the *Articuli Smalcaldici*, Part III. Art. III. (pp. 320, 322, *Ed. Rechenb.*), rejects the notion of Luther's view of *contritio*. *contritio activa* maintained by the scholastic theologians, and describes true repentance as *contritio passiva*. We can easily understand how the impulsive spirit of Luther, in which the consciousness of sin as a ruinous enmity against God was as strong as his consciousness of God's all powerful grace, would oppose the penance of Roman Catholic doctrine and practice, the artificial forcing and eliciting (*elicere*) of the required penitence, so that he calls this repentance *factitia et accersita*, and the delusion that we may merit forgiveness of sins by means of repentance an *opus meritorium*; and he combats it as Pelagianism.* But from what we have already said, it is evident that human activity rightly understood is included in true repentance. When Luther, Chemnitz,† and others maintain the contrary, they do not sufficiently distinguish repentance from the mere consciousness of guilt and from the pain of an awakened conscience, and this Bellarmine has pointed out.‡ Still this view of the doctrine of repentance coincides with that *pati actionem dei* and *capacitas mere passiva*, whereby Luther and the *Formula Concordiæ* § describe the relation of the human will to divine agency in conversion. We may regard this view as defective without having to assent to the opposite doctrine of the semi-Pelagians, or to the awkwardly worded formulæ of the Synergists.||

* And yet the Council of Trent, Sessio 14, De Poenitentia, c. 4, speaks not only of *contritio*, but even of *attritio* (*contritio imperfecta*) as *donum Dei*, and the work of the Holy Spirit. See Bellarmine, *De poenit.* lib. ii. c. 3.

† Examen Conc. Trident., p. ii. *De contritione*, p. 347 f. Ed. 1590.

‡ *De poenit.*, lib. ii. c. 2; *De contro. christ. fid.*, tom. iii. p. 964.

§ *Solida declaratio*, cap. 2, *De libero arbitrio* (p. 662, *Ed. Rechenb.*). Here, as in some other dogmas, we trace the want of a due distinction between passivity and receptivity, and the inadequate expression of a principle essentially true.

|| A refined semi-Pelagianism advocated by Melanchthon and his school, as well as by Erasmus.

CHAPTER II.

MAN'S GUILT AND HIS DEPENDENCE UPON GOD.

WE do not deny that the necessity under which we are of
 § 1. THE attributing sin to ourselves, and of accusing our-
 SENSE OF SIN selves of wandering from God, and of opposition to
 OVERWHELM- His will, is very humiliating and even fearful. On
 ING? the borders of this dark abyss into which man must descend
 alone,—for though the prevenient grace of God accompanies
 him here also, he knows it not as yet,—not merely a super-
 ficial and worldly morality that regards sins as ever coming
 from without rather than from within, not merely a pious
 sentimentality which may experience the sense of sin as a
 gentle sorrow intended merely to enhance the joy of deliverance
 rather than as a bitter pang; not merely a philosophy which
 requires for its world as an antithesis to the good, an evil
 continually to be overcome, yet never to be wholly vanquished,
 —but even an earnest and religious consciousness starts back
 in alarm, and betrays a strange proneness to resort to excul-
 patory theories.

And, indeed, the difficulties are by no means trifling which
 present themselves, especially from a religious point of view,
 against a decided maintenance of man's guilt in sin. The
 independent action on man's part, which the very nature of
 guilt implies, how can this be reconciled with our conception
 of him as a creature, and with God's all-pervading, all-sustaining
 presence in His world? If man be created by God, he derives
 his being and nature from an absolute cause; how then can
 anything proceed from his will which is not finally traceable
 to this absolute cause? If God be everywhere present with
 His all-powerful will, man's will can do nothing great or small,
 beneficial or baneful, without God's sustaining activity some-
 how taking part therein.

The wide distance between God and the world exists only in
 Is God the the imagination of a piety utterly emasculated, and
 author of sin? of a theology merely intellectual and barren; God
 is in reality so near, that man could not withdraw from His
 all-pervading power even if he would. Divine love, as it gives

being to the world, will not cast it off, but ever cherishes it in its bosom. Now, if facts which so deeply affect human life as the resolving and the doing of evil are to be derived from the will of man as their immediate cause, is it conceivable that on this account they should any the less depend ultimately upon divine origination?

But on the other hand, it is no trifling consideration that prevents our unhesitatingly adopting this train of thought and following it to its legitimate results. We shall see hereafter how thoroughly dependent the main doctrines of Christianity are upon the truth of the consciousness of guilt. But is it only consciousness of guilt which we must surrender if we look upon God as the author of sin? If the conscience which condemns the sinner be a delusion, can the conscience which repudiates sin be regarded as indubitably true? If so, we must bethink ourselves on WHOM the guilt of sin must fall, if we absolve ourselves. If God works evil by His own absolute will, so that when we sin we are merely the submissive instruments of that will, how can we venture still to repudiate and abhor what comes from God? If God be the author of evil, it is not evil that we have to repudiate, but that bold condemnation of evil which presumes to censure the Divine ordainments. We then cannot any more approve the good; the distinction between good and evil must give place to the identity of both; and the moral foundations of our being are overthrown. Or, must we say according to the maxim *nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse*, that God has established these moral distinctions within Himself that by an internal conflict He might provide a fountain of life, a never-failing incentive to development? Must morality thus be allowed to depend upon the blasphemous notion of a Pantheism that knows nothing of the holiness of God? A contrast of good and evil which God Himself creates, can never be anything but a mere play of the Absolute within itself, and how can it ever be regarded by the human conscience, cognizant of this, its import, as a solemn reality? If, as Rosenkranz maintains, true religion must regard God as a being who reveals His nature and His will with equal necessity in all that is and all that happens,—who gives birth to the good without thus honouring Himself, and to the evil without debasing Himself,—religion would be in its essence hostile to morality.

If the reality of the moral consciousness is to be sacrificed in order to preserve the reality of religion, that which we gain by the sacrifice must itself be sacrificed in its turn. For what kind of piety would that be wherein the soul could turn towards God without becoming conscious that its own selfish and worldly desires and aims were thoroughly condemned by Him? Thus, representations and views which seem at first to spring from a regard to interests of religion, clearly end in its total overthrow.

A way out of the difficulty seems to present itself in the supposition that God, while He has Himself ordained that limit or hindrance in human life which we call Evil, has, at the same time, inseparably joined with it the consciousness of guilt in order to prevent man from submissively resigning himself to it, and to stimulate him to untiring efforts after goodness as the true harmony and freedom of his being. But what a resort—what a conception of God—is this! A dark, demoniacal Power, “who lets the poor soul become guilty and leaves it in its pain,” the pain of an evil conscience—who ordains selfishness, lying, and even hatred as the necessary shadow of Good,—a shadow ever vanishing, yet never disappearing altogether, and who burdens man’s consciousness with the responsibility of this, thus adding to the weight of sin the inward torment of self-reproach,—such a Power may perhaps be conceivable upon the principles of Polytheism* and Pantheism, but it is utterly irreconcilable with Christian Theism. Not only does it contradict God’s truth and holiness; not only does it undermine all faith in His revelations, but it transforms the love of God into the cruelty of a despot.

* In the Epic poetry and in the Tragedies of Greece we not only find the guilt of sin shifted upon Zeus and Fate,—as in Agamemnon’s speech, *Iliad*, xix. 86 (see Nägelsbach, pp. 275 f., 295 f., 66 f.),—but the thought above-named appears, viz., that the gods themselves plunge a man into deep guilt when they have determined to destroy him. Thus Plato, in order to explain the banishment of the poet from his ideal Republic, quotes the following words from a lost drama of Æschylus (*De Republ.*, lib. ii. 380):—

Θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς

ἔταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλγ.

We cannot, indeed, attach much importance to this passage seeing that we know neither its connection nor the character and circumstances of the speaker; but Sophocles, the noblest poet of antiquity, puts the following words into the

It is, in fact, self-evident that every explanation of the consciousness of guilt which regards it as ordained of God, not because evil has its origin in the creature, but merely to the end that the creature

Such a view destroys the sense of guilt.

mouth of Œdipus Coloneus, describing what the king had done, or rather (as the poet often distinguishes) had gone through, v. 964 :—

Θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον
τάχ' ἄν τι μνηίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι.

And in the following lines he describes the *θείσφατον* which had been appointed for his father as the irresistible cause of his bloody deed, though this judgment is not justified in the further development of the drama. The gods avenge the *πρώταρχος ἄτη* of a family upon its descendants, by infatuation and wickedness, whereby they again become liable to divine punishment ; but this *πρώταρχος ἄτη* itself (as the myth and even the meaning of *ἄτη* suggests) is sent by the gods who are jealous of human greatness. The *πρώτη ἀρχή* of this perversion is in man, only so far as the extraordinary elevation of the individual above the usual level of human weakness and infirmity excites the *φθόνος* of the gods. Thus in the *Ajax* of Sophocles, 745–748, these are said to have been the words of the prophet Calchas :—

Τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα
πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις
* * * * ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσιν
βλαστὼν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ' ἀνθρώπον φρονῇ.

Greek piety includes humility in the presence of the gods. This, indeed, is a prominent feature in it so far as it regards evil, as *ὑβρις*, but this humility is metaphysical rather than moral. The *ταπεινοφροσύνη* of Christianity humbles us in the very consciousness of our lofty origin and our high destiny because of the contradiction for which we are ourselves responsible between what we are and what we might have been ; the humility of Greek piety forbids man to entertain lofty views of his destiny. It has, indeed, somewhat of a moral character, but this is not distinctly visible, it lies only in the background. The above quotation affords a striking instance of the wavering of the ideas of the Greeks upon the subject : the guiltless eminence of Ajax and the *ὑβρις* of his mind are together named as the causes of his tragical fate ; but does it not seem, as we read it, as if the *μὴ κατ' ἀνθρώπον φρονεῖν* is itself involved in the *περισσοῖς κἀνονητοῖς σώμασι* ? Schömann, in his profound and thoughtful work, the *Prometheus Vincetus* of Æschylus (1844), very kindly and instructively refers (p. 133) to the first edition of this work, and argues that a closer analysis of the story of Œdipus proves that his guilt was the cause of his tragical fate. As to the drift of the story this I allow to be true ; but had Sophocles regarded it in this light, would he not have thus described it in his play, especially in the concluding scenes where atonement is made ? But as to the prevailing opinions of the Greeks at the time of their highest glory as a nation, it is difficult to believe that they would have listened so attentively to the father of history at the Olympic games had not the *πᾶν θεῖον φθονερόν*, which characterizes his work throughout, been deeply rooted in the faith of the people. Greek philosophy, on the contrary, expressly condemns the attributing of guilt to the gods. We find this in Plato repeatedly (see the passage above-named), and in Plutarch also, *Adv. Stoicos*, c. 19.

should confine the derivation and imputation of it to himself really involves the destruction of that consciousness altogether. To discern such a purpose would be really to defeat it. Having discovered his Creator's design, the subject of it can no longer really attribute evil in its source to himself. God's device is frustrated when clever man sees through it. The consciousness of guilt, moreover, no longer serves as a spur to progress.

§ 2. THE
PROVIDENCE
OF GOD. We must not turn our backs upon the momentous interests involved in the question as to the trustworthiness of our sense of guilt, for the sake of quietly resting in the belief of God's all-conditioning power. But it would be equally wrong to deny our immediate consciousness of this divine agency, recognized as it is by true piety, and confirmed by the uniform testimony of Holy Scripture, lest we should thus have to call in question the affirmations of consciousness concerning our guilt. Both dictates of our consciousness are alike true, and alike to be vindicated; and a true solution of the problem is to be found in the union of both. So far as this question is immediately connected with the freedom of the human will, the consideration of it does not belong to this part of our treatise; this aspect of it, and indeed its profoundest basis, must be examined in the third book, where this freedom will be the topic of inquiry. The question whether a power of causation be conceivable which, while dependent for its existence upon God, yet is able in itself to give to its activity a tendency opposed to the divine will, and independent of His power of causation,—this question properly concerns the relation of sin to the *creative* power of God. Here we have only to consider whether God's active power in *continuing* the existence of all created beings, and in *sustaining* all things, does not necessarily make Him the author of evil; does not resolve our sense of guilt into a mere shadow thrown upon the soul by a mistaken feeling of our own independence.

A definition of God's providence, usually assigned to the schoolmen, describes it as *creatio continua*.* This view of it has found special acceptance with those who from their own

* Is this expression really derived from the schoolmen? In those whom I have by me, Lombard, Aquinas in his *Summa totius theologiae*, and in his *Summa contra gentiles*, Bonaventura in his *Commentary*, and in his *Breviloquium*, it does

religious experience have been confirmed in the belief of the close and continual relation of God's working to the history of the world. It served them as a safeguard against deistical separations of the world from God as its maker, as if it were a completed piece of mechanism.

If this expression have any definite meaning, it must clearly be, that what we denote by the terms creation and preservation, are one and the same divine activity,—the difference between them being only in our subjective apprehension of them; and that not only the beginning, but the continuation and development of all finite being, with all its movements and changes, wholly and alike depend upon this creative working. They especially must maintain this identity who with Schleiermacher regard modes of divine activity, objectively different, to be inconceivable, as necessarily involving alternate contrasts and limitations. But Schleiermacher insists very strongly upon the duty of tracing all doctrinal conclusions, and especially those relating to creation and providence, to the immediate *data* of our religious consciousness; and this identification of all divine workings is merely a metaphysical abstraction. It is based upon the notion of a unity simple and uniform, which is alike the transcendental principle of the world and of all the various and contrasted existences upon it, and which is accordingly the absolute *terminus a quo* of all things, and equally pervades all ranges and movements of being. Further on in our inquiry (in book iii. part i. chapter 4) we shall endeavour to show how inconsistent this idea of God and His relation to the world is with the truths of religion, with which the interests of true philosophy must always be one; meanwhile, we cannot give up the real distinction between Creation and Providence for the sake of the fancied notion that there can be no change in the manner of God's operations.

Provided, moreover, the distinction be acknowledged as a Relation of fact, it does not signify to us that the various time between modes of the divine working follow each other Creation and Providence. in the order of *time*; that as Providence pre-not occur in any place where creation, providence, foreknowledge are treated of. The conception, however, we do find otherwise expressed in the words of Aquinas, in his *Summa tot. theol.* p. i., qu. 104, art. 1,—*Conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis, qua dat esse.* See also the beginning of art. 2.

supposes the existence of its object-matter, the creative activity originating it must have preceded the providential activity which preserves it, and which therefore follows creation in the order of time. God's will and counsel are (as Luther says) independent of time, both as to means and opportunity; but it is a misunderstanding as great as it is common to infer from this that divine agency cannot be manifest in time, i.e., in the world; or that it cannot limit itself by time. There is no contradiction (as the schoolmen have shown) in the thought of an eternal counsel of God's will to accomplish a definite work at a definite time; but it is a contradiction to allow the active presence of God in the world, and the divine government of the world accomplishing a definite end, and yet to repudiate that thought. If time be only the subjective form of our own imagination, the representation that God can limit His workings in any manner by time is equally a phantom; and so is every conception, every presentiment as to what change and development in themselves may be; for without the idea of duration we cannot conceive of anything, even the least, and our view of the world would be reduced to a tantalizing *Fata morgana*, to an objectless reflection of our own faculty of knowledge, and its limit. If time, on the contrary, be the real and objective form of worldly existence, so far as this existence is essentially an advancing one; and if God's working can yet have no possible relation to time, then—on the supposition of God's independent personality—all bonds of union between God and the world are snapped in sunder.*

Argument from God's holiness.	We shall not renounce the distinction between Creation and Providence upon any such grounds as these. The weightiest considerations against their identification are suggested by the conception of God's
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* Luther maintains no such timelessness, and though Schleiermacher quotes some expressions occurring in his commentary on Genesis in favour of the theory that the divine operations must be absolutely timeless (*Glaubenslehre*, § 41, vol. i. pp. 215, 217), these expressions, taken in their true connection, intimate no such doctrine. Thus on Gen. ii. 2 Luther says, "*Operatur Deus adhuc, siquidem semel conditam naturam non deseruit, sed gubernat et conservat virtute verbi sui. Cessavit igitur a conditione, sed non cessavit a gubernatione.*" That expression, "apart from time either as to means or opportunity," Luther predicates, not of God's working, but of God Himself.

holiness. Our religious consciousness cannot allow the principle to be impugned, that God could never have *created* man evil; because, were this principle denied, God must be the author of evil. But, nevertheless, it is God who *preserves* man, sinful though he be; and if creation and preservation be identical, must not God still be the author of evil?

.. The distinction between creation and providence has the universal testimony of language in its favour. In the sphere of human operations, we call an activity that accomplishes something new, "creation," with the proviso of course that it is not absolutely a creation, a making out of nothing, because this new thing is only a mode of being. An activity, on the other hand, which controls and guides what already exists, we call "providence" or "preservation." Now the word "creation" implies a much stronger activity, which, other things being equal, has a higher degree of responsibility attaching to it. How are we to apply this distinction to the divine activity? If every new production, so far as it is original and cannot be derived from the agency of created powers already present, must be attributed to the creative power of God, our conception of creation cannot be confined merely to some one moment at the beginning of finite existence. Every new species is originated by a creative act, for the very conception of a "new species" implies that it cannot be deduced from or explained by anything already existing. Thus, for example, to take only the most general orders of species presented to us, the first appearance of plants was a new miracle of creation in the realm of unorganized nature, that of animals gifted with life, endowed with senses and instincts, in the vegetable, and that of man in the animal world. Upon the principles of theistic metaphysics indeed, it is usually assumed that the production of new species does not take place in the progressive development of finite existence, but only at the beginning. But even supposing this opinion to be correct, the relation in which the various species stand to each other, one being the presupposition of the other, very much favours the extension of this beginning itself in a series of successive moments, just as we find it represented in the Mosaic account of the creation. And granting such a series of creative moments, it makes no difference (as far as the doctrine of crea-

tion is concerned) whether the intervals between the successive moments be days only or thousands of years. Within the sphere of humanity itself, moreover, there is a new life proceeding from Christ, the introduction of which into the history of mankind in general, and into the soul of the individual, must be regarded as a new and distinct creative act of God, a "new creation," *καινὴ κτίσις* (2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15). Miracles, and above all the future resurrection of the body, and the renovation of the earth by the wonder-working power of God ensuing thereupon,* must be included in the same conception. Thus it is clear that we may undeniably speak of a *creatio continua*, though not as denoting the preserving power of God.

Are we then to say, that whatever in God's working is not strictly speaking His sustaining activity, must be looked upon as creation in an absolute sense? If so, the thing created must be wholly new, original, and independent of any created agencies. The question can only be answered upon the principle that the world must be regarded as a whole, whose parts mutually correspond and work together. As a whole, it is continually progressing, but this whole itself was not originally composed of various disconnected pieces placed in juxtaposition. If it had been so, it must have remained a mere juxtaposition for all future ages. Now, the entrance of a new creative activity such as that above described unto the world in its present course of development, does not destroy its unity nor its organic progress, because it is the activity of that wherein the world first had its origin, of that Mind which first evolved the eternal idea of the world, and of that almighty will by which it is held together and ruled. And yet this creative activity would certainly produce some such destructive results did it not before its entrance attract as if with magnetic influence the active powers of nature, that they by their activity might prepare the way for its manifestation, and make material things susceptible of it; and moreover, did it not at the moment of its entrance unite itself

* It is of this creative activity of God, and not, as is commonly supposed, of His sustaining power, that Christ speaks in John v. 17, when He says *ὁ πατήρ μου ἔως ἄρτι ἐργάζεται*. The general connection in which the passage stands proves this.

with these powers and adopt them as co-workers. We have not therefore, in such cases, a pure creation, but a making which is at the same time a sustaining—a preservation of the co-operating powers. If we contemplate the world in its continuance and, as this implies, in its development, we find that God's working therein is not isolated and monotonous, but sometimes has more of a sustaining and sometimes more of a creative character.

Now if creation in the strict sense of the word be attributed to God, it necessarily implies *a distinct beginning of the world*. A creation in its absolute sense, and entirely distinct from anything before existing, would, if it took place in the course of the world's progress, unavoidably be destruction. We may trace all relative moments of creation, yea, all indications of creative power in all times and places, back to one original creative act, as the general principle and source of all productions in the world's development, and herein we may fancy that we have creation in an absolute sense. But this original creative act is, properly speaking, the creative will of God viewed as His determinate counsel, which as the transcendental basis of all terrestrial beings, absolutely determines the existence of the whole world from its elementary beginning to its consummation; it is not creation as a generating cause and a working power. For if that creative will were really and directly causative it would at once establish the world in its final completeness, and no place would be left for gradual development. We have here to do with creation as a positively active and working power, and we must abide by the principle that in its strict sense it can be conceived of only as the giving birth to the primary beginning of the world.

But has there ever been such a beginning? The well-known theory of an eternal creation of the world here presents itself. The phrase is manifestly inaccurate, for eternal creation would necessarily involve the eternal existence of the world, which contradicts our conception of creation; but this is easily rectified. What is meant is that the existence of the world *a parte ante* is of unlimited duration, that it never had a beginning. This theory of the world's eternal duration (not to mention decidedly pantheistic views) has been zealously espoused

by Rothe.* It is indeed a very crude notion to suppose, as some do, that by the denial of the world's beginning the dependence of the world upon divine causality is removed; all the more crude because even they who maintain that the world had a beginning cannot by reason prove that God existed *in time* as the creator before the world. Thus much, however, is clear;—though this theory of a world without a beginning may recognize a living and really active God, yet it cannot admit the possibility of His activity being purely creative at any period of the world's development; it can only admit of such an activity as adjusts itself to the workings of created agencies—such as is blended with the sustaining activity—and accordingly it seems almost to do away with the distinction between creation and providence altogether. To maintain the absolute dependence of the world upon God it is obliged in this particular to turn aside from the category of active causes and to have recourse to that of the transcendental principle, which conditions the existence of the world as a whole in time and space. But here the difficulty occurs, that the really causal activity of God, which as the world's development has no beginning, is never purely creative,† but co-operates with what already exists, does not correspond to the transcendental principle which must be absolutely creative.

But starting from the conception of the *world*, we wonder how Rothe can bring himself so easily to give up the fact of its having had a beginning. It is an essential part of this theory that the world must be regarded as a gradational development. But in what conceivable sense can there be a succession of degrees which is to reach its appointed goal according to an ordered progress, and yet has no first stage, but flows back into a *regressus in infinitum*? If this succession have no beginning, progress conformable to a certain end is nullified; in its place we have only a purposeless vicissitude, and there can be no degrees, properly speaking, in the world's development. And yet Rothe himself admits one primary stage of created

* *Theologische Ethik*, § 40 (vol. i. p. 101).

† The creation of pure matter seems here to be expected (p. 131), so that we should have in it a creative work of God. Yet Rothe does not venture to derive the existence of this miserable shadow of the Godhead, which is absolute nonentity (p. 126), from any *work* of God.

being, namely, pure matter, which he calls the primitive creation of God.* But how can he conceive the existence of mere matter to be a step in this series, if all other steps are limited by time, while this alone is without a beginning, and entirely unlimited *a parte ante*? † And do not the difficulties supposed to be involved in a beginning of the world return now indeed as really unsolvable, because, while denying its beginning, we have to allow the fact of its eternal creation, and to believe that God, having left it as it was for a limitless period, barely existing as *materia bruta*, at length began at some definite point of time to think of it and to ordain it, *i.e.*, to begin to develop it towards the goal of its becoming spirit? What conceivable pleasure could God have had during those countless ages—in comparison of which the duration of the world's development hitherto vanishes to a geometric point—in idly gazing upon Himself in contrast with “the abstract and empty form of imaginary being, this imaginary nothing”? And if the beginning of the world involves a transition from non-creation to creation inconsistent with God's unchangeableness, have we not here also a transition on God's part from inactivity to action, equally inadmissible, because in this case God's revelation of Himself in outward activity becomes a necessity of His nature? Rothe manifestly contradicts himself when, on the one hand, he calls pure matter, though ordained of God, “beginningless as God is” (in any case, a very questionable expression), and yet, on the other hand, maintains that every creature without exception has a beginning in time, according to the old axiom, *nulla creatura esse potest nisi post non esse*. ‡

Every one who holds that the world had a beginning must of course admit that time had a beginning likewise. The beginning of time.

Time can be predicated only of earthly existence

* As before, § 44, 45.

† It logically follows from this that matter is something which has no sequences or effects, for if it had, supposing it to have no beginning, these must proceed from it eternally. As Rothe does not maintain this; it is evident that his representation of matter as the universal womb from which all created beings proceed (p. 129) cannot be taken literally. But the world and time begin only from the moment when matter, conceived and appointed by God, begins to be developed. Thus Rothe's denial of a beginning for the world's existence seems unavoidably to involve its affirmation.

‡ As before, pp. 102, 103.

whose source is not in itself, but is derived. The notion of an endless duration of time, during which nothing is done or happens, is self-contradictory. The above supposition, that God may not for ever have been externally active, may not always have been Lord of another being, is not wholly inconceivable, for this is not on our principles a necessity of His nature. And yet we cannot so much as say this in words, because "ever" and "always" are designations of time, and a moment of time without something created by the outward activity of God is inconceivable. The only real difficulty of the assumption that the world, and therefore time, had a beginning, lies in our inability to form any clear conception of a first moment of duration. When our imagination endeavours to form such a conception it unavoidably falls into the contradiction of fixing a boundary, separating time collectively from what lies beyond it, and yet really there is no Beyond, nothing, strictly speaking, preceding it.* This difficulty disappears when we remember that the reason why we cannot have a definite conception of the beginning of time is, because we can form no definite conceptions whatever, save according to the register and within the domain of time.

Seeing, then, that we not only may, but must assume that the world has had a beginning, we have here creation in its strict sense, as distinct from Providence, or God's sustaining of the world;—a primary commencement of finite substances and powers by the exclusive causation of the Divine Will. And thus the opinion above stated is confirmed, that if God had created a being tainted with evil, He must have been the author of evil, because there could have been nothing in such a being but what had its origin through Him; yet at the same time He can *preserve* a being so tainted without any infringement of his holiness.

How then are we to understand God's sustaining activity as distinct from His creative power? It is not enough to say that

* Kant, on the contrary, the advocate of the transcendental philosophy (in his remarks on the antithesis of the third autonomy, — *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 7th ed., p. 347), bases our belief that the present course of phenomena must have had a beginning upon the fact that the imagination continually endeavours to find some resting place. But we may confidently appeal to the self-observation of any one to say what the power of imagination has to do with this question.

God's sustaining activity is identified with the agency of created powers ; for to discern even the possibility of such a union, we must have some conception of the nature of this sustaining activity. There appears in Luther's earlier writings, particularly in his work, *De servo arbitrio*, rather an original view of this Divine agency in man, which unquestionably has its sanction in the Old Testament, particularly in the Prophets. There God's almighty and direct working in all His creatures, is represented as a never resting movement, an onward and mighty tide which cannot be stayed. Among men in particular, so far as their will is perverted, this movement on God's part nullifies their fancied freedom to choose between good and evil, between the committal or rejection of sin. If man's will acted only according to his own impulse, he might imagine that he could turn whichever way he listed, but now he is carried along by God's all-pervading activity to choose what is natural to him in his present circumstances. By this general divine working, Luther explains, moreover, the obduracy of man's corrupt will. God's working urges the man forwards in the course that he has once for all chosen, so that he must ever become more evil. The corrupt will, if left to itself, might not move at all, but as the Almighty Ruler, by His irresistible movement within the man, obliges him to will something, he must, following the dictates of his depraved nature, put himself in determined hostility to God's word and commandment.*

We cannot say that this representation of God's omnipresent working in His creatures makes Him the author of sin, though dangerous consequences such as this do arise from other points of doctrine advocated in the same work (*e.g.*, from the necessitating power of God's prescience). But the independence of the creature in willing or forbearing action is made entirely to succumb to the prevailing power of God's operations. This theory, indeed, leads us to the conclusion that God has not created active energies, but only passive substances. Creatures (according to the view presented in some passages) would, if left to themselves, remain at rest ; but they are continually acting, because the all-impelling activity of God is upon them. This somewhat resembles the doctrine of Divine Assistance, or

* *De servo arbitrio*, Seb. Schmid's edition, pp.127-137.

Occasional Causes, as expounded chiefly by Malebranche. According to him, God is the only truly active Cause, created beings are only apparently so; their strivings and agitations would produce nothing, did not God take occasion to work by them. But, according to this view, not only are so-called finite causes without any real activity, but the infinite Cause must be so too; for the finite being which is the product of this infinite cause has real existence only as it somehow acts. Thus in describing providence as *creatio continua* in this strict and narrow sense, we have nothing but a God continually producing, without any real product.

The view of God's working which the schoolmen and the older orthodox theologians of our Church developed and designated as the Divine co-operation (*con-*
The Scholastic
doctrine of
concursum.*cursus Dei generalis*), is undeniably more satisfactory. It endeavours to maintain the true efficiency of finite causes, and at the same time God's activity throughout the universe—an activity which does not retain the same form amid the manifold variety of created causes, but which distributes and individualizes itself among them, not only preserving created energies in being, but exerting a direct influence upon their action and effects. But against this view the objection arises that it assigns two causes for every effect, either of which would be sufficient as its cause, and an adequate explanation of its working. When to meet this Thomas Aquinas asserts that created causes are effective only in virtue of the first cause, God,* this, in its only legitimate sense, is obviously true, for it is involved in the fact of their creation, but it avails nothing towards the solution of the difficulties which the conception of a *concursum* involves. If the meaning be that created causes can operate only so far as they are moved by God's co-operation, it then becomes a question how this can be reconciled with their independent movement, and the influence of other finite causes upon them. A division of their operation, assigning part to the power of the Divine *concursum*, and part to the created causes, cannot be entertained, for the schoolmen and the early Protestant theologians have rejected such a representation, and indeed every external co-ordination of divine and created efficiency in this question. And though ordinary modes of

* *Summa Univ.*, P. i. qu. 105, art. 5.

speaking seem to sanction such a view, ascribing, for example, the increase of the fruits of the earth partly to the labours of the husbandman, and partly to the blessing of God, no immediate activity on God's part is meant, but one working through finite causes, such as seasonable weather; and the distinction arises from our consciousness that some of the conditions upon which the result is contingent are beyond our power. Seeing, then, that we cannot correctly speak of a division in the operation, the old dogmatic theory of a *concursum*, as one wherein the divine and the created activity simply involve one another, must be adhered to.* Upon certain conditions, therefore, recognizing more especially that in the ordinary course of nature (to which alone our present remarks refer) every effect may be inferred with correctness from certain finite causes, we may suppose that God's power works through finite causes, and we may attribute the effect as correctly to the direct action of God as to the finite cause; the latter serving as the wholly dependent instrument of the former.† But this view unavoidably drifts into the shallows of the doctrine of occasional causes, which it strove to avoid; all finite agencies being swallowed up in the one great and only true cause. The tendency of this theory in that direction appears from the fact that it cannot reconcile human responsibility on account of sin with its doctrine of a *concursum*, save by the method described by Malebranche. For, according to Aquinas, it adopts the old canon, *Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale actionis malae*, in the sense that the form of the action as evil is nothing real, but merely a defect, an *ens mere privativum*, wherein there is no co-operation on God's part, but which must be attributed to the will of man alone.‡

If this view also be involved in unsolvable difficulties, the question naturally arises, Why is the doctrine of The Arminian view. Providence adopted by Arminianism, which seems

* Quenstedt, syst. theol. De Providentia, sect. ii., qu. 3, *et* l. xiii.; "(Actio Dei) intime in actione creaturae includitur, imo una eademque est cum illa."

† Quenstedt at the outset denies this, and yet it is implied in his words as quoted in the foregoing note, wherein he endeavours to explain the union of both causalities.

‡ See Malebranche, *Illustrationes ad librum de inquirenda veritate* (Ed. of 1753, P. ii. p. 325). "*Peccatum . . . a solo homine perpetrari fateor; sed quicquam ab ipso tum agi nego; nam peccatum, error et ipsa concupiscentia nihil sunt.*" See also p. 206 f.

so simply to meet the perplexities of the question, so generally distasteful to Protestant theology in its more modern development? According to it, providence has only the negative import that God does not annihilate created beings, though He has the power to do so. A true apprehension of the nature of *creation* will show that this does not at least contradict our conception of created being. It would be a contradiction to suppose that a finite being has the source of its existence in itself; the power of existence which it has received may have been given it in such a manner that it possesses in itself the elements of its continuance during the term of life assigned to it in the general order of the world. This may be said of the world as a whole. But we have not here to do only with a logical necessity. We allow that in the ordinary dogmatic and popular religious view of God's omnipresence there are many misconceptions, and that when regarded as dynamical, religious interests are sometimes brought in when the divine omnipresence only should be recognized; but we must nevertheless assert that the consciousness of God's presence as embracing and sustaining all earthly being, forms an essential part of all living piety. God has indeed given to the world which He has made a substantiality of its own; but he has not made it independent of Himself, nor removed it to an infinite distance from Him. Had He done so, would not every act of God in the government of the world, His causing the working together of free powers according to the law of their nature to a predetermined end, be ever an intrusion? It cannot be a stirring and movement of the world within itself unless the world at every point in its development does not depend upon itself, but upon God's living and omnipresent power.

The idea of divine providence, defined as *concursus* in the sense attached to this word by our older theologians, lost itself in these difficulties through the supposition that God's activity is divided and individualized according to the varied divisions of created powers and their operations; and, moreover, that it directly ordained and accomplished certain effects in common with finite causes.* This view certainly recommends itself to our religious consciousness, and seems to express most accu-

* When Rothe, from his religious standing-point, so readily surrenders divine providence in its usual acceptation, resolving it into God's government of the

rately the truth we inwardly feel. Yet there lies at its foundation a delusion, not indeed in this consciousness itself, but in the particular application of it ; the religious convictions which are properly met and satisfied in the recognition of the divine government and the workings of the Holy Spirit, being erroneously included in the conception of providence. Were this view maintained, it would unavoidably lead to a plurality of causes, involving a contradiction, for each explanation of the given result would be in itself adequate, and would therefore supplant the others. We must therefore turn from this, and

True concep-
tion of provi-
dence.

regard the providence of God as an activity universally simple and uniform, sustaining created powers in every moment of their working, and keeping them in subjection to Him. It thus makes itself the basis of all minor activities in the life and progress of the world, without itself, as such, giving any special bias to the working of created powers. In this respect it simply keeps in view the ordainments and bounds appointed by God's creative activity, and sustains individual existence within the limits assigned to it by those ordainments, and by the relations and activities of worldly powers dependent thereupon, and mutually directing and restraining one another. As God's world-sustaining activity thus leaves all natures as it finds them, compassing irrational as well as rational natures, the evil as well as the good (Matt. v. 45), it in no way destroys nor interferes with man's responsibility for his sins, whether of act, of resolve, or of inclination. It conditions the action of created powers unremittingly when they are directed towards some evil end, but only just so far as it sustains and embraces the whole world in all its parts, with uniform and universal attention to existence as its appropriate province. But it communicates

No bias given
to man's
moral nature.

no bias whatever, whether towards good or evil, to any created activity. The fact, therefore, that

man in his sin is still encompassed by the sustaining providence of God does not in the least degree take away world, and this again into God's creation of the world, he does so upon the ground that he regards the development of the world itself, so far as it is a constant generation of spirit—"a continual world-becoming of God"—in a *progressus in infinitum*. See as before, vol. i., pp. 98, 99, 105. We can easily see how he thinks he can dispense with the dynamical power of providence by substituting this substantial immanence.

from his guilt. Man derives his power to act, to decide, to desire, from God alone every moment of his life; but he desires or resolves upon or does evil of himself. To say that God if He really did not will evil would only have to refuse His sustaining efficiency from the evil promptings of the will, means nothing less than to require God to create no personal natures whatever, so as to make evil—the possibility of which is inseparable from the existence of created personality—impossible; for any such momentary withdrawal of God's sustaining activity from His creature would involve its immediate annihilation.

An unbiassed investigation which will not allow a few minor difficulties to hinder its taking a comprehensive view of the whole, may easily discover the conclusions to which Holy Scripture, the New Testament in particular, leads us regarding the nature of our consciousness of guilt, and the relation of evil to the Divine will and operations.

§ 3. The witness of Holy Scripture.

It is allowed on all sides, that the specific difference between the religion of the Bible and Heathenism is the high moral standard which the former maintains in contemplating the relation between God and man, and the prominence it gives to God's holiness. The divine revelations contained in Genesis and Exodus begin deeply to impress the thought of God's holiness upon the heart of man, and in the fulness of their realization in Jesus Christ this idea shines forth in the perfection of its clearness. God is absolutely "the good," *ὁ ἀγαθός*, Matt. xix. 17; Rom. v. 7; Christ reveals Him in visible manifestation because He is the Holy One, John xiv. 6–9; and man can see God only by holiness, Matt. v. 8; Heb. xii. 14; 1 John i. 6, iii. 2, 3; and while it is a prominent doctrine of the Old Testament that there is in God a profound and living abhorrence of evil,* while the history of Israel is thoroughly

* The expression used in the Old Testament for God's holiness—*קדוש*, Hebrew term *קדש*—distinctly implies the denial of evil because it represents for holiness. God as *pure* from the defilement of evil, *separated* from any communion with it. He it is whose fellowship makes man holy, *יהוה מקדש*, Lev. xxi. 8, 15, 23; xxii. 9, 32. When Jehovah appears as the terrible One,

penetrated with the consciousness that through sin the nation is guilty before God, the New Testament fully and without reserve ratifies the same doctrines, insisting particularly upon the wrath of God against all who cleave to iniquity. Those very doctrines of Christianity, to which a narrow and spurious moralism takes exception, the Atonement for instance, and Justification by faith, bear on the very face of them a distinctively moral character, and have at their foundation, and as their presupposition, the thought of God's inviolable holiness.

γ. With these teachings the notion that God is the author of evil is utterly irreconcilable; God could not hate what was His own work, nor could man be

God cannot originate evil.

guilty in God's sight on account of that which came from God Himself. Sin is described as "enmity against God," Romans viii. 7; Col. i. 21; and to call God in the face of this the author of evil is not profundity but absurdity. Such a notion is expressly condemned by the New Testament writers, especially in the Epistle of James (i. 13-17). As God cannot Himself be tempted to evil, as in Him is no darkness nor shadow of turning (see 1 John i. 5, ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστὶ, καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία), He tempts no one to evil; on the contrary, from Him, the Father of all spiritual light, man receives nothing but good gifts, yea, nothing but perfect gifts; * temptation comes to man from his own (ιδίας) inordinate desires. The same truth is implied in those texts which attribute the

the sight of whose countenance would be death, He makes arrangements that the people may not be consumed before the flame of His devouring wrath, Exodus xix., xxxiii., xxxiv.,—representations which at first sight seem to refer not to the moral but to the physical manifestation of God as the almighty principle of nature; but it must be remembered that these manifestations of Jehovah clearly and obviously imply the guilt of the people.

* This is indisputably the import of the passage; the intention of St. James is not primarily to give utterance to the thought that all that is good comes from God, but that all which comes from God is good, that nothing evil can come from Him (like the Platonic expression *Deus causa boni in natura*, which also has this restricting force excluding the *mali*). The use of πᾶς admits of this interpretation; compare chap. i. 2, and its connection with v. 13, upon which what follows, as far as v. 17, depends; what is predicated of God moreover in v. 17—παρ' ᾧ οὐκ ἐνὶ παραλλαγῇ ἢ προπῆς ἀποσκίασμα—requires this rendering. Neander also recognizes in the whole passage an express argument against the deep-seated propensity in man to excuse himself on account of sin by attributing it to God as its cause. *Gesch. der Pflanzung der Kirche*, p. 872. See also Kern, *Der Brief Jacobi*, chap. i. 13.

presence of sin to the agency of the devil in opposition to God's working—John viii. 44; 1 John iii. 8, 12; Matt. xiii. 39. Christianity cannot more distinctly exclude the derivation of sin from God than by ascribing, as it does, its origin to a being diametrically opposed to God in all his aims. When, for instance, it is said of the devil, in John viii. 44, ὅταν λαλήῃ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖ· ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ, this language, taken in connection with verses 42, 43, most distinctly excludes every explanation of evil that seeks the basis of its existence higher than in finite spirit.

Some modern theologians, Olshausen * for example, maintain that God is represented in Holy Scripture as producing evil, though the man who commits it is not thereby exculpated. What is said concerning God hardening man's heart, and concerning the punishment of sin by means of sin, and those New Testament texts usually referred to in support of this opinion, will be examined more in detail when we come to consider the growth of sin in its development in time. Here it may suffice to remark in passing that this conception of the Divine activity presupposes the depravity of man. We need not be surprised to find in the books of the Old Testament expressions which seem almost to transgress the limits of propriety in their assertion of man's unconditional dependence upon God. For at this stage of the religious consciousness of mankind enlightened by Revelation, the distinction between the sphere of nature and of spirit in its relation to divine agency was not fully developed, as the doctrine

Does God work evil by man?

* Comm. upon Romans, Introduction to chap. ix. p. 347. Religious reverence prevents the author from carrying his explanation in the direction he marks out to its clear and definite results. Hengstenberg's remarks also upon the hardening of Pharaoh's heart (Authentic des Pentateuches, vol. ii. p. 462 f.) can scarcely be reduced to a definite and self-consistent theory. He rightly condemns the resolving of the plain teaching of Scripture regarding God's working through the evil deeds of men, into the notion of mere permission. But when he insists that we must first learn to regard our evil maligners as involuntary instruments in God's hand, so as to extinguish all enmity against them, how is this to be reconciled with his assertion of the sinner's answerableness and desert of punishment in God's sight? If original sin has brought man into the condition of an involuntary and dependent instrument of evil, how can it be said of him, so as to preserve his accountability, that at any moment he might by penitence free himself from sin? There would still be wanting on God's part the call which does not come at any moment and anywhere, and on man's part the power of self-determination which this view expressly denies him.

of the Holy Spirit for example shows ; man had not yet attained to the clear consciousness of his dignity in God's sight, and of his destiny as a candidate for eternal life in fellowship with God ; the infinite importance attaching to created personality was but partially revealed, for it could be fully unveiled only by the Incarnation of the Son ; so that we can easily understand how a man, thoroughly imbued with the conviction of God's universal working, might attribute evil to it as well as good, without in the least intending to deny the essential opposition of sin to the divine will, and man's accountability

because of it. Strictly speaking, however, there
 Texts
 apparently
 attributing
 evil to God. is only one passage which, candidly interpreted, must be allowed to present a contradiction or antinomy, baffling every attempt at solution. I

X mean 2 Sam. xxiv. 1 and 10, where David's resolve to number the people is represented as instigated by Jehovah in His wrath against Israel, and then as the king's own sinful act it is visited with severe punishment.* We have, indeed, a similar case in 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11, compared with 1 Kings ii. 44, but here we have only David's declaration, which upon the strictest theory of inspiration cannot be taken as authoritative.

^ In 1 Kings xxii. 22, we have a figurative representation adopted by the prophet Micah, and we cannot base any dogmatic theory upon the phraseology used. The complaint in Isaiah lxiii. 17 seems to be a more serious stumbling-block,
 X "O Lord, why hast Thou made us to err from Thy ways, and hardened our heart from Thy fear?" But these words occur in that glorious prayer so full of grief and aspiration which the sacred writer puts into the mouth of the people, chap. lxiii. 11—lxiv. 12, and their excessive grief cannot in its expressions be taken as the statement of the prophet's doctrine. In Isa. xlv. 7 we must not take the חֹשֶׁךְ which God creates in any other than its proper and literal sense as "darkness," not as "sin;" and רָע here does not denote "evil" in a moral sense, but physical evil, as is clear from its contrast with שְׁלוֹם and from

X * It is worthy of observation that the Old Testament itself contains a correction of this statement ; in 1 Chron. xxii. 1, the stirring up of David is attributed to Satan.—Rehoboam's severity, which ended in the division of the kingdom, is traced to Jehovah as its source, כָּבַדָּה מִעַם יְהוָה, 1 Kings xii. 15 ; but it is not described as an evil course of action.

its use in Isaiah xxxi. 2 ; Jer. ii. 18, xviii. 8 ; xxiv. 2, 3, 8, and other places.* It is clear that this also is the reference of Amos iii. 6. Some other passages usually cited, such as

Man's evil
perverting
God's plans. Gen. xlv. 8, 2 Sam. xii. 11, express the thought that even human perversity in its manifestations and consequences must be subservient to God in

the execution of His will and the carrying out of His designs.†

This is strikingly apparent when phenomena the reverse of these occur, and the plans of God seem to be thwarted by the wickedness of man. Regarding these appearances the sacred

writers declare, that whatever springs from such hostility on man's part has a place assigned to it even in God's own plan.‡

The perversity of the human will itself, though God foreknows it from eternity, can in no way be attributed to Him as its author ; but God urges on the will which has perverted itself, by circumstances arranged by Him, to certain manifestations and acts.§

When Olshausen further argues from certain Scripture proofs of God's foreknowledge of evil that He is the cause of evil, this arises, as we shall hereafter see, from a mistaken estimate of God's knowledge. As for so general an assertion as that which Cölln (not to mention earlier writers) ventures upon, that "Hebraism attributes to God not only all extraordinary good, but all extraordinary evil likewise," || it should have been prevented by the perception that in the most prominent sins and sinful circumstances to which Holy Scripture refers, such as the fall of our first parents, the fratricide of Cain, the depravity of the race before the Flood, /x

* See Gesenius, *Lexicon manuale Hebr.*

† Jeremiah xxvii. 14, 15 (see also verses 9, 10) throws much light upon this connection. Here the Jews are warned in the name of Jehovah not to give ear to false prophets, "For I have not sent them, saith the Lord, yet they prophesy a lie in my name, that (יִמְּוִי) I might drive you and that ye might perish, ye and your prophets." This, however, can only mean what the prophet himself intends by it, that if the people, contrary to the will and warning of God, persisted in obeying the false prophets, their doing so would be an instrument in His hand for the infliction of righteous judgment upon both them and the false prophets.

‡ It is in this way that we must explain those similar passages in the New Testament, Acts ii. 23, iv. 28. The same thought underlies St. Paul's argument in Romans ix.

§ See Hengstenberg as before, p. 466.

|| *Biblische Theologie*, vol. i. p. 184. See on the other side, Baumgarten Crusius, *Grundzüge der bibl. Theol.*, p. 274.

and of the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, the growing obduracy of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah and of their kings, there is not a trace of this attributing of evil to God.

Nothing so conclusively proves how firmly and deeply the recognition of man's consciousness of guilt and the exclusion of sin from divine causation has rooted itself in the Christian system as does the inseparable connection of these truths with the main points of Christian Doctrine, the Judgment of God, and Redemption.

As for the first of these two doctrines, a true estimate of it depends entirely upon our perception of the significance of Eschatology generally in the Christian system. Human perfection requires that man shall be liberated from all, in his present life on earth, that hinders his true fellowship with God; that the outward shall correspond perfectly with the inward, and that the harmony of the inner life which that fellowship already in principle involves shall be thoroughly embodied in the entire range of his outward circumstances. Christianity regards man's present state as one grievously disturbed and marred, and it accordingly involves the expectation of a blissful future realized through holiness; thus its Christology can only be fully understood by means of its Eschatology. It will ever be found that they who deprecate for themselves this *perfection*, because they can be happy only within the limits and contrasts of their present life, and who would prefer annihilation to life eternal, have never yet experienced the beginning of this holy life. If they have not this beginning we may easily perceive how the twofold want—the want of a living God to preserve His creature in death and to raise him from the dead again, and the want of just conceptions regarding a future life—causes them to regard perfection as something impossible.

The necessity of judgment, taking it in its literal import and according to the primary meaning of *κρίσις* as discrimination and separation, arises from the fact that the main contrast between man and man in relation to that future state must be made manifest by the cessation of intercourse between those who obey God and those who resist Him. Beings whose relations to God are diametrically opposite,

§ 4. THE
DOCTRINE
OF FINAL
JUDGMENT.

Eschatology.

Necessity of
judgment.

and persistently so, differ so greatly from each other that other ties of relationship become as nothing in comparison. Bonds of union among men arising out of the relationship of natural life must give way of themselves if the tie which binds man's spiritual consciousness and will to his Creator be on either side wholly severed. For those bonds have not in themselves an eternal significance, save so far as they are included in that relation to God which is of everlasting importance. If this truth be recognized, the most cogent objections, quoted by Strauss from Lessing or Schleiermacher, or raised by himself against the separation involved in a final judgment, are obviated.*

Meanwhile, the reality of this contrast is called in question in various quarters. It has been styled a childish Reality of the contrast of good and evil. fancy to separate men merely according to the antithesis of good and evil; these, it is said, are only abstractions, and in experience they are bound together in manifold complications, so that we cannot so much as assign any single act, to say nothing of individual moral characters, to one side or the other. There is much that is plausible in this reasoning; it not only flatters the intellect of man, which would resolve all moral distinctions into mere differences of degree, but it justly describes the actual limit of our present judgment regarding our fellow-men. But if, as we are convinced, good and evil are opposed to each other in principle, are both to dwell in peace together and happily to be blended in one life? Never: on the contrary, they will struggle together all the more violently in proportion as the contrast between them is perceived (Matt. vi. 24). The final decision of this struggle may indeed be long delayed: many may uncertainly vacillate between the two powers for a long time, but in the long run the struggle must terminate in the triumph of either the one principle or the other. It is only when the good principle has gained the ascendancy in the man that we can with propriety speak of good intentions and good works, according to Christ's words, "Let the tree be good, and we may take for granted that the fruit will be good," Matt. xii. 33, which Luther's well-known saying paraphrases, "Good works do not make the good man, but the good man makes the good works." The denial of this contrast among men

* *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. § 105.

necessarily leads to the denial of the essential difference between good and evil. It is easy in the contemplation of human circumstances to deny the presence of this contrast, because in time it is very much concealed; a fact which the prophecy of a future judgment itself distinctly implies. It is a very beautiful, a very humane truth, though an unchildlike generation may deny it and scorn it a thousand times, that in the highest departments of human life the simplest intuition of childhood, which would be rejected by intellectual reflection as a crude, unformed imagination, and would be resolved into the fluctuating difference of a more or less, is re-established in a higher sense by the most advanced and profoundest knowledge. "Whosoever doth not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he can in no case enter therein."

But the judgment of God is not only separation but retribution, *i.e.*, the realization of a correspondence between the moral import of the man's life and his outward condition, whether it involve something of pleasure or pain, blessedness or misery (though be it remembered, meanwhile, that in the separation itself of good from evil there is involved a retribution for both classes). Here we have to do only with retribution in its negative sense as denoting punishment. And in endeavouring to examine its necessary import our immediate purpose is not moral and practical,—*i.e.*, to inquire whether the thought of punishment be a fit stimulus to keep the will from evil and to urge it towards goodness,—it is only to attain a clear apprehension of what God has actually ordained concerning the judgment of the world.

The idea of Wickedness is usually included in our conception of evil, and under the designation of moral evil it stands contrasted with natural evil; but the general conception of evil forming its basis may be defined as simply an interruption of life. This interruption cannot be the limitation of life necessarily involved in the fact of our finite nature and its gradual development,—this would be only *malum metaphysicum*, which is called *malum* only by a misappropriation of the word,—it is something disturbing, which arrests the course of life and its normal development, as an element foreign to and opposing it. Moral evil or wickedness is that disturbance

of life which arises from *self-determination and action*; natural evil, on the other hand, is that which is *extraneously determined and involves suffering*. We become immediately sensible of the disturbance of life produced by physical evil, but are not so of the disturbance of moral evil; it is felt rather to be an advance or furthering of a purpose, though this may sometimes consist only in the gratification of the will, in the pleasure of wilfulness; for disturbance cannot spring from self-determination unless in conformity with the canon, *nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione boni*.*

These definitions, though abstract and insufficient for the full understanding of retribution, nevertheless serve to show on the one hand the distinction between natural and moral evil, and on the other hand the close connection subsisting between them, *i.e.*, the *necessity of punishment*, and how thoughtless it is to refuse to believe in the punitive justice of God on the ground that it is already misfortune enough for man to be wicked. The general conception of punishment is, that the evil which was felt by the subject of it as an excitement, is thrown back upon him in its true character, and is felt by him as a hindrance and disturbance. As punishment attaches physical to moral evil, it necessarily implies the return of moral evil upon its author, so that what he has actively given out, he receives again passively. Thus there is a law of harmony even in the perversion of a principle. Sin, first of all, involves a self-gratification, at least, of an unrestrained liberty, but the working of the divine Order counteracting it is punitive, so that the sinner experiences a state of bondage as the consequence of his sin. This punishment is in its beginnings within the sphere of the inner life; it consists in the upbraidings of conscience on account of the sin committed, and the bitter experience that sin is a tyrannical power, and that to give way to it is servitude.

The friends of "the modern gospel of virtue," as Strauss calls it—those of them, at least, who do not explain these "glad tidings" as having nothing to do with sin—are quite satisfied

* A man, of course, may determine upon that which he feels to be a suffering and an interruption of life, but (except in cases of a perverted consciousness) he does so only in proportion as he regards it as means toward the furtherance of life.

with this theory of punishment. But they reject a *future retribution*, a divine judgment removing the discrepancies between man's moral state and his outward circumstances, as an unspiritual representation that cannot distinguish the outward from the inward, appearance from reality.

Considering the anathema which Strauss pronounces upon every contradiction of his view,* it would be useless here to pause in order to test its tenableness. In this, at least, we are perfectly agreed with him, namely, that man's happiness essentially consists in something spiritual, although we understand by this spiritual possession something very different from what Strauss means. But does not the New Testament in almost every page bear witness that they who believe in Christ have eternal life, and are passed from death unto life, that Christ gives His own peace to them who are His, that they who are justified through Him have peace with God, and that peace and joy are among the truest gifts of the Spirit? It is a wanton perversion of New Testament doctrine to represent the knowledge that life in the truth brings with it its own immediate reward, as a principle opposed to Christianity, and as a new discovery. He who in the Pauline sense unceasingly works out his own *salvation*, so far from acting from egotism or selfishness, is thus really working out his own *sanctification* (*σωτηρία ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος*, 2 Thess. ii. 13). The New Testament, so far from representing holiness merely as a means to happiness, knows of no holiness, of no blessedness save in fellowship with God, wherein holiness and happiness are inseparably one. But Holy Exceptions in this life. Scripture will not, any more than will experience, suffer us to deceive ourselves as to the fact that this inner joy of the Christian is often hindered in its full development and influence by serious drawbacks in that sphere of life over which he has no control.†

But, on the other hand, regarding evil, with which especially

* *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. § 107, p. 712.

† If, indeed, human happiness be defined as "whatever is estimated and felt by the man himself as such, and recognized by others as such" (*Christliche Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. § 20, p. 269), it might easily be shown how, according to the tautology involved in this, the most dreadful fate that could befall a man, could not in the least disturb or mar his happiness, so far as he himself is concerned.

our inquiry is concerned, it is not true that punishment

Sin not always immediately accompanies it in this life.
 always one On the contrary, the sinner may oftentimes avoid
 with sorrow. it, and all the more readily, the more thoroughly

he has surrendered himself to wickedness. If, as Strauss maintains, the happiness which is identical with virtue consists in a sense of power inseparable from the exercise of power,* an egotism in some degree active, backed by talent and good-fortune—though for these reasons none the less condemnable—may itself lead to the attainment of this happiness: a contradiction arising out of Spinoza's doctrine of moral good, which forms the basis of Strauss's theory. The oft-quoted saying of the poet in his youth, "the history of the world is the judgment of the world," cannot be applied in an unqualified sense to the inner experience of the individual. The sinner does not

Discrepancies always perceive at once the worthlessness of his sin
 between and the vanity of resisting God and His holy
 character and commandments, nor is he always plunged into
 condition. sorrow and remorse. The present state of the

world is not likely to force the conviction of these things upon him, though a deeper insight into its history can hardly fail to discern the power of God's laws penetrating all its complexities and overcoming all hindrances. Bayle, as is well known, drew the strongest arguments in his hypothetical defence of Dualism from the present state of the world,† and this shows that it must contain many assurances of power and success to satisfy the unscrupulous efforts of selfishness, and to flatter the depraved will. Sin is, indeed, vanity (nothingness, as the Hebrew word יָסָא expresses it) and wretchedness; but this is not always apparent in every part of human life, it is not

Obviated evident until the consequences of it come. But
 by a final these are realized only by the judgment of God at
 judgment. the end of this world's history. Then the discre-

pancy between the outward and inward sphere of the sinner's life, the continuance of which would be a violation of God's

* As before, vol. ii. p. 714; compare vol. i. p. 603. This identifying of virtue and happiness, and consequently of moral with physical evil, possesses an equivocal import; it may lead not only to the elevation of the physical to the level of the moral, but to the lowering of the moral to the level of the physical.

† Strauss recognizes this also; see as before, vol. i. p. 407; compare also vol. ii. p. 366.

law wholly incompatible with His dominion over the world, will be for ever done away. The perversion of the will and of the moral life proceeding therefrom, will then be reflected in a corresponding decay and ruin of the outward state and prospects according to the fundamental principle of justice *sum cuique*.

It is easy to see how the Christian belief in a discerning and retributive judgment involves the truth that the responsibility and guilt of sin belong to man alone, and not in any sense to God. If evil came from God as its author, if sin were necessarily interwoven into human nature and its development by divine ordainment, the essential distinction between good and evil would be resolved into a mere comparison of means and ends of conditional and unconditional necessity, and the principle upon which a discerning moral judgment rests would be destroyed. If God punished His creatures on account of an act of will or of deed which He Himself had caused, He would condemn His own act, and a horrible contradiction would ensue in our consciousness of God. *Peccati ultor non peccati auctor*. However many the intermediate links in the chain of thought and action between the creative will of God and the sinful act of man, if none of them have any independent power of causation apart from God, they are nothing more than the media through which the divine causation is transmitted, and whatever evil they issue in, whatever guilt they involve—if indeed there can be any mention in such a case of “guilt”—must rest solely upon God. The divine judgment of evil therefore necessarily presupposes a power of causation, a relative independence, distinct from God’s; an *independence*—otherwise man could produce nothing that could be the subject of divine condemnation; a *relative* independence, otherwise man could not be subject to divine judgment at all. It is only by the recognition of this relative independence that we can really exclude the notion of God’s being directly or indirectly the author of sin, and maintain in its integrity the consciousness of guilt in man.

In order, however, more fully to perceive how necessarily the conception of the righteous judgment and retributive justice of God involves the conception of guilt in all its fulness, we must examine the difference between *chastisement* and *punishment* so clearly set forth in the New Testament. The conception of

Distinction
between
chastisement
and punish-
ment.

chastisement is there expressed by *παιδεύειν παιδεία*, 1 Cor. xi. 32 ; 2 Cor. vi. 9 ; Eph. vi. 4 ; Heb. xii. 5-11 ; Rev. iii. 19 ; and the conception of punishment by *δίκη*, 2 Thess. i. 9 ; Jude 7 ; or *ἐκδίκησις*, Rom. xii. 19 ; 2 Thess. i. 8 ; Heb. x. 30 ; 1 Pet. ii. 14 ; or *τιμωρία*, *τιμωρεῖν*, Heb. x. 29 ; Acts xxii. 3, xxvi. 11. *Κόλασις* also, and *κολάζειν*, which in classical Greek are usually associated with the idea of chastisement (*κολάζειν ὕβριν*, meaning primarily "to curtail," "to prune"), are applied in the New Testament to punishment ; although here also it seems rather to express only physical suffering, or pain, not moral retribution, Acts iv. 21 ; Matt. xxv. 46 ; 2 Pet. ii. 9 ; compare 1 John iv. 18.

If, as is commonly supposed, the sole design of punishment were the good of the culprit, this would explain the connection of the conception of punishment with that of *sin*, but not with that of *guilt*. The only consideration would be that by means of punishment something which ought not to be, *i.e.*, sin, must be taken away from man ; the principle that man is the responsible author of that which is to be taken away, *i.e.*, the principle of guilt, would not once occur to us. But this view of the design of punishment confounds the distinction between it and chastisement. The design of chastisement is the improvement of the person chastened, but punishment is the actual revelation of the fact that the majesty of law has not been dethroned by rebellion against it. The moral law, which has to do with the will, cannot *directly* force it as by a necessity of nature to fulfil its requirements, the very conception of it as distinct from natural law permits the resistance of the will ; but it maintains its character as law by realizing itself *indirectly* through the punishment following upon such resistance. The design of chastisement as such rests entirely in the person chastened, but punishment properly so called—for it may of course include sometimes an element of chastisement—has to vindicate the universal against the individual. Chastisement accordingly (as that other word for it, *discipline*, implies, *παιδεία* from *παῖς*) presupposes a tutorial relationship of which punishment as such knows nothing.*

* In the O. T. also (Lev. xix. 20) we find chastisement, *בְּקָרָת*, distinguished from the punishment of death. In other places the idea of chastisement is usually expressed by *מִסֵּר*, *מִסָּר*.

As to Divine punishment, its distinctive purpose cannot certainly be the improvement of the person punished, because this in the full truth of its import is the object of *redemption*. If punishment were the means appropriate to this end there would be no need for redemption; or rather, if this object is attained by redemption, of what use is the severity of punishment? Are we to suppose that when redemption proves ineffectual for the improvement of man, punishment must be resorted to to attain the object? It would then follow that punishment is more effectual for man's regeneration than redemption. The conflict between the sphere of punishment thus regarded and that of redemption becomes all the more perplexing when we recollect that the main feature of redemption is the doing away with punishment by the forgiveness of sins. If punishment be remedial, is it a kindness to free man from it before it has accomplished its work? And how is it possible that redemption, which is the removal of punishment, should renovate, if punishment itself does so also? If again the sensational part of our nature be the appropriate sphere of punishment, while redemption has to do with the spiritual, is the true amelioration of man to be accomplished by a work upon his sensational nature as effectually as by one upon his spirit?

And yet the influence of punishment in preserving and re-establishing the power of moral goodness in the sufferer must not be wholly denied. Punishment on the one hand acts as a barrier against the desolating inroads of sin by reasserting the fixed ordainments of the law; and on the other hand, it bears witness to the sinner of the crushing power wherewith evil recoils upon himself and makes him tremble when he surrenders himself to it. In these two ways it prepares man for the work of redemption. But in its distinctive character it is not calculated to produce a true improvement, an inward renovation of the sinner. On the contrary, the two spheres, that of redemption, which alone can accomplish a true renewal, and that of punishment, mutually exclude one another. Whenever a living participation in the blessings of redemption begins, punishment, properly so called—*δίκη, ἐκδίκησις, τιμωρία*—ceases; but so long as man continues to be the subject of God's righteous punishment, he is excluded from those blessings, John iii. 36.

Divine chastisement, on the contrary—*παιδεία*—is itself a part of God's redeeming work, Titus ii. 11, 12. Nature of chastisement. In order to become the object of it, the man must have experienced the saving grace of the Spirit, become a child of God, and surrendered himself to His fatherly care; whereas, to be the object of divine punishment, the sinner's acquiescence is by no means needed, for he has really surrendered himself to it by his sin.* The New Testament writers accordingly speak of God's chastisements only in reference to those who by faith in Christ have become children of God; see especially Heb. xii.; so strictly is this rule adhered to, that even those of God's children who have deeply fallen are still represented as the objects of chastisement, emphasis being laid on their salvation as the aim of it, 1 Cor. iii. 11-15; Rev. iii. 19. The world, on the contrary, including all who refuse the obedience of faith to the gospel, becomes liable to the righteous punishment of God, together with apostates from the fellowship of Christ, 2 Thess. i. 8, 9, ii. 12; Heb. x. 29, 30, and other passages. This contrast between the two conceptions is strikingly set forth in 1 Cor. xi. 32, *κρινόμενοι*—the Apostle had been speaking of the chastisements (ver. 30) which the Corinthian Church had suffered on account of their frivolously partaking of the holy communion—*ὑπὸ κυρίου παιδεύομεθα, ἵνα μὴ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ κατακριθῶμεν*. The Lord chastised the Corinthians by afflicting them so that they might not be punished with the unbelieving world. The appropriate sphere of chastisement is within the range of fellowship with God, that of punishment lies beyond it.

Chastisement, therefore, is in the New Testament represented as prompted by *love*; thus Heb. xii. 6, *ὃν ἀγαπᾷ κύριος παιδεύει*, quoted from Prov. iii. 12; Rev. iii. 19, *ἐγὼ ὅσους ἐὰν φιλῶ, ἐλέγχω καὶ παιδεύω*. Punishment, on the other hand, is described as springing from *ὀργή*, on the part of man, Rom. xiii. 4, 5; on God's part, Matt. iii. 7; John iii. 36; Rom. ii. 5, 8, iii. 5, v. 9, xii. 19; 1 Thess. i. 10; Rev. vi. 16, 17, xi. 18. While, on the one hand, we

* In this sense Clemens-Alexandrinus—though otherwise we cannot find much that is thorough in his conception of punishment—says very truly by expressing an unplatonic truth (a celebrated Platonic word) *αἰρεῖται ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὰς τιμωρίας αὐτοῦ, ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνων· αἰτία δὲ ἐλπομένου Θεοῦ ἀναίτιος*.—*Paedag.* c. viii. § 69 (ed. Klotz, vol. i. p. 154).

abide by the conception of God's wrath according to the warning of Heb. xii. 29, *καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν* (not only the God of the old covenant but *our* God, compare verses 18–27), *πῦρ καταναλίσκον*; on the other hand, we must as firmly recognize it to be a necessary and truly Christian effort, to trace all God's dealings with the world to *love* as their original source. Even God's wrath is in its ultimate essence love; love itself is "a consuming fire" against all which is opposed to it—the very essence of good. Love would not be true to itself if it did not repudiate its opposite. Herein we see how it is that heathenism does not discern the holy wrath of God, namely, because it fails to recognize His love; because it descends at the inmost centre of the universe behind all divinities, whether friendly or hostile to man, a mysterious power indifferent to man's welfare, declaring all existence with its greatness and glory to be less than nothing and vanity.

God's holy love not only precludes His having any part whatever in the origination of sin, it implies His Love must prevail over sin. emphatic negation of its continuance. With a personal being, opposition to God's will must at least be possible, but it cannot acquire any permanent value in a world created and ruled by God. It must be manifest by clear and external experience, both to society and to the wicked man himself, seeing that he is to be regarded even in his deepest wickedness, and in the face of his wish at the time, as a reasonable being, that by his sinful conduct he has fallen into a ruinous self-contradiction. Hence arises the punitive justice of God, which subjects the man who sins actively to a corresponding suffering. By just punishment, God's majesty, which is the source of all reverence for law, and whose inviolableness is the safeguard of all creatures, is maintained and attested. The assault upon God's majesty, implied in the act of sin, cannot overthrow it, because in punishment, the act recoils upon the sinner himself. If, on the contrary, the sinner remained unpunished, sin would win the day against the majesty and law of God, and the law would belie itself. This majesty of law, *i.e.*, love, by punishing sin which is selfishness, affirms itself as that which alone must prevail.

In punishment again, as distinguished from chastisement, the complete personality of the person punished is recognized,

and in this sense, it has been truly said by others, and of late by Göschel,* that honour is shown to the transgressor in punishing him. This is easily seen in the case of civil punishment. If the authorities were to allow the transgressor to go unpunished, or merely chastised the evil-doer in the way which appeared most conducive to his welfare, without measuring the proportion between the offence and its penalty according to a certain standard, they would be treating him as an undeveloped irresponsible child, the guilt of whose crime is not to be imputed to him. Did they hand the offender over to the citizens of the state to be slain where and how they liked, they would be treating him as a wild beast. But by showing justice to him in equitable punishment, they recognize the mental independence upon which his accountability depends, and thus the dignity also of his developed personality. And it is not otherwise in the case of divine punishment. The very fact that man can become the subject of it, implies the relation to God in which he stands, namely, that man is the object and aim of God's redeeming love ; it depends upon the dignity conferred upon him as a rational being possessing an independent centre within himself ; and hence it is that punishment, as well as God's condemnation, loses all meaning if the conception of guilt be not maintained in its full reality.

This is not in any way opposed to what has already been affirmed, that the relation of sonship to God which chastisement as distinct from punishment implies, is far higher than this independence which punishment recognizes in the transgressor. It is indeed far nobler, but only so far as it is not compulsory, but the result of a willing self-surrender. God deals with each according to the bearing of each one's will towards Him, according to the rela-

* Zerstreute Blätter aus den Hand- und Hulfakten eines Juristen, part i. p. 434 ; a work which, following Kant and Hegel, has done good service in our day towards the thorough investigation of the conception of punishment. But when Göschel (died 1862) finds this thought in the words *τίμημα, τιμωρία*, this, like many of the derivations of this clever man, is a witty play upon words rather than an etymology. *Τιμάω* means "to estimate the value of a thing," "to estimate the amount due as an equivalent for something taken away," and hence comes the meaning "to award punishment" in *τιμάω* itself, and "to punish" (including both the judicial sentence and its execution) in *τιμωρέω*.

tion which each assumes. He punishes the sinner who by wilful disobedience asserts his own independence in opposition to Him. But He treats the pious man who looks upon self-surrender to God as the highest exercise of his independence, and who finds his happiness in ready and childlike dependence upon Him, as His child; and like a father, chastens him with sufferings according as in His wisdom He thinks fit, but always for his profit, Rom. viii. 28; Heb. xii. 11; Rom. v. 3, 4. This is an assurance which is never given in the New Testament to those who have exposed themselves by sin to punishment from God in the strict sense of the word.*

Considering the moral necessity of punishment as here described, we cannot but regard it as one of the most prominent symptoms of a fatal disease which is eating into the very heart of our national life, that our people, so far at least as they are represented by the prevailing views of our educated classes, no longer believe in punishment as properly the desert of sin and crime. Whoever considers the discussions of our representative assemblies upon capital punishment, political offences, social misdemeanours, and the like, will find them marked by this weakening of the moral consciousness. No one is surer of the applause of the majority than the man who discovers some new method of evading justice under the pretext of humanity, or even presumes to be a lawgiver and judge of human weakness, so as to secure impunity from the law, and if possible from public opinion too, for the villain and the criminal. This moral corruption most commonly assumes the form of a more or less refined Determinism. The real author of the deed is not the criminal, but his circumstances or his bad training, or the want of proper social regulations which should enable him to procure the means of life without resorting to crime. Crime is misfortune rather than guilt, and it seems accordingly very unkind to inflict upon him who has had the misfortune to commit an assassination, the additional and "still greater evil of his death." We then find

* This distinction between punishment, properly so called, and chastisement, is fully described by Twisten, *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik*, vol. 2, part i. p. 145 f. Among the older theologians, Gerhard distinguishes between the *poena satisfactoria* and the *poena castigatoria*, *Loci Theol. De morte*, § 199. See also Baier's *compend. theol. posit.* p. ii. cap. 1, § 15; Hollaz's *Examen theol.* p. ii. cap. ii., qu. 19.

among keener thinkers the logical consequence of this opinion, a decided moral scepticism which regards the moral law as a matter of arbitrary contrivance and agreement. Thus is illustrated the truth of the old maxim, that the man who alienates himself from God soon becomes a traitor to his own conscience. In forming a moral judgment of the evil-doer, that is the true humanity which recognizes the murderer, who makes himself amenable to the law with the clear consciousness that he thereby of right forfeits his life, as beyond comparison higher than the lawgiver or the judge who will not venture to inflict the punishment of death upon him because he is to pity not to punish. The former has violated the law, but he is willing to pay the heaviest penalty he can as a member of society for the greatest crime; the latter destroys as far as in him lies the authority of the law.

Redemption is the other great doctrine of Christianity whose true import is wholly undermined by the supposition that man's consciousness of guilt is only a subjective feeling, and is utterly overthrown by the imaginary notion of the divinely ordained necessity of sin. This is unquestionably the most important part of our present inquiry. It is no mere item of Christian truth that is here called in question, but the very essence of Christianity, and yet we may be all the briefer in our treatment of it, considering how clear its import is and how obvious its connection with the reality of guilt.

We cannot at once, however, give our assent to the theory which has of late been propounded,* that no recovery from sin is possible if sin be not regarded as involving guilt. Supposing that sin were only suffering, a malady affecting the guiltless race of man, it might still be regarded as a transitory state, the termination of which as well as its beginning had been ordained by God. Its disappearance also might be brought about, not by the unassisted power of man, but by divine help, by a divine activity freeing man from the tyranny of evil; and thus it might be regarded in some sense as a redemption.

But such a deliverance would be widely different from the Christian Redemption taken in its true import. The first point of difference consists in the fact that salvation as wrought

* Ackermann, *das Christliche im Plato*, p. 247.

by Christ's redemptive work is always spoken of in the New Testament as an operation and exhibition of the *grace* of God, something which man could not claim by right, but which he receives as wholly undeserved. This is set forth in many passages, particularly in Luke xvii. 7-10 ; Acts xv. 11 ; Rom. iii. 24, v. 15 ; Eph. ii. 4-8 ; Titus iii. 4-7. If God in redemption merely freed man from a yoke which He Himself had imposed in the order of the world, we could not even call it an act of *righteousness*, much less an act of *grace*.* For on such a standing-point what intelligible sense would the divine attribute of righteousness have ? Nothing here can be maintained as just or righteous unless, besides the divine will and work, there is another and relative independence whose decisions have not their origin in God, but—we do not hesitate to use a strong expression in order sharply to mark the difference of view—are given facts or *data* even to God Himself, upon which His act of retributive justice assigning to each his own depends. The elevation, or more properly, degradation of God's omnipotence to the absolute necessitating of all beings and events leaves no room for the objective conception of God's righteousness, and by logical sequence it must destroy all the so-called moral attributes of God. According to this view, no mention can be made either of man's meriting redemption nor of his desert in an opposite sense, *demeritum*, as the schoolmen called it ; grace loses all its meaning at the same time with God's righteousness ; they both sink into the abyss of absolute will, wholly beyond the power of man to determine it positively or negatively, and this will arbitrarily orders all.

If we more closely examine the way in which grace develops itself in redemption, we distinguish two departments in the work, the one objective, namely, the propitiatory sacrifice of the Redeemer ; the other subjective, namely, the principle of the forgiveness of sins.

* It is evident from this, I remark in passing, how cautiously the expression, so often repeated now-a-days, "redemption is the true or normal theodicy," must be received, if it is not to lead us into a serious error fundamentally affecting Christian doctrine. If redemption be an essential act of God's righteousness, necessarily involved in His justice, it would have been an act of injustice and the neglect of a rightful claim on man's part to have left him without redemption. But he alone can so regard it who denies that man is responsible for his sin and its consequences.

Taking the latter first, it is evident that by denying the reality of guilt, our conception of forgiveness, as denoting the removal of guilt and of the punishment which it involves, loses all its reality likewise. The innocent man requires no forgiveness, and where no guilt exists no guilt can be taken away. When God removes man's guilt, He by no means declares that man had no guilt or that evil is not to be condemned.* He declares that upon certain conditions, essentially involving the renewal of the guilty, the existing guilt shall not exclude him from His fellowship. If sin were a necessary part of the world's development, to rise above it, to resist its rule, to combat and overcome it, might be regarded as man's appointed destiny. But it would in this case be utterly meaningless, nay, an act of impiety, to sorrow and mourn over sin, and to seek the divine forgiveness for an act, for an inner state, which is an appointed stage to be passed through in the divinely ordained course of human life. The proper frame of mind would certainly be a patient submission to and contentment with the course of development thus appointed, joy upon every advance in goodness and willing surrender to its impulse, coupled with an entire absence of reproach or penitence in the retrospect of past errors.† We shall not be surprised if some of our readers here exclaim, "And is not this really the right temper of mind? does it

* Ritter, for example, seems to apprehend divine forgiveness thus when he contrasts it with the judgment of man upon sin. He regards it, not as God's free act, but simply as giving prominence to another aspect of sin, viewing it in the light of love rather than of justice. *Ueber das Böse*, pp. 72, 73.

† Romang in his acute work, *Ueber Willens-freiheit und Determinismus*, p. 160 ff. (compare also his *System der natürlichen Religionslehre*, §§ 99-111), endeavours to reconcile the facts of consciousness concerning guilt and repentance with his theory that evil, like everything else, is necessary and divinely ordained. But he neither realizes the full import of those facts, nor does he bring what he does recognize in them into harmony with his theory. This view, especially as it is in this case a religious and therefore an optimistic one, cannot explain this one thing, viz., why it is that our moral development (seeing each step is a contrast to the one preceding it, which it supersedes) does not proceed in such a manner that nothing higher enters into consciousness and endeavour than the will at the time has power to realize. What Romang advances by way of proof is only the affirmation of his view in another form (compare p. 142 ff. with p. 166 ff. See also his own admissions upon this point, "Contributions towards the doctrine of freedom," *Fichte's Zeitschrift*, vol. 7, part 2, p. 214 ff.). Sigwart in his Dissertation concerning the freedom and bondage of the will (*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1839, part 3, pp. 1-222) endeavours in a similar manner to vindicate the moral justice of Determinism.

not imply the most admirable union of moral earnestness and truly wise equanimity?" Moral earnestness, we reply, is exactly what this view lacks; such serene slurring over and disregard of the deep reality of the contrast, such easily bought contentment with the existence of evil in one own's life, is wholly incompatible with moral earnestness. Such a temper of mind quite enervates the moral energies, especially in our present state of moral development, which is not an even and gradual progress, but a hard battle against the power of perverted principle, a conversion and a regeneration. Christianity is essentially a new life, beginning with faith in the forgiving grace of God in Christ; it therefore presupposes the inner condemnation of conscience and the self-accusings of contrition.

How dependent the doctrine of redemption is upon a full
 Redemption objectively considered. recognition of the reality of guilt is still more apparent when we recollect that forgiveness has for its objective basis propitiation by the death of the Redeemer. The need of this propitiation cannot be perceived while the moral act of man is regarded as a thing merely outward and temporary, and while the interruption of his fellowship with God is made to consist in the evil now happening, not in that which has already taken place. It would follow from such a view that the sinner needed no expiation in order to be restored to sonship with God, any more than he needs repentance and forgiveness, but that all that is required of him is to forsake evil, and to turn again to Him. So far from recognizing the truth of the old saying, "What is done cannot be undone," this theory looks upon evil when once committed, as if it had never taken place, just because it is done, and in point of time is past and gone.

But a true forsaking of evil and return to God, a renewal of the inner life which this implies, can be accomplished in man by redemption alone. Man may bring himself into a state of ruin by his own perverted will, but he cannot raise himself out of this state when once he has fallen into it. He has surrendered himself to a power which tyrannizes over him, and he cannot free himself again, except by the help of the Spirit of God working in him to will and to do. Man, if left to himself, can never make the evil which he has once com-

mitted, an act past and gone, no more to be thought of, or to reappear; on the contrary, his sin embodies itself in his present sinfulness. Even supposing that man could, if he chose, sever these bonds, and, by the power of his will, free himself from sin at any given moment, he could never annihilate that past sinfulness of his, which includes within its range innumerable violations of the law. Even supposing, therefore, that past sin no longer repeated itself in the actual state of the man who commits it, we cannot see how, on this theory, its guilt and imputation can be done away. The sin still cleaves to the man in the form of guilt, and he is accountable for it, and liable to punishment because of it, so long as its guilt is unexpiated.

If mankind are to be restored to fellowship with God, there must be an expiation which Christ alone can accomplish; because He alone among men is perfectly sinless, and He alone, as the incarnate Son of God, and the Founder of a new kingdom, universal in its range, stands in an all-embracing relation to humanity. By the power of His love uniting Himself most intimately with the race that needed expiation, He fits Himself as the Substitute for man to suffer that death to which He was not Himself liable. And now only, now that this side of the connection between our present state and our past sinfulness—which we may call its ideal side—is obviated, can the other side—the real—be also removed. For the Holy Spirit, as the source of the new life, could not be given to mankind while sin still lay upon them unexpiated, and while Christ had not entered into His glory through His atoning death (John vii. 39). But if, on the contrary, only present sins and not those which are past, have power to separate man from God, there was no necessity laid upon Him to render satisfaction to the violated law, and the crucifixion of Christ was superfluous. Hence in that *locus classicus* for the doctrine of expiation (Rom. iii. 24, 25), the propitiation of Christ is specially applied to the *προγεγονότα ἁμαρτήματα*. In order to maintain the holiness of the divine government, which might seem to be doubtful on account of the “overlooking” (*πάρεσις*) or non-punishment of the innumerable sins before committed, it was necessary for God, when establishing the new kingdom of love and grace, to reveal His

righteousness in the expiatory death of its Founder and King.* Thus the full truth of the consciousness of guilt may be proved from the Atonement. The cross of the Son of God, of the All-holy among men, declares more forcibly than all the punishments of God, that sins which are past have a reality still, a power separating man from God; and the primitive Church rightly looked upon this Cross as the revelation of God's wrath, as well as of His highest grace and love.

From what has now been said, our opinion may easily be Import of O. T. inferred regarding the statement that the separation Religion. of Israel from God proves the inadequacy of the Old Testament standing-point. This alienation, proving that sin was as yet unexpiated, is really its foremost truth. We must remember that this apostasy concerns not only a process in consciousness, but the most real outward relations; in other words, that the Jewish consciousness of their relation to God arose from actual facts. A transitory reconciliation and blending of the bold contrast was necessary, lest the pious under the Old Dispensation should, by the cognizance of that truth, be kept in the bonds of hopeless grief. And hence we find in their declarations the feeling of Jehovah's gracious nearness to them side by side with the consciousness of separation from Him. In the earlier ages of the world, preceding the Mosaic Legislation, this was owing to the fact that the religious consciousness of man had not yet adequately measured the depth of the chasm caused by sin. But in the post-Mosaic period it had its foundation partly in the theocratic institutions which served those earnestly disposed, as a provisional barrier against the prevailing power of this contrast—among which may be named the covenant relation established between God and the people, and the propitiatory offerings for manifold sins which did not exclude a sincere effort after righteousness—and partly in the profound anticipation of New Testament truth involved in Messianic hope, and belonging to a stage of religious consciousness, which, according to divine appointment, was a preparation for, and a prophecy of, something higher yet to come. It was, moreover, the very error of heathenism, especially among the Greeks, that it did not regard the separation from God by sin as something

* See Neander, *Planting and Training*, etc., p. 619 f. Tholuck, *Commentary on the Romans* (5th German ed., p. 146).

pervading the whole life, so that it encouraged men to approach divine things boldly and confidently while still in their sins. This can only be done when the Divine Being is robbed of His holiness, and is brought down into the very contradictions of human life. A celebrated poet has said, "When the gods were more human, men were more divine." This is true in so far only as it is a mere tautology. In proportion as men make the gods human, attributing to them their passions and their sins, it is very easy for them to be godlike. Christianity alone presents to us the truly human in God, the religion of the Son of God incarnate in humanity. But as Judaism alone could supply the historical conditions under which the Son of God was to appear among men (John iv. 22), that is true in a spiritual sense which the first Christian Church maintained in an outward sense until the turning-point of Acts x., the royal road from heathenism to Christianity is through Judaism.

Ecclesiastical development of doctrine has ever endeavoured zealously to maintain the consciousness of guilt in its integrity by excluding evil from the divine causality; but in its anxiety to avoid the clashing of this doctrine with that of God's unlimited power of causation, it has not always been successful.

§ 6. HISTORICAL THEORIES CONCERNING GUILT.

It was this anxiety, and not the Platonic conception of the $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$ which is connected with quite another line of thought, which led Origen and Gregory of Nyssa to resolve evil into an $\text{o}\acute{\upsilon}\kappa\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, an $\alpha\pi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\rho\epsilon\iota\tau\tau\omicron\nu\omicron\varsigma$; in this way they intended to avoid the production of evil by God, the Author of all that actually exists. Basil, too, in one of his Homilies, the ninth, endeavours to prove that neither physical nor moral evil comes from God.* Augustine, moreover, always abides by his denial of the divine causation of evil; and though in ancient and modern times the opposite opinion has been attributed to him, on account of his doctrines of the moral inability of human nature, and predestination, this arises from unwarrantable inferences unfairly attributed to this great teacher of the Church. Augustine expressly distinguishes between God's predestination, which relates to Himself and what He does, and God's foreknowledge, which extends to what He does not do—to sin†—

* Opp. ed. Benedict., tom. ii. pp. 73–83.

† *De predest. sanctorum*, c. x. Compare *Enchir. ad Laur.*, c. 95, 96.

and he thus clearly excludes the latter from the sphere of the divine predetermination. This predetermination, according to his system (which in this part of it resembles that of the later Infralapsarians),* presupposes the free act of man by which sin gains an entrance into human nature, namely, Adam's fall, in the guilt of which every individual of our race is involved. Another cause of this charge against Augustine, that he makes God the author of evil, we find in Julian, Pelagian bishop of Eclanum, who often attributes to his opponent the thought that God frequently punishes the sins of men by means of sin. Our investigation of this question further on will show how ungrounded this notion is. The difficulties besetting the problem multiplied in the scholastic theology, as it began to define more minutely the doctrines of Providence, of a divine *Concursus* with the free acts of men (see p. 220), and of the unerring and all-embracing foreknowledge of God, in support of the conception of an absolute causality. But with a few decidedly pantheistic exceptions, the schoolmen manifest the most earnest endeavour to remove the causation of evil far from God. Thomas Aquinas, indeed, and many others, do not hesitate to adopt the formula on account of which Calixtus was severely censured by the orthodox Lutherans, *Deus est causa mali per accidens*. This offensive formula is used by Aquinas, however, in a very harmless way, simply to prove that God

* Wiggers misunderstands the Infralapsarian view when he denies its coincidence with that of Augustine (*Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus*, p. 309). The theologians of Dort do not regard the divine decree as following the fall in the order of time; on the contrary, they emphatically define it *decretum aeternum*; *Canones Dordr.*, c. i., art. 6. Priority in the order of time is by no means logically connected with priority in thought. According to the Supralapsarian view, the fall forms part of the divine decree regarding the blessedness or condemnation of man, and is therefore necessary as a means of fulfilling that decree. According to the Infralapsarian view, Adam's fall involving the corruption of the race is a given fact for the eternal decree of God, and stands in the relation of a presupposition to that decree. And this is certainly Augustine's view. But seeing that this presupposition is a given fact taking place in time, while the divine decree which it determines is eternal, this apparent contradiction is reconciled by the principle of the unerring foreknowledge of God. If indeed we hold that this foreknowledge necessitates the act of man, and thus attributes to God's knowledge a causative force, the Infralapsarian theory will seem very weak and illogical, but we thus introduce into it a principle which is wholly foreign to it. Augustine expressly defends himself against assigning such a power to God's foreknowledge, e.g., *De Civitate Dei*, lib. i. c. x. *De anima et ejus origine*, c. vii.

created a being to whom sin was possible.* But in treating of the relation between divine and human agency, scholasticism lost sight of those practical religious interests and principles to which Augustine ever recurs, and involved itself in a predilection for a one-sided and metaphysical treatment of the question. When, accordingly, its anti-Pelagian tendencies become prominent, as in that remarkable Treatise of Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de Virtute Causarum*, they lead to results which only hide the divine causation of evil by means of artificial formulæ.†

We cannot wonder that that deep stirring of the religious spirit from which the Reformation sprang somewhat erred in its first attempts to solve the old problem by means of a Christian consciousness which now rested on a new ground. A superficial Pelagian and deistical view of God's relations generally to the world, and to the moral life of the individual, may find it easy by a

* Summa, p. i. qu. 48, art. 2. The following remark occurs in the preceding question, *ipsa natura rerum id habet, ut, quae deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant*; and if this be taken together with what follows, we fall into the dilemma either that the divine creation was originally limited, and must be regarded not as a pure act, but dualistically as a permission of God, or that the origin of evil must be traced back to God's will. Upon the principles of Aquinas it is quite inconceivable that God should not foresee what the *natura rerum* as ordained by Him involved. As used by Calixtus and his disciples, the formula *Deus est auctor peccati per accidens*, is applied partly to the divine permission of sin, and partly denotes that every act of sin is committed against God. This vexed question resolves itself into the relation between human freedom and divine foreknowledge. God could only be called *causa mali per accidens* if He had produced something in creation from which evil must necessarily spring in certain circumstances unforeseen by Him.

† Lib. i. c. 34 (p. 294-307 in Savilius' ed.); compare lib. ii. c. 29, 30; lib. iii. c. 42. Bradwardine (Archbishop of Canterbury, died 1349) in opposing Pelagianism defends the absolute causality of the divine will as the *prima causa*; and seeing that he disallows all contingency and separation of this will from the action of created beings, he holds that it absolutely necessitates all action of the *causae inferiores*, and of course of the human will—which is free only in relation to other *causae inferiores*, as Schleiermacher and Romang maintain. The change of view above remarked is generally indicated by the denial or ignoring of the distinction between God's active and permissive will; and Bradwardine sees no meaning in the notion of God's permissive will, though, out of respect to the authority of his master Augustine, he retains the name; he recognises really but one all-producing and all-working will of God, lib. i. cap. 9, 22, 32, 33. He glides over, as in a light skiff, the hidden rocks involved in this question, adopting that conception of evil which regards it as something only privative, lib. i. c. 27 and 34.

harmless formula to forbid the derivation of evil from God. Separating God from His world, as a work-master from his perfected machine, and abandoning His reasonable creatures to their own powers and the freedom of their own wills in the decision of their moral duties, without distinction of moral condition, Deism is in no way tempted to make God the author of evil, and it is wholly without excuse when, in its decisions concerning the origin of evil, it is often involved in a net which was never laid for it.* But a clear consciousness of the omnipresent and all-working God, who is "above all and through all and in all" (Eph. iv. 6), a deep-seated conviction of the truth that man, in his present condition, can do nothing really good without the assistance of divine grace (John xv. 5), has other difficulties to encounter. The general principle, that God has created man's free will and has left him to choose and decide for himself, is an inadequate explanation, if we would not lose that *numen præsens* of the living God which all true piety feels the deep need of while endeavouring to keep the holy God clear of the evil in His creatures.

If we endeavour to solve the difficulty like the scholastic theologians by ascribing to evil a private character only, we shall find, if we examine it closely, that so far as this has any really definite meaning, and is not a simple negation of evil, it is nothing more than a vain expedient to reconcile the existence of evil with God's omniscience and omnipotence. For if evil is a defect, which must have its place in the normal order of things, we must first of all consider what this defect is in its relation to the divine knowledge in all its truth and perfection; unless, indeed, it be maintained that the object of God's knowledge is not the world in its actual condition, but an ideal world quite different therefrom; a doctrine which is subversive of all religion. Answering to this privation, to this defect in the will of man, which contradicts the divine order, there must accordingly be a deficiency in the divine co-operation, a want of its ordinary force. If again it be answered,

* And yet, more closely considered, there are reasons why a consistent Deism is wholly unable to avoid the derivation of evil from God. Giving up the truth of God's relation to the world, it necessarily surrenders also the personality of man, and its natural fondness for mechanical representations leads it unavoidably to degrade human action to the sphere of the so-called mechanism of nature, against which freedom is only a deceptive safeguard.

this want of co-operation does not arise from God, but from the want of that action on the creature's part together with which God works, we reply that in this case there is no need to introduce the idea of privation in order to exclude evil from the divine causation. For if we allow any determination of the divine activity to be contingent upon the decisions of the human will, we may apply this principle to the apprehension of sin as positive, equally with the privative view of it. Hence, too, it follows that the formula, *Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale actionis malae*, is of no avail in solving the problem, seeing it depends solely upon the privative view of evil. If, again, we are to exclude evil from the divine causation and knowledge by means of a negative conception of it, we must at once adopt a simple negation of evil instead of resorting to the theory of privation. In this case evil is only what is imperfect, what is implied in the necessary limits of finite being, according to its diversities and gradual development. It can only be called a defect or want by an unwarrantable isolation of the individual, and an unfair comparison of him with other individuals at a higher stage of development; for the true view of the world, which loses sight of the individual in the great whole, does not take any note of evil. This doing away *in toto* with evil is logically justified on Spinoza's principles, but had the Reformers thought that their method of separating the causation of evil from God would lead to such a result, they would have at once rejected it.

Thus pressed, in a very difficult conflict, they have a just claim to an equitable judgment, if they often stumble in the endeavour to harmonize the contrasted tendencies of the Christian consciousness, and advance contradictory statements in the same connection. It would have been wiser to have left the antithesis unharmonized by the separate affirmation of each of the contrasted truths, than arbitrarily to incline to one at the expense of the other.

The nineteenth Article of the Augsburg Confession, which was framed expressly for the purpose of denying the divine causation of sin, and of refuting the imputations of Catholic opponents, involves this unsolved antithesis. It runs thus,—*De causa peccati docent quod tametsi Deus creat et conservat naturam, tamen causa*

peccati est voluntas malorum videlicet diaboli et impiorum, QUAE NON ADJUVANTE DEO AVERTIT SE A DEO,—(in the original German version of the Confession it is still more strongly expressed, viz., “when God withdrew His hand, it turned from God to evil,”*)—*sicut Christus ait, John viii., “Cum loquitur mendacium ex se ipso loquitur.”* In order to understand the words which we have emphasized, it must be remembered that in the opinion of the Reformers of Saxony God’s dealings with man, not only in his restoration when fallen, but in his primæval innocence, were regarded as operations of grace. Melanchthon, for instance, expressly taught that from the beginning man was prompted to good by the influence of the Holy Spirit.† That article, accordingly,

* The efforts alike of ancient and modern Lutherans to give an orthodox explanation to the words *non adjuvante Deo*, by interpreting them, “without God’s furthering this turning away from Him,” are utterly useless when applied to the original German text of the Confession. When Melancthon puts *contra mandata Dei* for *non adjuvante Deo* in the *Variata*, it is very unnatural to call this merely “an explanation,” as a dissertation in the *Ev. Kirchenzeitung*, 1847 (Nos. 46, 47, p. 464) does,—a dissertation directed against this exposition of the 19th Article of the Augsburg Confession, and against a similar one in my pamphlet upon the General Synod of 1846,—but it is a witness that Melanchthon perceived the hazardousness of the expression.

† *Loci Theol.* Augustische Ausg., p. 19. Melanchthon treats of this point more guardedly in the editions of his *Loci* published after the year 1535. Where before he spoke of the *auxilium Spiritus Sancti*, he now uses the more general expression *lux Dei*. The above interpretation of the 19th Article of the Augsburg Confession is objected to in the Dissertation of the *Ev. K. Z.* The Holy Spirit, as named by Melanchthon in this part of the *Loci*, is said to be, “not the Spirit of supernatural grace, but generally the spirit of life, the principle of life in man as he was originally united with God,” p. 463. Further, Melanchthon is said “already (in his Commentary on the Ep. to the Colossians, 1527) to have changed the opinion according to which man’s freedom seems to be absorbed in the all-working power of God,” p. 459. As to the second of these statements, the modifications which Melanchthon here proposes correspond exactly with Luther’s doctrine of God’s universal activity as stated in his treatise *De servo arbitrio*. (See above, p. 228.) This *generalis Dei actio*, Melanchthon now takes to be compatible with a certain freedom of the will in actions which relate to civil justice, see the 18th Art. of the *Conf. August.* This, accordingly, has nothing to do with the point here discussed. The correct and careful delineation of the gradual transition in Melanchthon’s views, given in Galle’s *Charakteristik Mel.’s* (1840), to which the dissertation refers, makes it evident that Mel. from the year 1532, in the new ed. of his *Comm.* on the Romans, began to break through the magic circle whose primary premiss is unconditional predestination. But as to the first of these statements, viz., that Mel. understood the Holy Spirit in man’s original state, differently from the Holy Spirit in Christianity, it is a groundless assertion, as the connection in which the words in question stand in the *Loci* shows. This appears

undoubtedly involves the presupposition that man as man possesses in himself no sufficient power toward good and against temptation ; and Schleiermacher is certainly right when he sees in this withdrawal of God's hand, a divine causation of that which necessarily follows that presupposition.* Further, Luther in his controversy with Erasmus, Melanchthon in the earlier edition of the *Loci*, and in his commentary on the Romans, Zwingli in his treatise *De Providentia*, Calvin and Beza ultimately base their doctrine of predestination upon the ever present and active power of God's knowledge and will to involve everything which happens in an absolute necessity. Thus, the Infralapsarian view essentially resolves itself into the Supralapsarian, and it logically follows, that the first sin, as little as those which come after, can be excluded from the divine causation. To disavow this, and affirm that God does not give birth to sin in the heart of man, but only ordains by His decree that it shall be produced by man's own will and its arbitrary causation, is only a roundabout way of saying the same thing and returning to the same point.† It is here just

also by comparing Luther's statements on the subject in his treatise *De servo arbitrio* (p. 79, 80, ed. of Seb. Schmid, 4to), *Etsi primus homo non erat impotens assistente gratia, tamen in hoc praecepto satis ostendit ei Deus, quam esset impotens absente gratia. Quodsi is homo, cum adesset Spiritus nova voluntate non potuit velle bonum de novo propositum, i.e., obedientiam, quia Spiritus illam non addebat* (i.e., clearly, *non adjuvante Deo*), *quid nos sine Spiritu* (Luther is speaking of man's natural state), *possemus in bono amisso? Ostensum est ergo in isto homine exemplo terribili pro nostra superbia conterenda, QUID POSSIT LIBERUM ARBITRIUM NOSTRUM SIBI RELICTUM ac non continuo magis ac magis actum et auctum Spiritu Dei.* Augustine's well-known *adjutorium gratiae* in man's original state is implied here, but the Reformers took the *adjutorium* to be something more definite than Augustine meant.

But when the *Ev. Kirchenzeitung* (p. 461) charges me with an unjustifiable method, namely, that I "intentionally separate the *Conf. Augustana* from the body of our Church Symbols, and attribute to its articles an interpretation justified only by quotations from the private writings of the Reformers," and denies to me "the virtue of historic and fair interpretation," it misstates the case ; because there is nothing here of "intentional separation," nor of "exclusive justification." Did we possess, *e.g.*, an explanation of this disputed point in the Apology, this would have with me the weight of an authentic interpretation. But this reproof can only mean that I ought to have interpreted the 19th Art. of the *Conf. Augustana* by the 11th Art. of the *Formula Concordiae*, and I must freely confess that to such a doctrine of the historic interpretation of our symbolic books my view of historic interpretation is diametrically opposed.

* Glaubenslehre, l. i. p. 496, 497.

† Still less does it go to the root of the matter when Calvin urges, in opposi-

as we find it in many forms of modern philosophical systems which profess to explain the conception of guilt, what they say really amounts to nothing more than is self-evident, namely, that sin is *in* the creature and springs forth, but that it is not of the creature. They all with one accord guard against the inference that God is the author of sin, and Calvin waxes very zealous in defending his position against it.* But he can do so only by placing statements directly contradicting each other, side by side, as in the well-known proposition CADIT HOMO DEI PROVIDENTIA SIC ORDINANTE (that the connection here between providence and the fall is causal, is clear from the words immediately preceding, *lapsus est primus homo, quia Dominus ita expedire censuerat*) SED SUO VITIO CADIT.† The real meaning of this proposition clearly appears in the development of it by Beza, whose acute intellect feared no consequences, especially in the following striking passage: — *Quaerenda est vitii origo in instrumentorum spontaneo motu, quo fit, ut Deus juste decreverit, quod illi (protoplasti) injuste fecerunt. At enim dices: non potuerunt resistere Dei voluntati, id est, decreto. Fateor; sed sicut non potuerunt ita etiam noluerunt. Verum non poterant aliter velle. Fateor quoad eventum et ἐνέργειαν;*

tion to the above inference, that the conceptions of the divine command and the divine will are thus confounded, *Instit. Relig. Christ. lib. i. c. xviii. § 4.* The question concerns the causation of the evil decision of the will; and the divine command, which, as Calvin himself allows, has no power to bring about the tendency of the will which it ordains, does not belong to the consideration; the question still is, in what relation does man's evil will and act stand to the creative will of God, which according to Calvin is the absolutely necessitating cause of all things.

* *Instit. Christ. Relig. lib. i. c. xviii. § 4; lib. iii. c. xviii.,* and especially in the polemic work *Ad calumnias nebulonis cujusdam, etc., responsio;* also in the *Consensus Genevensis.*

† *Instit. lib. iii. c. xxxiii. § 8.* In § 7 he says, *Decretum quidem horribile, fateor; infitiri tamen nemo poterit, quin praesciverit Deus, quem exitum habiturus esset homo, antequam ipsum conderet, et ideo praesciverit, quia decreto suo sic ordinarat.* Similarly Luther says (*De servo arbitrio*, p. 37), *Deus suæ voluntate nos necessario damnabiles facit.* Both maintain that God must have *justissimas rationes* for this decree, though the reason of man is not in a position to understand these. *Occulta ratio esse potest, injusta non potest,* says Calvin in the *Consensus Genevensis* (p. 268 of Niemeyer's Ed. of the symbols of the Reformed Church). He rejects in the strongest terms the notion of a divine will which works by its absolute power without reference to the rule of righteousness, *Instit., lib. i. c. xviii. § 2; lib. iii. c. xiii. § 2.* But in this case, wherein there is nothing whatever on man's part according to which God's ordainment is to act, righteousness is an empty and meaningless word.

*sed voluntas tamen Adami non coacta fuit.** Thus Beza lays great stress upon this fact that the first man was not compelled to sin, although he necessarily fell into sin ; and in investigating the origin of evil he requires us to maintain, as the instrument of action, the will of man, and its *spontaneus motus*. But Beza himself does not keep to this, for he calls man's will "the instrument" of God's ; he teaches, too, in another place (in the treatise quoted below), that all *causae secundae*, intelligent or not intelligent, are nothing more than instruments of the *causa prima*. The injunction, therefore, to keep to the instrument and its *spontaneus motus* when treating of the derivation of evil, coupled with the fact that the consideration necessarily extends beyond this (and not only in a negative manner, for Beza ventures very confidently to define God's designs in ordaining sin),† leads us to adopt two positions, a relative and an absolute one, by means of which some modern theologians have tried to help themselves. From the relative standing-point evil is regarded simply as the guilt of man in contradicting the revealed will of God which here appears in the form of law : from the absolute standing-point it appears as the ordainment of God, the working of His hidden will, which is the unconditioned and conditioning cause of all being and events, but which realizes itself in effecting evil in the form of the self-determinations of an intelligent being. But such a relative standing-point, from which the fact contemplated presents quite a different phase to that seen from the absolute point of view, is quite done away with when we perceive that it is relative and discover the absolute ; it may indeed, and peradventure always will, make good its claim as an unavoidable phantom in our instinctive consciousness, and

* *Resp. ad Sebast. Castellionem de aeterna Dei praedestinatione, in refutatione secundae calumniae.* See the expanding of the same thought in the *Consensus Genevensis* ; Niemeyer, p. 267.

† Beza, following Augustine, Zwingli, and Calvin, explains these designs as consisting in the fact that the divine attribute of punitive justice, as well as that of compassion, must have objects whereby to manifest themselves ; see the *Abstersio calumniarum Fitem. Hesshusii*, and the *Acta Colloquii Montisbelligartensis*. But the conceptions of righteousness and of compassion are alike destroyed by his theory. For God's punitive righteousness presupposes the accountability of man in virtue of his free self-determination ; but this is done away with on Beza's principles, by the necessitating force of God's decree. Compassion also is resolved into a cruel pretence on God's part, if He brings man into a condition requiring His help in order to deliver him out of it.

it is still of the highest interest as a psychological phenomenon, but if it claims an objective import as contrasted with the absolute view it becomes a positive untruth.* The men of the sixteenth century were ingenious in developing these thoughts, and they thought them quite compatible with highest Christian piety. In our day, owing to our advanced perception of the presuppositions and inferences involved in every view, such thoughts cannot be scientifically developed without leading to Pantheism. The attempt of Al. Schweizer to reduce the old theology of the Reformed Church to the principle of religious fatalism, and to make it the representative of the absolute view in contrast with the relative view of the Lutheran theology, no more helps that theology than it conduces to health when the morbid matter in a living organism concentrates itself to one point and shows itself.†

* The same relation may be shown to subsist in the contrast between the hidden and the revealed will of God. God's hidden will must be a revealed one, because otherwise nothing could be known of its relation to a so-called revealed will. The revealed will, on the contrary, reveals nothing, it rather serves only as a veil to hide God's true will, and is therefore a mere fiction, so far as it contradicts the so-called hidden will.

† With these remarks the cautious and thorough comments of Nitzsch may be compared, in his first Article against Möhler upon the teaching of the Reformers as to the origin of evil (*Studien und Krit.*, 1834, part i. pp. 45-55).

A venerable opponent of this work, Ritter *uber das Böse*, p. 69, is mistaken in referring the argument of the last note but one 'concerning the distinction between the hidden and the revealed will, to the view put forth in his *Die Erkenntniss Gottes in der Welt*, pp. 531-543. It is really directed against Beza and other of the older maintainers of the *decretum absolutum*; and the remark occurring a little before in the text, "whereby some more modern writers have endeavoured to find help," which Ritter, giving it the same reference, challenges me to prove, relates only to the assumption of an absolute and relative standing-point in defining the relation of sin to God. This assumption is to be found substantially even in Spinoza, and appears in various forms in the theories which have arisen from his philosophy. But as to the hypothesis itself, that there are two wills in God, one of which, the hidden will, is said to have produced evil; while the other, the revealed will, forbids evil to men,—the hypothesis, accordingly, that there are two contradictory wills of God—I am utterly at a loss to understand, even after Ritter's remarks, how any one to whom that hidden will has revealed its import can still sincerely maintain the revealed will as a true and real will of God. And here I may appeal even to my opponent himself. From his remarks, pp. 67, 68, we see that the revealed will is said to belong only to the "relative" will of God. But regarding this "relative" will, Ritter says, p. 67, "that of course in God, contemplated exclusively in and for Himself, there is nothing relative or conditioned, all in Him is unconditioned; but we are obliged to conceive of God in relation to His creatures, and especially in

relation to ourselves; and thus such a distinction between a hidden and a revealed or relative will must necessarily present itself." Now, if this means that God in His relations to His creatures has given certain conditions to His own will, simply in order that it may be realized, so far at least as they identify their wills with it, I should myself agree with the thing meant. But Ritter's view of the omnipotence of God prevents his taking the distinction in this real sense, otherwise why should he so emphatically reject the thought of self-limitation on God's part? The "relative" will of God, therefore, cannot be anything more than a subjective representation; and however irresistibly it may enforce itself upon us, we cannot but know that it does not express the essence of the divine will, and we are also conscious that it embodies no real knowledge of it. But if we consider more closely the "hidden" will of God, and remember that the entire distinction is laid down by Ritter merely in order to guard against the exclusion of any being or event from the unconditional causality of the divine will, we must naturally be greatly surprised that Ritter, in the decisive passage, where the greatest accuracy of expression was needed, describes this hidden will merely as a will "left unrevealed" (pp. 68, 69). If all that is meant be only a divine reservation, involving the notion of a self-imposed and negative relation of God towards another causality, I should be rejoiced to be able to appeal to the argument of one of our most distinguished philosophers, in a conception which, I am convinced, must find a place in every logically consistent system of Theism. But Ritter prevents our understanding him thus, for at p. 32 he reckons the divine reservation among those evasive distinctions often resorted to, which cannot be taken in real earnest. I honour the motive which keeps him from asserting that God wills and works according to His hidden will the evil which He forbids according to His revealed will; but I cannot see the solution of this problem in a distinction which the author himself lets go at the deciding point.

BOOK II.

EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL THEORIES IN EXPLANATION OF SIN.

INTRODUCTION.

THE question whether the existence of sin can in any manner be explained *a priori* from the idea of it, is to be answered in the following inquiries. It must, however, at once be granted that evil does not thus present itself to us in the first instance ; on the contrary, we first become cognizant of it as a fact of experience. It is thus that the thought of evil is suggested to our minds, and not by any outward tradition ; tradition, indeed, would be virtually meaningless to us if it were not ratified by inward perception of its truth. Evil is so entirely a matter of experience, that the understanding would be very ready to rid itself, if it could, of this unpleasant yet obstinate element of our being. But experience will not allow it to do so. We should like to deny the reality of sin, but it forces itself upon us, and recognize it we must.

In our inquiries thus far we have considered sin, and its reversion upon us as guilt, simply as facts of experience. Some* would rather let evil be logically inferred *a priori* from the conception of will as a so-called element thereof ; and they have blamed us for not following this method.† Any one who has thus far attentively followed the course of our inquiry must admit that such a mode of procedure would have been in direct contradiction to the fundamental principles

* For instance, Vatke in his treatise, *Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und zur gottlichen Gnade*.

† Vatke in his Review of the first edition of this work, *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 1840, p. 1036.

of our view. It may appear very fair to require us, as a matter of course, to allow that sin is "an element of the self-determining will;" and yet we have only to adopt this apparently harmless proposition to see the conclusions we have arrived at concerning the nature of sin one after another explained away.

If this discord which we call sin be not a mere phantom, with which a melancholy view of life torments us, but an indubitable fact of experience, we cannot put from us the question concerning its origin and the *data* which render it possible. How does such a discord arise in human life, wherein everything indicates unity and harmony as its normal condition; a discord which penetrates life to its lowest depth, and fills it with inexpressible restlessness and pain? How can any hostility against God arise in a world created and sustained by His holy and almighty love?—an hostility whereby the creature may incur endless punishment through the judgment of the Creator? *—an hostility which has to be expiated by the sufferings and death of the Son of God, which extorted from Him the cry of agony, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"

We shall not here decide whether the very conception of sin does not forbid the possibility of a perfect solution of the enigma; for peradventure, if the consideration of it only leads us to discover *that* such a solution is impossible, and *why* it is so,—such a solution I mean as would convert the dark abyss from which sin arises into light and clearness,—even this result would be of the highest importance for the more thorough understanding of man, his eternal destiny, and the relation thereto of his present state.

This great problem has ever occupied the thoughts, not only of theologians and philosophers as their proper study, but of all who have felt any desire to fathom the true significance of human life. And justly; for as the moral and religious concerns of the spirit of man are the most important, a worldly view, which entirely evades the question as to the origin of

* When we read, even so early as Genesis vi. 6, that on account of the wickedness of man "it repented Jehovah that He had made man on earth, and it grieved Him at His heart," no one who understands how to read the Holy Scripture will fail to discover the deep meaning underlying the anthropopathic form of this striking expression.

sin, or would treat it as a subordinate matter, is in the highest degree inadequate and unreal.

It would not, therefore, be right for us at once to pass to the exposition of that principle in human nature, on which the entrance of sin into the world clearly depends, without giving our attention to the views of others. If we would not at every step of our progress be hindered by doubts and objections, we must pave the way to our goal by critically examining the various theories that have been propounded in explanation of evil, as far at least as they demand special notice on account of their intrinsic value, or their external celebrity in our day.* The perception of the erroneousness or inadequacy of these opposite and divergent views will help us on to the only true solution of the problem. We shall, moreover, feel ourselves fully warranted in not always taking the negative side towards those who have most profoundly examined the question, because the solutions they propose, however inadequate, cannot be wholly destitute of elements of truth, widening and deepening our knowledge of sin; and even the errors of such men will instruct us more than the truth of others who content themselves with repeating the general decisions of the moral consciousness regarding evil without trying to reconcile them with other and no less certain and holy truths, and even without being able to guarantee a thorough understanding of those decisions.

If we be asked by what standard we shall judge these theories, seeing that no provision has been made for an appeal to any definite philosophic system as the test of all truth, we reply, that apart from a few contradictions in the several views, which must be judged of in themselves, our inquiries hitherto furnish a sufficient basis of judgment. If we find those theories in unison with what we have established as the nature and form of sin, if they explain more fully the results of our investigation, and if, at the same time, they are confirmed by the undeniable witness of our moral and religious consciousness and of God's Holy Word, how can they be anything but welcome to us? If they contradict what upon this ground

* As a matter of course, therefore, we shall not enter upon the consideration of those theories which in their conclusions are closely and affirmatively connected with our own exposition.

we have recognized as true, we must of course reject them. For as, upon scientific principles, it would not be enough merely to maintain that fundamental truth without endeavouring to unfold it, it would be equally wrong to adopt as our own what virtually contradicts it.

CHAPTER I.

DERIVATION OF SIN FROM THE METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION OF MAN.

The first answer which presents itself to the question concerning the origin of sin is contained in the notion of metaphysical imperfection which cleaves to man as a created being. Absolute perfection, it is urged, cannot belong to the creature; otherwise man would be God. He alone is the Infinite; what is finite and limited belongs only to His creature. Definite limits are put to man's power and knowledge; he is subject to a development in time, and consequently to change of circumstances and state. He is variously dependent upon the outward world, which exercises sometimes a furthering, and at other times a hindering, influence upon his life. In virtue of this imperfection cleaving originally to his nature, knowledge of error as well as of truth finds place in his understanding, pain as well as pleasure in his affections. How then can it seem strange to us that in the will of man moral good should appear, not indeed in perfection, but imperfectly, and mixed with sin? Must it not rather surprise us that a finite being, in the hurry of life and the continual stream of manifold excitement, should ever hit upon the right instead of continually doing the wrong and the false? *

* Bockshammer thus expresses himself in his treatise *Ueber die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens*, p. 115. The same thought is still more distinctly expressed in Jacobi's *Allwill*, which, to use an expression of Hamann, requires us—instead of asking, Whence comes what is imperfect, vain, and evil? (for it is characteristic of this standing-point that it does not recognize any difference between imperfect and evil)—to reverse the question and to wonder that finite creatures

In giving an exact account of this view of evil we have the advantage of being able to refer to a universally recognized advocate of it, to Leibnitz, who develops it in his *Theodicée* with wary acuteness and in manifold aspects. From his work the above statements are in the main taken.*

Leibnitz of course does not mean that the *malum morale* must always spring from the *malum imperfectionis* which is inseparable from the creature. That would oblige us to attribute evil to all finite beings; in other words—for such an assumption literally taken would be perfectly meaningless—to destroy the conception of evil by resolving it into finiteness. Leibnitz by no means overlooks the fact that moral evil presupposes certain perfect and higher faculties, viz. reason and will.† But as the limitation essential to the creature appears in the sphere of these faculties, and chiefly in that of the will, evil ensues. The tendency to good is, generally speaking, essential to the human will.‡ But as man is influenced in virtue of his finite nature, not only by adequate but by dark and confused representations,§ he usually remains in the lower sphere of impulse instead of advancing to higher and real good; and herein evil consists.||

This again is regarded as nothing real, but as a mere privation, like error in the spiritual sphere, darkness or cold in the sphere of nature, *inertia corporum naturalis* as discovered by Kepler.¶ As, therefore, we have not to seek a principle or *causa efficiens* of evil, but only a *causa deficiens*, the divine will is not to be blamed as the originator of it.** For though the perfections of the creature, his power and knowledge, as they appear even in sinful acts, must be traced back to the divine *concursus*, and must be regarded as *creatio continua*,

are capable of inquiring after truth, of demanding what is good itself, and of laying claim to blessedness.—*Werke*, vol. i. p. 132.

* *Theodicée*, part i. § 20, 31.

† *Ibid.*, part ii. § 119.

‡ *Ibid.*, part i. § 33; part ii. § 154.

§ *Ibid.*, part i. § 64.

|| Part i. § 33.

¶ *Ibid.*, part i. § 20, 30, 32; part ii. § 153; part iii. § 377, 378. Compare *Causa Dei asserta per justitiam ejus*, § 69.

** *Ibid.*, part i. § 33; part ii. 152. In this opinion the *Theodicée* has been anticipated not only by the Schoolmen (see especially Aquinas, *Summa, Prima secundae*, qu. 75, art. 1), but even by Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, lib. xii. c. 7, where, however, the thought is somewhat obscured by a play upon words arising from the double sense of *deficere*.

this cannot hold true of that which makes the action sin as to its *formale*, because this is a mere privation.*

But this, like all other privations, wherewith the creature is beset, is really nothing more than his limited susceptibility of the perfections (realities) which God is willing to communicate to him in the greatest possible fulness.† This limited susceptibility has its foundation ultimately in the divine understanding, the region of eternal truths, of possible forms or ideals, in the only thing which God has not made, because He is not the author of His own understanding.‡ We must regard this region of ideas as the ideal source of evil (and indeed of good likewise), and as thus occupying the place usually assigned to matter by the ancients.§

The thoughts of Leibnitz now quoted regarding the origin of evil, admit of a twofold interpretation. They may
 Twofold interpretation of Leibnitz's view. *first* be taken to mean that sin has *of necessity* arisen from this original imperfection of the creature.

It may, indeed, be firmly maintained here, that sin is immediately realized by an act of the self-determining will, but this self-determination is nothing more than the form in which the higher necessity makes itself felt in this sphere. While man in his subjective consciousness determines for himself, he really is determined by the limits of his own nature, implied in every act. The words of Leibnitz may, *secondly*, be taken to mean that in human imperfection the *possibility* only of evil is implied.

If the Leibnitzian theory be understood according to the

* *Theodicée*, part i. 27, 28 ; part iii. § 381 f.

† *Ibid.*, part i. §§ 20, 30, 31 ; part iii. §§ 377, 388.

‡ *Ibid.* part i. § 20. Leibnitz here says concerning the *verités éternelles*, "*elles sont dans l'entendement de Dieu indépendamment de sa volonté.*" Part iii. § 288, 380, 381 (*les formes possible antérieures aux actes de la volonté de Dieu*), compare his *Principia philosophiae*, §§ 42, 43, 47. In the *causa Dei*, etc., this region of eternal truths is called the *status purae possibilitatis*, § 69. In the *Theodicée*, part ii. § 149, when arguing against Bayle's exposition of the principle that the condition of the world as known to experience is favourable to the doctrine of dualism, Leibnitz uses the following remarkable words: "Je suis surpris, qu'il n'ait point considéré, que ce roman de la vie humaine, qui fait l'histoire universelle du genre humain, se trouve tout inventé dans l'entendement divine avec une infinité d'autres, et que la volonté en a decernée seulement l'existence."

§ *Ibid.*, part i. § 20 ; part ii. § 149. Leibnitz qualifies this definition, § 20, by a *pour ainsi dire*, for we cannot speak of a cause in any true sense in relation to evil if it be merely a privation.

first of these interpretations, we must affirm that the Theodicée has totally failed in its aim, which is to vindicate God's justice in the existence of moral as well as physical evil in the world. For granting that evil, being only an *ens privativum*, "*une suite des limitations precedentes, qui sont originaiement dans la creature,*" has no effecting cause, still the presence of sin must be laid to the charge of God as its *causa deficiens*, seeing that He did not give His creatures the power requisite to avoid sin. The distinction between the understanding and the will of God is of no avail to avert this inference, unless it be taken in a most dualistic sense. And as such a sense contradicts the spirit of the Theodicée and the general system of its author, how can he avoid the conclusion that the divine Will, when it determines to create beings from whose nature it perceives "in the region of eternal truths" that evil must of necessity arise, must logically be regarded as the author of evil? And even supposing this inference could be avoided, how much better will it be if we seek the source of evil in the divine understanding? Remembering our past investigations, it requires no further argument to prove that upon this theory that distinctive feature of sin in human consciousness which we call guilt, so far from being explained, is virtually denied.

But the objective conception of sin which this theory proposes, namely, that it is a *privation*, cannot (as will be shown further on) be really maintained, if sin necessarily follow from the nature of man. They who maintain this necessity, without denying the immortality of the individual, really make sin everlasting. If it arise necessarily from the limitation which belongs to our conception of a created being, it cannot really be removed through all succeeding ages, but affords only an endless approximation to entire removal, a view which Leibnitz virtually adopts in general terms when he describes finite spirit as ἀσύμππτως (non-coincident) with the Godhead. But such a so-called endless approximation, wherein the distance from the goal aimed at must ever remain the same, because ever infinite, would not really be blessedness, but on the contrary a torment worse than that of Sisyphus. Even the supposition of a magical transformation wrought at death to accomplish what development could never attain, would not serve us.

For while, on the one hand, such a transformation would be tantamount to an annihilation of the being to be made perfect and the creation of another, on the other hand, this new being must still have within it the germs of sin equally with the old, in virtue of the metaphysical imperfection which pertains, according to this theory, to all created beings. It is a significant fact, that those theories which weaken our conception of evil are most in danger of making it an abiding element of human existence.

But are we justified in understanding the *Theodicée* thus? There are indeed strong grounds for taking it to mean this. Its task throughout is to reconcile not only the possibility but the fact of sin with its "best world;" and it seriously argues, that the world would be less perfect if sin were wanting;* so that according to the fundamental idea of Leibnitz, it seems to follow that it was an act of necessity on God's part to arrange for the entrance of sin. If the original imperfection of the creature involved only the possibility of sin, this would not suffice to explain its origin. The realization of evil would in this case be entirely the act of free-will unbiassed by any necessity, and we should expect that the *Theodicée* would have examined the relation of free-will to evil as the very kernel of the inquiry. But it nowhere does this clearly, because its author knew that upon his theory of will—which, with some modifications in particulars, hardly escapes the ban of fatalism—it would be useless. There is one striking passage indeed in which Leibnitz describes the original imperfection of the creature as the ground of the possibility of evil (*cela les rend capables de pécher*), but attributes the realization of this possibility not to free-will, but to circumstances arising in the course of events (*et il y a des circonstances dans la suite des choses, qui font que cette puissance est mise en acte*).† This

* *Theodicée*, part i. § 10, and frequently afterwards. Speaking of the evil of guilt as among the best things which God could ordain, Leibnitz says (§ 25), "*non obstant le mal de coulpe, qui s'y trouve enveloppé par la supreme nécessité des vérités éternelles*." Among recent writers, Lamennais is satisfied with this derivation of evil from the necessary limitations of finite humanity, eking it out with some of Spinoza's thoughts, in his *Esquisse d'une philosophie*. This is the more strange because his theory of two principles in man and in all created beings, viz., identity and individuality, should certainly have led him to a more thorough view of evil.

† *Ibid.*, part ii. § 156.

would lead to the conclusion that, presupposing certain definite and finite relations in which man stands, evil necessarily arises from the limit of his being.

And yet a fair and unbiassed judgment of the *Theodicée* will rather recognize here an unsolved contradiction than attribute to it an entire sublimation of evil, with all its ruinous consequences. When Leibnitz calls the original imperfection of the creature as it exists among the objects of the divine understanding and its eternal ideas, *cause idéale du mal*, he only means, according to his use of language, to denote that which involves the *possibility* of evil. Leibnitz, indeed, says distinctly that evil is not necessary, but is possible only in virtue of eternal truths; * that the real cause of evil is the free will of created beings,† from which he excludes not only compulsion, but necessity likewise.‡ And as, according to him, while the will is the cause of existence generally, the understanding in God is the source of essences and of things as possibilities,§ we can only infer the possibility of evil from the fact that evil, as a result of the limitation of created being, is contained in the region of eternal truths, and nothing but a will can give it reality; and seeing that the will of God cannot be the source of evil,¶ it must spring from the creature's will.

Leibnitz, therefore, describes the relation of the Divine will to evil, not as an ordainment, but as a permission; and he strongly vindicates the permissive will against the objections of Bayle and others, without penetrating deeply into its nature.|| Leibnitz distinguishes also between an antecedent and a consequent will in God. The primitive and antecedent will aims simply at the good, and excludes evil. But the divine

* *Theodicée*, part i. § 21. Leibnitz says this most distinctly in his *Causa Dei asserta*, etc., § 69. *Ita fundamentum mali est necessarium, sed ortus tamen contingens, id est, necessarium est ut mala sint possible, sed contingensest ut mala sint actualia.* What immediately follows, however, almost nullifies this:—*contigens autem* (the reading “*non contingens*” in the German Ed. of his works, vol. i. p. 485, and in the Amsterdam Ed. of the *Theodicée*, 1734, lib. ii. p. 360, must be a literal error) *per harmoniam rerum a potentia transit ad actum ob convenientiam cum optima rerum serie, cujus partem facit.*

† *Ibid.*, part ii. § 120; part iii. §§ 274, 288.

‡ *Ibid.*, part i. § 34; part iii. §§ 288 f.

§ *Ibid.*, part i. § 7.

¶ *Ibid.*, part i. §§ 23, 24, 30.

|| *Ibid.*, part i. §§ 21, 25; part ii. §§ 121, 127, 128, 149, 150, 230.

understanding presents to the creative will an endless series of possible worlds, and in the best of those possible worlds evil is contained as a *conditio sine qua non* of the highest good. The divine will, accordingly, as it directs itself solely according to the standard of wisdom, cannot but choose the best thing possible, and determines as a consequent will (*la volonté finale et décisive*) to permit evil *à titre du sine qua non ou de nécessité hypothétique, qui le lie avec le meilleur.**

Were there in the moral world only sins of weakness (would that it were so), wherein a will directed towards the good is thwarted by the prevalence of opposing impulses, there would be nothing, in our experience, directly opposed to this theory of Leibnitz. But will the notion of mere limitation or privation suffice to explain actions which indicate not only a weak but an evil will, a malevolent disposition, a wanton lust after what is forbidden, and a shameless and resistless surrender to vice? Such phenomena as these cannot be regarded as a mere “stopping short of the will at some lesser good, instead of advancing to the highest.” This difficulty has not escaped the notice of Leibnitz himself, who endeavours to explain it by the illustration of cold, which, though a privation, yet by freezing an enclosed mass of water, may burst a metal pipe, thus showing how what is in itself privative may accidentally, or *par concomitance*, become in some degree positive.† But apart from the twofold insufficiency of this method of proof, we are not speaking of what occasionally may happen as the result of evil, but of universal phenomena, in which the distinctive consequences of evil reveal themselves. Those forms of sin wherein evil seems to us at the outset to be only a privation, can, through interruption and opposition, attain malignity only in virtue of some positive principle inherent, though latent, at the outset. If the sinful act had (as Leibnitz infers from the idea of privation) no effecting cause, we do not see how it could effect anything in the Subject, how (not to go beyond its first and innermost sphere) it could beget a sinful state.

* *Theodicée*, part i. § 25, 22 ; part ii. § 119, where mention is made of the connection of evil *par concomitance* with the best world. § 201.

† *Ibid.*, part ii. p. 153.

The undeniable connection subsisting between the various perverted acts of a man, the progressive development which advances in evil as well as in good, the hardening of the will in evil by repeated and deliberate sin, these are phenomena which this negative view utterly fails to explain.

Again, how are we to account for the fact that when evil becomes apparent in its most decided form, when And to experience ; selfishness is enthroned with clear consciousness and deliberate aim as the ruling principle of life, it is not usually attended with any weakening of the power of will or of the understanding, but is often accompanied by a remarkable energy in both ? * Man can concentrate his powers in evil as well as in good. Does not experience frequently bear witness to the fact that a decided bias to evil may stimulate its possessor and beget in him a prevailing elasticity of mental power in restless activity ? † Holy Scripture speaks of an ἐνέργεια πλάνης as the acme of human depravity, 2 Thess. ii. 11, and it recognizes not only βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ, but βάθη τοῦ σατανᾶ, Rev. ii. 2. Christ Himself declares that “the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light,” Luke xvi. 8. This energy of the intellect and will is not, indeed, in itself evil, but neither can it be called morally good ; it is a natural good to which evil cleaves, and makes use of for its own purposes. But if sin be in its essence nothing more than a weakening and limitation of mental and spiritual life, this tendency to concentrate the spiritual life so powerfully in evil would be more than inconceivable.

And how, lastly, can we upon this theory explain that very And to distinct and peculiar feeling of abhorrence with conscience. which evil fills us the more clearly it presents itself in conscious will, and the more definitely it is embodied

* See Schelling's Works, 1st part, vol. vii. p. 368 f.

† Plato, as Weisse (*Idee der Gottheit*, p. 110) remarks, describes ἀδικία as τὸν ἔχοντα (τὴν ἀδικίαν) μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσα καὶ πρὸς γ' ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον. *De Republica*, lib. x. (p. iii. vol. i. p. 495, ed. Bekker). However unsatisfactory his theory of evil may otherwise be, his μὴ ὄν must not be confounded with the negative view of evil adopted by modern philosophers who follow in the steps of Leibnitz. It will be seen further on that this theory of privation derives no real support from the fact that every method of explaining evil must ultimately resolve it negatively into that which ought not to be, into that which has no part in existence, viewed according to its true ideal.

in outward life? We need not call to mind the monsters in human form who have made for themselves a name in history;—the decided wickedness, recklessness, and unbridled selfishness which we continually observe, not only awaken in us mere pity on account of the weakness and thralldom of man, but make us turn away with indignant horror and loathing.

There are certain phenomena of our moral life and judgment by which every scientific inquiry into the nature and origin of evil must test itself and discover its latitude, if it would gain the credit of solving the problem. But as an erroneous theory, if it only obtain sufficient prevalence, will in the end betray the life into error, so this view of evil, widespread in its manifold modifications, has in its measure only too well succeeded in supplanting the feeling of moral loathing and abhorrence which it cannot explain, by a mere pity that this or that man is so unfortunate as to be a miscreant. It turns away from the inner reality of evil, and in the end comes to regard sin, not as in itself deserving of abhorrence, but merely as something which “makes man miserable in manifold ways,” as Leibnitz incidentally expresses it.* Thus the shallow eudemonistic philanthropism of the last century ventured to construct a kind of philosophic support for itself out of fragmentary extracts from the *Theodicée*, as for instance in the treatise of Villaume on the origin and ends of evil. While this weak and enervating view of sin is utterly worthless in itself, it necessarily involves the deepest and most thorough

Scripture
opposed to it. contradiction of the moral principles of Christianity. For Holy Scripture, while it testifies to the compassionate love of God towards our sinful race, ever represents sin as the object of God's wrath; it recognizes in the servant of sin an enemy of God and an ally of Satan, and it announces God's retributive justice, and con-

* *Theodicée*, part i. § 26. And yet better principles concerning the relation between physical and moral evil are to be found elsewhere in the *Theodicée*. That view of the real cause of the condemnatory judgment which we pronounce against evil is presented in a work which appeared a few years before the *Theodicée*—a work containing many striking points of resemblance with the *Theodicée*—I mean Archbishop King's treatise *De origine Mali*. King does not shrink from avowing the doctrine—which is the necessary inference from that view,—that physical evil is greater than moral, *cap. v., sect. 5*. Happiness itself indeed is upon the same principle regarded merely as physical good.

demnation against the ungodly.* The prevailing feeling in reference to sin which it presents in the Lord Jesus, the pattern of the perfect man, is not sorrow on account of an insuperable infirmity in Himself or in others, but holy wrath. It therefore summons us, not to useless lamentation over the melancholy fatality of sin, but to burning hatred and relentless war of extermination against it. We need not cite particular passages; this doctrine, like the life-blood which throbs in every vein, pervades every part of the New Testament; we perceive the divine abhorrence of evil if not expressed in so many words, yet implied in every line. We may here be reminded of the eschatology which the Bible predicts, especially of its prophecy regarding an amazing increase and intensity of evil before the end of history, and of an anti-christ. In this sense the ethical principle of Christianity may justly be described as *dualistic*.

We cannot enlarge upon this; but in few words we may say that a view of the world which regards the deep discord in our nature to be merely negative, and seeks its origin in the metaphysical imperfection of the creature, may account for the absence of good, but not for positive evil, not for actual opposition to goodness; it strikes at the root of the Christian doctrine concerning evil, a doctrine which exactly corresponds with the real testimony of our moral consciousness. Instead of the

* The *Theodicée* preserves these doctrines inviolate, and endeavours to harmonize the eternal duration of punishment with its principles. We are not justified in regarding this recognition as a mere conformity to popular notions which Leibnitz gave way to—a view which Hegel (*Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. iii. p. 452) unwarrantably takes of the *Theodicée*, thus sacrificing the integrity of the writer's convictions for the sake of securing his speculation from the reproach of narrowness. The only external evidence in support of such a view is Leibnitz's well-known letter to Pfaff, in which he satirizes the theologian's acuteness and his naive confidence in his discovery. There are many other writings which deserve the same censure as the *Theodicée*, e.g., "The reconciliation of faith and reason," the *Causa Dei asserta per justitiam ejus*, Hobbes's work on *Freedom, Necessity, and Chance*, King's treatise on the *Origin of evil*, and several of Leibnitz's letters, in which, as in those other writings, the principles of the *Theodicée* are traceable. Every attentive reader of the *Theodicée*, however, must confess how foreign the doctrines of Scripture are from the principles thus maintained, how artificial and strained their justification is, and to what suspicious consequences these principles lead. Among these may be named the serious ignoring of the high importance attached by God to individual personality, the eternal salvation of the individual being sacrificed to the rigid notion of the "best world." See *Theodicée*, part ii. § 118, 122; part iii. § 244.

positive and essential difference which Christianity presents between good and evil, this meagre view offers only a difference in degree, one of more or less; the will, according to Leibnitz, really tends towards the good even in wickedness,* and the limitations attaching to the action through the inadequate value of its aim are a privation only or *defectus*, and deserve the name of sin only through an unavoidable comparison with a *Better*, i.e., with a will directed towards higher objects. All is thus resolved into a mere difference of degree, and this is plain from the way in which Leibnitz speaks of the *naturalis inertia corporum* which, according to him, is only a negative force—a limit in the susceptibility of the body for the fulness of energetic power,—the perfect prototype of the original finiteness of the creature, so far as he is evil.† He compares the good and evil acts of men to several boats borne along upon the same river (i.e., upon the current of the divine activity, co-operating with whatever is real and positive in human action as the efficient cause), which, nevertheless, move with different degrees of swiftness according to the cargo, whether heavier or lighter, with which they are freighted, and which acts as a greater or lesser hindrance to their progress. If this analogy, which occurs not only in the *Theodicée*, but elsewhere,‡ be a fair one, evil is resolved into a merely relative and comparative conception.

We have already (p. 132) referred to the abstract conception of moral good from which Leibnitz (with other philosophers and theologians) sets out in the investigation of the nature and origin of sin. We cannot look upon moral good as essentially connected with freedom of choice, nor can we maintain that in choosing its opposite, there has been freedom in the true sense, so long as actual moral goodness is derived from or rather resolved into metaphysical good, it being made to consist merely in preference for the perfect, as the more real, above the imperfect. Hence arises the indistinct confounding of moral with metaphysical good which so often presents itself to us in the *Theodicée* in expressions like these;—"freewill tends to what is good, and if it turns aside to evil it is by

* *Theodicée*, part i. § 33.

† *Ibid.*, part i. § 30.

‡ *Causa Dei asserta*, § 71.

accident, and because the evil is concealed beneath some apparent good which it assumes as a mask." * The conception of good is in both cases taken in a metaphysical, and that of evil in a moral sense.

The common saying of our own day, that evil always contains an element of good, is akin to this doctrine of Leibnitz. If this saying has any real meaning, it must be that evil never manifests itself in inward or outward action without being associated with something morally good within the soul, something to which it cleaves like rust to iron. Taken in this sense no unprejudiced person will assert that it is true of every act, however infamous. Whether or not, hardly any one can seriously think of proving such a proposition by experience and observation. It is nothing more than a mere assertion that it must be so, based upon a certain psychological theory. Appeal is made on both sides to the necessary permanence of the moral consciousness in life, good and evil ever being factors therein, if, indeed, good be still any factor in the moral life of the hardened villain. But it is too external an application of a just thought to argue from the presence of these conflicting powers in the inner life that they must logically find place in every outward act. The maxim, however, has been adopted by many; in ancient times, for instance, by Augustine,† and the Pseudo-Dionysius (*De div. nominibus*, cap. 4), and thus it is taken to mean that evil has no objective and substantial existence, that it never can, in the strict sense of the word, become "nature," that it abides in the sphere of subjectivity, and that it must attach itself to something in a metaphysical sense good, which it misapplies and perverts, in order to embody its lie, its unreality, in act. Taken in this sense, the maxim is so unquestionably true that nothing but the sheerest dualism could deny it. But even here it involves serious mistake and error, because it does not distinguish as it should

* *Theodicée*, parti. § 154. "Le franc-arbitre va au bien, et s'il rencontre le mal, c'est par accident, c'est que ce mal est caché sous le bien et comme masqué." This coincides with the theory propounded by Plato in his *Gorgias*, 468 (Bekker, p. ii. vol. 1, p. 46 f.), according to which the aim of the will at the time is to be considered, and not the import of the act itself, as it is related thereto as means to an end (—οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει). But the man always regards these aims as good (see *Meno*, 77). We have already seen that this maxim, if viewed in reference to the good, is a mere tautology. See also Ritter's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, p. ii. p. 401.

† *Op. imperf. c. Julian.*, lib. i. c. 112.

between moral and metaphysical good,* a distinction upon which the conception of reality in good and evil rests. If the category of substance is thus to be applied to moral distinctions, we must allow that evil equally with moral good has, strictly speaking, no substantial existence, but presupposes some existence as its basis, and we may extend the maxim that evil always has good coexistent with it, by adding that good always has good coexistent with it, metaphysical good with moral.

In order to understand what sin is, and how it arises, we must have recourse to other conceptions widely different from, and far more definite than these bare categories of affirmative and negative, existence and non-existence, the real and the privative, whereon this theory of evil, and many others like it, ancient and modern, are based—an ethical method which attained its full development in the system of Spinoza.† We admit that these general abstractions may have their truth and value in the investigation of evil. But it is wrong to confine one's self to

* The confusion of these two conceptions forms the basis of a modern argument, supposed to be logically unassailable, against the existence of the Evil One. So far as he has natural existence, it is said (*i.e.*, mind and affections in some substratum), he is good, so that evil is not absolute in him, but coexists and is limited by good of some kind. If the evil in such a being were really absolute it must have destroyed all good in him, *i.e.*, destroyed his substantial existence (*natura*), so that he is really non-existent. "Satan has being, therefore he must have good in him, and, therefore, must be 'in God and through God ;' Satan is only evil, therefore he cannot be." Göschel's fragment upon Evil, appended to his *Octavius and Cæcilius*, p. 201. Here good and evil are evidently taken in two different senses, good as metaphysical, evil as moral. The representation of an absolutely evil being who has become so and in whom there are no elements of moral good, is certainly compassed with many difficulties, arising partly from the conception of evil itself, and partly from the relation of such a being to the all-embracing, all-sustaining activity of God. But there is no contradiction between evil which has become absolute and that kind of good which is necessary to all existence,—according to Augustine's canon, *quidquid est in quantum est, bonum est*,—this metaphysical good cannot limit moral evil because it does not concern the same sphere of things ; it cannot infringe upon the perfect ascendancy of evil (which is at the same time complete slavery), it cannot interfere with the entire penetration and filling of life with evil.

† *Ethic.* p. iv. *propos.* xx. *Quo magis unusquisque—suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute prædatus est ; contra quatenus unusquisque—suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens ; compare prop.* xxii. In the demonstration of *prop.* xx. *potentia* corresponds to virtue, see the eighth definition of part iv. ; so that the want of virtue or evil is inability in man to preserve his being. But this inability does not arise from anything in the man himself, *Schol.* to *prop.* xx., but from the hindrance which every individual

them, and to imagine that they are the key to the entire problem. Moral good is defined as something *positive* and *real*, yet its true conception is not, strictly speaking, thus realized, for these predicates obviously pertain only to the sphere of nature, whereof no mention can be made of moral good. So long as the philosophic treatment of the question is thus confined to the sphere of these abstract determinations the contrast of good and evil is not really present, and though notwithstanding the endeavour be made to consider it, the result will be simply to explain it away. In order to examine moral distinctions fairly, some true conception must already have been obtained regarding the relation of created beings to God, and regarding personality and will.

And yet it would be unjust to describe the *Theodicée* as containing no recognition of these conceptions concerning the creature and his relation to God. But in how abstract a manner is this for the most part recognized, and with how many merely quantitative limitations! God is infinitely perfect, uniting in His own essence all reality, but the creature is finite and limited. Could these limitations only be removed, the creature would at once become God. The creature is therefore by necessity imperfect, and affected with *malum metaphysicum* in order that he may be distinguished from God. Hence the quantitative view of the distinction between good and evil condemned above logically follows together with the privative conception of evil.*

thing experiences from others round about it, *prop.* iii., iv.,—its passive relations *props.* xxix., xxx., lxiv.,—and therefore, the limitation involved in the reality of individual being, see the Preface to the fourth Part. The fact that this limitation, attaching to everything finite as a mere *privation*—*omnis determinatio est negatio*—appears as *malum*, arises merely from our inadequate knowledge which regards individual things one-sidedly and apart from their due connection, and compares them with other perfect things, or the various circumstances and stages of progress of the same thing with each other or with some general conception, and thereby discovers some want, *prop.* lxxiii. Schol. Tract. polit. c. ii. § 8, *Epist.* xxxii., xxxiv. Leibnitz, as we have seen, agrees with Spinoza in this issue, with this difference; the comparison, according to Leibnitz, which gives rise to the notion of evil is *necessary*, but, according to Spinoza, it is arbitrary and a prejudgment of imagination which the true philosopher does away with; thus with all true conceptions of evil the conception of good also disappears—see also the Appendix to Book i. of Spinoza's Ethics.

* Compare on Leibnitz's doctrine concerning evil, Sigwart, *Das Problem des Bösen oder die Theodicée*, 1840, p. 101–120.

This merely quantitative estimate of good and evil has been lately developed in Dr. Baur's "Rejoinder to Dr. Baur's theory. Möhler's last polemic," etc.,* but (like Spinoza) the conceptions of *malum morale* and the so-called *malum metaphysicum* are identified, so that the privative conception of evil resolves itself into a simple negative. The extreme to which a reckless acuteness has thus reduced the doctrine that we have been combating, is too significant to be passed over without a few extracts in illustration of it, concerning the nature and cause of sin. If "freedom from sin," it is said, "be the removal of the limit of finiteness, it is clear that there must be an endless series of gradations leading on to the point where sin appears as a vanishing *minimum*. If this *minimum* be conceived of as wholly done away, the being perfectly free must become one with God Himself, because God alone is absolutely sinless. — If, again, there are beings distinct from God, there must be presupposed in them, so far as they are not God, a *minimum* at least of evil."† Further on we read, "If we are to call everything constituting the difference between the Creator and the creature sin,"—this the author himself does, and not his opponent,—"it follows that sin can no more be done away than can the distinction between the Creator and the creature, but it is only fair to recognize in this case, that nothing more is said than must in any case be allowed, viz., that while man is man, the limitations which separate him as a creature from the Creator, the absolute God, can never be removed. In this sense, the highest created spirits cannot be conceived of without a *minimum* of sin, neither can the most degraded of fallen spirits be without a *minimum* of good, for even this one fact that they are spirit, implies reality, and therefore good ;" ‡ here a distinction between moral and metaphysical good is not so much as thought of. The issue of the discussion is summed up in the following remarkable words: "In every sin that only must be regarded as evil, which appears as a negation in it ; evil therefore is only the finite, because the finite is itself negative, the negation of the infinite, and all manifestations of the finite are only a relative nothing, the negativity which appears in many various forms

* Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, 1834, 3d part.

† *Ibid.*, p. 230.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

according to the continually varying *plus* or *minus* of reality.”* To return to the starting-point of these statements, is it possible more effectually and thoroughly to do away with all real difference between good and evil in the world as created by God? To make the finite, as such, evil, is (as has already been observed) only another way of denying the existence of evil altogether. As to the practical consequence of this extension of the theory, it will be this: instead of leading man to turn away sadly or with hatred from the finite on account of the evil which attaches to it, evil will ever become less an object of anxiety, and man will allow himself to indulge in it because it is inseparable from the finite.

The derivation of evil from the metaphysical imperfection of the creature is closely allied, both in the *Theodicée* § 3. THE DOCTRINE OF EVIL AS PRIVATION. itself, and in many popular philosophical treatises upon this problem, based upon the main principles of the *Theodicée*,† with the explanation of evil as a privation. It remains for us, therefore, still to examine the relation of this idea of privation to the essence of evil, and to its origin as derived from the so-called *malum imperfectionis*.

To understand this question clearly, we must more closely analyse the distinction between simple *negation* and *privation*, as it has been carefully drawn already by Distinction between privation and negation. Thomas Aquinas.‡ Simple *negation* denies to a thing certain realities, which it affirms do not belong to its nature. *Negation*, in a general sense, is inseparable from finite being; separate individuality involves a distinction from other individuals, and therefore an exclusion of certain other realities. This simple *negation*, as it is essential to all finite beings, cannot be regarded as disturbance or depravation; disturbance or depravation in anything is that which contradicts its own essence. *Privation*, on the contrary, is the want of some reality which belongs to our conception of its essence.

Now, it is evident that every sin includes the idea of privation. Holiness, and the continual development of holiness,

*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, 1834, p. 233.

† Werdermann gives illustrations from the most prominent of these writers in his *Versuch einer Geschichte der Meinungen über Schicksal und menschliche Freiheit*, p. 241 f.

‡ *Summa*, p. i. qu. 48, art. 5.

alone correspond with the true conception of perfect humanity. But every sin, if it be not a sign of the entire absence of this development, is at least a limitation of its progress. It is, however, quite another thing to affirm that evil may be wholly reduced to this notion of privation. If we call to mind the result of our earlier inquiry concerning the nature of sin, we shall find that the explanation of evil merely as a privation is wholly inadequate; that self, which so strongly and ungovernably asserts itself in evil, ought indeed to be affirmed, but only in harmony with the divine law, and in perfect subservience to the love of God. But is not this want of advance to the higher principle of the love of God a privation? Certainly; but this want arises from the fact that what ought to be a subservient element usurps the place of the higher principle, and will rule alone. The perverted negative here presupposes a *perverted affirmative*. And must not the privative view of sin, whatever be the more concrete definitions which it lays down concerning its nature, at least acknowledge this? If evil be really privation, it is a disturbance of moral order; and then the question arises, What power or activity is it whereby the confusion of the moral order is caused? If this question be not evaded, the element required by the moral order in this particular place will be found to be wanting, because another and perverted element has supplanted it; and this in its turn is the perverted affirmative.

However correct it may be to recognise a privation in every sin, the real nature of sin is by no means adequately expressed thereby, nor is its origin explained. The question still remains virtually unanswered—What is it that produces the privation? To say that evil has no *causa efficiens*, but only a *causa deficiens*, i.e., a *defectus causae*, is not really to answer the question; this is clear from our definition of privation. Leibnitz may answer, as we have already seen, “the privation arises from the original finiteness of the creature;” but we must further ask, how can a privation which contradicts the true nature of man spring from other privations essentially belonging to his nature? Leibnitz has nowhere shown how this comes to pass; and being still unacquainted with the evolutions of the idea by means of which, in a purely logical manner, the simple negation—the mere not being good—

passes on into positive contrast and contradiction, he could in no wise show this. The imperfection which necessarily arises from the finite nature of created being, or from its progressive development, cannot properly be regarded as sin or disturbance, and is not, therefore, strictly speaking, privation. If evil, therefore, be deduced from the mere finiteness of the creature, the idea of privation is resolved into a mere negation, *i.e.*, into the denial of evil altogether. But to despatch a problem which has occupied the thoughts of the deepest thinkers for thousands of years with the summary explanation of Spinoza, that the subject-matter of it does not really exist, is not to solve, but virtually to evade it.

Schelling expresses surprise at the fact that many of the
 § 4. PRIVATIVE FATHERS, Augustine in particular, make evil to
 VIEW OF EVIL consist in mere privation.* And he is right; for
 BY THE how can we harmonise this with the clear per-
 FATHERS. ception of evil in its reality which penetrates the inmost soul of this great Father, and pervades his entire theological system?

Augustine is not the first who endeavoured to reduce the conception of evil to that of a mere negation. The germs of this view, which seem to be traceable in the Platonic philosophy, vanish upon closer examination, but it is distinctly defined in the writings of some of the Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophers.† Within the pale of the Christian Church we find it in various expressions of Origen,‡ then in Athanasius,§ Basil

* Sämmtliche Werke, erste Abtheilung, vol. vii. p. 369. We find this view of evil in Augustine, *e.g.*, *Contra epist. Manich. quam vocant fundam*, c. xxxv., seq.; *Confess.* lib. 7, c. 12; *De natura boni c. Manich.*, c. iv.; *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xi. c. 9; lib. xii. c. 3. *Enchir.*, cap. xi., xii., xiii.

† Especially in Plotinus, in whose writings we find this view of evil connected with the theory of emanation, *Ennead.* iii., lib. ii. c. 5; compare lib. viii. c. 8, where evil is called *σπίρησις τοῦ ὄντος*. Compare, concerning the doctrine of Plotinus, Sigwart as before, p. 80 ff., and Vogt, *Neoplatonismus und Christenthum*, p. 67 ff.

‡ *De principiis*, lib. ii. c. 9. In *Joann.* t. ii. c. 7 (tom. iv. p. 65, 66, ed. de la Rue), where among other things he says, *πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδὲν ἐστίν* (in reference to the *οὐδὲν* in John i. 3), *ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ὂν τυγχάνει*. Further on he denotes evil as an *ἐσπερήσθαι τοῦ ὄντος*. Compare Thomasius on Origen, p. 175 f.; Redepenning on Origen, p. 2, p. 328 f. Ritter also recognizes the fundamental error here to consist in the quantitative view taken of the distinction between good and evil, *Geschichte der Christl. Philosophie*, part i. p. 534.

§ *Contra Gentes*, c. vii. (tom. 1, p. ii. p. 7; ed. Bened.).

the Great,* and Gregory of Nyssa.† We have already seen (p. 257) how the true aim of these Christian theologians was to exclude evil from the divine causation, and to harmonize the fact of its existence with the consciousness of God's living presence in all beings and events. Closely allied to this is the Mysticism of the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita regarding emanation, who sought very fully to explain and support the negative view of evil,‡ although he thus involved himself in a very formal and fruitless play upon the categories of being and nonentity, good and evil. But it is above all to the authority of Augustine and to the wider application which the theory of evil as negation, or more accurately, as privation, received from him, that this conception owes its wide spread, not only in Scholasticism, but even in the older theology of Protestantism.§

Augustine built up his theory in opposition to Manichaeism, thinking to guard against the doctrine that evil resides in substance or nature, by adopting the principle that evil is only privation. Accordingly he is wont to describe the essence of sin as *corruptio* or *privatio boni*.|| But as he takes this *bonum* usually in the metaphysical sense, expressing it more accurately as *bonum naturae*,¶ the phrase really means the same as

* *In Hexaëmeron*, hom. ii. (Opp. ed. Garnier, tom. i. p. 16 f.). 'Ομιλία ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν ὁ θεός (tom. ii. p. 72-83, especially p. 78). Yet his formula, τὸ κακὸν σπέρησις ἀγαθοῦ, must not be confounded with Augustine's, because the ἀγαθόν here is, as the connection shows, *moral* good.

† Λόγος κατηχητικός, c. v., vi., xxii., xxviii. ; compare the Dialogue, *De anima et Resurrectione*.

‡ *De Divinis Nominibus*, c. iv. § 18, to the end.

§ In Duns Scotus Erigena, the view taken corresponds rather to that of Pseudo-Dionysius. As to the Schoolmen generally, it may suffice to refer to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, part i. qu. 48, art. 1-3 ; qu. 49, art. 1. Most of the later Schoolmen and the Catholic theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries follow him, as does also Bellarmine. Among Protestant theologians Melanchthon may be named as in the later editions of his *Loci* adopting the conception of privation in the more exactly defined forms of Aquinas ; *De causa peccati et contingentia*, p. 64 f.

|| For this expression, see in addition to the passages already referred to, *De moribus Manich.* c. v. seq. ; *De libero Arbitrio*, lib. iii. c. 13, 14.

¶ *Contra Julianum Pelagianum*, lib. i. c. 8, 9. *De civitate Dei*, as before and lib. xi. c. 17. *De nuptiis et concup.*, lib. ii. c. 17. Cölln (*Bearbeitung des Münchscherschen Lehrbuches der Dogmengeschichte*, vol. i. p. 355) makes out a contradiction in Augustine, when, in contrast with his later views, he says in his treatise *De Genesi contra Manich.* lib. ii. c. 27, *nullum malum esse naturale, sed omnes naturas bonas esse*. But as Augustine means it, this sentence is in per-

“depravation of being,” “a falling off from its reality” (*Enchir.* c. 12). Evil, according to Augustine’s fundamental definition of it (wherein he follows Plato), is, “what is injurious;” it is that which tends to destroy (*consumere*) the existence of the being to whom it cleaves (*tendit ad non esse*); and yet it may never reach this goal and has never yet reached it, because evil can only exist as it is connected with good,—connected with the divinely created nature of the subject who has become evil—so that it would annihilate itself if it annihilated this nature.* This corruption is possible in the case of the creature alone, and arises from the fact that he does not derive his existence from himself or from the essence of God (*de Deo*), but is made out of nothing by the creative will of God.† In King’s work, already mentioned, this thought is expanded into a kind of dualism, which puts “nothing” in the place assigned to matter by the ancients as one generating principle of existence. King’s words are, *nascitur creatura a Deo patre perfectissimo, at a nihilo quasi matre, quae est ipsa imperfectio.*‡

Recollecting, however, that Augustine (as has already been shown) regards evil in respect of its object and aim as perverted desire, as *conversio ab eo, quod magis seu summe est, ad id, quod minus est*, the antithesis between good and evil seems to escape us just as we were about to grasp it. For if we set up the *nihil* in the place of a *minus* of reality, there is no truth in the representation that *nihil* forms an actual antithesis to absolute being or God.§ If such an antithesis

fect harmony with the view which he afterwards develops more fully against the Pelagians; indeed, he often repeats the same thought in various forms in his later writings, in the *Civitas*, the *Enchiridion*, the books *contra Julian.*, and in the *Opus imperfectum*. He does not therefore consider that the expression needs any explanation in the *Retractationes*. If we may judge the contents of the last treatise of Theodorus of Mopsuestia from its title, viz., *πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ πταίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*, it seems not to have hit the right nail on the head, at least as far as Augustine is concerned.

* *De moribus Manichaeorum*, lib. ii. c. 6, 7. *Op. imperf. c. Jul.*, lib. i. c. 112. *Enchir.* c. 13.

† *De libero arbitrio*, lib. ii. c. 20. *Contra epist. fund.*, c. xxxvi., xxxviii. *Contra Jul.*, lib. i. c. 8. *De nupt. et concup.*, lib. ii. c. 29.

‡ *De origine Mali*, cap. iv. sect. 9; compare sect. 2. We frequently find the same thought in the Theosophists, and the theosophic sects.

§ *Contra Secundinum Manich.*, c. 10, when Augustine says, *non esse contrarium Deo, qui summe est, nisi quod omnino non est*. From this imaginary contrast

were possible it could only be by supposing this *nihil* to be another being over against absolute being, *i.e.*, by supposing it no longer to be *nihil* but *something*. Now, if we keep to the definition above given, that man, in evil as well as in good, strives after something real, but after the lesser instead of the greater, or rather *more* after the lesser than the greater; instead of the antithesis of good and evil we have only a difference of degree between the more or less perfect. That primary flaw in Augustine's conception of evil, his endeavour to derive it, in its contrast with good, from the greater or less reality in the object aimed at, pervades his treatise, *De libero arbitrio*, and leads to many strange statements both there and in his works, *De ordine*, *De Moribus Manichaeorum*, *De natura Boni*; *e.g.*, that it is better to be evil and wretched than not to be at all, non-existence being the *summum malum*; that the creature depraved by sin is more perfect than the wholly irrational, just as adulterated gold is of higher value than pure silver.*

Thus Augustine's view of sin appears to be essentially the same as that of Leibnitz. Throughout Augustine's writings we find the deepest conviction of the positive antithesis between good and evil, and the keenest discernment of the reality of evil. This raises them far above the *Theodicée*; and the only apparent explanation seems to be that his genius was far beyond his system, that the riches of Christian experience, the fulness of deep insight in his giant spirit, and his recognition of sin arising therefrom, broke through the limits of his theory.

But upon closer examination we find that there is a very important and fundamental difference in the way in which Augustine and Leibnitz explain the conception of *privatio boni seu naturae* in their respective theories of evil. The former uses the word *privatio* in an active sense, but the latter merely between nothing and being Origen infers his negative conception of evil, for he makes being and good identical.

* We meet with the same thought in Leibnitz in the *Theodicée*, and Spinoza (ep. xxxii.), and also in Hegel's *Encyclop.*, § 248 :—"If mental caprice or arbitrariness goes on to evil, it is still infinitely higher than the movements of the heavenly bodies in conformity to law, or than the harmlessness of plants." As if any comparison at all were possible between things so remote as the harmlessness of plants, the order of the heavenly bodies, and the depraved will of man!

in a passive sense. With the latter, evil is merely a defect or want, arising essentially from the metaphysical imperfection of created being; but with the former it is a privative activity which lessens real being, not a mere infirmity, but a tendency resisting bare life (*malum tendit ad non esse*), the presence of which can only be explained by the freedom of the will. With Augustine it is plain that the fact of man's creation out of nothing, and the corruptibility of his nature involved therein, explains only the possibility of evil. The actual introduction of it is to be accounted for only by the freedom of the creature; and his conception of freedom did not allow of his regarding the act of will as the working of another cause still further removed.* It is only thus that Augustine could harmonize his notion of *privatio* with his doctrine of *corruptio* and *perversio*. Evil is, indeed, according to Augustine, a negation, but in the same sense in which fire, for instance, is a negation, because it tends to destroy the material on which it feeds.

If this be the true import of Augustine's theory, it manifestly
 { Evil ac- affords a clearer and more suggestive insight into
 cording to the nature of evil. Evil is no longer a mere
 Augustine defect, it is a positive antithesis between God and
 corruptio. created being, a principle of disturbance; and it is well to
 remember, that in his speculative treatment of the subject,
 Augustine, like his Manichæan opponents, blends together
 moral and physical evil in the one term *malum*, and this is
 certainly a disadvantage in his inquiry. It is essentially the
 same view of evil as is presented in Goethe's Faust.† It is

* So in his *De libero Arbitrio*, lib. iii. c. 17, 18, and in many places in his anti-Manichæan writings. Baur recognises the importance of this principle in Augustine's theory—see his work, *Die christl. Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, vol. i. p. 905.

† Especially in the confession of Mephistopheles,—

“ I am the spirit which constantly denies ;
 And rightly so, for all that is created
 Is worthy only that it be destroyed ;
 Far better were it, had nothing e'er existed.”

And further on, from another point of view, in Faust's complaint concerning him,

“ He turns Thy gifts to nothing with a breath.”

Tieck, in one of his thoughtful poems, the *Hexensabbat*, develops a different theory of evil. Here its reality arises from the fall of the most powerful

certainly true and sound at bottom, it rests upon the cognizance of the fact, that this world's existence and the existence of finite being is in itself a good, conformable and well-pleasing to the divine will. And every one who considers with any degree of attention the view which the Bible gives of the creation, must allow that this is in keeping with the principles of Christianity. If the talk indulged in now-a-days about the austere dualism of Christianity be anything more than an accusation, it must prove that Christianity presupposes at the beginning of the world a fall, and an estrangement from God.

The more accurately we test this principle, the more clearly we see how little it harmonizes with a candid observation of depraved human life to attribute evil wholly to a tendency to non-existence. We have indeed already seen (p. 176) that there is an *acme* in the development of evil wherein it becomes a fury of destructiveness, a fierce hatred of all being. But the cases wherein the destructive power of evil has thus broken through all bounds of selfishness are comparatively rare, and they admonish us that evil contains in it an element of insanity. Usually, however, it by no means shows this tendency to destructiveness and to pure annihilation.* It rather

created spirits from God, and their being plunged into the deep ; and Lucifer is the world-forming principle, "the power that moves the world, the life of nature, the spirit and flow of matter, that by seeming destruction creates, and by seeming creation destroys." Similar opinions have been held within the Christian Church ever since the views of Gnosticism concerning the *δφis*. The main source of that poetic representation is probably the speculations of Solger, which in their continual alternation between God and Nothing, contain the Hegelian process as if in embryo. God gives Himself up to nothing that we may be, and offering up Himself destroys this nothing that we might not remain nothing, but may return to Him and live in Him. But if this Nothing will separate itself from God and become a positive Nothing, it becomes evil. This is a sort of divine game which comes to nothing, and which we rightly treat with scorn. We need hardly observe, however, that there are elements in the philosophy of that noble spirit which quite break through his unfruitful principle and its logical consequences.

* In order to subordinate evil in all its elements to this one aspect of it, we may adopt the explanation which Augustine gives of the conception of being, in his work *De moribus Manichaeorum*, c. viii. *Nihil est esse quam unum esse. . . . Simplicia per se sunt, quia una sunt ; quae autem non sunt simplicia, concordia partium imitantur unitatem et in tantum sunt, in quantum assequuntur. Quare ordinatio esse cogit, inordinatio vero non esse ; quae perversio etiam nominatur atque corruptio.* Without deteriorating from the beauty and relative truth of this thought, it rests upon an abstract conception of the highest unity, and that view of evil could not be maintained in its integrity if that be true

awakens in man an immoderate effort to possess all for self, stimulating all his powers and concentrating them on one point, so that the *ego* assumes an independent importance, isolating itself from the higher unity to which it belongs, and seeking a unity within itself. Sin is indeed destructive, but it will only destroy that which interferes with the eagerness of selfishness. Thus a perverted state lies at the foundation of the negative tendency in evil. And this Augustine himself confirms, for "when he would picture to us the nature of evil in the individual, or would describe the difference between good and evil in general, we find that he always adopts something affirmative,"*—pride, avarice, self-love, and the like. We have already shown that this must be so if the conception of privation be really meant as something different from mere negation. Augustine, however, seems not always to have had a clear consciousness of the relations of these two conceptions to each other, and of the difference between them, for in his treatment of privation he sometimes passes imperceptibly to the other standing point.

When the *Apologia* of the Augsburg Confession maintains original sin, not only as *defectus*, but lays stress upon the other aspect of it as *concupiscentia*,† it is not Melanchthon's intention directly to oppose the Augustinian definition of evil, for this is of metaphysical import only, and refers to sin *in abstracto*, as our older theology expresses it. Melanchthon is here treating of a contrast in the experimental and psychological apprehension of inborn moral depravity which pervades the middle age theology; for on the one hand he keeps more to which an earlier examination has taught us (p. 143), viz., that evil is not only want of order and of unity, but a perverted order and unity.

* Ritter, as before, p. 357. Ritter has not given sufficient weight to the peculiar view of the theory of evil as privation explained above, and in his account of this Augustinian doctrine of evil, he arrives at very different conclusions from mine; but this arises from the fact that he attributes an element to Augustine's method, to which, while he allows that it is borrowed from Greek philosophy, he attaches greater importance than I can. I mean the æsthetic view often to be found in Augustine's earlier writings, viz., that evil in contrast with good, tends to the beauty of the world and to the manifestation of God's righteousness. See Ritter, p. 329 f. If in those writings the æsthetic view is made the basis of the divine righteousness, the necessity of evil would be proved, and the idea of holiness would be sacrificed to that of beauty, a charge which cannot be brought against the Augustinian system.

† *Art. de peccato originali*, p. 55, the Rechenberg Ed.

the *defectus* or *carentia* (*absentia privativa*) *justitiae originalis*, and on the other to the *positive depravity* of man, the *vitiosa qualitas*, which, after Augustine, is usually denoted by the word *concupiscentia*. Melanchthon, therefore, and the older Protestant theologians, though recognizing a twofold element in sin, do not consider themselves at variance with Augustine's theory of privation any more than did Aquinas * in his general

Evil viewed ethice and metaphysice. view of evil (see p. 132). Viewed *in concreto et ethice*—which is the usual form of the older Protestant teaching upon this point†—original sin is not a mere want of original righteousness, but a *qualitas positiva* in relation to the other essential element, *concupiscentia*.

Viewed *in abstracto et metaphysice*, it is according to them a *mere privation*; and it is surprising that the irrational relation of this metaphysical view of sin to the ethical aspect of it did not check these theologians in the conclusions they arrived at. It is, however, plain that the adoption of this notion of privation did not lead to the same results, nor was applied to the same uses as we find it now-a-days, by modern writers who welcome it so as to reconcile the presence of evil with God's knowledge and will. But we dare not allow (as the older Dogmatists did) that God is cognisant of evil in man only *in abstracto*.

CHAPTER II.

DERIVATION OF SIN FROM MAN'S SENSUOUS NATURE.

OUR examination of the theory of privation in explanation of the origin of evil, has led us to the conclusion, fully established, that there must be something *positive in sin*, whereby what is privative in it is produced. If we now inquire what this positive element is, innumerable voices of the present day, and still more numerous

§ 1. STATE-
MENT OF THE
THEORY.

* *Summa*, p. i. qu. 48, art. 1, 2, 3; qu. 49, art. 1; compare with p. ii. 1, qu. 82, art. 1.

† It is sufficient here to refer to Gerhard's *Confessio catholica, de peccati originalis natura et quidditate*, p. 1406; and Quenstedt, as before, p. ii. cap. ii. sect. ii. qu. 11.

voices of the past generation refer us at once to SENSE.* Herein, we are told, lie hid the springs of sin; to wit, in the power of man's sensuous nature over his spiritual. The fact that man is not only a spiritual but a sensuous being, and the examination of the relation between these two elements, brings to light (it is said) and fully accounts for the presence of sin and its wide diffusion through the human race.

The derivation of sin from man's fleshly nature or sense is certainly preferable to the privative theory already considered, because the abstract view of evil, and the conceptions connected therewith, become more concrete.

Ritter sanctions the derivation of sin from sense; but he attributes to sense a meaning which we cannot recognize in the theory we have now to examine. He understands by sense the changeableness and transitoriness of our earthly life—our present state being continually moulded by our past, what we are by what we have been; and he opposes to this the super-sensuous, as the essence of man and of all creatures, so far as it exists in the eternal mind of God. Hence he asserts that our derivation of sin from selfishness may be resolved into this explanation of it from sense. For "the *ego*, which the selfish man inordinately loves, is only his temporal self, not the immortal *ego* as it exists ideally in the eternal heart of God."† We readily allow the latter proposition; for the *ego*, as it exists ideally in God's eternal nature, exists not only in its own purity and truth, but in perfect unison with God and the world. If man loves thus to realize his ideal self, this love can never become selfishness. But, on the other hand, a man might make the blessedness of an eternal existence hereafter

* While there have ever been numerous espousers of this view, the great Doctors of the Church have never been backward in their denunciations of it. See Augustine, for instance, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xiv. c. 2-5; Luther, *De servo arbitrio* (p. 167, Ed. of Leb. Schmidt in 4to); Melancthon in the *Apologia*, art. *De pecc. orig.*, p. 55, compare pp. 52, 53. In the *Formula Concordiae* (sol. declar., art. 1, *De peccato orig.*) original sin is described as having its seat in *superioribus et principalibus animae facultatibus*. As to Augustine, it is all the more necessary to refer to such passages as the above, because the derivation of sin from sensationalism has been attributed to him in our day, e.g., by Baumgarten Crusius, *Lehrbuch der Sittenlehre*, p. 220. So far was Augustine from holding *concupiscentia* to be the original source of sin, that he names this as its effect and punishment.

† *Ueber das Böse*, p. 5 f.

the aim of his endeavour, and yet if he did not keep before him fellowship with God and a life of perfect love as his goal, but only his own satisfaction, he would even in this effort fall into selfishness and sin. But we have not here to do with that philosophic use of language wherewith Ritter describes the difference between sensuous and a supersensuous *ego* in man and all other creatures, but with the language he describes as ordinary, and by which man's sensuous nature, or SENSE, is

Definition of sense. that part of our being which is capable of receiving impressions from the outer world.* If we would reduce the distinctions upon which this theory turns to the most general philosophical conceptions, we must describe them, not as the antithesis between the ideal and the phenomenal, but as the contrast of spirit and matter, action and being. Moral goodness in God, according to this theory, is pure spirituality; in man it is the unconditional dominion of the spirit over matter in his sensuous yet rational life. And yet in the case of many who hold this view there seems to be a confounding of both conceptions in this word sense.

The theory here to be weighed cannot, on the other hand, mean that our sensuous nature, with its instincts and their satisfaction, is in itself evil. For in this case it would follow that wherever there is animated matter, evil necessarily exists; but what reasonable person would regard the instincts of animals, and the gratification of them, as sin? Were we to do so, we should evaporate the conception of evil altogether by an unwarrantable extension of its meaning, for all manifestations of sensuous life would in this case be sin, in fact sin in its true meaning would no longer exist—all guilt, all conscience, of an inner discord which ought not to be, would vanish, and nothing would be left but the necessary laws pertaining to a really innocent nature.

Evil, therefore, cannot, according to this theory, have its root in sensuous nature in and for itself, but only in so far as this is blended with spirit in a personal being. And if this,

* LUECKE, seeing that he defends the principle that sense is an essential factor in the origin of the first sin, and of all following sins (*Göttinger Gel. Anzeiger*, 1839, part xxvii. p. 261), expressly explains "sense" in a wider yet exacter way, according to which, even in the most spiritual sins, the will is still inclined towards the world.

again, is not to lead us back to the same point, we must not regard the manifestations of sense in this sphere as in themselves sinful, except so far as sense, which ought to be the willing servant of the spirit and the basis of its earthly existence, by its own action and susceptibility resists the spirit and asserts its independence and even dominion in human life. If we would discover the only conceivable import of this theory we must bear in mind that, strictly speaking, it is not the sensuous nature but ultimately the will alone—man as a voluntary being—that can be the subject of sin. Taking the word *sense* in its true meaning, it is clear that no action, in the true sense of the word, can properly be attributed to it; every theory which does not wholly give up the fact of guilt in sin must recognize this. Any view, therefore, if it is not to be involved in manifest contradiction, which derives evil from sense, must suppose that the spirit voluntarily yields to its stronger power instead of obeying the law involved in its own moral being.

But how can any such theory explain the possibility of so strange a phenomenon as this, wherein that part of human nature which, according to its true ideal, is the higher, thus becomes the lower or subservient, and that which is properly the lower the dominant? Whence this disturbance and perversion of a true order which necessarily arises out of the essential relations of both parts to each other?

It is replied that our sensational nature demands merely what is agreeable and satisfying, whereas our reason demands what is morally good, and that the determinate aims of both do not always coincide. But while we may thus very easily understand how momentary perplexities and complications between the impulses proceeding from each part of our nature may occur, no explanation is given of the fact that in such a conflict the pleasant overcomes the good, and the claim of our lower nature, which is ever limited, supersedes the unconditional law of the higher and spiritual nature,—as we see that it really does in sins against conscience and against the demands of the watchful and self-conscious spirit (see p. 165). An abnormal and (upon this theory) inconceivable relation must be presupposed, wherein what is really good for the spirit is not at the same time pleasant and agreeable for the flesh, but forms a stern *ought* in opposition to the inclination. And it

must be most strange that there is in this sphere not only a conflict issuing in the subjugation of the spirit, but a retrogressive development—an advancing degeneracy—in which the sensational nature obtains the mastery over the spiritual, and makes the will the ready servant of its desires. Here we behold a power which the spirit already possesses, and which it endeavours according to its nature to maintain, yet wrung from it (according to this theory) by sense apart from will, and this not momentarily merely, but for life; so that sense, the part of our being by which we are determined in a particular way, annihilates that which the independent principle of our being would have effected. And so thoroughly perverted may this relation become, that in innumerable cases the spiritual is nothing more than the instrument of the sensuous nature, and to concern one's self with the interests of the spirit is with not a few of no importance, save as it may minister to their sensuous need and satisfaction; in a word, that the spiritual is of use only to refine and sharpen the sensuous appetite. All these are facts fully confirmed by experience, and to contravene them implies the most glaring ignorance of real life; but what light can a theory which attributes evil wholly to sense throw upon the possibility of such a positive perversion in our nature?

Would we fall back upon the doctrine of the freedom of the will for the solution of this difficulty,—upon its power to yield either to the demands of the spirit,—i.e., the reason, or to the impulses of sense, and thus to raise the one or the other to supreme power,—the supposed explanation of evil on the principle of sense must be not only modified but virtually surrendered. The fact that sense in the present state of human nature works upon the will as a stimulus to resolve in opposition to the moral law,—that the dominance of the sensational impulses over the spiritual is the usual form which moral corruption in man assumes,—must be recognized in every theory of evil which does not ignore the facts of the case. And nothing more than this is really left to this theory if it calls to its aid the doctrine of freedom. For if the final decision as to whether the spirit or sense shall have the predominance be left to free-will and its unrestrained decision, the real source of sin is no longer sense, but must be looked for in the fact that the will, being free, surrenders itself to a

perverted tendency, and wantonly gives to sense inordinate power and supremacy. It is not weakness, but a positive self-perversion of the will, and a contradiction of the freedom which it possesses, if the spirit makes sense and its promptings the principle of its acts, instead of obeying its own law. How comes it to pass that the spirit thus willingly determines itself, not according to its own nature, but according to sense? Wherein consists this self-degradation and self-surrender to an ignominious slavery? This is really the problem wherein the question regarding the origin of evil takes its rise. However inconceivable it may seem, naturally and psychologically, that the representations of man's sensuous nature (whose objects are immediately present to him and claim momentary satisfaction) should work more effectually upon him than his spiritual desires, and thus cause the entrance of sin, the fact that it is so can only be recognized by admitting that the resolve not to act depends not upon sense but upon will, *i.e.*, upon the spirit. And thus the wide-spreading web of psychological explanations, wherewith the enlighteners of the past century delighted to adorn their sensuous theories, is swept away by the simple affirmation that nothing can be nearer to the spirit than the spirit itself.*

This derivation of evil from our sensational nature, to be self-consistent, and to maintain its claim to explain not only the nature but even the origin of evil, must not assume the principle (hypothetically received) of the freedom of the will, as an ability to decide either according to the promptings of the spirit or according to the promptings of the flesh. It has often done this in ancient and modern times, but we must recognize herein an obvious want of logical *acumen*. If it will not surrender the fact or at least the name of freedom, this name will only be the power of spirit in another form, whereby it determines itself according to its own nature and spiritual instincts, in opposition to the power of the sensational nature. This power of the spirit must be limited in its relation to the flesh, and

* Against such modes of explanation it has often been rightly urged that they begin with denying the spirit and degrade man in the sphere of nature, in order afterwards to find that, like the brutes, he follows his merely sensational instincts quite naturally. The problem to be solved, the dominant power of sense in man, is presupposed as the law of his nature, and then it is further argued from that law.

only thus (upon this theory) is sin possible to man; sin being said to have its foundation simply in the limitation or fettering of the spirit. So far from sin, according to this theory, arising out of human freedom, it does not really begin to exist until freedom is sacrificed.* And these fetters, which the spirit encounters in endeavouring to realize its true nature, could not have been imposed by any act of self-enthralment; for if it were, this primary act would be its original sin, and the dominance of sense would be the consequence of such an act, and not, as this theory would make out, the cause and original source of evil. But these fetters are assigned to the spirit without its co-operation, and by a necessity from without. There must, therefore, be a natural weakness and want of energy in the spirit corresponding to the preponderance of sense; indeed, the excessive strength and irritability of the sensational instincts is only relative, and virtually means a want of due energy on the part of the spirit to subdue it, and so to make it its servant and instrument. Accordingly, to say that sin has its origin in the sensuous nature, or its preponderance, is tantamount to saying that sin has its origin in the natural weakness of the spirit, i.e., of the will. If it arise from these natural and necessary limits, it cannot be regarded as perversion or depravation; and if it must be regarded as perversion or depravation, the reference to our sensuous nature does not in the least explain its origin.

What has now been said throws some light upon the relation of this view to the Leibnitzian theory of privation.

Only a form of the theory of privation. If the sensuous theory resolve itself into the weakness of the spirit or will as the seat of sin, the

* BRETSCHNEIDER, e.g., on the contrary, sets out with this view, and yet thinks that he can attribute sin to freedom. In his *System Entwicklung aller dogmatisch. Begriffe* (p. 498, 3d ed.) we read,—“So far as it (the Reason) appears as an ability to act we call it will or rationality, and so far as it is the only ground of action we call it freedom. Moral liberty, viewed as human ability, is the power of human reason to follow out the knowledge of the true and good as the only basis of will and act, and to resist all other impulses not coming from the reason.” But at p. 530 he says, “Sin formally consists in the knowledge of the law and the voluntary violation of the law—its violation *with freedom, i.e., in a state of reasonableness.*” The source of this manifest contradiction is to be looked for beyond the range of Bretschneider’s dogmatic system (see the Appendix to this chapter). His system is answerable only for the doubling of the contradiction which occurs in the explanatory clause, “in a state of reasonableness.”

doctrine of privation really lies at its root, and it can be regarded only as a further evolution of it in a particular direction, however little it is wont to be thus understood.* The distinction between good and evil is thus resolved into a difference only of degree, and not of nature. Man's free will has various degrees of strength; if its strength be great, it subdues the sensational nature, and the result is virtue; if it be small, sense gains the ascendancy, and the result is vice.

But it may be asked, does our inability to conceive the origin of a total perversion of the relation between the spiritual and fleshly natures in man, arise from our regarding these two elements as distinct and separate from each other? Their relation is not that of settled and independent co-existence, but of living and mutually progressive growth. Let us picture to ourselves the manner of their development as it usually appears in human life, and the changes and alternations springing therefrom. Our sensational nature not only unfolds itself first, but for some time it is the only medium of perception. The child becomes accustomed to satisfy the sensational instincts, and to act upon sensuous desires, before its spirit awakes to consciousness and independence; and we cannot regard this as a violation of order, or a disturbance arising from a free act of the will. When the spiritual nature begins to emerge from its primary condition of latent potentiality, and to assert its claims upon the man's life, it finds the ground already occupied by the sensational impulse which has obtained considerable power by the very force of habitual dominion, whereas the spirit has to begin with only a *minimum* of power. Can we wonder that the fleshly nature continually resists its claims, and that in its endeavour to establish them, the spirit has a hard battle to fight, and many defeats to endure? And although in the progress of development it may obtain in-

* We find the recognition of this connection, e.g., in Töllner, *Theol. Untersuchungen*, part ii. iv. *Von der Erbsünde*, p. 110; also in Bretschneider, *Grundlage des evang. Pietismus*, p. 126, though here only in indefinite and somewhat contradictory hints. It is, however, entirely overlooked by Michaelis, one of the most decided advocates of the theory that our sensational nature is the root of sin, in his *Gedanken über die Lehre der heil. Schrift über die Sünde und Genugthuung*.

creasing power, the sensational nature advances in equal ratio, and retains its position in advance, so that it can be outstripped and overcome only by a long and difficult conflict. Thus we see that we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by occasional victories upon the part of the spirit over the flesh, which seem at first sight to prove how utterly the latter has been subdued, and which lead to the belief that if it afterwards becomes active, this is owing to some extraneous cause. These victories are never more than partial, and while the power of the sensational nature is kept in check in one direction, it silently strengthens itself in another, and soon breaks forth again with renewed vigour. Hence arise the contradictions, the vicissitudes, and continual retrogressions which occur in the gradual subjugation of the fleshly nature to the spirit.

This theory seems specially to be confirmed by the altered principles now-a-days maintained regarding the relation of the spiritual part of our nature to the sensuous.

In former times the derivation of evil from sense usually regarded it as standing in an abstract and mechanical relation to the spirit,—man being made up of soul and body, spirit and nature. And many even still avow their adoption of the theory according to this view. Upon this principle it seems easier to understand the resistance offered by the sensuous nature to the spirit; but it is far more difficult to understand how the spirit comes to submit to the fetters of the fleshly nature which is so wholly external to it, and why, seeing it has to submit by a necessary ordainment to such a yoke, it imputes to itself as sin what arises naturally from the power with which its physical nature is gifted.*

The theory can be much better established if, according to

* Some would solve this difficulty by the assumption that God has ordained that the opposition of the flesh against the spirit, though in itself natural and necessary, should nevertheless appear in consciousness as guilt, in order by this consciousness to stimulate us to increased strivings after moral good. Such a *naïve* attempt, unobservedly, to lift the veil behind which God is said secretly to contrive, may well have its reward in the discovery that God attributes to man a sinfulness which arises from His own planning and ordering of the world,—from the inadequate spiritual power which He has bestowed—and that He suffers man to bear the guilt of it in his consciousness to the end that by redoubled effort he may find the necessary corrective, though at the cost of his inward peace and unity in himself. Upon such a principle we must allow that—God might more easily have effected the same result, by giving greater strength to man's spiritual nature so as to enable him to realize the moral claims

more modern views, we maintain the inseparable union of the spiritual with the natural or sensuous in man, and regard the former simply as the awakening of the latter and its becoming conscious ; nature being thus only dormant spirit. Thus it is certainly less contradictory to suppose that the spirit becoming self-conscious, should not be able so easily and quickly to free itself from the trammels of the sensational nature, and at the same time that it should impute to itself as guilt what is, strictly speaking, nothing more than an unrestrained power of the fleshly nature ; for nature in this case is only the spirit itself in a state of potentiality.

While we do not espouse the mechanical theory of the relation subsisting between the spirit and the flesh in man above referred to—we may call it the theory of *co-existence* or juxtaposition—we must as firmly guard against the theory of *identity* here laid down which looks upon the spirit of man merely as the highest blossoming of his natural life, the issue of his progressive development. Of course we maintain the unity of the finite spirit and of nature in a really true sense, a truth which Christian theology cannot deny as long as it does not ignore the significance of its doctrine concerning the Resurrection. This doctrine clearly implies that spirit and nature in man will at last become so perfectly one that the latter, as *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, will no longer stand contrasted with the spirit as something external and foreign to it, but will be perfectly adequate for its full manifestation and outgo. But if spirit and nature are thus in the issue to become one, they must ever have been in themselves one, *i.e.*, in the divine understanding which eternally beholds the ideas which it has to realize as the goal of all development.

Anthropological theory rejected.	But we do reject such a doctrine of identity as would make the spirit simply a development of nature, so that nature, which is only its presupposition and the medium of its manifestation, becomes its principle.*
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implanted in him, whenever they appear in consciousness, and to subordinate the sensuous nature in ready, yet unhindered, development, and to make it the instrument of the spirit.

* History teaches us the sad yet easily conceivable fact that the obliteration of the sacred line of demarcation between spirit and nature has ever tended, not to the spiritualizing of nature, but invariably to the naturalizing and consequent degrading of spirit.

The ideal unity which we allow involves the greatest actual difference; it specially demands it in the present stage of man's development, because his corporeal nature, the *σῶμα ψυχικόν*—is not yet fully conformable to the spirit, but has still in order thereto to be transformed and glorified. Properly speaking, there is no fixed transition from nature to spirit; spirit is not only distinct from the stages below it, but is essentially different from nature as a whole; the difference is one, not of degree merely, but of kind, for spirit is infinitely above nature, an entirely new beginning, which can be explained neither by the stage of natural development next below it, nor by all the stages of natural development together. This is most clearly attested by the fact that man alone, as distinct from all merely animal natures, has religion, and possesses not only a relation to this world, but an absolute relation to God. Hence it is that the dignity of divine kinship as "the offspring of God" is assigned (Acts xvii. 28, 29) to man alone as spirit.

If this truth be acknowledged, we cannot understand—it requires at least a further tracing out of evil even
Awakening of
conscience in
man. to its source in an original disturbance in the
 spirit itself and its relations to God to explain—
 how it is that when it first becomes conscious of its divine destiny, the spirit does not at once subordinate the fleshly nature to its will and exercise unwavering dominion over it. The habit of following the sensational instincts may be formed in the child before the awakening of its spiritual nature, but certainly not the habit of subordinating the moral instincts to the sensational; because the sensational nature only now begins to be a power acting over against the spirit. The awakening of moral consciousness, moreover, does not take place imperceptibly and gradually from day to day, it is a sudden transition, an enlightening almost like a lightning flash in the twilight of unconsciousness. "The light of consciousness," to adopt an expression of Baader upon this point, "is begotten of the lightning." The presentiment thus arises in the child's spirit that moral duty, which hitherto had been regarded by him only as the will of parents, guardians, and teachers, possesses an unconditional authority as God's will, and this is the first definite self-manifestation of conscience.

This might suffice as an answer to the anthropological foundation of the sensuous theory which we have described. But let us for a moment suppose—we could admit it only by the sacrifice of freedom, by resolving it into a mere potential energy of nature—that there is a quantitative relation between spirit and nature as the factors of human development. In this case, both must be regarded as powers whose reciprocal relation is marked by increase or diminution, and at the outset, when the development advances from the earliest stage of infancy, the spiritual factor is smallest, and the sensuous possesses predominating sway. In the course of time, both would grow in equal ratio, and thus virtue would be wholly impossible to man. If he attained it, either the second factor must have remained stationary with the same unvarying amount of strength, while the first increased, a supposition inconceivable in a living individual, or the gradual increase must have been more rapid in the case of the spiritual than in that of the sensuous nature. Thus, in the progress of development, a point must occur where both powers coincide in strength, and are of exactly the same weight, but from this turning-point the relation is reversed and the spiritual begins to preponderate. What would follow from this account of the phenomena? Why, certainly this, that in the ordinary development of human life, and with some isolated exceptions arising from special circumstances, the power of sin must be greatest in early childhood, when the spirit is only beginning to awake to activity, and when the moral consciousness begins to dawn. But they who would derive evil from the sensational nature would be slow to allow this, for it contradicts experience no less than the plain declarations of our Lord (Matt. xviii. 3, xix. 14) and of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. xiv. 20). On the other hand, were sin nothing more than the unsubdued animal in man,—the animal nature as the first stage of human consciousness resisting the liberation of the spiritual and its own subjugation to the spirit's sway,—the general law for the gradual conquest of sin would be that sin must vanish in proportion as spiritual culture advances. But is this again confirmed by experience? A theoretical judgment indeed, and a superficial observation of life itself, have led to the conclusion that immorality decreases in proportion as the growth of the spiritual nature increases, and the truest “children of this

generation" pride themselves in no small degree upon the discovery that culture and not Christianity is the means of true freedom, and the panacea for all the disorders of the world. But a single unbiassed and penetrating glance at life will suffice to dissipate these illusions. We oftentimes find the deepest moral degradation and disorder in the very highest stages of culture, a frivolity of mind resolving all relations of life into rottenness, an utter insensibility to every impulse of holy love, and a cold calculating self-conscious egotism which puts from it the call to sacrifice any one of its own interests as something quite ridiculous,—the men with whom it comes in contact being regarded merely as cyphers, by whose help its own aggrandizement may be attained. Mental culture does not eradicate a single tendency of moral depravity, it only veils and refines them all; and so far from redeeming the man, if it be not sanctified by a higher principle, it really confirms within him the dominion of sin.

This theory, therefore, even if we could adopt its anthropological basis, instead of explaining the most obvious facts of experience, is in irreconcilable contradiction thereto.*

In testing this theory thus far, we have refrained from

* Rothe defends himself against this criticism upon a theory which virtually coincides with his view of the nature of sin, by saying that the conception of "spirit" as here described in its workings, is to him very indistinct and confused. It is not easy to argue against a condemnation so generally expressed, at least by resorting to definition; yet, I must confess to my honoured friend, that as far as my powers of conception go, it is just that conception he has of "spirit" leading him to condemn me, which usually seems very difficult and obscure to readers of his work. Will they not call to mind, for instance, the manner in which he describes "spirit" as "the product of the working of personality upon material or physical nature" (*Ethik*, vol. i. p. 98, 99), "because personality itself can be conceived of only upon the basis of spiritual existence." I must leave it to them to make out what this means, with the help of the *Theological Ethics* and its terminology, for I find Rothe's notion of *matter* still more difficult to understand. Rothe's rejection of the above representation of "spirit" as in a state of potentiality, is quite in keeping with his belief that it is only a product not of the divine causation alone, but of the active powers of the creature. But it is quite irreconcilable with his doctrine, that spirit itself, or at least the two factors which compose it, the ideal and the real, are educed or "allured" out of pure matter by the creative activity of God (vol. i. p. 214); for how could this be if they were not there *in potentiâ* already? "Matter," according to this, must be the twofold factor of "spirit" *in statu potentiae*, whereas, according to our view, neither matter nor nature generally can be called "spirit *in statu potentiae*."

noticing the facts which it presupposes, namely, that in § 3. THIS experience the manifold forms of sin indicate THEORY an unbridled power of the sensuous nature as TESTED BY the source from which they spring, so that sin THE PHENO- always has for its essential object the satisfaction of MENA OF SIN. sense, as the preponderating inclination and bias of man. Let us now inquire, Does this really hold good? Can we deny the fact that a very marked exertion of will in controlling the sensuous nature is to be often found combined with that selfish instinct which in itself no one would hesitate wholly to condemn? What have the affections of ambition and love of power in common with the sensational nature? Nay, more, have not men's desires after so purely spiritual a possession as posthumous fame often exercised a positive and strong control over their sensuous instincts? and how in this case can we regard this as the source of those desires after dominion and greatness which have actuated men of power—men who have appeared like disturbing meteors in the hemisphere of history? Traits of character which in themselves claim the highest admiration—acute understanding, clear discernment, inflexible fixity of purpose, singular energy of spirit—may be found in conjunction with, and made subservient to, a prevailing effort to realize by any means the authority and predominance of self, and to exalt the individual will, even in its minutest and most capricious whims, and in its mere arbitrariness without any determinate plan, into a law for others in the widest possible range. Can this be called the preponderance of the sensuous nature over the spirit? Or, seeing that it is not, must we withhold our moral abhorrence of this Doctrine that force is good- disposition, as those of our contemporaries do who ness. have brought themselves to estimate greatness by mere power, and to regard morality as only the idea of power in disguise,* and who from this standing-point look down with

* We cannot, indeed, include Goethe among those whom we have here specially in view; genius, in her happy hours, revealed to him more of the real nature of sin than to any other modern poet of Germany. But there is certainly a tendency in his view of the world to regard power and activity as the essence of morality, as indeed an acute interpreter of the poet, Schubarth, showed in his great work on Goethe many years ago. Power is not, indeed, made the exclusive test of good and evil, but somehow good is always made to appear

haughty self-importance, or the complacency of superiority, upon what they are pleased to call the "vulgar" moral judgment concerning such phenomena, as very narrow and ignorant? Now the Christian view of humanity must submit to this reproach, because it recognises no greatness where man refuses to submit to the holy will and law of God; and on its principles the elevation of evil to the presumptuous boldness even of a Lucifer is not its removal, but its augmentation and enhancement.

It is the great defect of this theory, when viewed in relation to the facts of experience, that it takes notice of but one range of phenomena in human life—that, namely, wherein sin appears obviously to arise from the preponderance of the sensuous over the spiritual nature, while it overlooks many forms of sin which spring from pride, an emotion wholly distinct from sense. It regards sin only as a degradation of man, and not as a false self-exaltation; as a *defectus* of the spirit, and not as an *excessus*. The theory continually abides by and refers to the coarsest and most palpable forms of sin; but these are not really the worst or most dangerous, but, on the contrary, those cases where selfish-

wherever there is power; and the prostration of power, the barrenness of life, alone is evil.

"Whoe'er with constant effort strives,
Him we may hope to save."

The meaning of these words is evident from the fact that Faust attains the heavenly goal without repentance or expiation, and merely by his unceasing efforts from below, and by the attraction of the eternally feminine from above;—a doctrine of course acceptable to those to whom the fundamental truths of the gospel have become so entirely incomprehensible that they can see nothing in its requirements save the arbitrary setting up of certain conditions of pardon. This conception of moral good is one of the results of the great poet's study of Spinoza. With Spinoza, as we have already remarked, moral good is only power or reality, and accordingly his well-known principle (though spiritually interpreted) was *suum utile quaerere*—a principle warmly espoused by Goethe in his correspondence with Zelter.

It is worthy of remark that the Fichtian morality, though the contrasted starting-point of its investigations seems to promise more, arrives in the end at no better a conclusion regarding the source of evil than that it springs from "an inherent indolence or inertia of human nature."

There is, however, one indisputable truth underlying these views, viz., that conversion to goodness is never more difficult than in the case of those in whom the exclusively selfish tendency is coupled with a general inertness, and a state of careless indifference or lukewarmness.

ness penetrates human life like a subtle and transparent poison, all the more destructive because insidious. By the man who knows how severe a conflict the soul has with sin when "the messenger of Satan"—whether it be pride, ambition, or envy on account of the spiritual superiority of others—"is sent to buffet him," it will be regarded as nothing more than trifling to tell him that his real enemy is only his sensuous in contrast with his spiritual nature. In the primitive history of our race, as recorded in Genesis (as Daniel Von Cölln acutely remarks*), this twofold tendency in the development of sin shows itself, on the one hand, as the excess and perversion of sensuous impulses; and, on the other hand, as arrogance and ambition. The same contrast pervades the entire history of Israel. It reappears, though in a somewhat modified form, in the history of our Lord in the contrasted sins of the publicans and the Pharisees, "Verily I say unto you, That the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of God before you" (Matt. xxi. 31).

This ignoring of the sin which lurks in pride and springs therefrom is but one indication of a general tendency apparent in all such explanations of evil. § 4. CONSEQUENCES OF THIS THEORY. Man is obliged to allow the fact of sin in his life, though he would deny it if he could, but the propensity to self-justification springing from the depths of selfishness is not overcome, and it endeavours to regard sin as something separate from the real *ego* of the man and quite external to him. Christ, on the contrary, declares that sin first appears in the form of evil thoughts springing out of the heart, *i.e.*, out of the inmost centre of life, the seat of the desires and the will; and that thus "it defileth the man."† This theory, on the

* Died 1833. *Biblische Theologie*, vol. i. pp. 234, 235. This twofold development of sin in Genesis had already been pointed out by the Cabalistic writers.

† Matt. xv. 19, 20. The *διαλογισμοὶ πονηροί* are not contrasted with the *φόνου, μοιχεῖαι*, and so forth, as a distinct class of sins, but are represented as the first developments of all sin, all that follow being the outward realization of these sins of thought. It seems difficult in this passage to explain how evil proceeding out of the heart is said to defile a man, seeing that it springs from a heart which seems already to be defiled. But the realization of what springs from an impure bias of heart makes the actual consciousness and the conduct impure in deed and in word (*ψευδομαρτυρίαι, βλασφημίαι*). That the body which ought to be the temple of the Holy Ghost is thus also defiled is in the New Testa-

contrary, maintains that sin springs from the sensational nature, *i.e.*, from a sphere of life external to the real *ego* of man ; so that it cannot very seriously defile the entire man, but is rather to be treated as an earthly contamination contracted from without, by which the radiation of the inner life, in its true brightness, is hindered, and its manifestation only disturbed. The heart is thus preserved from every dishonouring impeachment ; the will in itself is ever directed towards the good ; for if it were evil or perverted, it, and not the mutiny of the flesh against the spirit, would be the source of sin. The supposed good turns out to be a mistake and a failure only when it has been realized, and thus evil ensues. Sin, therefore, is not in truth our act but our misfortune, an infirmity of our nature to be mourned over and pitied, and arising from the sad fact that the flesh and the spirit have been united in one, and that the flesh is so strong and the spirit so weak ; we are not in ourselves evil, we only suffer it. The words that Sophocles puts in the mouth of Œdipus, viz., that his works were rather suffered than done (*Œd. in. Colono*, 266, 267), would thus hold true of all the evil works of man.

Moreover, as every act of self-vindication and exculpation implies an unjust accusation, this explanation of the origin of sin involves a gross calumny against the sensational nature of man, because that is laid to its charge of which the accuser itself, the spirit, is guilty, whose will the sensational nature has to obey. *Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.* Against these unjust accusations we must consider Hamann's statement (already referred to, p. 161) as to the influence of man's physical nature in the entrance and beginning of sin. The flesh is in itself wholly guiltless ; its instincts and impulses are never, even in the most degraded circumstances, directed towards evil for its own sake ; the guilt lies in the chooser who misapplies it as the instrument of his own perverted unnatural and godless thoughts. Each man's conscience testifies to this by accusing him of wilful sin. But it is easy to see that a theory in explanation of sin which ignores the relation of the

ment made a secondary yet by no means an unimportant fact ; see the Pauline expression *καθαρίσωμεν ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος* —the train of thought being progressive from the less to the greater, 2 Cor. vii. 1.

sinner to God will also mistake and pervert his relation to nature in the sphere of his own life. He who does not seek the principle of sin in man's rebellion against God, begins by presupposing man as godless in order to discover that principle, and is in a fair way to rob him of his very nature. He slurs over the true source of sin, and, to make out a principle from which sin may be derived, he can hardly avoid converting the innocent and divinely ordered distinction in human nature between the sensuous and spiritual into a primary and irreconcilable discord.

And here we see the practical consequences of this view in another direction. While, on the one hand, a trivial view of sin, which makes light of it, and resolves it into the supremacy of the flesh over the spirit, regards it only as an insuperable hindrance in our mortal life ; on the other hand, a practical spiritualism turns away in melancholy and gloom from the sensuous sphere of human life, which it regards with an almost Manichæan dread. If evil be the antagonism between the sensuous and spiritual nature, how can we find fault with the monastic asceticism which weakens the fleshly nature by subduing its instincts and its needs ? This is nothing more than the logical consequence of this view of sin urging the necessity of asceticism, if the spirit would preserve any remnant of its primeval nobleness, and would earnestly strive after holiness. If our sensational nature be really antagonistic to our spiritual life, and seeks to destroy it, it is only natural that our spiritual nature should endeavour to free itself from its fetters. We may find fault with the methods which asceticism adopts for the attainment of its end, but the end itself we must allow to be good.

In order to avoid these serious inferences, will it suffice to say that it is not our sensuous nature itself, with its instincts and inclinations, that is to be regarded as evil, but only its excessive influence in relation to the spirit ? We answer, no ; for whatever the sensational nature necessarily and of course develops when it has reached a certain standard, must have already existed in it as a germ in its very beginnings ; its tendency must ever have been to oppose the spirit, and if sin ensues from this opposition, it is clear that the entire effort after holiness must apply itself from the first to the subduing and weakening of the flesh. The necessity for this is all the

more pressing if we hold that the sensuous nature already possesses dominion over the life, so that when the spirit begins to assert itself, it is already at a disadvantage, and its development begins with a preponderance of the lower over the higher sphere. The most energetic and persevering activity for the conquest of sin will, upon this theory, be carried on in both spheres at the same time — viz., the strengthening of the spirit and the weakening of the flesh ; for if we regard each contrasted sphere in itself, it amounts to the same thing, whether the spirit be strengthened or the flesh be weakened.

But what is worse than all in the practical and serious carrying out of this theory, we find that while in the effort after holiness the enemy is sought and conquered in the outworks, the serpent is all the more securely cherished and fostered in the bosom. Fleshly lust and love of the world are resisted and subdued, but the more dangerous and insidious feelings of self-conceit, of pride, of an exclusive narrow-minded disposition, are quietly preserved in all their power. The very victories over sin obtained under such circumstances prove a snare to the mind ; they only strengthen the enemy within, by feeding spiritual pride and self-righteousness.

It must be allowed, and is, indeed, very easily perceived from our investigations thus far, that Pelagian views form the principal groundwork of the argument in favour, not indeed of the derivation of sin from sense—for a very little logic would suffice to show how the principle of freedom of choice, so highly esteemed by Pelagianism, excludes all this—but of that one-sided view of sin which makes it merely the preponderance of the fleshly nature over the spirit. Taking this fact in connection with what we have now seen to be the practical consequences of this view of sin, we cannot refrain from observing, by the way, that the difference between the sanguine and melancholic temperament by no means serves to explain the contrast between the Pelagian and Manichæan extremes of opinion ; and it is also an obviously mistaken attempt when we would trace all one-sided tendencies and extreme views—which really proceed from the deepest movements of the spirit, seeking the knowledge of eternal truth,

Point of
coincidence
between
Pelagianism
and Mani-
chæism.

yet unable to surrender itself to its power—to the same physiological differences. Pelagianism has certainly its deeper root and more congenial soil in the more joyous feelings of human nature; but while as in our day its tendency is to laxity in the judgment and treatment of morals, it can with equal facility assume the form of melancholy abstinence from everything pleasant and charming in physical life, and gloomy zeal to establish its own righteousness, together with a self-renouncing devotion to this end. Monasticism especially shows this, for from its cells Pelagianism first sprang, and there it formed its strongest advocates and champions in opposition to the Augustinian doctrine.* Our view, moreover, is confirmed on the other hand by the fact that Monasticism, so far as it claims to be the most perfect form of human life, strongly tends to Manichæan views. The main bond of union between these tendencies of thought in life is the disposition common to both to find the original source of sinful effort in the outer, and not in the inner sphere of human life, in the fleshly nature and the lusts thereof.†

We have already recognized the fact that a very important place must be assigned to the predominance of the sensuous nature over the spirit in the phenomena of sin. But the view which we have here combated unwarrantably errs in not keeping to the recognition of this fact so obvious and striking, but in endeavouring to explain the nature and the essence of sin by means of it, instead of seeking an underlying principle. Hence it is that any theory of evil which goes no further than the contrast between reason and sense, spirit and nature, in explaining it, can never rid itself of a certain superficiality in its treatment of the subject. We have already seen (in the first book) that the disturbance of the true harmony between the two parts of our nature—which, in innumerable cases, is not only a want of harmony, but a ready slavery on the part of the spirit to fleshly desires, an exchange of true unity for a false and perverted one—has for its principle and source a derangement of

* See Wigger's *pragmat. Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus*, part ii. p. 19.

† Compare Nietzsche's *System der christlichen Lehre*, § 106. Note ii. (p. 228, sixth ed.).

the highest relation in which we stand, our relation to God.* The fearful discord, the unbounded wretchedness which sin has diffused throughout human life can be explained only upon this principle, that sin in its inner essence is a fall from the worship of God to the idolatry of self. He who in the face of this boundless and unutterable misery can make the unsusceptibility of our fleshly nature to the determining power of the spirit the primary source of sin, can keep his ground only by shutting his eyes to it as much as possible.

The explanation of sin which we have been combating, shields itself under the highest authority; a century ago it was the view all but unanimously adopted by theologians; and it is still very generally held that the doctrine of the New Testament is that sin proceeds (as some express it) from the body,† or, as others more cautiously say, from man's sensuous nature, its instincts and inclinations. Christ Himself is said to have taught this, Matt. xxvi. 41; John iii. 6; and St. James, ch. i. 14, 15; but especially the Apostle Paul, who not only makes *σῶμα* or *μέλη* the seat of sin in many passages, but distinctly names the *σάρξ* (in his Epistles to the Romans, the Galatians, and the Colossians) as the source of sin, describes the man who has surrendered himself to sin as *σαρκικός*, and the necessary striving after Christian holiness as the warfare of the *πνεῦμα* against the *σάρξ*. But *σάρξ* is said to be simply the sensational or animal nature of man, including not only corporeity, but the physical principle of life, with its multiplicity of sensations, impulses, and passions, and *πνεῦμα*, in contrast to it, denotes the higher, the rational nature of man, and its powers, intellectual and practical.

First, as to the non-Pauline passages, we certainly are not justified in taking Christ's words, *τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον ἢ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής*, as a general declaration concerning the nature and source of sin. The

Christ's words, Matt. xxvi. 41.

* In the profound account of the Fall which Genesis iii. contains, sin is, in the first instance, represented as the consequence of a primary rebellion against God, and the preponderance of fleshly instincts is represented as the punishment which ensues; the serpent is to cleave to the earth more than all the beasts of the field, to go on its belly and eat dust all the days of its life.

† Ammon, for example, in his *Handbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre*, part i. § 12, charges the Apostle Paul with "a moral dualism, because he considers matter as the seat of evil, and spirit as the source of good"!

Saviour does not here say of all men in all conditions that the spirit ever wills what is good. He is speaking of His disciples, whose love to Him He knew; and when He warns them of the weakness of the fleshly nature, which He designates as *σάρξ*, His reference is to the emergency of the approaching moment when their fidelity would be threatened with dangers directly acting upon and terrifying the sensational nature. While in this passage *πνεῦμα* clearly refers to an element of human nature, it

John iii. 6. has a different meaning in those other words of

our Lord, *τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς, σάρξ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος, πνεῦμά ἐστι*. Here *πνεῦμα* is clearly, as verses 5 and 8 show, the *πνεῦμα ἁγίου*, and in the last-named verse, the new life derived from Him, the Divine life in man. The expression *γεγεννησθαι ἐκ τῆς σαρκός*, on the other hand, means the fleshly or physical birth of man, from which the sensational or natural life alone is derived, not that in virtue of which he becomes a citizen of God's kingdom (see Lücke's Commentary, vol. i. p. 524). Nicodemus thought that this sufficed of itself to make him a sharer in God's kingdom, and this is the notion which Christ here condemns. There is no reference to the source of sin, the active hindrance to this participation. James i. 14, 15 teaches us, indeed, the manner in which sinful acts usually arise in human life in its present fallen state, but it is quite arbitrary to take *ἐπιθυμία* as meaning desires after fleshly satisfaction merely.

In these and similar texts the semblance of a derivation of St. Paul's sin from sense vanishes upon closer examination; teaching. but the inquiry is more difficult and involved when we turn to the Apostle Paul's teaching upon the subject.* We must at once grant that St. Paul often speaks of the body and its members not only as instruments of sin but as the seat of its power, thus clearly denoting the inordinate strength of fleshly instincts and desires. See for example Romans vi. 12, 13, 19; vii. 5, 23, 24. Commentators are wont to attach the same meaning to Rom. vi. 6, and Col. ii. 11; but it will be shown by and by that these passages have quite another

* See Tholuck's renewed investigation of the meaning of *σάρξ* as the source of sin, *Studien und Kritiken*, 1855, 3d part, p. 477 ff. Ernesti, "The theory of the derivation of sin from sense, viewed in the light of the Pauline teaching," 1855.

import. Neander has explained * what it probably was that led the apostle to lay so much stress upon the manifestation of sin in the preponderance of fleshly lusts. But in recognizing the importance thus attached by St. Paul to man's sensuous nature, no real sanction is given to the theory which seeks support from it. Scripture critics and theologians in treating upon this subject have often confused the three distinct conceptions, "source of sin," "seat of sin," and "instrument of sin;" in the present investigation we must distinctly keep before us the first of these as that alone with which we have to do. The question is, whether, according to St. Paul, the presence of sin in human life arises from man's sensuous nature and its original insusceptibility of submitting to the determining power of his spirit; whether, according to this theory, he thus makes sin, as to its nature and essence, to consist in the preponderance of the fleshly over the spiritual nature. The apostle certainly must be understood as teaching this if *σάρξ* as used by him in contrast with *πνεῦμα*, really means (as many modern theologians understand it) † the sensuous nature of man, with the wants and instincts, the pleasures and pains essentially pertaining to it. Such passages as Romans viii. 7, 8, Gal. v. 16, 17, Eph. ii. 3, together with the apostle's oft-repeated description of a life beset by sin as *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν*, . . . *ζῆν*, . . . *εἶναι*, leave little room for doubting that he understood *σάρξ* to be not only the seat of sin, and the instrument of sin, but at least one source or principle of sin.

If, however, we examine other and corresponding points of Paul's general teaching, we shall find it very improbable that *σάρξ* with him, in contrast with *πνεῦμα*, meant only the sensuous or (if the word be preferred) the

* *Geschichte der Pflanzung der Christl. K.*, vol. ii. p. 665 (4th ed.).

† E.g., Usteri, *Entwicklung des Paulin. Lehrbegriffes*, p. 43; Schulz, *die christl. Lehre vom h. Ab.* p. 96 f. (1st ed.); De Wette, *christl. Sittenlehre*, § 10; Bretschneider, *Grundlagen des evangelischen Pietismus*, § 12; Von Cölln, *bibl. Theologie*, vol. ii. p. 237, 248. Tholuck, in the earlier editions of his Commentary on the Romans, opposed this interpretation of *σάρξ*. Baur in his *Paulus* speaks very hesitatingly upon the subject. On the one hand, he says expressly, p. 528, "the flesh means the man not merely as to one part of his nature, but according to his natural condition viewed as a whole, his nature according to the flesh." And yet in p. 551, *σάρξ* is said to mean "the corporeal part of man." According to Baur, indeed, *σάρξ* is at the same time the principle, the seat, and the instrument of sin, so that any determinate conception of its meaning is out of the question.

animal nature of man. If, according to Paul, the human body—because possibly it is *χοϊκός*—is necessarily at variance with the spirit, and if sin arises necessarily from this variance though in the form of arbitrariness and freedom, how can he exhort Christians to yield their bodies and their members as instruments to God's service? How can he call their bodies, this present earthly and material frame, a temple of the Holy Ghost? (See Rom. vi. 13, 19; xii. 1; 1 Cor. vi. 13, 15, 19, 20.) 1 Cor. vi. 13 must specially be noticed, where the high and holy importance of the human body is insisted on in opposition to the views of modern spiritualism; for the apostle not only says *τὸ σῶμα τῷ κυρίῳ*, but also conversely, *ὁ κύριος τῷ σώματι*. The derivation of sin from sense, strictly understood, must mean that sense determines, and that the spirit and the will submit; and this can be made the doctrine of the apostle only by supposing him to teach that sense possesses the power of itself to choose between the service of God and that of sin, *i.e.*, that will and spirit may be predicated of it.

It is moreover in the writings of the Apostle Paul especially, that we find the doctrine of the future resurrection of the body most prominently insisted upon, and this is clearly at variance with the doctrine that sin springs from our corporeal nature as its source,—even taking into account the distinction between *σῶμα ψυχικόν* and *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, 1 Cor. xv. 44—for no one can deny that there is a marked contradiction between these two doctrines, at least in their tendency. When once the view that sin is owing to sense is fully adopted, and the dualistic notion of the relation between soul and body established, all interest in the question as to the preservation and final glorification of our corporeal nature is taken away, and nothing is left but the general notion of a merely spiritual existence after death. This incompatibility between the two doctrines becomes a direct contradiction, if we follow the most obvious and logical inferences from the apostle's general teaching. Paul has clearly excluded sin from the divine ordainment and causation by describing it as enmity against God; if, therefore, man's fleshly nature were regarded by him as the positive ground of sin, he could not make God the author of this nature, but

must have regarded it as the work of a principle opposed to God. And in this case, so far from man's redemption from sin's power being consummated in the resurrection of his body, the perfection of that redemption would be realized only in its annihilation.

We shall find also that the derivation of sin from sense is utterly irreconcilable with the central principle of the apostle's doctrine as to the perfect holiness of the Redeemer. If sense in man be not merely a stimulus acting upon the will and urging it to oppose God's will, but the original source of sin, some degree of moral impurity must of necessity spring from the sensuous nature in any given circumstances of human development; and thus we are involved in the fatal dilemma either of sacrificing the spotless holiness of Christ's life, the *ἀμαρτίαν μὴ γινῶναι* (1 Cor. v. 21), as some modern espousers of this view have ventured to do, or of surrendering (according to the Docetic view) the reality of Christ's human nature, the *ἄνθρωπον εἶναι* of 1 Tim. ii. 4, Rom. v. 15, 1 Cor. xv. 21; the *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικὸς, ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα* of Gal. iv. 4, Rom. i. 3, and his participation in the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* of our present life. Either alternative contradicts alike the plain declarations and the entire drift of the Pauline doctrine, and even the most essential interests of the Christian faith. A way out of the difficulty seems, indeed, to present itself in the notion which Töllner's acuteness has discovered and insisted upon in order to preserve on this principle the sinlessness of Jesus. It is the notion that supernatural power was given to Him so that He was in every critical moment preserved from sin by a continual miracle.* But on this principle we lose the true conception of the

* *Theolog. Untersuchungen*, vol. i. part 2, p. 126. Töllner virtually maintains that sin necessarily arises from the natural limits which pertain to man as man, and he endeavours to reconcile the sinlessness of Jesus with this doctrine by means of the above expedient. This doctrine of evil, as well as the one combated in the preceding chapter, which derives sin from the metaphysical imperfection of men, are not only contradictory to Christian doctrine, but preclude even the possibility of the doctrine of the Incarnation. The opinion of Bayle, which coincides with Töllner's notion, is adopted (hypothetically, of course, and on the supposition that the Christian doctrine is true) by Strauss in his *Christl. Glaubenslehre*, § 78 (vol. ii. p. 371), when he holds that God, if He did not will evil, might prevent its realization by withdrawing the *concursum* whenever man was about to sin.

Redeemer's inward purity ; sin is ever on the point of manifesting itself in Him, and is suppressed and prevented from realizing itself in act by an external force. This intervention of an external force coincides with the Catholic doctrine of man's primary condition, developed by Bellarmine, according to which there always existed an antagonism between the fleshly nature and the spirit, a *naturalis propensionum pugna*,—Bellarmine does not hesitate to call it *languor, morbus naturae humanae*, and to trace it back *ex conditione materiae*,—which was kept in check only by the *donum supernaturale justitiae originalis velut aureo freno*.* The objection against such a view is not obviated by the doctrine of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, upon which the sinlessness of the Saviour was based in the theology of the ancient Church,† His divine nature being supposed to act in place of supernatural grace as a check upon His sensational nature. For the purity of Christ's humanity would not by this means be preserved, and in addition to this, the personal union of the divine and human natures in Christ would be supplanted by a merely outward or Nestorian view of the relation. The contradiction therefore remains unsolved, and we naturally shrink from attributing it to the apostle, and not to our mistaken views of his doctrine.

The fact, moreover, that the apostle predicates evil, and that in its worst form, of created beings who possess no earthly nature, no *σῶμα ψυχικόν*—to evil spirits, suggests a doubt as to the correctness of the view above given of what he means by *σάρξ*. He denies the presence of evil in Christ, who was partaker of our fleshly nature (Gal. iv. 4 ; Heb. ii. 14) ; and he recognizes it in

Evil attributed by St. Paul to spirits.

* *De gratia primi hominis*, cap. iv., v.

† This was certainly a mistaken view, for by such a theory of Christ's holiness we lose His liability to temptation, which is insisted upon by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as strongly as is His sinless purity and His progressive moral development, which is especially confirmed to us in Luke ii. 52 ; and indeed, the conceivableness of Christ's life on earth generally. This mistaken view of Christ's holiness arose from the fact that the old theology did not recognize the full import of the *ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*, Phil. ii. 7, and was never free from a certain vacillation between the Docetic theory on the one hand, and the Nestorian doctrine on the other. As to the holiness of Jesus as a sharer in our sensational nature, and as liable to temptation, see Ullmann's learned treatise, *über die Sündlosigkeit Jesu*, especially pp. 113–131, 152 f. (seventh ed.).

spirits who are not partakers thereof ; is it not therefore in the highest degree probable that, according to him, evil does not necessarily pertain to man's sensuous nature, and that *σάρξ* denotes something different from this ?

Now if we contemplate more closely the Pauline use of the word, its import in one of the main passages where it occurs (Gal. v. 13-24), cannot certainly be "the sensational nature." At the very outset it must strike us as strange how the apostle supposing him to mean this, could have added the exhortation "By *love* serve one another," to his admonition "Use not liberty for an occasion to the *σάρξ*" (v. 13). The connection shows that by the *ἐπιθυμία σαρκός*, spoken of in the following verses, he has in his mind the passions of hatred, envy, and the like (*ἀλλήλους δάκνειν καὶ κατεσθίειν*, v. 15). In ver. 20, accordingly, he enumerates the following as *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός*,—*ἔχθραι, ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθείαι, διχοστασίαι, αἰρέσεις, φθόνοι, φόνοι*. What have these sins to do with the sensational or bodily nature ? Even if it be possible to show how every sin, when manifest outwardly, is more or less connected with the sensational nature, how can we make this the active agent producing these sins, these *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός* ? In keeping with this passage, the apostle, writing to the Corinthians, calls them *σαρκικοί*, because there was among them envying, strife, and divisions, because they attached themselves to certain human teachers, instead of to Christ, 1 Cor. iii. 1-4. By the *ἐπιτελεῖσθαι σαρκί*, in Gal. iii. 3, the apostle does not mean a preponderance of carnal inclinations and passions, but a trusting to the works of the law. This is manifest from the somewhat parallel passage in the Romans (iv. 1), where the order of the words, according to the received text, must be retained, and *κατὰ σάρκα* must be joined to *εὐρηκέναι* (see Fritzsche, *Pauli ad Romanos Epistola*, tom. i. p. 213, 214). Here, also, *κατὰ σάρκα εὐρηκέναι*, refers to that which Abraham had attained by his righteousness of works, namely, *καύχημα ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν θεόν* ; but what has this to do with the sensational nature ? The *κατὰ σάρκα σοφοί*, in 1 Cor. i. 26, moreover are, according to St. Paul, clearly not the adherents of a materialistic or sensual system of philosophy, but, as the connection of the entire chapter shows, all who sought their happiness in the various systems of Hellenistic philosophy, instead of trusting

to the grace of God in Christ, 2 Cor. i. 12. But the restriction of *σάρξ* to the sensational nature is clearly forbidden by Col. ii. 18, 19. The apostle is there condemning a sect which combined strict asceticism with theosophic speculation, and this he stigmatizes as *ἀφειδία σώματος* (ver. 23). These spiritualists, proud of their superior knowledge and their abnegation of the sensuous nature, Paul describes as “vainly puffed up in their *fleshly mind*,” and declares that their distinctive aim was nothing else than “the satisfying of the flesh.”

Seeing that we are thus driven to the conclusion that the sensuous nature is not what St Paul denotes by the term *σάρξ*, let us inquire what is the true and full conception he expresses by that word?

If we would trace its meaning and development from the outset, we must begin with the word *בָּשָׂר*, which is used in the Old Testament with a far wider reference than its primary meaning warrants. In many passages the notion of the sensuous is retained, and the word means simply the material substance of the bodies of man or of animals, sometimes distinguished from the skin and bones, sometimes without this distinction, and sometimes again in a tropical or figurative sense, as in Job xix. 22; Psalm xxvii. 2, lxxxiv. 3; Jer. xix. 9. Akin to this is the use of *בָּשָׂר* to denote the human body generally as distinct from *לֵב*, *רוּחַ*, *נֶפֶשׁ*: thus it occurs in Psalm xvi. 9, lxxxiv. 3; Job xii. 10, xiv. 22. A more extended application of the word grows out of this its primary meaning; the distinction of *בָּשָׂר* from *נֶפֶשׁ* is lost sight of, and all terrestrial beings who possess sensational life are called *בָּשָׂר*; e.g., Gen. vi. 16, 19, vii. 15, 21, viii. 17; Num. xvi. 22, xxvii. 11; Job xxxiv. 15; Psalm cxxxvi. 25; Dan. iv. 9. Human nature, and the personal life attached to it, are very frequently denoted by *בָּשָׂר* in the Old Testament, Gen. vi. 12; Deut. v. 26; Psalm lvi. 5, lxxviii. 39, cxliv. 21; Isaiah xl. 5, 6, xlix. 26, lxvi. 16, 23, 24; Jer. xii. 12, xvii. 5, xxv. 31, xlv. 5; Ezek. xx. 48, xxi. 4, 5; Joel iii. 1; Zech. ii. 13. In this use of the word the predominant idea is that of the weakness, the frailty, and the transitoriness of all earthly existence. This is very prominently set forth in several passages, e.g., Job xxxiv.

15 ; Psalm lxxviii. 39 ; Isaiah xl. 6 ; and man's frailty is strikingly contrasted with the eternity, the omnipotence of God, and with God's Spirit as the source of all power, Deut. v. 26 ; Isaiah xxxi. 3 ; Jer. xvii. 5 ; Psalm lvi. 5. But not a single passage in the Old Testament can be adduced wherein **בִּשְׂרֵךְ** is used to denote man's sensuous nature as the seat of an opposition against his spirit and of a bias towards sin. Gesenius in his *Thesaurus*, and many others who follow him, find this meaning in Eccles. v. 6 ; see also ii. 3. But taking the words as Gesenius takes them, and according to their obvious import, **אֶל־תִּתֶּן אֶת־בִּשְׂרֶךָ לְחַטִּיָּא** can only be rendered, "Suffer not thy mouth to bring thy flesh into sin," *i.e.*, by vows of offerings beyond thy ability, and which thus would prevent thy attending to the wants of thy body. The passage thus contains no reference to the corporeal nature as inclined to sin. Still less do we find any such reference in Eccles. ii. 3, where the resolve is expressed "to nourish the body with wine while the heart behaved itself wisely."* At first sight we might suppose this to be the meaning of that difficult expression in Gen. vi. 3. Yet, in this case, whether we take the following words to denote the time of grace or respite given to the race before its destruction on account of sin, or as the limit put to human life for succeeding generations (which however does not agree with ix. 10-23), **הוּא בִּשְׂרֵךְ** cannot be explained as meaning more than the transitoriness and mortality of man's corporeal nature. This use of the word **σάρξ** is also foreign to the Apocrypha ;† it occurs often in the book of Ecclesiasticus with the signification "human nature," or the individuals who partake of that nature.

With this conception of **בִּשְׂרֵךְ** as used in the Old Testament, associated as it is with the views of Mosaism and of revealed religion generally, the adoption of the term in the New Testament, and particularly in St. Paul's

σάρξ in the
N. T.

* Gesenius himself thus explains this passage under the words **נָהַן** and **מִשְׂרָה** so that his reference to it under **בִּשְׂרֵךְ** must be an oversight.

† The **σῶμα σαρκός** of Sirach xxiii. 16, cannot be adduced as contradicting this, for there **σάρξ** must be taken to mean the substance or material of the body. Sirach xxviii. 5 might rather be referred to as an instance of the meaning sought. But here also there is no sufficient reason for departing from the usual idea of weakness, infirmity, and mortality.

writings, is closely connected. Sometimes *σάρξ* is unquestionably used by him in its narrower and physiological sense, for the earthly material substance composing the *σῶμα* of man and animals generally, viewed as an organism; if the conception of an organism be left out, the word used is *κρέας*, Rom. xiv. 21; 1 Cor. viii. 13.* Paul uses *σάρξ* thus in 1 Cor. xv. 39; Eph. v. 29. Taking this as the germ of the conception, Paul often denotes the outward sensational part of human existence by *σάρξ* in contrast with the inner and spiritual part, a relation which he more definitely expresses by the words *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα*, 1 Cor. vi. 16, 17, vii. 34; Rom. viii. 10 (compare 2 Cor. iv. 10); once also he expresses it by *ὁ ἔξω* and *ὁ ἔσωθεν ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος*, 2 Cor. iv. 16. *Σάρξ* has this meaning in Rom. ii. 28; 1 Cor. v. 5, vii. 28, x. 18; 2 Cor. iv. 11 (compare v. 10), vii. 5, xii. 7. To these texts may be added the *μολυσμὸς σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος*, 2 Cor. vii. 1; the meaning of which is perfectly clear if we compare it with 1 Cor. vii. 34 (*ἀγία καὶ σώματι καὶ πνεύματι*); and Rom. ii. 28, 29. The conception expressed by the word is in just the same stage of development when *σάρξ* is used by Paul to denote the corporeal presence visible to the senses as contrasted with spiritual fellowship *ἐν πνεύματι*, 2 Cor. v. 16; Col. ii. 1, 5. This contrast again is likewise expressed by *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα*, 1 Cor. v. 3, 4; 2 Cor. x. 10. From this there is a natural progress in the development of the conception, and *σάρξ* comes to mean the earthly being or life of man generally and in the circumstances and relations peculiar thereto. Thus *ζῆν, περιπατεῖν, ἐπιμένειν ἐν σαρκί*, Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. x. 3; Phil. i. 22, 24; and in particular Col. i. 22—*ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*, “in the body of his earthly life”—24 (in confirmation and explanation of which, see Heb. v. 7. x. 20); and *κατὰ σάρκα* in reference to Christ, Rom. i. 3, ix. 5; Acts ii. 30 (?). To this class of texts Eph. ii. 15 belongs, where *τὴν ἔχθραν* is governed by *λύσας*, and must be taken in connection with *ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ* immediately follow-

* This indeed may be taken as the true distinction between *σάρξ* and *κρέας* as used in the New Testament, and not, as is commonly supposed, *living* and *dead* flesh; see Acts ii. 26, 31; Rev. xix. 21. In the classical use of the words there is no fixed distinction, for we find *σαρκοφάγος* not only as meaning a coffin (which might be in keeping with the distinctive meaning of *σάρξ*), but *σαρκοφάγος* and *σαρκοφαγία* in a literal sense, as well as *σαρκοβόρος* and *σαρκοβορέω, σαρκολαβίς, σαρκίδιον*.

ing. This ἔχθρα means the enmity between Israel and the heathen, which still continued while Christ's earthly and human life lasted, and which could be removed only by His expiatory death, together with the gift of the Spirit following thereupon and introducing a new relation between God and the whole family of man, a relation which supplanted all former distinctions—ἀποκτείνας τὴν ἔχθραν ἐν αὐτῷ (i.e., τῷ σταυρῷ, unless indeed we are to read ἐν αὐτῷ). Σάρξ has the same meaning in 2 Cor. xi. 18 ; Gal. vi. 12, 13 ; Phil. iii. 3, 4 ; Eph. vi. 5 ; Col. iii. 22 ; Philem. 14 ; in all these places the earthly life of man and its relations—all qualities, circumstances, and actions which concern man's relation to the world—are represented in strict contrast with his relation to God in Christ.† It was a natural transition, therefore, to use σάρξ as רֶשֶׁת is used in the Old Testament, to designate human nature itself in its present earthly stage of development, and the individuals belonging to it collectively. Thus the word occurs, 1 Tim. iii. 16 (compare John i. 14 ; 1 John iv. 2, 3) ; and Rom. vi. 19 ; Gal. iv. 13 ; further in Rom. iii. 20 ; 1 Cor. i. 29 ; Gal. ii. 16 (compare John xvii. 2 ; Matt. xxiv. 22 ; Luke iii. 6).

In all these passages the word σάρξ, whether it refers to the outward sphere of human existence as distinct from the inward, or human life generally as distinct from the divine life in God, has as yet no directly ethical import. It includes this only when it passes beyond the bounds of the Old Testament use of רֶשֶׁת, and when that necessary and sinless distinction becomes a separation and an actual opposition. Σάρξ is now no longer a special, yet perfectly legitimate, department of human life ; it

* This difficult text, so profound in its meaning, is in its several parts analogous to the following explanatory passages—Matt. x. 5, xv. 24 ; Gal. vi. 15 ; Col. iii. 11 ; 2 Cor. v. 16, 17 ; Col. i. 22, ii. 14 ; Heb. x. 20 ; John xvi. 7. The exposition of it given above seems to be more correct than that of Harless in his Commentary on this Epistle, p. 216-234, which he vindicates with great acuteness. Considering the connection of the passage, it is rather forced to refer the μεσότητον τοῦ φραγμοῦ and the ἔχθρα to anything else than the enmity between Israel and the heathen, or to place the transition of thought from the reconciliation of the one with the other to the reconciliation of both with God in any other part of the sentence than after καταργήσας, where it naturally occurs.

† It is very remarkable that in 2 Cor. xi. 23, f., Paul applies the expression κατὰ σάρκα καυχᾶσθαι (v. 18) to the service of Christ, with all its persecutions and sorrows—though only so far as he speaks ironically, or “as a fool.”

denotes a *tendency*, that tendency which turns towards the things of the world in desire and in lust, and is thereby turned away from God. *Σαρκικός, ἐν σαρκὶ ὧν, κατὰ σάρκα ὧν, ζῶν, περιπατῶν, στρατευόμενος* (Rom. vii. 14, viii. 4, 5, 8, 13 ; 1 Cor. iii. 3 ; 2 Cor. x. 2, 3), describes man as governed by this bias or tendency. Here we find a surrender to the good things of the *κόσμος*, which has its foundation essentially in the primary meaning of the word already proved ; the *ἐπιθυμία* (*ἐπιθυμιαί*) *τῆς σαρκός* as used by Paul, Gal. v. 16, 25, Eph. ii. 3, corresponds exactly with the *ἐπιθυμία τοῦ κόσμου* of St. John, 1 John ii. 17 (compare the *ἐπιθυμιαί κοσμικαί*, Titus ii. 12), while with the latter (St. John) the *ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός* is only a particular form of the *ἐπιθυμία τοῦ κόσμου* (v. 16). With St. Paul himself the “minding of earthly things” (Phil. iii. 19) is only a more objective expression of the thought which lies in the words “to be carnally-minded” of Rom. viii. 6. The principle of selfishness forms the background of the Pauline conception of *σάρξ*. It finds its place accordingly in that development of sin wherein selfishness is hidden and represented by the love of the world (see p. 157).

Now, when the Apostle contrasts *πνεῦμα* with *σάρξ* as the principle of all that is good and holy in human life (Gal. v. and Rom. viii.), he must not be understood as meaning the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* as distinct either from *σῶμα*, or from *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*. How could this be reconciled with the Pauline doctrine that *πνεῦμα* in this anthropological sense is itself exposed to pollution (2 Cor. vii. 1), and needs sanctification and cleansing just as *ψυχή* and *σῶμα* (1 Thess. v. 23 ; 1 Cor. vii. 34) ? that this spiritual sphere of life is the one which in the work of regeneration most needs to be renewed (Eph. iv. 23, compared with Rom. xii. 2) ? The notion that man’s spirit cannot be depraved, that it is only limited in its activity from without, and that sin is the consequence of this limitation, cannot properly be attributed to the Apostle ; and if Romans vii. be referred to in proof of such a notion, it can be so only (we shall presently see) by an unwarrantable generalization of that passage. The *πνεῦμα*, as contrasted morally with *σάρξ*, does not moreover mean, as Usteri expresses it,* “the human spirit, ever strengthened by the indwelling Divine Spirit,” it means

* *Entwicklung des Paul. Lehrbegriffes*, p. 43, ed. 4.

the Divine Spirit Himself, so far as He works and rules in man, the principle identifying itself with his spiritual life, the πνεῦμα τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, Rom. viii. 2, the πνεῦμα θεοῦ, Χριστοῦ (v. 9), the πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐνοικοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν (v. 11). Accordingly, in Rom. vii. 6, the Apostle contrasts καινότης πνεύματος with the παλαιότης γράμματος, and yet he calls this παλαιότης γράμματος “πνευματικόν” in an objective sense, v. 14. And who can doubt that the ἄγεσθαι τῷ πνεύματι of Gal. v. 18 is synonymous in the Apostle's mind with the ἄγεσθαι τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ θεοῦ of Rom. viii. 14. But it is beyond question that πνεῦμα in Gal. v. 16, 17, 22, must be taken in the same sense as in ver. 18. The fact that expositors have usually understood πνεῦμα here of the spirit of man rather than of God, may be accounted for, apart from doctrinal prejudices, by the fact that the spirit of man is the appropriate basis of susceptibility for the working of God's Spirit, Rom. viii. 10, 16.* In German, moreover, according to the precedent established by Luther, a different word is used for πνευματικόν when contrasted with the σαρκικόν; it is not expressed by the ordinary *Geistig*, but by the word *Geistlich*.†

The Apostle describes this contrast between πνεῦμα and σὰρξ and σῶμα σάρξ in its most general bearing in Gal. v. 13-25.‡ “The flesh” which “lusteth against the spirit” denotes man's habit of life and conduct in this present world. This, and not the sensational nature, is “the flesh” which is to be “crucified,” v. 24; and this will appear still more clearly to the unbiassed expositor when he compares

* We may easily see here the analogy between the ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός and σαρκικός, 1 Cor. ii. 14. When man's spirit withdraws from the influence of God's Spirit, by whom alone it can really become what it ought to be, it brings upon itself the punishment of its self-perversion in servitude to the lower powers of physical life, wherein man's relations to the worldly and temporal alone are realized. These powers become dominant, occupying his consciousness, and determining his will. He is therefore called ψυχικός, in distinction from πνευματικός, the man whose spirit has God's Spirit as the principle of its life. Compare the ψυχικοί, πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες, Jude 19; the σοφία ἐπίγειος, ψυχική, James iii. 15. The σῶμα ψυχικόν, as contrasted with the σῶμα πνευματικόν in 1 Cor. xv. 44-46, also explains and illustrates this distinction.

† *Geistig* means “mental,” “spiritual,” or “pertaining to the spirit,” in a human sense; *Geistlich* “spiritual” in a religious or divine sense. The former denotes the immaterial as contrasted with the material; the latter denotes the religious as distinct from the secular.—*Tr.*

‡ Neander, *Pflanzung*, etc., p. 737.

the expression with that much milder one concerning "the body," in 1 Cor. ix. 27, "to bring it into subjection," *δουλαγωγεῖν τὸ σῶμα*. This distinctive meaning of *σάρξ* may be recognized in 2 Cor. i. 17, and Eph. ii. 3 ("we all also walked once in the desires of our worldly and godless life"). The *φυσιούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νοὸς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ* (Col. ii. 18), is the man "vainly puffed up by the mind of his own flesh," by his own ungodly worldliness, the man who, in his apparent humility and self-abnegation, is seeking only the satisfaction of his vain worldly-mindedness. Hence, too, we may see how St. Paul explains his *σαρκικοί ἐστε* in 1 Cor. iii. 3, by the words immediately following, *καὶ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε*, i.e., "according to the mind of man alienated from God and given up to worldly impulses." The contrast between *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* has the same general bearing in Gal. vi. 8, iii. 3.

The antagonism between *πνεῦμα* and *σάρξ* has a more definite reference to the life of the regenerate in Rom. viii. 4-13. From the import of *σάρξ* as now developed, we can understand the Apostle's strong assertion in ver. 7, that the *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς* is *ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν* (compare 1 John ii. 15-18; James iv. 4), that "it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος* are certainly the deeds which spring from sensuous lusts. If, however, according to the structure of the sentence, the *κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν* at the beginning of the verse corresponds with the *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος*, it by no means follows that both ideas are synonymous and co-extensive, but only that they stand side by side in contrast with the *πνεῦμα* and its works. The *κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν* is the genus of which the *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος* is the species.

If we now revert to Romans vii. 14-25, we find the same contrast, but in another form. We must especially remember that Paul is here describing a particular stage of religious development in the inner life; his exposition as he proceeds becomes more and more personal as he reflects in it his own experience. His description of the life of faith in Christ does not begin until chap. viii. 1. According to the Apostle's doctrine they only who are in Christ are partakers of the Spirit, and therefore the principle which is opposed to the power of sin before this turning-point in life cannot be the

πνεῦμα (τοῦ θεοῦ). We find, accordingly, that the Apostle denotes it by another word ; he calls it ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, or νοῦς, vers. 22, 23, 25.* On the other hand, the Apostle is by no means describing the state of unredeemed men generally, or the confirmed and settled service of sin, for in such a condition the flesh in one form or another is the sole ruling principle, and there can be no real conflict between it and the opposing principle, which is wholly dormant or subdued. In the state which he is describing, a conflict (ver. 23) is going on ; the Divine principle, indeed, appears first in the form of law only, but it awakens in the man a feeling of approbation, and a wish to carry it out in the life, and thus far a will conformable to the law ; but this will has not the power to determine and to penetrate the man's real life in its manifold departments, or even in its very beginning ; it has not the power to redeem him. Now, when this endeavour after conformity to the divine law, whose import reveals itself in all its fulness to the mind, has once begun, it must be regarded as that of the man's inward self, deeply reflecting upon himself, and hence the expression ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, ver. 22, implying the separation of the man's own *ego*, his better self, from the act of sin, vers. 17, 19. In such a case, the man's sinful nature is as if removed into the outward sphere of things in relation to himself, where it still asserts its dominion unimpaired, though a better impulse has arisen within ; and hence the representation, given ver. 18, of the will, good in itself, being hindered by sin dwelling in the σάρξ, and the description of sin's power in such a man as a fettering νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, ver. 23, together with the contrast τῷ μὲν νοῦ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας, ver. 25.† As ἁμαρτία is here distinguished from σάρξ, and the latter described as simply the appropriate seat of the former, σάρξ strictly taken must still be confined

* St. Paul might, indeed, have predicated the συνήδεσθαι and δουλεύειν τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ of the πνεῦμα, i.e., τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ; but he chose the above designations in preference, because πνεῦμα implies the idea of power, and when this element of our being has to be expressed in its inability to realize itself in actual life, those other designations are more appropriate, so as to avoid our confounding the πνεῦμα of man with the Divine principle of all true renewal, the πνεῦμα in the highest sense.

† Tholuck's commentary on this passage (5th ed., 1856) contains many clever and pointed remarks thoroughly sifting the question. See also his general remarks, ch. vi. 6. Some variations will be observable between his exposition and mine.

in its reference to that part of human nature which is neither moral nor immoral, but simply natural, as we have already explained it. It denotes the whole outward and manifest life of the man, his worldly life in all its bearings. Thus, the meaning of verse 25 is made clear and freed from all tautology, the contrast in chap. viii. 4, *μὴ κατὰ σάρκα ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν* is clearly and distinctly marked, and the difficulty in ver. 18, *οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου ἀγαθόν* removed. If, on the contrary, *σάρξ* be rendered "man's sensational nature," or "his life as alien from God or ruled by selfishness," or "immoral disposition," this last-named passage will have a very strange meaning.* If *σάρξ* be simply taken to mean the outward reality of human life viewed as a whole, the apostle may fairly explain the *ἐν ἐμοί* by *ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου*.†

There are, lastly, two expressions used by the Apostle which Rom. vi. 6, and seem to sanction the assertion that he derives sin Col. ii. 11. from man's sensuous nature, viz., those wherein conversion is represented as the destruction or the putting off of "the body of sin," "the fleshly nature" (*σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, σῶμα τῆς σαρκός*), Rom. vi. 6; Col. ii. 11. Let us examine these passages more closely. *Σῶμα*, in Col. ii. 11, denotes, as most modern expositors affirm, man's actual body, and thus the *ἀπέκδυσις τοῦ σώματος*, answering to the *ἐκδύσασθαι* of 2 Cor. v. 4, can mean nothing else than the death of the body, and never

* The second and third rendering involves a tautology. According to the first, it would seem inappropriate to substitute "the sensational nature" for the "in me," and superfluous to affirm that in "the sensational nature" no good (clearly moral good, as the connection shows) dwells.

† The explanation of Rom. vii. 14, viii. 12, espoused by Philippi, in his commentary to the Romans, and by the Erlangen theologians, Hofmann excepted, according to which the section vii. 14-25 describes one aspect of the regenerate life, and viii. 1-12 the other, I consider quite untenable. There would in this case be no transition from the state wherein sin rules over the man and works spiritual death, vii. 9-13, and that which Paul describes as *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι εἶναι, πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ ἔχειν*, viii. 9; the description of the regenerate man would begin suddenly and unexpectedly at vii. 14. Again, if Paul speaks of himself as a regenerate man when he says, ver. 14, *ἐγὼ σαρκικός* (or *σάρκινος*) *εἰμι, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τῇν ἁμαρτίαν*, how could we harmonize this with his witness *Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξηγόρασεν ἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου*, Gal. iii. 13, and *εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ καινὴ κτίσις, τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρῆλθεν, ἰδοὺ, γίγνεται καινὰ τὰ πάντα*, 2 Cor. v. 17; nay, with his assertion in the same epistle *ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ μεκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*, Rom. vi. 6, and on to the end of the chapter. It must be remembered that the apostle predicates of the *ἐγὼ* (which must be distinguished from his own inner self, v. 17), *ποιεῖν πράσσειν*,

signifies the subjugation of the body and its impulses to the spirit. The *καταργεῖν τὸ σῶμα*, Rom. vi. 6, must undoubtedly be rendered "that the body might be deprived of its power." But as the *καταργεῖν τὴν κοιλίαν*, 1 Cor. vi. 13, refers to the death of the body, it would be more natural to take the words in Rom. vi. 6, considering the preceding and following context, as likewise referring to the destruction of the body by death. The qualifying genitive, *τῆς σαρκός, τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, could not upon this rendering so alter the sense as to make the apostle mean no longer the body ruled by sensational desires and afflicted with sin, but these sensational desires, this sin itself, as that which is to be destroyed. But no one will maintain that the apostle is speaking of physical death in either of these passages; and therefore we cannot take *σῶμα* literally. We are thus led to

σῶμα used figuratively. the conclusion sanctioned by the context that the apostle in both places uses the word figuratively.

In Rom. vi. we have not only the comparison of man's regeneration through Christ with bodily death and resurrection, but in the words immediately preceding, ver. 6, St. Paul uses the figurative expression *σταυρωθῆναι τὸν παλαιὸν ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον*, and how natural it is that he should immediately call the mass of sin "a body" which is deprived of life in the death of "the old man." Col. ii. 11, moreover, stands in close connection with a figurative representation carried on from that verse to chap. iii. 9, wherein the stages of moral renewal through Christ are represented as death, burial, and resurrection with Him. In this train of thought it is natural that the apostle should

κατεργάζεσθαι κακόν, in contrast with a powerless will towards good which springs from his true *ἐγώ* in its state of bondage, v. 15-21, and are we really to understand this of the regenerate? If so, in what does the condition of the regenerate differ from that of the unregenerate? The *νόμος αἰχμαλωτίζων μὲ τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας; τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου*, vii. 23, and the *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐλευθερώσας μὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου*, viii. 2, are diametrically opposed to each other, and how can we take them as describing merely two aspects of the same state? Is that undecided struggle really the token of a state of regeneration? We must assume this if we take the exclamation *ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος· τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*; as describing the present state of the apostle. And is this the same apostle who immediately afterwards says, *ὅσοι πνεύματι θεοῦ ἄγονται, οὗτοι υἱοὶ εἰσιν θεοῦ*, viii. 14, and in Eph. ii. 10, *αὐτοῦ ἐσμεν ποίημα κτισθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς, οἷς προητοίμασεν ὁ θεὸς ἵνα ἐν αὐτοῖς περιπατήσωμεν*? If so, how is the teaching of the Apostle regarding the regenerate to be distinguished from the views of Mani, that man has two souls, one good and the other evil?

describe the old sinful nature as a "body" which the Christian puts off in regeneration (see iii. 9), in order to be clothed upon with the νέος ἄνθρωπος. Σάρξ, therefore, is to be taken just as in the words σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ (τοῦ Χριστοῦ), i. 22, as meaning the earthly life, though of course as part of that figurative comparison. Col. iii. 5 also serves to illustrate this, νεκρώσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, πορνείαν, ἀκαθαρσίαν, etc. Here, according to the grammatical structure of the passage, the πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, etc., simply specify the μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, and thus various kinds of sins are represented as the members or limbs of the "old man" minding earthly things.*

I trust that by these investigations it has been satisfactorily proved that Paul does not derive sin from man's corporeal nature, and that the contrast which he draws between πνεῦμα and σάρξ, as moral principles, by no means corresponds with our antithesis between man's spiritual (or rational) and sensuous nature.

In deriving various forms of sin from σάρξ the apostle recognizes (as our inquiry has shown), that man in his separation from God and devotion to the κόσμος, can originate nothing truly good in himself, but ever bears about with him a perpetual source of sin and death. There is surely no need to prove the fact that this consciousness of the vanity and inefficacy of all human thought and action apart from fellowship with God is a distinguishing feature of Scripture teaching generally and of the Pauline doctrine in particular. By this close connection between sin and σάρξ, Paul expresses the truth that the source of sin is not in the relations of the creature in himself nor in any contradiction essential to his own nature,

* K. A. Fr. Fritzsche in his Commentary on the Romans, vol. i. p. 386, gives another explanation of this passage, *Hæc P. mens est: enecate corporis vestri membra, quæ in terræ orbe habetis* (np. cupiditatum quas accendunt ardore restincto), *enecate, inquam scortatiorem*, etc. But it somewhat violates the close connection of πορνείαν, ἀκαθαρσίαν with the preceding words to insert *enecate, inquam* in the translation, so as to make a new beginning. And in this rendering it is difficult to see what the words τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς really mean, as they form an implied contrast to μέλη τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς,—perhaps also to the members of the resurrection body? To explain them by a reference to the τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς of ver. 2, would lead to an unmeaning view of them. In our exposition it is plain that τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς is unimportant. The μέλη (τοῦ νέου ἀνθρώπου) τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς would be the Christian virtues as contrasted with the vices enumerated. It is generally important carefully to recollect the symbolic character of the entire passage, from chap. ii. 11, as above referred to. See, among modern interpreters of this Epistle, Bähr and Böhmer, *in loc.*

but solely in his relations to God. $\Sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ is not a merely anthropological notion, its meaning is to be found in the depths of the religious consciousness. St. Paul does not indeed overlook the comprehensive significance of the warfare between the sensuous nature with its impulses and the spirit, in the development and manifestation of sin. But this state of warfare is itself, as he clearly shows, Rom. i. 18–32, the consequence of man's not following his original bias towards God, and not remembering that His will is an absolutely holy standard.

It has not escaped the notice of the chief Doctors of the Church at various times that St. Paul's conception of $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ goes far beyond man's sensuous nature. In earlier times Augustine distinctly declared * this ; in the middle ages it was affirmed by Anselm † and Thomas Aquinas. ‡ The chief of the reformers, moreover, Luther, § Melancthon, || and Calvin ¶ agree on this point ; and following them, the wider meaning of $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$, which even the great catholic theologian Bellarmine recognizes ** in many passages in the New Testament, is generally adopted in the older Protestant theology. In our own day we must refer to Neander's thorough development of this conception in his "History of the Planting of the Church by the Apostles." ††

* *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xiv. c. 2 and 4.

† *Opera*, ed. Gerberon, epist. 133.

‡ *Summa*, prima sec. qu. 72, art. 2.

§ *De Servo Arbitrio*, ed. Seb. Schmid, pp. 163, 178. Compare the passage which Philippi (*Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, iii. p. 201) cites from the preface to Luther's version of the Epistle to the Romans.

|| *Loci Theol.* ed. Augusti, p. 20. *Comment in epist. ad Rom.*, ch. vii. 14, vii. 7.

¶ *Instit. Rel. Christ.*, lib. ii. c. 1, sect. 9, *Comment in ep. ad Rom.*, ch. vii. 18. Yet Calvin is not very exact in thus defining the Pauline contrast between $\piνεῦμα$ and $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$, — *utrumque nomen in animam competit, sed alterum, qua parte est regenerata, alterum, qua naturalem adhuc affectum retinet.*

** *Ibid.*, lib. v. de amiss. gratiae, c. 7, 15. Usually, however, he renders $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ by *sensualitas*.

†† *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 662, f., compare p. 737, f. (4th ed.) Stirr also in his anthropological and exegetical inquiries (*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theol.*, 1834, part iii.) treats of the Pauline $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ in a sense essentially correct, though not without some indistinctness and uncertainty in details. Harless, also, *Comment. on the Ephesians*, p. 162, f. (1st ed.), Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, i. p. 234, ff. (1st ed.) ; Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, i. p. 463, f. (1st ed.) ; Philippi, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, iii. p. 200, ff. ; Kahnis, *Lutherische Dogm.*, i. p. 550, f., all alike espouse the correct rendering and conception of $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$. Plitt (*evangelische Glaubenslehre*, part i. pp. 280, 281), lays stress upon "the deeply grounded distinction between Adamic and Satanic sin," and discovers in the Pauline $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\xi$ "not

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II.

KANT'S VIEW OF THE ORIGIN OF EVIL, COMPARED WITH THE THEORY OF THE DERIVATION OF SIN FROM SENSE.

As the doctrine that evil has its source in man's sensuous nature penetrated the literature of the last century, influencing both its poets and its thinkers, some have supposed that it is embodied likewise in the greatest production of philosophical thought during that period—the Kantian Criticism. And at first sight this opinion seems to be correct. Does not Kant continually affirm that evil consists solely in the perverted maxim which subordinates the law of the Practical Reason to sensuous instincts,—which makes obedience to consist in satisfying those sensuous inclinations which are summed up subjectively under the name “self-love,” and objectively as constituting “happiness ?” And, according to him, is human freedom anything more than the power of acting independently of sensuous impulses, and even

the purely spiritual and absolute selfishness, personal in the fullest sense, with its corresponding enmity against God, which forms the essence of the sin of evil spirits,” but “a moral deadening or weakening of the man, subjecting him to the finite and sensuous part of his being. This, forgetting his divine origin and his corresponding destiny, selfishly buries itself in a temporal and isolated existence, and thus leads on to death, *i.e.*, ruin in all relations, entire hostility and alienation from God and men, nay, even from self, inasmuch as a general internal destruction of the man's spiritual relations and energies is the inevitable consequence of its perverted activity.” I agree with the distinction between diabolical and Adamic sin, or, as I would rather express it, human sin generally, although I regard it as a transitory and vanishing one,—as indeed the author of the *Glaubenslehre* himself does ; human sin itself in its most aggravated stage, becomes diabolical. We find that the Apostle Paul represents the struggle which the Christian has to carry on against those who deny or pervert the gospel of Christ as a struggle against Satan, 2 Cor. xi. 14 ; Eph. vi. 11–18 ; 2 Tim. ii. 26 ; but we find diabolical sin referred to only in 2 Thess. ii. 3, 4. But in more than one description of human depravity he uses *σάρξ* (or the *μέλη*) in connection with such sins as cannot be derived from a mere “subjugation of man to his sensuous and finite nature.” Are *εἰδωλολατρεία, φαρμακεία, ἔχθραι, ἔρις, ζήλοι, θυμοί, ἐριθείαι, διχοστασίαι, αἰρέσεις*, Gal. v. 20, to be regarded merely as “tokens of weakness” ? In passages, moreover, when the apostle does not expressly name the *σάρξ*, *e.g.*, Romans i. 18–32 ; 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10, he refers to sins which do not differ in kind from those specified in Gal. v. and Col. iii. We must, therefore, maintain that the apostle includes the entire range of human sin, excepting a few cases when it passes into diabolical sin, in his expression *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός*.

in opposition to them, according to the dictates of the Practical Reason? Is not the freedom which thus cleaves to this form of universal law, in his view, the only freedom that man, according to his ideal or intelligible essence, and so far as he practically needs it, can be conscious of? If evil, therefore, cannot be derived from freedom nor from man's intelligible or ideal essence, what remains save to derive it from sense?

And upon this standing-point such a derivation of evil can be effected only by tracing its origin, on the one hand, to a hindrance which man's sensuous nature presents to his spirit, and its manifestation in the world of phenomena; and on the other hand, to a want of power in man's intelligible or ideal character to realize itself empirically. Many expressions in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* and the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* seem to harmonize with this; and even in the *Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Rechtslehre* the possibility of deviating from the inner dictates of the reason is explained as a want of power—an "inability"—and all derivation of evil from freedom is forbidden.* But, according to this, evil evidently dwindles into a mere privation, as in the theory of Leibnitz; and as in that theory it is resolved into the metaphysical imperfection of the creature, here it is resolved into the inability, or "insusceptibility," of the creature to realize its ideal character in its empirical life and under the conditions of time and space: and thus, in judging of human life and conduct, the difference between good and evil becomes unavoidably one only of degree. It is quite in keeping with this that Kant zealously endeavours to deprive man of the hope of ever rising above that stage of perfection wherein reverence for the moral law, for duty, and for virtue is highest, or of attaining the goal of perfect holiness in any future development. He maintains that a state in which man spontaneously and perfectly fulfils the demands of the law is incompatible with the nature of a being both sensuous and rational; and while thus depriving us of the prospect of actual

* *Metaph. Anfangsgründen, Einleitung*, p. xxviii. (2d ed.) This remark clearly refers evil to man only as a sensuous being. The natural outgrowth of the Kantian theory in this phase of it is the Fichtian doctrine, that evil has its foundation in the original inertness of human nature; and this corresponds with the identifying of morality (as realized in independent action) with freedom in the Fichtian sense.

freedom from all inner contradiction and discord, he indemnifies us with the Tantalus-like bliss of an endless approximation to the goal of moral perfection.*

If, with these results, we now turn to that treatise of Kant's, wherein he makes evil directly the topic of inquiry—I mean his *Religion innerhalb der grenzen der blossen Vernunft*—we shall be surprised to find a theory developed apparently the very opposite of what we have described. Here the derivation of evil from sense is expressly condemned, and on two grounds, because evil cannot be predicated of our sensuous inclinations, and because by such a derivation the guilt of evil would be done away. In order to maintain man's responsibility and guilt, the origin of evil is transferred to the “thing in itself”—to “the intelligible being” of man, to his self-determining freedom apart from all conditions of time—in a word, to liberty, as it belongs to man as *noumenon*.†

How are we to harmonize such contradictory assertions? Must we not adopt the conclusion of those followers of Kant who, as they cannot reconcile themselves to this “Radical Evil,” endeavour to explain it as an unaccountable departure of their master from his principles—a kind of mystical reverie in an hour of weakness,—an aberration of his sober understanding, the serious consequences of which have been since developed in Ehrhard's *Apologie des Teufels*, and in Daub's *Judas Ischarioth*?‡ Even Schelling, though he considers

* See especially the *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft*, pp. 89, 107, 122, 178, 189, (6th ed.)

† 1st part, “Concerning the indwelling of the evil principle side by side with good in human nature,” pp. 21, 22, 27, 39, 40 (2d ed.)

‡ Among these attempted explanations given by his disciples, one of the most noticeable is that of J. A. W. Gessner, “*Ueber den Ursprung des sittlich Bösen in Menschen*,” which endeavours to recall the critical philosophy from its daring flight into the realm of the ideal, where it hoped to discover the source of evil, and to bring it back to the well-known regions of sense and experience. The treatise contains much that is acute and clever in opposition to Kant's view; but it shows how great a sacrifice is involved in this getting rid of evil as *radical*—as based upon an ideal act—nothing less than the surrender of moral accountability and guilt. The huge rock of Radical Evil, which Kant rolled into the way, is broken by Gessner into innumerable fragments, so as to make a road of natural and progressive development from the dominion of sense to that of spirit. Erh. Schmid also in his *Versuch einer Moralphilosophie* finds the doctrine of his master insufferably hard; he cannot understand how Kant could say that man, as a reasonable being, forms a character of his own, if he

Kant's view the very opposite of the sensuous theory, inclines to the opinion that Kant arrived at that view only later in life, and in opposition to his former principles and method.*

But we cannot adopt such an explanation. Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in its investigations concerning the relations of human freedom to the necessity of nature, contains the unmistakable groundwork of that first section in his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*.† It is not difficult to see that he could hardly have arrived at any other conclusion upon the highest principles of his system. How could he imagine that the world of *phenomena*, which is only the reflex and counterpart of the world of *noumena*, manifest within the limits of space and time, can possess any independence of its own, or actively contradict that world of *noumena*? If man, as noumenon, apart from and above all time, be ever in real accord with the law of the practical reason, how could he as "phenomenon" ever contradict that law? What can man's empirical character be in its elements of good and evil save the outgo and manifestation of that ideal character by which he is wholly determined? The *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* expressly recognizes this.‡ And as Kant always proceeds upon the axiom which unites the consciousness of the law of practical reason with the conception of human liberty—"what man ought to do, that he can do,"—the fact that he does in the least degree that which he ought not to do, must arise, not from weakness and inability, but from a want of will, which is conceivable only on the supposition of freedom; and be himself the free source also of transgression;—if all that springs from the arbitrary will of man, every evil act done with premeditation has freedom for its cause (p. 342, 2d ed.) These improvers upon Kant should have reflected that had he desired to accommodate himself to the pleasant doctrine, that the good only, and not the evil which man does, must be imputed to him as his own, Kant would have been no longer Kant—the inspired prophet of the moral law, and of its inviolable sanctity.

* Works, part i. vol. vii. 388. Schelling took a different view of the Kantian doctrine of evil in his dissertations upon Idealism in the *Wissenschaftslehre* of the years 1796, 1797; see Works, vol. i. 432.

† In the section entitled *Auflösung der kosmologischen Idee von der Totalität der Ableitung der Weltbegebenheiten aus ihren Ursachen*, see in particular pp. 429–433 (7th ed.).

‡ Pp. 422, 431, 432.

as freedom involves independence of the phenomenal law of nature, it can apply only to man as "noumenon."

Even if, upon the principles of the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, evil is to be regarded as a merely phenomenal interruption of the perfect accord of man with law ; still this interruption or hindrance cannot be regarded as merely passive, as a *being hindered*, but as a *self-limitation*—as a sin of omission on the part of that freedom which should ever be identical with reason. Thus, upon Kant's own principles, evil must of necessity spring from man's intelligible or ideal liberty. According to the fundamental principles of his Criticism, it is the law of the practical reason alone which—being unconditioned—raises man above the world of phenomena into the region of the intelligible. Were the actual behaviour of man in perfect harmony with this law, there would be no difficulty. But man's actual moral conduct in manifold ways contradicts the moral ideal. If, then, we are to explain this contradiction by saying that human freedom, as the necessary correlative of the intelligible law of reason, *does not possess the due power* of realizing itself, human freedom as intelligible would have to be surrendered, together with the possibility of recognizing the practical law of reason as unconditioned ; and in the very act of passing from the world of sense to the world of ideas, the Kantian principle in its affirmative aspect would have to be given up. We must therefore seek for the source of evil in ideal or intelligible freedom itself.

Now when Kant in his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft** so distinctly regards evil (as in his earlier writings) as a subordination of the claims of the law to the impulses of sense, we must lay it down as a fundamental principle of Kant's in relation to this question, that the *object* which man aims at in sin belongs to the world of sense, but sin's *source* to the world of ideas ; and that evil has not its origin in sense, but in an intelligible or ideal act of man's spirit outside the sphere of empirical existence, yet conditioning it—an act whereby he has taken up into his will as its regulative principle the *maxim* to subordinate the motives of the moral law to the

* *E.g.*, pp. 33, 34 (2d ed.).

sensuous impulses.* In this, the Kantian view, the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon corresponds to the dualism between duty and inclination, virtue and pleasure; only that the phenomenon, when it opposes and overrides the noumenon, in the form of an impulse after happiness, does not possess this power of itself and through an original necessity, but derives it primarily from a self-perversion of the noumenon.

It will now, therefore, first of all be expected of us to explain what seems to be utterly inconceivable, viz., how a purely intelligible essence could ever impose on itself the maxim which gives the sensuous instincts and inclinations—whose objects have for it, as purely ideal, no reality whatever—a preponderance over its law, *i.e.*, over itself. If the inconceivableness of this is to be justified only on the ground of the transcendental character of the intelligible, we cannot too strongly protest against a mode of procedure which creates contradictions at pleasure in the essence of man, and then uses the *x*—the unknown quantity in the calculation—as a loophole in order to evade the claim for an explanation.

It is, however, evident that it was an essential extension of this theory when Schelling, in his treatise *Philosophie und Religion*, and after him Daub, in his *Judas Ischarioth*, gave to this intelligible act another and more conceivable import, explaining it as a fall from the absolute to the concrete, or to self-dependent existence. It is certainly a conclusion drawn from premisses, which any one who will may recognize in Kant, that on his standing-point the existence of the world of phenomena should be regarded as the consequence of that primary fall.

Furthermore, according to the above description of the Kantian principle, there must ever be a hopeless contradiction. For on the one hand he blends freedom as closely and inseparably with the law of practical reason as the facts of nature are united with its laws; nay, he supposes this practical law to have so necessary a causality in relation to the free act of man, that even as in nature nothing can happen without a cause working

Want of
consistency
in Kant's
doctrine.

* Kant designates this by a term very strange, yet necessary, on his principles, viz., “the Origin in Reason” of evil action, in contrast with its “origin in time” as a mere phenomenon.—*Religion inn. der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, 40, 43, 46.

according to law, so a freedom which does not work according to the law of practical reason gives the idea of action without a cause, *i.e.*, of an impossibility.* And on the other hand, he is obliged to regard the freedom of the will as an ability not only to do good, but also to do evil, or what is contrary to the moral law. This perplexing ambiguity in his conception of *freedom* pervades the practical side of Kant's philosophy throughout, and this has been fully shown by Herbart.† The contradiction involved in this way of viewing freedom is partly hidden by his usually avoiding the use of the word when he is speaking of the origin of evil, and by his preferring to speak of a perversion of motives in the general maxim of "arbitrariness," of evil having its source in "arbitrariness," and so on. But if evil action really has its ground in the ideally intelligible character of man, what else can this "arbitrariness" be than man's freedom as noumenon? Or, if we must distinguish between this "arbitrariness" and freedom, so that freedom may be regarded only as what is in harmony with the law, must we still include in the intelligible essence of man a faculty of "arbitrariness" from which nothing but evil could spring? If, again, an ideal or intelligible freedom involving the possibility both of good and evil be objected to, how can such an ideal arbitrariness be entertained? Would not the serious contradictions which, according to this theory, destroy the sphere of the intelligible, be really multiplied? For besides the moral law and obedience to its commands, we should have also the transgression of it, and then again, the negating of this transgression by repentance and amendment, all alike deriving their origin from the same ideal.‡

The profound truths included in Kant's doctrine of evil, together with the errors which they conceal, will come before us again at a future stage of our inquiry. Here we have only had briefly to explain the relation of his doctrine to the derivation of evil from man's sensuous nature.

* *Grundlegung zur Metaph. der Sitten*, pp. 98, 118 (ed. of 1791). *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft*, pp. 43, 49, 60, and elsewhere. Freedom and practical reason, according to this aspect of the Kantian doctrine, are simply different names for one and the same thing; freedom is practical reason so far as it possesses causality; the practical reason is freedom so far as it is a law unto itself.

† *Gespräche über das Böse*, p. 145, f.

‡ Compare Paul, *Kant's Lehre vom radikalen Bösen*, p. 78, ff.

CHAPTER III.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S VIEW OF THE ESSENCE AND
ORIGIN OF SIN.

ROSENKRANZ, in his critique of Schleiermacher's "*Glaubens-*
§ 1. Does SCHL-*lehre*," finds fault with the author because he
EIERMACHER
derive sin seeks the principle of that aberration which we
from sense? call *evil*, not in the spirit of man, not in freedom,
not in the will, but in his sensuous nature. Schleiermacher
would hardly adopt this expression of his views, for it is some-
what inexact; but his treatment of the doctrine of sin must at
once convince every one that this objection in substance is not
without foundation. It is therefore fitting that a brief exami-
nation of his theory should find place here. We have mainly
to consider the statement of his doctrine in the "*Glaubens-*
lehre," but for explanation's sake, we may refer also to
what Schleiermacher has advanced upon the subject in other
writings.

Schleiermacher's "Outlines of a System of Ethics," published by
Testimony of Al. Schweizer after his death, define the conception
SCHLEIER- of evil only incidentally, so as to justify its exclusion
MACHER'S of evil only incidentally, so as to justify its exclusion
Dissertations from the sphere of this science; yet enough is said
on Morals. to confirm the above objection. Good is there
described to be the coincidence or union of reason and nature;
evil, on the other hand, is in Schleiermacher's earlier writings
defined to be the negative factor in the process of this union,
in his somewhat later works, as the negative expression of the
original irrationality of nature, and at last, as "the divorce of
reason and nature in every individual moral sphere;"* state-
ments which, taken together, clearly point to an antagonism
between our sensational nature and our spirit. The striking
expression incidentally used regarding evil, as "an act of
nature involving a corresponding suffering of reason," confirms
this interpretation.†

If we inquire how a passive state can be attributed thus to

* *Glaubenslehre*, § 91, pp. 52-54. See the note p. 48 of this work

† *Ibid.*, § 109, p. 71.

reason, and an active power determining and acting upon reason to the sensuous nature, though our question is not answered in the "Ethics," Schleiermacher's academic dissertation, "Concerning the distinction between the laws of nature and of morals" is very valuable as indicating the exact point of his philosophic view.* Here we are told that "the spirit entering upon earthly existence must become a *quantum* or relative quantity,† and as such seems adequate to counterbalance the subordinate functions of individual life;" and hence arise deviations from that moral law, which is the pure and perfect expression of the essence and activity of the intelligence. This is analogous, it is said, to what we find in the sphere of nature. Taking the various species as the true standards of nature, we continually meet with deviations from these in the diseases of plants and animals, in malformations and the like, which are owing to the circumstance that the distinctive principle of each successive stage has not fully appropriated the powers of the preceding. It is evident that the subordinate functions, whence evil, or that which contradicts the moral law, springs,—through their strength not being fully subdued by the spirit,—are those of the animal life.‡

And this, as it seems to us, is just what the *Glaubenslehre* says. In it sin is described to be a limitation of the spirit's determining power, caused by the independent action of the sensuous functions, or again, "a positive resistance of the flesh against the spirit." § The conception expressed here by "the flesh" is not exactly that of St. Paul, neither is it that of many

* *Philosophische und vermischte Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 415.

† The *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre* expressly denies this of the Reason, and explains it as impossible, § 105, p. 64. How, then, can this Reason "suffer" from the quantitatively determining nature, as the same *Entwurf* says that it does?

‡ See "*Die Abhandlung über die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Tugendbegriffes*"—*Philosophische Schriften*, vol. ii. 359. Supposing we could allow that the conception of species were nature's laws, a great discrepancy would still be perceptible in any parallel between the disturbances which occur in natural and in moral life. In the phenomena of nature above referred to, though some particular in nature's law is wanting (it being either interrupted or paralysed), that law is in other particulars realized. But in moral evil, on the other hand, we find that when one particular in the law of the will is actually contradicted, no other points of this law are realized.

§ *Die Christliche Glaube*, part i. § 66, 2 (2d ed.).

modern theologians, who understand by it the body; it is said to denote "the lower powers of the soul collectively." This hardly indicates a difference of view on Schleiermacher's part; he only expresses more accurately those refined anthropological conceptions which other expounders of the theory really mean; for the body apart from the soul is mere lifeless matter, and strictly speaking it cannot be to it, but to the *ψυχή* in the body, that sensation and sensuous impulse belong. But Schleiermacher nowhere accurately defines what he understands by "the spirit" in contrast with the flesh; he simply makes his conception of it more distinct by using, as synonymous, the expression, "place of the God-consciousness."* This expression favours the idea that the spirit, the limitation of which causes sin, is the seat of other functions besides the God-consciousness, and that the limitation of these by sense must also be regarded as sin. But it is clear, from the sections preceding and following the 66th, that Schleiermacher does not mean this,—that sin with him is simply an opposition to the determining power of the God-consciousness.

But there is some confusion or at least complexity here.

Want of
perspicuity
in his
statements.

How can Schleiermacher's conception of "the spirit," though meant subjectively, be taken as analogous to the Pauline *πνεῦμα* in relation to the Christian life, when the other side of the contrast, "the flesh," embraces in his view a much narrower sphere than that assigned to it by St. Paul? How comes it to pass that according to St. Paul the godly and the worldly (*i.e.*, humanity in its selfishness) are opposed to each other, but according to Schleiermacher the divine and the sensuous? Does Schleiermacher really mean that the *πνεῦμα* of man, as distinct from the *σάρξ*, is the seat of the God-consciousness alone, and not of anything else? Does he consider that the God-consciousness alone is implanted as a heavenly germ in our animal nature, so that man really differs from the brutes in nothing save in the fact that he is religious? This may have been the opinion of others, *e.g.*, of Jean Paul, though it is not seriously maintained even by him; but the Introduction to Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, especially § 5, admits of

* *Die Christliche Glaube*, p. 398. The explanation given of the spirit in the 1st ed. of the *Glaubenslehre* is peculiar—"that within us which gives rise to the consciousness of God," part ii. § 86, p. 17.

no doubt that his view was widely different. When he teaches us to regard the God-consciousness as the highest in human life, he clearly implies that the subordinate sphere includes much more than the sensuous activities of life—the movements and workings of the lower energies. But the question recurs, Why are the disturbances of the divine harmony of life arising from other parts of this higher sphere, though subordinate to the God-consciousness, altogether overlooked in the section concerning man's sinful state? Or what proof is given to show that opposition to the determining power of the God-consciousness might not arise from other parts of that higher sphere? How can it be supposed, not to say proved by experience, that the collective activity of the higher energies are so necessarily one with the divine consciousness that they can never be separated from it? *

If, in this perplexity, we turn to the Introduction to the *Wider meaning assigned to "sensuous" in the Introduction.* *Glaubenslehre* to see whether it throws any light upon these undefined relations, we find there also (§ 4 and 5) the distinction drawn between the God-consciousness on the one hand, and our sensuous self-consciousness on the other; but another and far wider application is given to the conception of the sensuous nature. It is made to include all the movements of self-consciousness wherein the world (*i.e.*, finite existence collectively) is a co-determining factor; and as a counter-working of our own activity in opposition to that which works upon us is possible, these movements may be divided into a sense of dependence on the one hand, and a sense of freedom on the other. "Here we include," says Schleiermacher, § 5, 1, "those determinations of self-consciousness which we have above (§ 4, 2) described as closely allied to the feeling of absolute dependence; so that by the term 'sensuous,' we must understand social and moral, as well as selfish feelings, seeing that they find place in the sphere of independent existence and of contrast." The God-consciousness, on the contrary, "expresses the feeling of *absolute* dependence" † which has to do not with

* As the question concerns the unity of the God-consciousness in this sense, the difficulty is not obviated by referring to the statement in the *Dialektik* of Schleiermacher (§ 214), that all knowledge and will have their transcendental basis in the idea of the absolute as the highest unity of all contrasts.

† Schleiermacher uses this expression in § 5, note, and thus seems to dis-

the world (because our relation to the world is one of *relative* dependence only, involving the possibility of reaction), but with God who is raised far above all contrasts. This sense of absolute dependence, in relation to the Unity far removed from all contrasts and all limitations of time and space, can be realized in time only by an inward state of pious feeling, combined with and embodied in some of the manifold determinations of the sensuous self-consciousness.*

Here, indeed, we stumble upon a glaring contradiction. Contradiction here. First of all we are told (p. 28) that the consciousness of total dependence, when once it has entered human life and while life lasts, is an abiding one, always there and always the same: this, indeed, necessarily follows upon Schleiermacher's principles, since that consciousness is simple and uncompounded, and free from the limitations of time. But immediately after this (p. 29), speaking of a life wherein this God-consciousness is already present, mention is made of certain elements of a merely sensuous consciousness as really appearing; indeed the idea of the abiding union or interpenetration of both tendencies of our self-consciousness dwindles into the notion of a mere demand, or of something which ought to be, preceding action (pp. 33, 34); see also § 60, 1; 63, 3, of the *Glaubenslehre*. We shall hereafter see that this notable contradiction, traceable throughout, has an important bearing upon the question before us.

In § 4, pp. 32, 33, he makes a further distinction between Indistinctness of Schleiermacher's view of sin itself. an easier and more difficult maintenance of the highest self-consciousness (the easier or more difficult union of the sense of entire dependence with the sensuous consciousness in its determinations), and derives the contrasts of religious joy or sorrow from this distinction; and we naturally expect that we have here arrived at a distinction between an absolute sense of dependence and the God-consciousness, the former being that which manifests itself in the latter, which is its manifestation. But he could do this only by regarding the God-consciousness as the product of the sense of entire dependence combined with an act of sensational consciousness, which he does not.

* The description of these different relations is clearer and more definite in the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre*, § 9-11; but in the second edition it is withdrawn, especially the part which relates to "the amalgamation" of both tendencies of consciousness in pious endeavour. Compare pp. 43, 45, 46 of ed. 1 with pp. 29, 32 of ed. 2.

at the discriminating point at which the consciousness of sin arises. Where can it have its origin if not in the fact of our sensuous consciousness, which has to do with what is finite, being hindered in its union with the feeling of absolute dependence? This expectation is fully confirmed by the introduction to "the Doctrine of Sin," § 62-65, including certain statements in § 66. Here Schleiermacher shows that whenever the tendency to fulfil the God-consciousness is hindered by the sensuous consciousness, disinclination is aroused; and further, that when our God-consciousness embodied in any state of mind determines our self-consciousness as disinclination, the consciousness of sin is awakened. But Schleiermacher, misled by his ambiguous use of the word "sensuous," places this hindering and interrupting force in the functions of the lower life (see § 66, and following),—in "the flesh,"—according to the meaning of this expression above described, and yet he adheres to the corresponding conception of "the spirit," as denoting exclusively the God-consciousness. Thus arises an unjustifiable confusion between conceptions widely different in their range; "sense," as denoting the functions collectively which concern man's relations to the world, and "sense," as denoting the functions of the lower or animal life. Hence, too, arises that manifest hesitation between two distinct and separate points which pervades Schleiermacher's entire treatment of the Doctrine of Sin, not only in his Theology, but in his Sermons likewise. Sometimes he seems to adopt the ordinary sensuous theory; but suddenly we find him taking quite a different standing-point, and proving, in most impressive language, that every self-willed act, every effort violating our relation to God, however esteemed and lauded by the world, is sin, showing us that selfishness is the inmost source of sin, and tracing the corruption proceeding therefrom, into the most refined and spiritual forms of evil.

As the *Glaubenslehre* of Schleiermacher is really nothing more than a description of the directly pious and Christian consciousness, it does not properly concern itself with sin and its derivation, but only with the consciousness of sin: and, accordingly, it must be regarded as an *opus supererogationis* (which, like everything superfluous, implies a corresponding deficiency), when Schleier-

§ 2. SCHLEIER-
MACHER
RESOLVES SIN
INTO THE CON-
SCIOUSNESS OF
SIN.

macher endeavours to show that sin cannot exist in the Christian life without this consciousness of it (Part i. pp. 396, 397). He unwarrantably encroaches upon the objective bearing of the question, when (p. 405) he maintains that sin in general can be said to exist only where there is a consciousness of it. Thus in place of the principle which he laid down at the outset that the *Glaubenslehre* had nothing to do with the consideration of sin in itself, but only with pious endeavours which imply the consciousness of sin, he introduces the objective opinion that *sin*, strictly speaking, and the *consciousness of sin*, are identical. So far as this consciousness may be regarded as a power for good in the subject of it, it would follow that the notion of obduracy involves a contradiction. If we follow out these views in their ulterior bearings, the results of our inquiries concerning the conception of guilt and concerning unpremeditated sins oblige us certainly to grant that an immoral act can be imputed to a man as sin, only so far as he can be supposed to possess some consciousness of the moral law, of its contents and its obligation.

But we must distinguish between the presence of this consciousness generally in the person's life, and its being felt in this or that particular act. Its warnings, through repeated neglect of them, may become less and less distinct, until its voice be wholly unheard, in the case of actions which spring from unbridled selfishness violating law, and yet the guilt of such actions is by no means obviated. Hence it may happen that the crimes which spring from "rudeness and uncouthness," and still more, those arising from obduracy,—though the perception of their wickedness may be wholly wanting when they are committed,—must nevertheless be looked upon as sins, and be condemned as involving guilt; the former, because it must be taken for granted that every man who has passed the age of childhood, and is not afflicted with mental imbecility, possesses some activity of conscience; and the latter, because they clearly imply the wilful searing and suppression of conscience by repeated slighting of its calls. We cannot regard the conviction in the commission of sin that it is a violation of the moral law, as a power for good in the man, unless there be along with this an inner rejection of the sin in the moral sense, together with an approval of the good

and a desire after it. But it by no means follows that the objective knowledge of the sin is coupled with this feeling of approbation. There may be some consciousness of the claims of the moral law, but this by no means involves a necessary limit to moral depravity; on the contrary, this depravity is often aggravated by the fact that its most wilful outbreaks go hand in hand with that consciousness. If it were entirely extinguished, the man would sink into a deeper degradation, but the energy of evil would at the same time be lessened in him. Still less can mere feeling of total dependence apart from more accurate defining of the feelings, as good or evil, be regarded as an essential limitation to moral perversity.

Without doing justice to these distinctions the *Glaubenslehre* ventures to answer the question as to the origin of the hindrance which begets in us the consciousness of sin. In the section concerning man's sinful state, reference is made first to the general course of human development,—how, when the spirit begins to awake in nature the sensuous part of our being has always the start of the spiritual,—how this development is unequal, because in the spirit it proceeds fitfully and by impulse, and because, moreover, the spirit is one, but the flesh is multiform and varied in its power. The spirit (it is said) cannot maintain a uniform relation to these various tendencies, and if less effective in one direction than in another, it seems to be foiled and overcome. In this fitful development the understanding and the will do not keep pace, but the former outstrips the latter, and thus the union of the sensuous functions with the God-consciousness seems to the understanding to be far more perfect than can be realized at the time by the will, § 68, 1.*

But in endeavouring to apply this reasoning to facts we are again involved in great difficulties. If the spirit as here meant be nothing more than the God-consciousness, we cannot see, according to Schleiermacher's view, how it can be a defined and limited *quantum*, which the sensuous functions hinder or even out-

How God-consciousness is hindered, according to Schleiermacher.

This also inconsistent with his theory.

* The Advent sermon, "Christ, the Redeemer from sin and from the law," throws light upon this; see Schl. *Predigten*, new ed., vol. ii. p. 25. The gist of this development is the thought, "No one can have a consciousness of sin without there being in his knowledge something better than in his practice."

weigh. The functions being directed to what is finite may be represented as possessing a limited strength, but the God-consciousness cannot thus be spoken of, for it is the immediate entrance of what is *infinite* into human and finite life. Schleiermacher, indeed, expressly says, that the spirit (the God-consciousness) possesses an "intensive magnitude" (p. 401), and is thus susceptible of increase or diminution; but to go no farther than the *Glaubenslehre*, how does this agree with what is stated in the Introduction (p. 28), namely, that "the feeling of perfect dependence is in itself absolutely simple, and free from the conditions of time, ever the same, and raised above all shadow of turning?" In order to be defined and limited and realized in time, it must identify itself somehow with the sensuous consciousness; before this union, *i.e.*, when we are inquiring how far this union can be realized, and how far it is hindered by the resistance of the sensuous consciousness, we cannot regard this feeling of dependence as in any way limited, even though looked upon only as intensive. In this sense of absolute dependence, is it not God who makes our self-consciousness an absolutely determining one? How otherwise could this feeling of dependence be absolute? And how then could any opposition on the part of the finite consciousness limit or hinder this absolutely determining consciousness? According to Schleiermacher's premisses we must affirm that sin is utterly impossible.

This difficulty has hardly escaped the notice even of Schleiermacher himself; and accordingly, in describing the higher self-consciousness as increasing or diminishing in strength, through the opposition of certain functions of the sensuous self-consciousness, he adopts periphrastic expressions, such as "the tendency of the God-consciousness," its "efficiency," its "determining power," "the activity of the spirit," pp. 379, 380, 384, 393, 401. These circumlocutory expressions, which only mystify and confuse the thought, have the appearance of being other thoughts when they are only a repetition of the same, and, if taken literally, amount to an identification of the feeling of absolute dependence, with the sensuous self-consciousness before that union is supposed to have taken place. Such phrases are out of place in a strictly scientific work, when the question concerns the exact defining of a difficult conception, *viz.*, that of sin; and they altogether fail to obviate the mistakes which we have pointed

out. Are we to understand the frequently recurring expression, "tendency towards the God-consciousness," as anything more than a circumlocution? If so, it would necessarily follow, that the God-consciousness and the sensuous consciousness are not the only factors in every pious excitation, as § 5 teaches, but that between these two there is a *third*, a tendency either towards the God-consciousness and the union of the sensuous consciousness with it, or against the God-consciousness and this union; and that in this third factor lies the true source of every given state of mind, and of the hindering or furthering of the God-consciousness which it represents. If this be meant, what can this third factor be but the power of choice, the FREEDOM OF THE WILL? And in this case, this freedom of the will would furnish the real basis for the possibility and the entrance of evil. Yet, though Schleiermacher's argument seems frequently to lead to such a solution of the problem, in his celebrated Dissertation upon the doctrine of election, and in his *Glaubenslehre*, § 80, 4, 81, 2, he distinctly forbids any appeal to the freewill of the creature in deciding the question as to the ultimate ground of sin. According to him, the feeling of freedom is nothing more than a determination of the sensuous self-consciousness; * it is not something intermediate which effects a union between the sensuous consciousness and the consciousness of unconditional dependence. The absoluteness of this feeling of dependence, in the sense in which Schleiermacher means it, would be done away with, if the entrance of this feeling of dependence into real consciousness (which occurs only by its union with the sensuous consciousness) were felt to be conditioned by freedom.

We must therefore abide by our opinion already expressed, that such expressions as "the tendency of the God-consciousness," must be regarded as vain repetitions or circumlocutory phrases; and as far as our investigations have gone, so far from the fact of the existence of sin being explained, it is represented really as an impossibility.

† *Glaubenslehre*, § 4, 2, 3. "Our self-consciousness accordingly" (§ 4, 2), "as the consciousness of our existence or of our co-existence with the world" [but this, according to § 5, 1, corresponds with the conception of the sensuous self-consciousness], "is a succession of alternate feelings, now of liberty and now of dependence."

These last remarks lead us on to another phase of Schleier-
 § 3. SCHLEIER- macher's doctrine of sin, namely, to his conclusions
 MACHER'S concerning the relation of sin to the divine
 THEORY OF causality, and in connection with this his explana-
 THE RELATION tion of the consciousness of guilt.
 OF SIN TO GOD.

While his religious or philosophical principles will not allow that anything can proceed from the will of the creature, which is not at the same time God's doing, there seems to be but this alternative in deciding the question concerning the relations of evil to the divine causality—viz., if evil be maintained as a real and positive antithesis to moral good, it must be recognized as ordained and brought about by God; if, on the contrary, it be excluded from the divine causality, it must be regarded as a mere negation. We shall see that Schleiermacher, by a singularly artificial theory, endeavours to blend both these alternatives in one.

The sense of absolute dependence which, in Schleiermacher's
 Man's sense view, is the essential principle of all religion,
 of dependence answers (in our views of God) to His absolute
 implies God's causality, His eternal power, which must be
 causative regarded as the basis of all His attributes. Every-
 power. thing that exists, everything that occurs, has this for its
 foundation; for only upon this supposition can He be the
 "absolute" cause. We cannot, therefore, in the face of this,
 speak of a finite power of causation, for this must, in its action,
 be pervaded by, and wholly dependent on the divine power, so
 that whatever is produced in time and space by finite causes,
 has been already, yea, eternally, appointed by the Infinite
 Cause.* And there can be no distinction here between more
 or less powerful or active finite causes, between causes belonging
 to the sphere of freedom, and causes belonging to the sphere
 of nature and necessity.† Now, if sin be an act, and if it
 proceeds as such from the highest activity of finite causality—
i.e., from freedom,—it is nevertheless ordained by the will of
 God, who absolutely orders all things. To deny this would be
 to allow the existence of a causality independent of God, and
 thus to destroy the absoluteness of the divine causality, which,
 according to the terminology of the GLAUBENSLEHRE, would

* *Glaubenslehre*, § 50, § 51, § 54, 1.

† *Ibid.*, § 49.

be Manichaeism.* And yet, withal, we cannot avoid the recognition of the fact, that sin, so far as we have to regard it as a total contradiction of the requirements of God's will, cannot have God for its author. For the causative or creative will of God, though in our consciousness it may be distinguished from his authoritative or commanding will, cannot really contradict it.

How then is sin to be regarded so as not to attribute to the divine causation that which cannot be attributed to it? There are two elements combined in every act of sin, namely, the outgo of a sensuous impulse, and the consciousness of God. We derive both without hesitation from the eternal causality of God; but both taken together do not in themselves constitute sin. Sin only ensues when the determining power of the God-consciousness is inadequate, when compared with the strength of the natural impulse. But we must regard this weakness of the God-consciousness at any given stage of our life, as arising from the gradualness of our spiritual development, and from the conditions of our present state of existence; and the original or ideal perfection of man is not thus done away. But sin, as such, thus resolves itself into a mere negation, and no mention can be made of a productive or generating will of God in connection with it.†

But it is clear that these propositions lead us on to the most complete Pelagianism, according to the description of it given in the *Glaubenslehre*. Sin must, in the progress of human development, be constantly vanishing, and the necessity for redemption no longer remains; the contrast between sin and grace, so far as these expressions denote real facts of consciousness, is resolved into a difference only in the stage of development, and instead

* *Glaubenslehre*, § 48, 1, § 79, 1, § 80, 4.

† *Ibid.*, § 68, 1, 2, § 80, § 81, 1, 3, 4, where the concluding words are worthy of particular notice, p. 498. Schleiermacher here draws a distinction between his view and that of Calvin and Beza, who, though maintaining that evil is ordained of God, yet ever maintain its fearful reality and positiveness. In order to avoid Dualistic inferences, Schleiermacher resorts to the merely negative view of evil (not, however, exactly to the idea of privation). It is clear that this difference of view on Schleiermacher's part coincides with his doctrine concerning eternal punishment and the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων, as contrasted with that of Calvin and Beza.

of conversion and regeneration we have a straight course of gradual progress and improvement; Christ is no longer the absolute centre of holiness and life, but only a prominent turning-point and leader in the history of our race. And even supposing it were possible upon these principles to regard Him as the centre and perfection of creation in virtue of the perfection of the God-consciousness in Him, we should not thus avoid the naturalistic system of Pelagianism. For a second and perfecting creation cannot, in Schleiermacher's view, be maintained in such a manner as to allow a real elevation of the facts of Christ's manifestation, distinguishing it from and raising it above the course of nature according to its wider sense, as embracing all history. Christ, on the other hand, is a new creation only in the sense that He was free from all hindering and disturbing influences in the development of the race down to His time, and that He sprang from its universal and untainted life germ as an original or ideal embodiment of human nature,—the perfect man. If the first communication of the God-consciousness to mankind in Adam was insufficient, this was because it had calculated upon the complete penetration of human nature with the God-consciousness in Christ at a higher stage of the development, and thus Christ is the complete embodiment of human nature. But as on these principles creation and providence are identical, this new creation is nothing more than a preservation and growth of the God-consciousness originally implanted in man.

Schleiermacher does not shut his eyes to the fact that this theory inadequately fulfils the declarations of Holy Scripture, and the demands of Christian consciousness as to the import of Sin and Redemption. He therefore endeavours to establish a contrast or antithesis in the simple progress of human development between these two factors—sin and redemption—which alike spring from the divine causation.

God has ordained (he says) that the relative inefficiency of the God-consciousness in us should to us be *sin*, in order that its perfect power, as realized in Christ, and given to man through Him, might by us be regarded as *redemption*. This weakness of the God-consciousness is sin to us, because, though it cannot overcome the sensuous impulse, it nevertheless

negatives or forbids it, being (in conscience) the consciousness of a commanding or forbidding will of God. The higher stage of development in Christ is thus anticipated in the consciousness of the lower, and this perception is always present to the will, and to its executive power; we are therefore compelled (notwithstanding the imperfection of our God-consciousness) to regard the sensuous impulse, still unsubdued, as "a disturbance of nature, and a departure from God." But this has been ordained only on account of redemption, a scheme which presupposes limitation and contrast. God is thus the author of sin so far only as He is the author of redemption; but sin is only the condition which redemption presupposes, and can in no other sense be assigned to God's absolute causation.* Leibnitz, if we take his *Theodicée* in its true import, simply postulates sin as the *conditio sine qua non* of the most perfect world, without bringing before us the inner necessity of evil thus implied; he simply concludes, from its presence in a world dependent on God's power and wisdom, that it must form a part of the divine order and plan. Schleiermacher extends this line of argument by attempting to demonstrate this inner necessity; according to him, there must be Sin, in order that the perfect development of the God-consciousness in us may be regarded as Redemption.

According to this it would appear that sin is necessary, not only on logical but on teleological grounds; and this directly contradicts the former inference that sin, upon Schleiermacher's theory, is an impossibility. And yet this contradiction is only an apparent one, for the doctrine that sin is a necessity is a denial of its possibility in another way. If we regard sin as necessary in virtue of the divine ordainment we give up nothing less than the essence of sin itself.†

* As before, § 80, 2, 4; § 81, 3; § 83, 1; § 89, 1. See also the Dissertation on the Doctrine of Election, *Theol. Zeitschr.*, part i. p. 96.

† Regarding Schleiermacher's doctrine of the necessity of sin, Lücke aptly remarks: "The universality of sin is thus fully explained, but not the nature of sin as a free act," Gött. Gel. Anz., 1839, part 28, p. 265. Schleiermacher's theory is not the only one which explains the universality of sin so as to lose its real nature. But as Lücke and another friendly and acute Reviewer of this Treatise (in *Rheinwald's Repertorium*, 1842, March, p. 223), will not allow that on Schleiermacher's principles the possibility of sin is denied, I would only

If we more closely examine this view of the relation of sin to the divine causality, we find that it calls upon us to look at sin from two standing-points. Viewed from the one, the *objective*, sin is nothing more than the expression of a negation incident to the progress of our moral development, and like any other mere negation, having no real existence in God's sight, and not, therefore, to be attributed to His causation. Nothing but what has positive existence can be traced to God's power of causation, although in each particular thing thus caused, its determinate limit is necessarily implied. Viewed from the other standing-point, the *subjective*, sin is a positive act of opposition to the determining power of the God-consciousness, and, therefore, an act of our own of which we are guilty. This subjective view of sin, moreover, is probably not a merely arbitrary one, but has been ordained for us by God, who has implanted it in human consciousness.

From this it is clear, first of all, that guilt finds place only on the subjective or human standing-point; in other words, we are guilty in the judgment of our own conscience, but not before God or in God's judgment; which latter, indeed, is evident, if evil has no real existence for God. The same, of course, must be true regarding our notions of God's righteous punishment and of redemption; they are only different aspects of the consequences of sin; sin objectively viewed suggests redemption, subjectively considered it implies punishment. In the former case the insufficient, and in the latter, the sufficient communication of the God-consciousness to man is implied. We here perceive the reason why Schleiermacher does not, in conformity with the plan of his Theology, treat only of the consciousness of sin, but goes on to the objective assertion that "sin and the consciousness of sin cannot be separated;" this he maintains obviously because, according to him, sin in itself is a mere negation, and is real and positive in consciousness alone.* Well suggest whether a theory of religion which bases everything upon the absolute dependence of man and the unconditioned causation of God, and which looks upon the freedom of the will merely as an activity of nature gifted with power, must not in one way or other make sin an impossibility.

* In the *Glaubenslehre*, accordingly, the holiness of God, inasmuch as it produces this consciousness of sin in conscience, is represented as an attribute

would it be could we but rid ourselves of this consciousness itself which causes us such grief and pain ! We cannot do this, the *Glaubenslehre* replies, for God has made this apprehension of the relative inefficiency of the God-consciousness as sin and guilt inseparable from our spiritual organization, to the end that the perfecting of human nature in Christ may be apprehended by us as redemption. If this be so, God has by his very creative ordainment consigned us to suffer an inner discord which every one who is not absorbed in frivolity and insensibility experiences as the deepest sorrow and most terrible hindrance to his higher life,—nay, even as a remorse which plunges multitudes in hopeless ruin, and drives them to despair and self-destruction,—and how are we to reconcile this with His love ? Schleiermacher himself recognizes that the divine ordainment of conscience would be a “cruelty” if it were not requisite in order to make men “think upon redemption and persevere towards it.” * But his view really frees us from this “thought upon redemption,” for according to it the essential good which redemption secures might have been imparted to man without redemption by making him perfect in the first act of creation.† It is as irreconcilable with the divine truthfulness as it is with the harmony or (as Schleiermacher expresses it), “the identity or oneness” of God’s knowledge and will, that He should have given us an apprehension of the relative inefficacy of the God-consciousness in its gradual development which is not true for Him as well as us.‡

Contradictions produced by this twofold standing-point.	And here we encounter the strange contradictions in which the adoption of these two different standing-points—the objective and the subjective—necessarily entangles us ; the one recognizes all beings and events as alike dependent upon God’s absolute power of causation, and therefore admits of no
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by which sin is ordained of God, not in and for itself, but in relation to redemption ; see vol. i. p. 503, compared with 478 and § 79. It is by conscience that the progressiveness of our moral development comes to be regarded as a want of conformity with knowledge and will through not keeping pace with these, and hence as sin.

* *Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. 505 (§ 83, 2).

† See what is said generally concerning this inference at p. 220.

‡ The expression, “In so far,” continually occurs like a barrier on both sides, and we thus arrive at the same conclusion regarding Schleiermacher’s views as

contrast between sin and redemption in relation thereto ; the other abides so firmly by this contrast that it regards sin as not communicated by God, but as having its foundation in man only, and redemption as not founded in man but communicated by God. Now, if the second standing-point had been adhered to throughout the *Glaubenslehre*, and the first maintained on philosophical principles in the Introduction alone, the work—though not the author—would have been self-consistent. But instead of this, both standing-points are maintained throughout the dogmatic system upon religious grounds ; the first being insisted on in the first part, the second in a subdivision of the second part, yet with frequent alternations between the two throughout. They are made to counterbalance one another so that the one may not lead us into Pelagianism, nor the other into Manichaeism ; but they only entangle and embarrass each other. The whole inquiry, therefore, concerning the relation of sin to the divine causation swings to and fro between mutually counteracting limitations ; these opposite standing-points are never reconciled so as to lead to a higher unity ; neither indeed could they be, considering their antagonism to each other. Supposing that we allow the first method of looking at the question to be that which properly relates to God, and the second that which relates to man, does not the recognition of the first, which is absolutely the true view and yet directly contradicts the second, oblige us at once to surrender the second even in its relation to man ? The first standing-point, we are told, has to do with God, the second with ourselves, but if the first be absolutely true it destroys the second (which contradicts it) for ourselves. And on the other hand, if God has ordained the second standing-point for us, must not any attempt to contemplate sin from God's point of view be an unwarrantable prying into a mystery which He has reserved to Himself, a presumptuous rebellion against God, and itself the worst of sins ? If this ordainment rests, as Schleiermacher holds, not merely upon an arbitrary command, but upon God's absolutely productive will, working in us both by law and conscience that apprehension of sin, how is it

Braniss, in his acute and in some parts thorough criticism of Schleiermacher's Theology, see in particular p. 134 of his work ; though we by no means agree with the various stages of the argument by which Braniss arrives at this conclusion.

possible for the theologian to entertain any other view save that which regards sin as a departure from God, a derangement of nature, man's own guilty act apart from any divine causation? Nay, more; if God has ordained that we should regard what to Him is only a negative as a positive derangement and contradiction, to the end that we might recognize as Redemption what to Him is only the perfecting of human nature, He must Himself somehow regard evil not only as a negation but as a positive contradiction;—how otherwise could He have ordained it thus for us? *

We should like to take Schleiermacher at his word here, and to keep his *Glaubenslehre* to this truth which it allows. It is God's ordainment that we should thus regard sin as sin in our own consciousness;—well, then, let us resolve in good earnest to keep fast hold of this view of sin, to go through with it, and not try to stand as if upon our own shoulders and to look beyond ourselves. We are justified, nay, we are bound to condemn and reject every view of the relation of sin to the divine causality which in any way contradicts that appointed for us by God, simply because He has appointed it. And for this reason we are compelled firmly to reject that first standing-point, though Schleiermacher maintains it as the absolute one. His main error lies in that very point from which this investigation started, namely, in his regarding the relation of created personality to the Uncreated as one only of absolute dependence, and the corresponding relation of uncreated Personality to the creature as one of absolute causality. This eternal and omnipresent causality of God which has not itself in its power, but is compelled to work according to its absoluteness, necessarily consigns every other being to a state of passivity. But if the relations of finite spirits to God are thus absolutely determined, so that all true freedom must be denied them, they are more or

* It is thus evident, that if this ordaining power of God be real, Schleiermacher cannot avoid attributing to God Himself two opposite and mutually contradictory views of sin. It is plain, moreover, that—contrary to what is stated in the *Glaubenslehre* (vol. ii. 18)—sin, according to the conception of it there maintained, i.e., “the consciousness of sin in man,” must be regarded as itself a creative thought of God. And it must thus hold true, generally, that if evil be not an actual and wilful fall of man from the divine ideal, we must regard it as in some way itself that ideal, or as forming part thereof; unless, indeed, we are content to adopt such a negative view of it as Spinoza's.

less confounded in their essence with *nature* ;* and as the legitimate consequence of this view, evil comes to be looked upon merely as the power of the sensuous nature hindering the spirit and conditioning the activity of its development. But the truly Christian view of sin and of redemption, which Schleiermacher adopts as his superstructure, is in direct contrast with this the foundation of his theory. Firmly agreeing with Schleiermacher as to the superstructure, we are obliged to reject the theoretic foundation of his doctrine.

CHAPTER IV.

DERIVATION OF EVIL FROM THE CONTRASTS OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE.

EVERY glance at nature witnesses that life in all its forms springs from contrasts. The isolated and simple
 § 1. STATE- is abstract and dead, without form and void ; but
 MENT OF THE THEORY. everything living and concrete is manifold ;—what is primarily one must divide itself in various and even opposite directions in order, by means of the contrasts thus formed, to repeat and re-establish itself according to a definite pattern,

* Schleiermacher's dissertation concerning the difference between the laws of nature and of morals, together with his work upon the Doctrine of Election, are important as giving us an insight into his views on this point. His logic also contains significant hints upon the same subject. It is not, therefore, a paradoxical whim on Schleiermacher's part, but a settled conviction, forming a necessary link in the chain of his thought when he says, p. 150, that "we may look upon nature as a whole as a system of Ethics in miniature ; and this implies the necessary converse that the spiritual world may be regarded as an exalted system of physics." It is hardly necessary to remark that this is in perfect harmony with Schleiermacher's renunciation of every philosophical argument for the immortality of the soul. It is also in keeping with his explanation of the great contrast in man's relation to God (see his treatise on the Doctrine of Election) in the sphere of theology. He expressly regards this contrast as akin to the manifoldness of nature in relation to God, and he resolves it finally into the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων, which if it cannot be brought about by an inexhaustible power of endurance, unavoidably resolves itself into a mere process of nature. (See *Theol. Zeitschrift*, part i., especially pp. 99 f., 103 f., 109.)

and in a still higher form. Light by itself is colourless, desolate, and void, even as is darkness; they are set over against one another as extremes, which in themselves possess no real life, but need to be blended in order to manifest themselves in a multiformity of operations. The medium for this is the earth's atmosphere, cloudy yet transparent, and as light and darkness are reflected in this medium upon material things and in our eyes, the variegated world of colours arises, through the charming alternation and conflict of the opposite forces. In the plant, again, if there were but a single power at work there would be no development, but as opposite forces and impulses act upon it, it is urged on in the progress of its changes to unfold a rich and pleasing life.

But individuality in the concrete conception of it implies plurality in oneness, and manifoldness in the most intimate and indivisible unity. Thus we see that the forms of organic nature become definite and individual in proportion as new contrasts, presenting the most striking antitheses, are produced at each successive stage. In virtue of this polarity which belongs to everything finite, each new feature must have its contrast, and yet indicates a tendency to harmonize both extremes; and the more striking and obvious the opposition, the stronger and more active is the effort after union; the greater, moreover, are the results of this effort, and the more individual and distinctive will be the type of character.

How then can it seem strange to us that in the highest range of finite existence known to us, in the spiritual life of man, this antithesis appears with a clearness and strength apparently excluding all reconciliation? I mean in the contrast of good and evil, which a moral sense within us pronounces absolute and unimpeachable, simply because it is more difficult to explain. But what else would it be than a wilful renunciation of all scientific method and logical understanding of the world and human life to allow this antithesis in all its boldness and definiteness to remain?

An explanation even of this antithesis is to be found in the fact, that whatever is individual and characteristic in the manifestation of moral character depends upon this contrast, appearing as it does in mani-

fold modifications in human life and conduct. What would ideal moral perfection—without any weakness and imperfections, without the warfare and suffering attaching to finite existence—be, but a mere abstraction meaningless as it was monotonous, a conglomeration of attributes such as we never witness in real life? The abstract and general ideas of virtue which Ethics may present, serve only as formulae for the guidance of one factor in moral development; they cannot be realized in actual life amid the throng of earthly relations without the co-operation of the other factor; and too scrupulous a fear of being tainted by evil leads only to inaction and morbid withdrawal from life, and ultimately to neglect of every moral claim.

Attempts indeed have been made to give real life and form to those mere abstractions of good and evil, and we have an instance of this in the doctrine of Angels and devils personifications. Christianity concerning angels and devils; but such beings must be regarded as mere personifications. Must not every candid person admit that it is more than difficult to conceive of such beings as really existent? The difficulty is as great in our conception of angels as in that of devils, for visible and individual life is conceivable only in the region between heaven and hell, wherein man is placed, to fight, and to yield or conquer.

Who is not cognizant of the enlivening and glorious effect which the contrasts of light and shade produce both in nature and in art? Is man then to be likened to a Chinese picture which is without shadow, and therefore virtually without light?—

Good needs evil to give it reality and vigour. X for the real nature of anything is manifest only by contrast; truth is truly known only by its being distinguished from error. Take away pain from the life of man, and you take away pleasure likewise. Rest is no longer rest if it does not spring from action, and the true value of health is felt only by sickness. Can it be otherwise, then, with the contrast of good and evil? It is in the mirror of evil that man first sees moral good reflected; and evil is thus itself a condition of good even as error is a condition of truth. Man must taste of evil in order to know and truly to choose the good. How flat and unprofitable, how objectless and tame would our life become

if sin were entirely removed from it! ✓ Good itself would slumber, and all incentive to action would be lost without the powerful stimulus arising from the opposition of evil which keeps it ever in motion. Hence the poet represents Mephistopheles among the servants of God in heaven, and in the presence of the Lord; and describes the design of his existence in God's great economy in these words:—

Goethe's
recognition of
this.

“ Man's activity is all too prone to slumber ;
He soon gets fond of undisturbed repose.
I therefore gladly give to him a friend
Who stirs and strives, and must, as devil, work.”

When, indeed, we see evil coming forth from its prison-house in appalling crimes, and by the power of vice making men its slaves, and threatening to destroy the primary laws of life, the feeling of aversion and horror which fills us neither can nor should be expelled. But the same powers which, when they thus prevail, plunge men into destruction and perdition, if kept within due bounds, tend only to the fuller development of individual life with its varied aims.

In analysing our conception of evil, moreover, do we not find that its true nature and essence consists in the resolve to act for oneself only?—asserting one's own particular interests and will at the expense of others, and in opposition to those rules of propriety which hold good for all? Now, all individuality is in its very nature exclusive; it negatives whatever is foreign to it, and is impatient of whatever disturbs or hinders it: that which does not resist cannot really be said to exist; and he who is incapable of hatred against what withstands him, has no power of loving what is congenial and agreeable. Indeed, the more any individual, even in nature, is conscious of its inner power and right to assert its existence, the less will it hesitate to make itself felt, peradventure at the expense of other individuals, and to obtain if need be from them what it needs for its healthy and free development. Thus, for example, the strong oak sacrifices numberless small plants for the sake of its own growth, appropriating to itself the nourishing juices of the soil and the life-giving light of the sun; and every one recognizes in this

a sacred and wise ordainment of nature. Why should it be otherwise in the relations of men to one another? If men thus are involved in manifold contentions, even these are productive of strengthening and confirming effort; the individual needs the most striking contrasts and the keenest opposition as incentives to unfold his powers.

This most clearly appears if we turn from individuals to
 and of nations. Who is not familiar with the tirades
 nations. indulged in regarding the iniquitousness of war? And yet must we not allow that prolonged peace produces indolence and enervation of life as its necessary consequence? The sea, if never tossed by storm, would become stagnant and impure, and in like manner nations sometimes require the mighty excitements and convulsions of war if they are not to fall into ruin and decay.

In these complications it is natural that individuals should
 Indispens- often be at variance with the common weal and
 ableness of with universal law, and should hold to their par-
 this variance. ticular and separate aims in opposition thereto. But upon closer consideration, will it not be found that the distinctive spheres of persons in society and their individuality would be fused and lost, if they did not possess a tendency to assert their existence, not only as a part of the whole, but in their distinct individuality? It is only thus that definite and independent points occur in the general fusion of life and history, individual points which become the centres of particular spheres, and which form in themselves an organic whole; indeed it is thus only that the distinction between the individual and the race is maintained, which gives rise to a higher and more effective union. If in the case of the planets of our system there were not an internal power of cohesion and a centrifugal force counteracting the attraction of the sun, they could not retain anything upon their surface, but would themselves ere long be absorbed. In like manner in the moral world, the self-seeking of individual existence is indispensable to counterbalance the attractive power of the common centre.

A marvellous conflict between attracting and repellent forces, between the powers of expansion and contraction, thus prevails not only in nature, but in the moral world.

Affirmation and negation, love and hatred, social life and individuality, are the extremes between which it is waged ; and it obtains significance and character only in proportion as good and evil are blended in it.

The perception of this truth may often be hidden from our view in real life by manifold and bitter experiences arising from sin in others and in ourselves, and a

dread of the practical consequences may perplex and bias our judgment ; but (it is further argued) there is a sphere, namely,

that of ART, wherein we may discover the truth regarding this question, unbiassed by personal considerations, however noble. What would become

of Art, if nature and experience presented only the eternal monotony of virtue and holiness ? If everywhere there were calm, peaceful, and harmonious development, without struggle and without disturbance, to what a scanty and meagre sum would the materials of artistic representation in painting and in music be reduced ! And as to poetry, could it be esteemed an advantage if it had to content itself with the idyll and with descriptions of nature ? Little else would be left to it if the conflict of good and evil in all its bearings were virtually destroyed or blotted out of the world. If pure conformity to law, untroubled clearness of spiritual life, perfect love, integrity, and self-abnegation prevailed, how could there be any complications of particular spheres and interests, whose solution is the appropriate task of the Epic and the Drama ? How could the tragic poet produce the excitement and perplexity necessary in order to unveil the deepest secrets of character, without the instrumentality of those dark powers of folly, suffering, and crime ? Even religious Art would lose the secret of its vigour, whereby it tells most powerfully upon the mind, in the anti-thesis of sin and grace, if evil were altogether done away. It is the strange mystery of our life, that while we cannot surrender ourselves wholly to those powers of darkness, neither can we wholly free ourselves from them without destroying the stimulus of life ; and this mystery can be explained only by the philosophic principle which is here indicated.

This solution, indeed, extends still further ; for it is said to explain a phenomenon to which we have already had to refer, without being able to

Exceptions
even
explained.

account for it. If evil has its origin in the universal contrasts of finite life, so that all active development of human individuality arises from it, this view of it seems to fail us in cases where it has attained such a pre-eminence as wholly to subjugate the individual. If evil then be regarded as the substratum of personal and individual life, does not this make it all the more inconceivable how it can become the centre, and even the focus of this life? To this it is replied, that what thus seems contradictory in the individual may furnish a higher stimulus to the whole of which the individual is a member. Thus discords in music serve to produce more artistic and telling harmonies, asserting themselves even in the contrast. In like manner figures in any large picture, not in themselves beautiful, by their very contrast and strangeness contribute to the beauty of the whole. Evil may in countless individual cases gain the ascendancy, and become predominant; but in the human race as a whole it only exists to be subordinated and overcome in the ever-advancing rhythm of the world's history.

As this theory lays great stress upon its being contemplated in its completeness, we felt bound to present it thus, and to give it a fair hearing as a whole, before proceeding to test its soundness.* We must not overlook the fact that it is in some respects an advance upon the theories already discussed. Evil is here apprehended as something more inward, more active and comprehensive; the explanation of it on the grounds of the limits of the human spirit and its power no longer suffices, its presence is recognized in the sphere of spirit itself. And though in one description of this theory the explanation of evil is for the most part negative only, yet the conception presented of it is very different from, and much more positive than those other distinctly negative theories.

This derivation of evil from the tendency in finite existence to develop itself in contrasts, is by no means peculiar to modern times. Its germ is to be found within the Church (to say nothing of what may

This theory held in ancient times.

* I allow the above exposition of this theory of evil to remain in the present Edition, although a clever theologian has quoted parts of it as if they were expressive of my own views.

be found akin to it in the Gnostics and in the Pseudo-Clementines), as early as Lactantius, and with a striking approximation to dualistic views : for this theory of evil is in its essence as much akin to Dualism as to Pantheism.* Which of these opposite tendencies it leans towards, will depend very much upon the strength or weakness of the moral consciousness in the person who advocates it. According to the view of Lactantius, summed up as it is in the expression *malum interpretamentum boni*, the contrasts heaven and earth, light and darkness, fire and water, heat and cold, and so on, of which the world consists, and which are traceable even to the two highest created spirits, the Logos and the Devil (*anti-theus, aemulus Dei*), are concentrated in

* The germ of this theory generates itself in the soil of positive Dualism. Thus Pococke in his *Spec. hist. Arabum*, quotes from Abulfeda the supposed statement of Zoroaster : *bonum et malum e commixtione lucis et tenebrarum contigisse, quae nisi mixta fuissent mundus nunquam exstisset*. See also Stühr, *Die Religionssysteme der heidn. Völker des Orients*, p. 361, f. According to Manichaeism, moreover, the existence of a world of finite beings arises from the complications of good and evil emanations ; see Baur's *Manichäisches Religionssystem*, p. 41, f. This method of explaining evil is to be found in connection with a Pantheistic view of the world in the eastern Theosophists, and in the theosophic sects, and in the profound Mohammedan mystic Dschelaleddin, (born 1207). Tholuck in his "*Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik*," quotes the following lines from him :—

"Never could aught its healing virtue show
Did dire Disease on none inflict its blow.
The Low doth ever mirror forth the High :
Nor Want is known apart from Full Supply.
All things by mutual contrasts are revealed,
Where nothing Bitter is, the Sweet must be concealed."—P. 108.

And in another passage,

"Though God in conflict with Himself appear,
Yet in this conflict see an Eden near :
In peace, in war, ever is God the same,
And conflict with Himself brings Him no blame."—P. 122.

We find similar thoughts concerning the necessity of evil in the universe in Plotinus, *Ennead i. book 8, caps. 7 and 15*.

The Stoic Chrysippus (according to the statement of Gellius, lib. vi. c. 1) teaches the same doctrine of the necessity of evil as a foil for good, and against him, Plutarch in his treatise *adversus Stoicos*, c. 14, 15, urges several very clever arguments. In Chrysippus, moreover, this theory rests upon a Pantheistic basis.

man as the contrast between the soul from which good emanates, and the body whence evil comes.* Lactantius abides by the principle that evil is to be absolutely rejected, and he avoids any direct contradiction by maintaining that the second created spirit was not originally evil, but became evil in virtue of freedom, and that the corporeal nature is sinful only so far as it does not subordinate itself but rules. This thought, as it

afterwards appears in a different form in Joh. Scotus Scotus.

Erigena, is developed into a pantheistic explaining away of evil from a nominally higher standing-point. Scotus regards evil in all its forms in an aesthetic light, as that contrast in the ideal of the world, which though injurious to the individual, appears necessary and good if we survey the whole.†

The elements of this view of Scotus are certainly Augustine.

traceable in Augustine's earlier writings, and indeed, every logically consistent optimism, which regards the world not only as originally ordained by God's creative will, but as thus ordained even in its present state, and which makes not only the possibility but the fact of evil the necessary condition of the greatest possible perfection, leads unavoidably to such a solution and explaining away of evil. Augustine's treatises *De ordine*, and *De libero arbitrio*, are founded upon this second form of optimism, and in more modern times Leibnitz's *Theodicée* ‡ and Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* are based upon the same principle; but Augustine, even in the first-named treatise, seems to be perplexed by the logical consequences of his own principles, and the inquiry abruptly closes (lib. ii. c. 7) instead of leading to a definite conclusion; and in

* *Div. Instit.*, lib. ii. c. 8, 9, 12; lib. v. c. 7; lib. vii. c. 5. This view, the outlines of which only are hinted at here, strikingly coincides with the speculations of Jacob Böhme, and in another direction with Blasche's treatise. Jac. Böhme's thoughts upon this subject have been epitomized by Sigwart in *Das Problem des Bösen*, pp. 173-198. See Baur's *Christliche Gnosis*, p. 558, 569.

† *De divis. naturae*, lib. v. 35, 36, 38. Compare Fronmüller's able treatise *Die Lehre des Scotus Erigena vom Wesen des Bösen*, *Tüb. Zeitschrift für Theologie Jahrg.* 1830; part i. pp. 80, 81.

‡ Herein the *Theodicée* coincides with the optimistic philosophy of Chrysippus, as is shown e.g. by Tennemann, "*Geschichte der Philosophie*," vol. iv. pp. 296, 307. The before-named formula also, that evil is *par concomitance* united to good, resembles the κατὰ παρακολούθησιν of Chrysippus; compare the *Theodicée*, part 3, § 336.

his later writings, he resorts to the first form of optimism,* by which Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa* abides.†

This way of explaining evil has been carried to its extreme length in modern times. This is fully and thoroughly done in Blasche's treatise, *das Böse im Einklange mit der Weltordnung*, 1827. God is here regarded as pure and absolute Unity, the negation of everything actual and definite, pp. 78, 79, 98; the special and individual, the multiform and manifold, which are necessarily implied as contrasts or opposites to this unity, arise only by means of a fall from unity, *i.e.*, evil. All development of corporeal beings in the various spheres of nature—in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdom—is the evolution of a manifoldness which is placed in them as unity, and is therefore nothing less than a progressive fall, a continually repeated and more definite yet inherent sinfulness; and in like manner, the rise and progress of conscious life, and its awakening daily out of sleep, is to be regarded in the same way. That man may not boast of his origin from God, he is reminded that this derivation necessarily implies a departure from him or a fall, pp. 198–210, 219–227. Now, seeing that God in and for Himself, and apart from the world, is, according to this theory, a mere abstraction and “nothing actual,” p. 99, we find that in this system, like that of Buddhism, something comes out of nothing by means of evil alone. In this case, the fall of man is more effective than

* In the later writings of Augustine, *e.g.*, in the *Enchiridion*, c. 96, the thought recurs *bonum esse, quod mala sint*, but this always presupposes the depravity of the human race as a thing already realized. The existence of evil is good in so far as physical and moral evil form a punishment for the ungodly, and manifest the rectitude of God, and serve, moreover, as a wholesome discipline for the godly. The thought does not go beyond this though repeated in several ways in the *Civitas*, viz., that evil is punishment, and in its proper place is compatible with the beauty and well-being of the world, and has therefore been permitted by God.

† Not, however, without a very marked leaning to the other side. Thus, part i. qu. 48, art. 2: *perfectio universi requirit, ut sint quaedam, quae a bonitate deficere possint, ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere*. Further on in the same article we read, *ipsa rerum natura hoc habet, ut, quae deficere possunt, quandoque deficient*. Were this the correct view of the transition from the possible to the actual in the sphere of morals, the fact of evil must be regarded as necessary to the perfection of the world. If the fact be thus necessarily connected with the possibility, the possibility itself ceases to be a mere possibility, and is already a necessity.

God Himself; and the theory threatens to resolve itself into Pantheism, Dualism, or rather Pan-satanism. At the same time, it is clear that this extension of the notion of sin, which makes it the essential condition of all being, is a direct and entire doing away with the conception of it. If everything be sin, then sin is no more sin.

The explanation of evil given in Blasche's work belongs to that earlier stage of philosophical development, which knew no way of reconciling the finite and individual with the idea of the absolute, save by the supposition of a fall from primeval unity.* Some indications, however, of this view may be traced in Schelling's treatise, *über die Freiheit*, though elevated by their connection with a purer system, and thus obtaining another and a higher import. The view delineated above, finds its more perfect counterpart in Hegel's *Lehre von Bösen*, from which some parts of the description above given have been taken; and yet here also they are greatly modified by the system in which they occur. But the theory of evil which we have sketched, may be found in various forms and stages of development among the more highly cultivated of our own day, who pride themselves chiefly upon a more profound and spiritual view of life; among those who are too thoughtful to be satisfied with the ordinary sensuous theory, but not thoughtful enough, or rather too fashionable, to lay aside all pretentiousness, and to learn the unassuming yet sacred reality of the Christian doctrine of sin.

We shall not here enter upon the investigation of the various forms in which this theory of evil is presented in various philosophical systems, lest we should involve ourselves in irrelevant discussions. We shall keep to the general outline of the theory as we have sketched it, assured that no one acquainted with the subject will suspect us of having drawn a caricature for the sake of obtaining an easy victory.

It is evident that the question with which we have here to do, is one of the highest importance. Is sin essential to, and inseparable from, all self-conscious individuality? Is it a necessary element in man's

* The work, indeed, is chargeable with a clever, but barren, and therefore distorted apprehension of principles, which might in various ways have been set right by a reference to Schelling's "*Philosophie und Religion*."

manifestation and development? Or is individuality as involving the energetic awakening and activity of human life compatible with perfect sinlessness? It is evident from our earlier inquiry concerning the conception of guilt, that the truth of our consciousness of guilt, and of those other great religious doctrines dependent upon this, is concerned in our answers to these questions. If evil arises only from a general necessity in the world's development, sinful man is merely the instrument by which this unavoidable necessity is realized; his sinfulness is not in himself, and the reality of his guilt is destroyed. Upon the same alternative, moreover, depends the decision we arrive at concerning the questions, whether in Christ's earthly life, a truly human individuality was combined with perfect holiness—a doctrine which Docetism denies—and whether, supposing He possessed a truly human individuality, perfect holiness was possible to Him—which the extreme Ebionites denied; and lastly, whether the Christian doctrine of the kingdom of glory, and of a holy and blessed life for the redeemed in fellowship with God, be more than a dream,—an imaginary picture,—ravishing when gazed on from a distance, but upon closer examination resolving itself into incongruous elements.* As to this last question in particular, some gifted men among our contemporaries have candidly confessed that any such representation of an eternal life, from which, together with sin, all suffering, all conflicting interests, all effort against hindrances, and all contrasts of love and hatred are banished, and which is penetrated and filled with the love of God, and of one another, produces in them the feeling of a spiritless and deadening waste and void, nay, even of unendurable wearisomeness. They thus have openly avowed what multitudes have more or less distinctly felt. They fear that with the loss of sin they will lose themselves and everything, that they will sink into an abyss of indifferent and meaningless existence, or, indeed, of non-existence. If, notwithstanding, they require for themselves and others perpetual effort to conquer and destroy evil, this involves the self-contradictory obligation of labouring without ceasing after self-destruction.

* As to the Christian conception of a perfectly holy and blessed life, the question may be thus expressed: Do holiness and bliss exclude life, and does life exclude holiness and bliss?

We allow, indeed, that the theory of evil above described is prompted by a worthy motive. It cannot endure that any stage of our existence should be wholly without spiritual life, motion, and activity. But in order to this, does good always require the companionship of evil? Is it necessary that man should sink into inaction and spiritual sloth, when goodness alone rules in him apart from all incentive from its opposite? This question is already answered, if we will but recognize the truth that living and energetic activity is itself an element of real goodness and of true piety; and even if it were not so, why should not goodness be able to dispense with evil in its realization? If good obtained vigour and energy only by contact with evil, good, as distinct from evil, would be no longer good, and evil would be no longer evil; their opposition to each other would be only nominal, and the highest issue—that which alone could have any reality or worth—would be *good, in its connection with evil*, a logical fusion of the two, which would do away altogether with any distinction between them. Happily, however, that is only a weak and meagre conception of good which sees in it only what is weak and meagre, while it attributes strength and energy to evil alone. What sort of morality would that be which needed some admixture with evil in order to give it consistency, and to prevent its being dissipated into the indefinite and void? What sort of love, for instance, would that be which must be blended with hatred (and it must be hatred of the person loved) in order to become a living and active power? That inaction from which good is to be preserved by means of evil is itself an evil, so that granting the rest, we should after all have one evil conquered by another (inaction peradventure by passionateness) but not the good requiring evil for its realization.* To attribute all power of advance, of moulding terrestrial existence, as well as of negatively working, to evil, while we regard good as simply the principle of continuous existence, would be to maintain the

* Daub, in his *Judas Iscarioth*, rightly says, that “the idea of absolute good, together with the fear of God and conscience, forbid man’s regarding truth as dependent upon falsehood, love upon hatred, reality upon non-reality; as if, forsooth, humanity and nature, which are limited and fettered by what is contrary to their nature, could be nothing without this fettering, and were true and real only by means of those unnatural hindrances.”—Part ii. p. 377.

very opposite error to that combated in the second chapter of this book, the derivation of evil from the sensuous inertness of human nature. But instead of this, while history presents to us an impulse to movement and advance, confirming the definite reality of being, and bringing it into conformity with its true ideal, which must be a power of good in the history, it presents to us also a conservative power endeavouring to retain what has long been established, and as a mere *vis inertiae*, acting as a hindrance to healthy development; and this is of the Devil just as much as is that rude thirsting after change and destructiveness necessarily arising from rebellion against everything established and ordained as a check to arbitrary power. Now if it be argued that evil is useful and necessary in order to prevent the slumber of history in that conservative indolence, by a circle in the proof, that very evil is presupposed as already present, whose existence this theory would fain harmonize with the present order of the world.

§ 3. TWO TRUTHS HOSTILE TO THIS THEORY. There are two truths the recognition of which will enable us to distinguish what is erroneous and false in this theory of evil from the true and deep to which it attaches itself, and on which it rests.

The first. The first is, that our moral life is complete in itself according to God's original ordainment, without requiring evil as its complement; complete in itself, and this by means of contrast. It is quite correct to say that all finite life, in the sphere both of nature and of spirit, possesses in itself from the beginning the germ of manifold contrasts, and makes advance by the intervention and unfolding of these contrasts. It is no less true that the most vigorous growth of terrestrial existence, and its strongest impulse towards progressive development, consist in this striving of contrasts after adjustment. At every stage of the development we find contrasted qualities which before were foreign to each other harmonized and adopted into the unity of life. Thus, even in a stone there is a principle of movement, though only in one definite form—its weight, which, though it is passive, yet opposes itself to every influence from without, sometimes as a hindering power, and sometimes as a power overcoming hindrances. In the plant, again, the weight of its

material is not destroyed, but it is entirely subdued and pervaded by the formative power of the organism, and is thus, though living, harmonized with the contrast. Thus the plant stands, not like the stone, in a passive relation to the external world, but still in a state of receptivity; the forces which operate upon it from without serve to stimulate that organic development whereby it assimilates the material presented to it. In animal life, again, we find receptivity and spontaneity united in the same individual. Thus man, as the cornerstone and topstone of nature, combines and harmonizes in himself, *i.e.*, in the material part of his nature, all those contrasted qualities which appeared separately in lower stages of being and species, and in him we see them as if summed up and epitomized. But inasmuch as he is not only a material being, but also a spirit distinct from nature, his individual existence possesses this contrast or antithetic character, not only internally and subordinate to a higher unity, but outwardly, so that one of the contrasted elements may be said to be external to the individual. This is the essential limitation of all finite being developing itself in time, and for this very reason it can never wholly free itself, as an individual, from a certain onesidedness,—taking this word in its strictly etymological sense. That this unavoidable onesidedness pertains to all individual and finite life, even the highest—*i.e.*, in our experience, to humanity as the sphere of self-conscious individuality—is manifest in the fact that it possesses the distinctions of sex, which is not only a physical contrast, but pertains to the sphere of spirit likewise. In general, however, our conception of mental idiosyncrasy implies the fact that there are certain points in the endlessly varied web of human life and character which form prominent centres of attraction for innumerable threads and complications. These central points—whether we call them mental tendencies, talents, or preferences—have others opposed to or contrasted with them which are nevertheless equally justifiable. Thus all human idiosyncrasy, even the most perfect, though in itself an inexhaustible living whole, flowing from a never-failing spring, and not by any means to be derived by negation or limitation from a general conception of human nature, is withal only a particular section or

Contrasts in individual character.

part of the great whole wherein the ideal of humanity is summed up and realized ; and it will still remain this, when, having reached the goal of its development, it will perfectly correspond to its individual ideal.

But these contrasts in individual life exist only so far as the elements composing them have been ordained of God—not mutually to exclude one another—but mutually to seek and claim one another in order to harmony and strength. Such a harmony must involve a variety, the elements of which stand to each other in the relation of contrast, and are attracted to each other like the opposite poles of a magnet. Man's vocation is thus declared to be to live, not in the cold isolation of reserve, not as a self-sufficient hermit, but in society, humbly giving himself up to fellowship with others, to be a living member of the body corporate, and thus to benefit himself and others. His vocation is to love, and this, as the apostle teaches in 1 Cor. xii., xiii., xiv., is the true means of reconciling the contrasts of individual character, the real instrument of overcoming the limitations therein involved. Now, as these contrasts are ordained by God's creative will, so as mutually to produce a living unity, we may certainly affirm that they can become one, only so far as they are already one in the divine thought. The same holds true concerning the internal blending of contrasts in individual life, as this keeps pace with the advance of spiritual development. It is only an isolating and atomizing process, separating each element in the internal contrasts of individual character, and isolating each man from his fellows, so as to contemplate him as complete in himself alone, that can find any insolvable difficulties, or any real disorder in this original and essential dualism characterizing all finite existence.

But the distinctions of good and evil must be carefully separated from these divinely ordained antitheses. It is quite possible, of course, that there should be some among the innumerable contrasts of nature presenting a striking analogy to moral distinctions, the contrasts, for instance, of contraction and expansion, of lightness and heaviness, of heat and cold ; and it is not to be wondered at that they who are wont to look upon spirit merely

These
contrasts
pure and
sinless.

Moral
distinctions
differ from
these natural
contrasts.

as specially gifted nature, identify moral distinctions with some or all of these natural contrasts. But we have already seen how erroneous that view of spirit is ; and analogy is not identity. Good, in its full meaning—i.e., moral good, of which alone we now speak—must, according to the very essence of it, be something brought about by man. It is not something naturally existing from the beginning, or that can be produced at any moment ; it can be realized only as the result of a free development, whose task is to unite the manifold tendencies of life, which are relatively contrasted, in a vigorous and unbroken harmony. Thus the tendencies to mere continuance and to progress, to rest and to action, to the individual and the general, to analysis and comprehension, to violence and gentleness, to isolation and association, are contrasted with each other. The creative beginning of the truly moral life—the act of the will—by which man surrenders himself to God, is certainly simple. But this beginning itself consists in man's not resting "quietistically" in this act of will, but going forth to the inexhaustible fulness of human life, so as to mould and sanctify all its elements with his godlike energy. Remembering the distinctions already defined, no one can so mistake what we have recognized as the principle of moral good—viz., love to God—as to suppose that it consists in one side only of the series of contrasts, while it negatives the other. If it were so, then either the aim of morality would be to destroy that other side, or love itself would have only a relative meaning and partial excellence,—both alternatives being equally absurd. Love to God really embraces both sides in the series of natural contrasts ; it does not allow that they are contradictory to each other, but it works out the perfection of moral life by means of their mutual influence. A love of God and man which (as a narrow view of Christianity has often supposed) mars the power of action and choice belonging alike to male and female character, would not be genuine love. This, therefore, is the true and altogether satisfactory way in which moral good is realized in the sphere of human life.

Evil is in
some sense
the corre-
lative of
good.

But we do not deny that in a certain sense evil is a means of good. We shall in an after part of this treatise have to inquire how this comes to pass in an objective sense—for the doing of

evil must be possible for man if he be able to appropriate the morally good as his own, and if moral goodness is to be predicated of his acts. But this is true in a subjective sense also, in relation to the consciousness of good in man himself. If evil has once become real in the world, it must be perceived by personal beings, and this knowledge of it serves by contrast to produce a profounder consciousness of good.* And here we see how in the sphere of life which alone comes directly within our observation, they who turn to goodness after a bitter experience of the nature and power of evil in their own life, possess a much clearer perception of good than they whose consciousness has been but superficially moved by evil. But how does the man who has thus experienced the power of evil attain to moral goodness? Not by his own power, but by the redeeming grace of God. It is this alone which makes the evil which sinful man in rebellious arbitrariness begins (Rom. v. 20) the means of good. But what divine grace is able to bring out of evil, supposing it to be already present, and the salvation which it is able to work out from a state of arbitrariness and perversion by overcoming evil, cannot certainly be referred to as a proof of the necessity of evil.† Christian poetry may have ventured to adopt the expression

“ *O certe necessarium Adæ peccatum, quod Christi
morte deletum est !
O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit
habere redemptorem !* ”

* This has already been said by Plato, in his *De Legibus*, lib. vii. (Bekker's ed. part iii. vol. iii. p. 57), ἄνευ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατὸν, εἰ μέλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι. But he wisely adds, ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἂν δυνατὸν ἀμφοτέρω, εἴ τις αὖ μέλλει καὶ σμικρὸν ἀρετῆς μεθέξειν, ἀλλὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τούτων καὶ μανθάνειν αὐτὰ δεῖ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι' ἄγνοιαν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὅσα γελοῖα μὴδὲν δεῖον κ. τ. λ.

† Exception might also be taken against the oxymoron of Bernhard von Clairvaux,—“*ordinatissimum est minus ordinate interdum fieri aliquid*”—(*epist.* 276, *ad Eugen.* P.) if this bold language did not find its justification in the general tenor of Bernhard's thought. The well-known grammatical law *exceptio firmat regulam* may be taken as true in a subjective sense.

‡ These words occur in the *Missale Romanum*—in the Liturgy for Easter Eve—in a beautiful hymn upon the consecration of the lights, which tradition assigns to Augustine. But the words are not to be found in Gregor's *Liber sacramentorum*, nor in the old Roman liturgy by Muratori, nor in other old editions of the Missal. See Daniel, *Thesaurus hymnologicus*, tom. ii. pp. 312–314. Similar phraseology may, however, be found in the sacred poetry of modern as well as ancient times, especially in the hymns of the United Brethren.

but the calm and deliberate reflection of science can never venture to adopt such words. Evil, strictly understood, and accurately defined, is not merely a contrast to good, but positive hostility against it.

The external correlative wherein good must reflect itself clearly in consciousness, is simply the natural life, which in its essence is free love, the unconscious necessity of the powers of nature. Contrasts properly imply one another; neither member of a contrast can be taken as the whole, but each requires the other for its realization; there must therefore be a higher unity above both, which is perverted when the one would exclude the other. To apply these principles and definitions to the relation between good and evil, implies the most serious misconception of their nature. While evil ever strives to destroy good, good ever wages a war of extermination against evil; if it seeks to supplement or produce itself by means of evil, it would cease to be good, and would itself become evil.

The self-realization of good, by means of internal contrasts, —we may call it “immanent” in distinction from that other realization of it, which arbitrarily transgresses the sacred limits of the divine law,—implies that virtue, in its true sense, by no means consists in an apathetic *nil admirari*,—an immovable passivity,—such as the negative morality, not only of the Stoics, but of many modern philosophers and theologians, imagines as its highest ideal. True morality, in its realization and accomplishment, includes an abundance of energetic efforts. Every truly great character has at its foundation powerful energy, and nothing great and immortal in art or science, in character or state, has been accomplished without warm feeling. Christ Himself, who is perfect in holiness, spoke and acted with anything but apathy; He was equally vehement in the expression of His love, and of His wrath, which is only another revelation of His love.*

* We must here, however, be upon our guard against the opposite error into which Schelling (in his celebrated Discourse concerning the relation of plastic art to nature, and in his work on Freedom), and Hegel in his *Encyclopädie*, fall, of affirming concerning passion, what is here stated concerning affection or inspiration. In passion in its usual forms, the spirit, or more accurately the will,

If this immanent self-realization of moral good be recognized, the Christian hope of an eternal life of bliss for the redeemed, in God's perfected kingdom, is fully vindicated. If sin were necessary to self-conscious individuality, Christian belief in eternal life would be meaningless, save as a symbol or synonym for the absorption of the individual into God, *i.e.*, for the annihilation of self of personal existence,—whereby alone the consuming torment of the inner discord of good and evil can, according to this view, be brought to an end. If there be necessarily in personal individuality a germ and beginning of sin, or if, according to another form of the same doctrine, individuality itself is the result of an original fall from God, there can be no other redemption for man, most miserable of all creatures, than his annihilation, together with the contradiction which his very existence involves, or (to express the same thing more euphemistically) in his absorption into God. For that optimism, moreover, which confines its attention to the present state of the world, and regards sin as in most beautiful keeping with its supposed perfection, the idea of a kingdom of glory has no true meaning; it must regard the hope of it, and the desire after it, as, strictly speaking, impious and blasphemous. The Christian Church, on the contrary, preserved from such wanderings of one-sided speculation by the Word of God, and

is itself passive, and is in subjection to that which is below it, and which works upon it as a blind force of nature; and this surrender of the whole nature to any impulse of selfish inclination or dislike, however laudatorily described in modern poetry, is a state unworthy of spirit, a state of servitude. Even in cases where the inclination is unselfish, and where its object is spiritual, this passionate condition is a miserable narrowing of the mind, a depression of the spiritual life, because it necessarily involves man in dependence upon the object sought. Genuine enthusiasm, on the contrary,—and that only is genuine which is directed towards a worthy object,—is a higher freedom of the spirit, a deeper self-consciousness and realization of its true being. A discriminate use of language, therefore, forbids our speaking of a “passion for God;” because our relation to Him is not exclusive and binding, but all-embracing, confirming, and sanctifying, bringing true freedom to the spirit. Schelling, however, in his Discourse, more accurately describes his view, by making virtue to consist, not in the absence of passion, but in the power of the spirit over it, and we coincide with him here;—though passion, over which the spirit has control, can no longer be designated passion. The collected sayings of Maximus, the confessor, concerning the moral right or wrong of the *κινήσεις ψυχῆς* (referred to by Ritter, *Geschichte der Christl. Philosophie*, vol. ii. 543), furnish a striking parallel.

His Spirit working in her, rests hopefully in the faith of the perfecting of that kingdom, which God has begun on earth ; and regarding sin not as a necessary condition, but wholly as a disturbance of moral development, she lives in the assurance that upon her elevation to that realm of glory, the true and perfectly harmonious march of human existence will begin.

The other truth which we have to urge against the theory which we are now combating is that sin is not something isolated and merely outward, existing, as far as we are concerned, only when it is embodied in some definite action, but on the contrary, and as the investigations of our first Book showed, an OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE whose hindering and perverting influence pervades man's entire being. In the recognition of this affirmative proposition a negative truth is implied, viz., that the spiritual life of the individual does not need sin for its development ; and both propositions taken together justify the explanation of evil which we have already given.

Proceeding from will as the basis of all personality, sin penetrates deeply into human development, entwines itself like a rank and luxuriant creeper about all the branches and ramifications of life, hindering, disturbing, and complicating all. No sphere of life presents its normal order or true form undisturbed ; as sin cleaves to the will, so error cleaves to the mind, impurity to the imagination, misery to the feelings, pain and sickness to the corporeal nature. Nay more, in virtue of the dynamical and internal connection of man with nature, a disordering and destructive influence has gone forth into nature from man's sin. As the sensational nature in man struggles in various ways against acting as the organ of the spirit, and must first be subdued by care and discipline, so external nature likewise refuses that subjection for which it was originally designed, Gen. i. 26, 28. Its relation, as willingly subservient to man, is by no means wholly destroyed, it is still apparent in various ways ; but in these indications it is like a tattered robe torn in a thousand places ; it presents innumerable signs of the strangest and most violent resistance and the wildest revolt ; and instead of

§ 4. SECOND TRUTH militating against this view.

The awful ramifications of evil.

Even in nature.

In its relations to man.

nature being subject to man, we often find man subject to nature, and a helpless slave beneath its sway. This is true not only in the ice-bound regions of the pole, but under the glowing heaven where the animal and vegetable world unfold their richest luxuriance and beauty,—even there nature endeavours, and not in vain, to subdue man beneath her yoke,—and where it is forced to recognize his power, it repeatedly exerts its terrible strength against his painstaking toil, and robs thousands both of possessions and of life in the twinkling of an eye. But in the depths of its own life, as well as in its relations to man, nature is at variance with itself, and though the eternal laws of the Divine order prevail and conquer this variance, they do not wholly destroy it. As the right standard of true self-limitation has been lost in the sphere of the spirit, so the productiveness of the powers of nature seems to be seized by a wild fantastic tendency which confounds the worthless, the loathsome, and the monstrous, with the pure and beautiful. Countless degeneracies, abortions, and malformations of all kinds bear witness to a disturbance of the generative powers of nature, to a principle of disorder and lawlessness pervading all, and preventing the pure embodiment of its species in each individual; and yet, while this is working, the invincible power of these universal laws, the expression of God's will in nature, still asserts itself. But the most appalling phenomena in this sphere are the manifold imitations of human sin which present themselves so unmistakably in animal life, implanted by the force of instinct, and expressing themselves more or less even in the revolting and hideous physiognomy of some animals. Those forms of evil which are most revolting in the world of man—covetousness and envy, falsehood and spite, wild bloodthirstiness, and a cruelty making sport with the torments of its victims,—all these we find repeated in nature in the fixed and permanent characters of certain species.

In a word, our present state of existence taken as a whole, and including the relation in which we stand to nature, is so thoroughly under the power of sin, that we are unable even to form a correct conception of what a perfectly pure and untroubled development of human life really would be. This

We cannot form any adequate conception of what a sinless life would be.

purity is indeed presented to us in the holy life of Jesus Christ, but only in relation to the inner sphere of His life,—for we must not include what is miraculous ; man, even in his sinless development, would not have possessed a miraculous power over nature—and even in this sphere, on the one hand, we do not fully behold the development itself, but rather the result of it ; and on the other hand, the picture as far as our knowledge is concerned, is not complete but only fragmentary. It must be remembered, moreover, that in Christ the revelation and realization of His perfectly holy mind was conditioned and limited outwardly by the opposition of existing evil. If, notwithstanding these drawbacks, we endeavour to delineate or sketch a picture of human life in its manifold ramifications and departments, and begin by leaving out the strong solicitations to exertion, the impulses to action, the claims of interest which arise from the limiting and disturbing power of evil, no other elements present themselves to our view to take the place of these ; and it is not to be wondered at if the picture conveys the impression of tameness and want of life.* This feeling will naturally be strongest in those who possess no inner experience of a life spent in fellowship with God ; they will be quite unable to understand what there can be still to urge men on to action, when they are deprived of their selfish desires and sinful lusts.

Further, it is easy to see that when once sin is active in the will of a personal creature, it must find its most ready and immediate opportunities of perverted action in those divinely ordained contrasts which determine the life of the world and of the individual. If man's will has set itself at variance with God's will, what is only a contrast in those departments of life most closely connected with that inner centre of will, degenerates into a variance. The contrasted tendencies which mutually condition one another, and when duly blended produce the

* When a reviewer of this work asks me how I know that an immanent development of good apart from evil is possible, seeing that I acknowledge the imperfection of our conception of it, I reply that the entire course of our inquiry shows clearly that this possibility is implied in the harmony—plain to every religious mind—between our ideas of moral good and the ideal of life and its development. The strongest actual proof is certainly the sinlessness of Christ ; for no one will venture to assert that Christ could not have been holy if the men about him had not been sinners.

health and beauty of human life, separate, assume a hostile attitude, and endeavour to destroy one another. It is, therefore, as much the rule of a life beset with sin as it is contrary to the original ordainment of God, that the conquest of a thousand errors is the way to obtain a thorough knowledge of the truth, and that the pain of conflict should be the only path to peace. Herein we have the key to the strange fact, that the most highly gifted characters have to pass through the greatest difficulties and the worst aberrations in their way to the goal. Gifted of God in order to a fuller and richer harmony, the elements of their character—those talents which they possess in common with others, and those peculiar to themselves,—their spiritual and sensuous nature—are at still greater variance; and while in their spirit the noblest aspirations arise, while peradventure a desire after what is highest and noblest will many a time spring up in their heart of hearts as an ardent longing, they wrestle in vain to free themselves from the fearful tyranny of sensuous passions. Heaven and hell seem to be striving together in them and for them, and the most contradictory thoughts, inclinations, and deeds may be found in them side by side. Woe to them if, upon the plea that they are following nature, they raise themselves above the eternal laws of morality, and, on the ground of being stronger spirits, demand an exceptional standard. But who can fail to perceive that a more difficult task has been assigned to them than to persons of a weaker organization? And if they do not fulfil this task, if their life is not wholly freed from entanglement in discords and contradictions of all kinds, who among us shall throw the first stone at them?

And is the history of the human race as a whole in any respects different? It does not advance onwards to its appointed goal by a steady, unwavering development, preserving its central unity amid the unfoldings of various forces; but, on the contrary, it has to pass through the greatest discord and the wildest aberrations.* History marches on, not only by means of contrasts,

* When Satan said to Christ that the kingdoms of the world which then existed were in his power to give to whomsoever he would, he said this of course as the "liar from the beginning," yet appearances were certainly in his favour.

but by startling contradictions, and shows its partiality for new and eccentric aims, alternately demanding, combating, and subduing one another. The present usually raises itself upon the ruins quite as much as upon the foundations and structures of the past. No age has any idea how many living and fructifying germs, sown by the preceding generation, it passes by and destroys in order to cherish and develop others with a one-sided partiality; no age is perfectly just to its predecessors. And if, in order to avoid any extreme, any given age or generation would redeem its character by a universal system of justice, an impartial theory of compensation, it would only be a new extreme, an unmeaning equalization and levelling of good and evil, and a confusion of the genuine with the worthless, of the baneful with the healthy, which would be anything but justice.

Since the introduction of Christianity indeed, a strong life-
 The stream of giving stream flows through the world's history
 Christianity and preserves it from relapsing into the wild
 in history. chaotic confusion, which ended in the destruction
 of the old world. It has proved itself an effective means of union for the nations amid the clashings of opposing elements, a never-failing source of regeneration for sickly and dying times. As in the order of nature it has been divinely decreed by God's covenant after the Flood, "While the earth remaineth seed-time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night shall not cease," so the divine warrant has been given regarding the inviolable order of history in the words of our Lord, "the gates of hell shall not prevail against my Church" * (Matt. xvi. 18; compare also Matt. xxiv. 35, and xiii. 33). In this last-named passage the aim and end of Christianity is expressly likened to a divine leaven, leavening human life throughout, till the whole is leavened. But while this penetrating work of Christianity in the sphere of history is still so far from its accomplishment, the divine order maintains itself only amid disorder, and the tide of history advances as if amid violent ebbs and flows. Strong reaction against a tendency on one side, with difficulty escapes the danger of

* We find this thought commented upon by Steffens in his *Anthropologie*, vol. i. p. 530, with deep insight into the co-ordinate principles of nature and of history.

going to the opposite extreme, and a new poison is often developed from the very means of cure.

All this arises from sin which has troubled the stream of human development to its lowest depths, and given it an uneven and wavering motion. In consequence of this disturbance, phenomena which have their origin in sin may become beneficial as opposing checks counteracting other sinful forces. This is true especially of war, which, as the theory we described above maintains, may be a true benefit, preserving the life of nations. But how? and upon what ground? Because nations cannot endure too long a season of peace and quiet; it is apt to develop in individuals a bias towards petty selfishness and narrow-mindedness, and it tends to stunt and wither national character; moreover it augments men's trust in worldly possessions, confirming the delusion that they are stable and permanent. War is necessary to preach to nations the instability of all earthly things, and they require such palpable preaching, because sin has fettered them to the earthly. But seeing that war has generally * its origin in sin, we can easily understand how, while trampling down one weed it sows broadcast another,—reckless immorality and unbridled lawlessness.

As to the relation of sin and its effects to art, and especially to poetry—for it is to this department chiefly that the opinion I am combating refers—there is certainly truth in the representation that an entire exclusion of the inner discord of human life from this sphere would deprive its pictures of all individuality, and give them a pale haziness, a sameness and simplicity void of interest. It is of course a most interesting and attractive task to trace a hidden order amid the confusions of life. But we can never allow that moral discord and confusion are necessary to the living development and individualizing character of poetic art. Such a supposition obviously rests upon the mistaken notion that a life undisturbed by sin would be destitute of all motive to action and all incentives of contrast; that all participation in human relationships in the joys and

* I say generally, for in particular cases, when the relations of nations to each other are established, war may arise without any apparent blame or injustice on either side.

sorrows of earth would cease if the principles of the divine life attained full sway. When any one turns away from the earthly side of human life and its endless change and variety, with indifference or even with railing and condemnation ; when he is unmoved by the most wonderful phenomena and the profoundest agitations of the world, he certainly cannot be commended as evincing thus a stronger piety or more perfect love to God. So far as his conduct is not owing to some natural defect or idiosyncrasy, it must be condemned as a vagary of fanciful monasticism, an endeavour to solve the problem of human life by separation from and rejection of it, instead of reconciling it to God and hallowing it by piety. Seeing, however, that there are these discords in human life, disarranging every sphere of it, producing the greatest sorrows and the most perplexing difficulties, poetry must take it as it is and shadow it forth in its workings and effects. Its aim should not certainly be to represent and describe discord and disorder for its own sake, but only as contrasted with harmony restored. We cannot affirm that this canon is realized, at least in its full and Christian sense—whereby alone true harmony can be restored—in our modern poetry.

Quite a different view of the scope and end of poetry has
 Rückert's view. been given by our gifted and learned poet Friedr. Rückert, in a thoughtful and suggestive poem, which bears so closely upon the subject before us that we cannot refrain from quoting the opening lines :—

“ In turning o’er the leaves of history’s thick book,
 Almost on every page thou findest some sad tale
 Of perverse strife or cruel treachery.
 Each deed of light on a dark background stands.
 The poet’s art, which boasts that it is free,
 Follows with servile tread this rut of history ;
 It knows of nothing that will more amuse
 Than covert trickery and bloody crime :
 As if God’s world had nought for art to grace,
 Save what concealing one would fain efface.” *

We could not think, on theological grounds, of defending poetry which obstinately pries into the dark abysses of sin and wallows in its mire ; but though perfect silence and reserve concerning it may well become the calm self-reflecting nature

* Rückert (born 1788, died 1866), *Die Weisheit des Brahmanen*, vol. i. p. 85.

of the Brahmin, it would be anything but promotive of a profound and spirited development of poetry. How could this reserve be maintained in such poetry as makes us feel as Shakespeare.

Goethe did when reading Shakespeare's plays, "as if the storm were opening the leaves of the world's history" ? If "every deed of light on a dark background stands," the knowledge of this dark ground is closely interwoven with the dearest interests of human life, every other enigma of our being is involved in this. The poet's art may well "amuse," but it cannot disclose to us the secrets of our own bosom if it keeps silence concerning the inner variance of man with his better self. If one of the greatest Milton.

poets the world ever saw, has made paradise the theme of a rich and varied poem, he has succeeded in his theme only by reminding us throughout the "regained" harmony, of a "paradise lost,"—of a discord that has been overcome.

Thus is it regarding our present standing-point, our present state. As for those who have attained perfection, Individuality retained in a state of perfection. there cannot be an unreal sphere of poetic representation, because to them the perfected reality has become itself the highest poetry—the purest development and blended harmony of individuals according to their perfectly realized ideal, even as from eternity it was contained in the divine mind. Sin, so far from belonging to the distinctive features and individual peculiarities of human character, is exactly that which disturbs and hinders these,—as Steffens has cleverly shown in his "Caricatures of the Holy,"—that which in their earthly life prevents the full manifestation of ideal and distinctive character. Holiness, which in its essence is love, does not destroy idiosyncrasy, it confirms and sanctifies it ; and no one need fear that he would suffer the loss of his individuality if sin had no more place within him.

The theory we have been discussing,—overwhelmed by the thousands of phenomena in human life wherein sin § 5. Evil in its relation to the race as a whole. so reveals its fearful power, that no one can explain it as a mere incentive to active individual development,—withdraws at last from the individual to the

general. It argues that out of the moral ruin of the individual, the most admirable triumph of the race springs. The dark shadows of sin which lie brooding over portions of the human family, by contrast with the light and virtue illuminating other portions, are said to tend to the glory of the whole. This thought has been advocated upon other principles than that of this theory, and has been modified in some degree, but variously applied by Optimists and Predestinarians. What Augustine says, particularly in his books, *De Ordine* and *De libero arbitrio*,* Leibnitz also in many parts of his *Theodicée*,† and Schleiermacher in his “*Reden über Religion*,”‡ and in his dissertation upon the Doctrine of Predestination,§ as to the significance of evil in the divine government of the world, is either identical with, or at least borders upon this theory. Passages of Scripture, too, have sometimes been appealed to as sanctioning it, in particular John ix. 3; 1 Cor. xi. 19; 2 Tim. ii. 20.

Let us examine the true import of these passages. In the Examination last the apostle by no means pretends to explain of texts the phenomenon of sin, but, stating its power referred to. 2 Tim. ii. 20; among men as an acknowledged fact, he compares the visible Church to a great house wherein are vessels to honour, and vessels to dishonour. That this pertains to the Divine order of things, he by no means says, he simply states a fact. When in the following verse (the 21st) he speaks of one who is a vessel unto honour, *εὐχρηστον τῷ δεσπότῃ* he represents this character as moulded by its own independent action;

* *De ordine*, lib. i. c. 7, *De lib. arb.*, iii. c. 9. Augustine in these earlier writings regards the contrast between the pious and the impious, the blessed and the lost, as ordained of God, and as arising from a natural distinction between a higher and a lower race, which agrees with his bias before noticed towards a quantitative view of the distinction of good and evil. See, concerning this aspect of the Augustinian system, the thorough investigations of Ritter, *Geschichte der Christl. Philosophie*, vol. ii., pp. 319, 328.

† *Eg.*, part ii. § 119, 122, 123, 128. Especially striking is the language of § 123, “*puisque ces maux (le péché et le malheur) devoient exister, il falloit bien qu’il y eût quelques uns, qui y fussent sujets, et nous sommes ces quelques uns* ;” which enables us to understand another expression, § 122,—“*Si quelqu’un est méchant et malheureux avec cela (avec cet ordre de l’univers), il lui appartenait de l’être.*”

‡ 3d ed. pp. 126, 130 f. A confusion is traceable here between moral contrasts and natural differences of character.

§ *Theologische Zeitschrift*, part i. pp. 80, 81.

and how, then, could he have explained the contrasted characters, "the vessels to dishonour," as moulded by the ordainment of God, and not by their own will and choice?

In 1 Cor. xi. 19, St. Paul certainly does speak of 1 Cor. xi. 19; it as the divine decree (δεῖ) that dissensions within the fellowship (σχίσματα, v. 18) should result in decided separations, and even sects (αἵρέσεις v. 19, where the intensive καὶ must not be overlooked), in order that genuine Christians might be made manifest in distinction from their false brethren. But the presence of dissension is thus presupposed; the apostle teaches neither here nor elsewhere that this has itself its foundation in a decree of God, to the end that good might be made manifest by its contrast with evil; on this point he unquestionably abides by the word of our Lord, Matt. xiii.

39.* John ix. 3 refers not to moral but to physical evil. John ix. 3;

As to the doctrine in itself that the divine government sacrifices a part of the human race, giving it over to destruction, in order that the rest, or (if it be preferred) God Himself may enjoy a higher and more perfect harmony, there can hardly be a greater violation than is this of the dignity conferred by God on man, in ranking him above all other beings by the gift of personality and creation in His own image. In comparison with such a degradation, the slavery and Helotism of the ancients was a mild and liberal institution, and the vindication of it as a necessary offset to the consciousness of freedom among citizens was a humane thought; for therein man was treated as a chattel instead of a person, in his earthly state and relations only; but according to this doctrine he is thus treated in his eternal and absolute relations to God. It is by giving him personality that God has placed man in this absolute

* There is still less difficulty in explaining Matt. xviii. 7, ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν τὰ σκάνδαλα. As in 1 Cor. xi. 19, the δεῖν connected with ἵνα οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροί γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν attributes a certain teleological necessity to the occurrence of dissensions, so the ἀνάγκη here (in Luke xvii. 1, ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ ἐλθεῖν τὰ σκάνδαλα) implies a necessity aitiological only. It is based of course upon the power of sin as already present among men. There is not a word to sanction any reference of the passage to the divine decree, as Meyer would make out in his *Handbuch* upon St. Matthew. Regarding 1 Cor. xi. 19, see Rückert's Commentary on 1 Cor.

relation to Himself; and having done this, He will sacrifice no individual to the whole, but offers to each His redeeming love in order to draw him into fellowship with Himself.

The extreme to which Beza's logical consistency in his Beza's view "*Mümpelgartschen Religionsgespräch*" has pushed a thought of Augustine's, also violates most wantonly man's dignity as a personal being, and our faith in the highest truth of God's love. In Beza's opinion, sin and its power could not have been dispensed with in the world, because the contrast, always represented as dualistic, between those two attributes of God, His righteous judgment (*judicium*) on the one hand, and His mercy (*miserericordia*) on the other, demanded objects on which to manifest themselves.* Besides

erroneous. the declarations of Christ Himself, we have those of the Apostle Paul, assuring us how highly and sacredly man as an individual is esteemed in God's sight, and how he cannot be a mere instrument whereby his Creator may reveal His attributes; and a seemingly contradictory statement, such as Rom. ix. 21, cannot move us from this conviction, even though we know of no satisfactory solution of the difficulty.† The infinite importance of individual personality is confirmed not only by isolated passages in Holy Writ—such as Luke xv. 7; Matt. xviii. 14; Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 11—it lies at the very foundation of Christianity,

* The germ of Beza's theory is traceable in the acute anti-Manichæan Dialogue *De causa et ortu malorum*. We there read, "*Quorum enim miseratus fuisset, cum non essent, qui peccarent? Qui bonus esse queat, cum nemo malus esset, qui ea Dei bonitate opus haberet?*"

† A true solution is discovered in the circumstance that St. Paul here and throughout the chapter is speaking of the human race (of whom Rom. ix. 21. God has power to make vessels to dishonour as well as to honour) as already the subjects of sin and guilt. This thought is in keeping with the entire scope of the epistle, but it specially appears in the passage cited, because the apostle represents those who were to be lost as already the subjects of God's wrath (ver. 22). It is not solely the bare relation of the Creator to the creature of which the apostle is speaking; the *φύραμα* is already depraved. Keeping to this fact, the most literal exposition of the difficult expressions of this verse and chapter will not shake the principle that the ultimate source of sin in a personal being lies nowhere but in himself. To this must be added a second consideration, viz., that in this place St. Paul is not describing the actual conduct of God towards sinful men, but only explaining how He might act without violating His justice. See the accurate remarks of Petersen in his elaborate work on Church Doctrine, vol. i. p. 62.

and pervades it throughout. Upon this truth those fundamental moral principles of Christianity rest which have exerted so powerful an influence in moulding the world's history by progressive development, excluding from marriage, from family relations, and from the State, whatever is at variance with the recognition of the infinite value of a human soul.

We conclude this discussion by quoting a striking remark of Nitzsch, "the dogmatic assertion that good requires evil for its glorification is no less objectionable than the ethical maxim, 'let us do evil that good may come,' or ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ, Rom. vi. 1."* This is all the more true, because so long as the dogmatic assertion is maintained, the less security have we against the immoral maxim.

It has been already remarked that the Hegelian doctrine concerning evil is a modification of the theory which we have now been examining. It is natural that the main features of this theory, when associated with a definite philosophical system, should be more or less particularized and modified; and we must not therefore wholly omit a more minute examination of these modifications.

First, as to the nature of evil, Hegel makes it consist in abstract subjectivity, or, more exactly, in arbitrariness,—in making self the ruling principle, instead of universal good,—in the Subject's recognition of his individuality as that which determines him, so far as it asserts some subjective interest in opposition to moral good.†

If it be asked, what is this subjective interest? Hegel vouchsafes us the reply that this formal self-assertion finds its subject-matter only in the natural will, in man's instincts, passions, inclinations, and so forth.‡ In this sense evil is more accurately defined, "the adherence of the spirit to its naturalness;" or, to adopt another mode of expression, "spirit in its state of nature isolating itself."§ The spirit must begin with its natural state, with what it is at the outset, but if it have any conception of its relations and

* *System der Christl. Lehre*, p. 221, 6th ed.

† *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 139 (*Werke*, 1st ed. vol. viii. p. 184); *Encyklopädie*, § 511 (3d ed. p. 513).

‡ *Philos. des Rechts*, p. 184.

§ *Vorles. über die Philos. der Rel.*, vol. i. pp. 163, 167 (*Werke*, vol. xi.). *Phanomenol.*, p. 582 (vol. ii.).

its harmony, it must go out of this state in order to be Spirit ; this state of nature or "naturalness" is not proper to it, and if it makes this the subject-matter of its will—if it chooses and wills this state of nature—this is the negation of Spirit, or evil. The mere animal is guiltless, neither good nor evil ; but man, because he has consciousness or will, is in his naturalness wild and evil.* "Naturalness" in itself is not evil, but only so far as it is recognized in the sphere of Spirit, only so far as it enters into consciousness and is adopted as right and real by the subjective will. Inasmuch then as naturalness as such is not blameworthy, and as variance occurs only through consciousness or will, it is no real contradiction, but only a remarkable example of the flexibleness and ambiguity of this system to say, as Hegel does in other places, that evil is "the first stepping forth of spirit from this naturalness," "the self-withdrawment of the *ego* from a state of nature."†

By "naturalness" Hegel certainly means more than is implied in the theories which derive evil from the opposition of "the sensuous nature" to the spirit. But our investigations thus far concerning the nature of evil sufficiently show how inadequate this "naturalness" in its widest sense is to furnish subject-matter for the evil will. It only serves to hide the innermost depths of evil, to underrate the most spiritual and, on this account, the most aggravated forms of wickedness. Thus, for instance, there is a licentious and reckless self-idolatry of the human mind which by no means appears where "naturalness" with its impulses and passions prevails, but only in the ranges of the highest and most cultivated intelligence.‡ The presupposition already examined of the evolution of the spirit from nature lies at the foundation of this view, but, as developed in Hegel's system, we cannot object to this as involving a degradation of man's

* *Vorles. über die Philos. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 194 ; vol. ii. p. 64. *Philosophie des Rechts*, pp. 185, 187.

† *Vorles. über die Philos. der Rel.*, vol. ii. p. 210 f. *Phänom.*, p. 587.

‡ "Naturalness," in this philosophical use of the word, which is opposed to spirit just as immediateness is to mediation, or isolation to harmony, must not be confounded with "naturalness" in its theological sense, which is opposed to grace. A person may have left "naturalness" in the Hegelian sense far behind him, who in the judgment of Christianity is still in the depth of that state.

true dignity, because God Himself is not allowed in this respect to have any pre-eminence over the human spirit. The unsatisfactory representations of the conquest of evil resulting from this view of its nature shall be considered by us just now.

Another and more important question is, how does man come to prefer this "naturalness" to the universal good as the subject-matter of his will? The reason of this, Hegel tells us, does not lie in any necessity of nature; man can will evil, but he is not obliged to will it. On the contrary, there is a necessity which opposes evil, moral necessity, attaching itself only to good; evil is an act of arbitrariness of spiritual wilfulness; it is what ought not to be, *i.e.*, what ought to be done away.* But are these two expressions identical? In the Hegelian phraseology they are, and this is an important point in our criticism. "Evil ought not to be," means usually "it ought not to occur at all," but here, its meaning is only "it ought not to continue," or "to remain," "it should be overcome." But it is at once clear that the necessity of evil generally is by no means excluded by this, indeed, it is rather included, for to say that evil is not to continue, that it is to be overcome, implies that it exists. Hegel himself expressly recognizes this necessity.† Evil, therefore, which ought not to be, must exist in virtue of a higher speculative and logical necessity.‡ What is affirmed, is not the simple and immediate negative, but a negation of the negative.§ The idea must separate itself, it must in the progress of its development alienate itself, in order by again obviating this alienation, to realize itself as Spirit. Spirit is the infinite harmony, that which spirit brings itself to; but the natural

* *Philos. des Rechts*, § 139. *Philos. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 195; vol. ii. 217. *Encykl.* § 248.

† Especially in § 139 of the *Rechtsphilos.* See also *Phil. der. Rel.*, vol. i. 193, 194, ii. 77.

‡ Vatke, who discusses the problem concerning the necessity of evil from the standing-point of Hegel in the fullest and most careful manner (*Die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verh. zur Sünde und zur göttl. Gnade*, pp. 262-303, 467), describes this necessity as "intelligible" or ideal. This view may in general be most simply described thus:—Physical necessity has nothing to do with the existence of evil; moral necessity excludes it; but metaphysical necessity requires it, yet only in order to the realization of good.

§ *Phil. des Rechts*, p. 187 *Vermischte Schriften* (*Werke*, vol. xvi.), pp. 469, 470.

unity from which it proceeds is, strictly speaking, spiritless, and must be obviated by means of discord. "Man must eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, otherwise he would not be man, but an animal only." * "The essence of man is Spirit, but it is essential to Spirit to exist for itself, to be free, to oppose itself to 'naturalness,' to raise itself from its passive state in nature, to set itself at variance with nature, and by and through this variance or separation, to reconcile itself again both with nature and with itself, with its essence, with its truth."† Accordingly, Hegel does not hesitate to affirm that

* *Vorles. über die Gesch. der Philos.*, vol. iii. pp. 100, 105 (*Werke*, vol. xv.). Compare *Philos. der Rel.*, vol. i. 196, ii. 212. "Hegel divides the whole of philosophy into three parts, viz., Logic, Natural Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Spirit. These three are but different stadia or degrees of manifestation of one and the same IDEA. Hegel defines the word *idea* to be what is true in and for itself, the entire correspondence or union between the notion of a thing and the thing as it really exists, between the conception and the object, the thing in its objective existence (*Encyclopädie*, § 213). The definition of *idea* and the definition of *truth* are with him one and the same thing. The *idea* is the same as what is elsewhere called the *absolute*. The first part of philosophy, Logic, is the science of this Absolute idea, of what is really true, in its abstract character, as it exists in and for itself. The second part of his system comprises Natural Philosophy. Nature is a manifestation of the same Absolute Idea, but in a different form. It is the same absolute substance, but existing materially, externally, instead of spiritually. The third part comprises the Philosophy of Spirit. This is the highest stage of the development of the Absolute Substance or absolute idea. It has here, so to speak, returned back from the material and external shape which it took in nature, and has become spiritual. As it existed in the realm of nature, being material and external, it was deprived of some of its true characteristics, it was in a foreign land, an estranged condition. But in the realm of spirit, it reassumes its true, its permanent, its real characteristics." *Bibliotheca Sacra*, vol. ii. 277; see also the able sketch of Hegel's system in WILLM'S *Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande*, vol. iv.—*Tr.*

† *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. i. 193. If we are to avoid having three negations here instead of two, Hegel's meaning must be taken to be this:—the term "Naturalness" is not in itself the negation of spirit, but it becomes so by being regarded as man's real and essential state by the will. The reality or perfection of spirit consists in the negation of this negation." There is here, as above observed, an ambiguity in Hegel's conception of "naturalness" by virtue of which he can in the passage above quoted, describe the essence of spirit as consisting in "separating itself from or setting itself at variance with nature," and immediately afterwards, represent it as an enhancement of this variance that the spirit should "set itself at variance also with its essence and its truth," and this, as we have already seen, "through isolation of its natural existence." Accordingly, the spirit raises itself out of its state of depression in nature, in order, by the isolation of its natural existence, to realize itself as Spirit.

this variance of man with himself, in which evil consists, belongs to the true conception of man.*

These affirmations have by no means the import which some of Hegel's disciples would attribute to them, as if the necessity of evil were to be attributed to the state of self-contained existence, only as it remains immanent in the universal, and reserves the possibility of separation, but not when it has actually separated itself. As by this separation, self-contained existence first becomes evil, if this interpretation of Hegel's doctrine were correct, it would obviously follow that evil might, perhaps, be spoken of in an exoteric way ; but certainly not within the range of a system which is only the unfolding and evolution of logical sequences. But any glance into Hegel's writings, *e.g.*, §§ 507–512 of the *Encyklopädie*, and §§ 82–104, 139, 140 of the *Rechtsphilosophie* contradicts this. Spirit submits itself to the utmost estrangement, in order, by the most striking contrast, to become certain of its identity. "It attains its full reality, only by finding itself in absolute dis severance."† Not in play, but in earnest, it pushes the distinction on till it becomes contrast and opposition, in order again to overcome it by toil and conflict, and to unfold in this conflict a great variety of determinations.

The necessity of evil, therefore, from Hegel's standing-point, is something unmistakably different (as Strauss rightly maintains),‡ from Spinoza's doctrine. According to Spinoza, all active and practical impulse is absorbed in a contemplative contentment with human circumstances and acts as they are ; moral consciousness, with its distinctions of good and evil, is reduced to a mere prepossession ; what is called evil has its appropriate place by the same necessity as good. In Hegel's system, on the contrary, the necessity of evil is wholly conditional upon and involved in the necessity of good ; evil exists only because good requires it, in order that good may realize itself, by overcoming it ; by evil a stimulus is given to a progressive movement, which must gradually supplant and crush evil.

* *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 217, 218. Compare *Philos. des Rechts*, 187. "The will is, according to the true conception of it, both good and evil."

† *Phänomenol.*, p. 26.

‡ *Christl. Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. 380, 381.

But are the claims of our moral consciousness satisfied by this? * In the first place, it is evident that these two necessities, the metaphysical and the moral, contradict each other; what the one demands, the other excludes. How can a moral necessity which forbids evil maintain itself in a consciousness which admits the metaphysical necessity of evil? The Hegelian system must allow those who have learned, by an unbiassed contemplation of human nature, the untiring earnestness requisite to overcome evil, to doubt whether this can be. †

But apart from the practical consequences of this theory, as bearing upon consciousness, how can the contradiction between the two necessities be maintained? It is least of all admissible upon the principles of "abstract Theism," ‡ which would have

* We agree with Strauss when he says (p. 379) that the best grounded "moral accusations" against the results of any system are no refutation of it in a scientific point of view. But it nevertheless holds good that a system which lays claim to truth, must prove itself to be in harmony with the moral consciousness of man. None but a conscience utterly degraded could willingly sacrifice moral truth to the idol of logical sequence demanding such a sacrifice. Strauss himself cannot help recognizing this, else why did he not rest satisfied with Spinoza? Must not a speculation, which boasts of being "free from any pre-suppositions," explain—without dissipating—the conception of moral good as well as that of life?

† To obviate these inferences, Vatke (p. 279) affirms that "whoever begins to reflect upon the necessity of evil will soon turn his back upon the logical process, which shows how evil comes to pass." If this statement is to serve its purpose, it must be taken to mean that, when once by reflection the necessity of evil is recognised, nothing more remains to be explained; that when once we have passed that turning-point, evil no longer exists, or at least is not really present in human life. We might wish it were so, for the sake of the logical consistency of this view, but experience does not confirm such a notion. This has not escaped Vatke himself, for further on he adopts another method, in order to avoid the clashing of moral consciousness and practical interests with this doctrine of necessity. It is said to hold good only of those immoralities, from which even the best are not free;—sins of weakness, of inaction, of haste, are said sufficiently to indicate this necessary contrast (p. 456, 471). Vatke, in his review of this work (*Hall. Jahrb.* 1840, p. 1134), narrows the circle of this necessity still more. There he makes out that the experience of sin, "in sinful thoughts," suffices to prove its reality. Strauss (*Christl. Glaubensl.*, vol. ii. 382), rightly calls this an illogical statement, resorted to for the sake of the dogma of the sinlessness of Jesus; it is an affirmation, moreover, which does not answer even this purpose, and which, on Vatke's principles, is meaningless.

‡ In explanation of the expression "abstract theism," as used by Vatke and others, we must bear in mind a remark of Schleiermacher's, to the effect that

to regard the supposed metaphysical necessity of evil as an element of the divine government, and must nevertheless abhor the blasphemy of attributing to God a deceptive or ambiguous will and law. Yet it is no less inadmissible upon the principle of any philosophical system; for how utterly self-destructive and nugatory does the notion seem, that evil ought not to be realized and yet of necessity must.

If, however, we examine the system more closely we shall find that the contradiction is really obviated in such a manner as to suppress and deny the moral "ought not," just so far as it ventures to object to the speculative "must." Hegel in his *Rechtsphilosophie* (p. 544) asserts that the moral obligation, the "ought not" forbidding evil, cannot remain, and must in turn be removed. According to this the matter stands as follows:—In so far as evil ought not to be, *i.e.*, as the prevailing and permanent element of life, it is not required by any metaphysical necessity; but, in so far as this metaphysical necessity demands it, we cannot say that it ought not to be. The contradiction between the moral and the metaphysical necessity is thus obviated, but at what cost? Conscience, which forbids the prevalence of evil, pronounces an equally distinct veto against the occurrence of evil at all, and if we are not to trust its latter judgment, how can its former be maintained? If the authority of conscience in its integrity and universality cannot be preserved against any metaphysical necessity, how can it be maintained when abridged and maimed? On the other hand, these definitions and explanations lead unavoidably to the startling conclusion that metaphysical necessity is not attributable to moral evil at all—to evil in its reality as that which ought not to be—to subjectivity maintaining its opposition to the universal; and moreover, even if the reality of evil be not straightway denied, it remains still entirely unexplained, and

he who pursues the middle path seems to them who keep to the left to deviate towards the right. Thus Christian theology, while from the creation to the end of all things it excludes all deistical isolation of Deity, yet, in opposition to Pantheism, maintains the distinction between God and the world, and thus is naturally exposed to the reproach of teaching an abstract separation between God and the world. Deism, on the other hand, has imagined that pantheism is traceable in the essential doctrines of the gospel.

argument, from beginning to end, is fruitless.* Evil thus the unexplained would be nothing less than an insuperable contradiction of the doctrine of the Absolute in this philosophy, which should perfectly unfold itself in the sum total of clear and reasonable thought; *i.e.*, this "absolute" would be no longer "the absolute," but would be resolved into an absolute Dualism.

It is clear that upon this principle of the necessity of evil the conception of guilt cannot in its true import be entertained. Yet Hegel always describes evil as man's guilt, and the question arises,—In what sense? Hegel replies, "When subjectivity maintains its antithesis and isolation from the universal, *i.e.*, when it is evil, it acts for itself, asserts itself only, and thus is really arbitrariness. The individual subject accordingly must be chargeable with the guilt of its own evil."† But this is only

* This fruitlessness of the theory is clearly indicated in Vatke's endeavours to reconcile this "intelligible" or metaphysical necessity of evil with the moral necessity against it. At p. 290, indeed, for the consolation of human weakness, it is said that no individual is obliged to realize evil in all its forms, for this would be impossible, but what the individual cannot do is accomplished by mankind collectively. But from what is afterwards developed it appears that according to Vatke's view, mankind collectively may only require sins of infirmity, of indolence, and of haste, as the antitheses of good, but that vice and crime and all the grosser forms of immorality may disappear from society without thereby superseding morality (p. 471). These sins of infirmity, being regarded as absolutely necessary, are no longer, properly speaking, sins; and real sin, as it is not to be included in the metaphysical necessity, remains still unexplained. This becomes still more evident in the monstrous distinction between what is "normal" and "abnormal" in the accumulation of evil realized in the world (p. 472), which manifestly answers to the above-named division of sins. The appeal to "the logic of arbitrary will," in order to explain the transformation of "normal" evil into "abnormal," is only a subterfuge of arbitrary logic. What is to be explained is a phenomenon affecting the life both of the individual and of society, and if in reference thereto metaphysical necessity is said not to have the power to control the doctrine of volition and its logical results, it would be better to leave this necessity out of view altogether. It is easy to see, and to prove from Hegel's writings, especially his *Rechtsphilosophie*, that "vice and crime properly so called" (Vatke, p. 456) cannot be excluded from the metaphysical necessity upon the standing-point of this theory; the evil which good is said to require must be in its nature definite; if the clearness of the antithesis be softened down, the impulse from the one to the other will be proportionally weakened. This view is thus involved in hopeless contradiction, and by endeavouring to mediate between moral or religious consciousness and the "intelligible" or metaphysical necessity of evil, it violates both.

† *Phil. des Rechts*, p. 185; comp. *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 193; vol. ii. p. 350.

a tautology, a repetition of that which the very conception of evil necessarily involves. Our earlier investigations have shown us that guilt is chargeable only when a person is by his self-determination the author of his wicked acts and behaviour *in such a manner* that he could have determined differently. But this is quite incompatible with Hegel's theory of necessity. It may certainly be said that man could have left undone any one evil deed which he does; but this possibility, as it regards the individual in the abstract only, amounts to nothing, for it ceases to exist if the individual is regarded concretely in his relation to the universal. But that man could have avoided the isolation and variance in which evil consists, directly contradicts, as we have seen, its supposed metaphysical necessity. Hence, according even to the Hegelian conception of guilt, it avails nothing towards the solution of our question, when Hegel affirms (with express reference to the necessity involved in the conception of evil) that man's decision concerning his own conduct is the act of his own free will and his own guilt.*

We may further judge from this how much truth there is in Hegel's more accurate definition of his necessity of evil, namely, that it exists only to be removed. Hegel has himself refuted this, for he recognizes that there are evils which cannot be removed but must continue. Experience perfectly agrees with this, and any one who is not totally inexperienced will regard it at least as a very unpractical thought that man must entertain evil in his will merely in order to reject it. The devil at least knows nothing of jest or unreality here, but relentlessly takes man at his word. His maxims on this matter are, "In the first step you are free, the second makes

The maxim
"evil a
means of
good"
unsound.

* *Phil. des Rechts*, p. 188. Vatke, at p. 279, says, "The consciousness of guilt, and conscience uttering its warnings against possible evil, directly negative the necessity of evil,"—and this must be regarded as a candid admission of the unavoidable contradiction involved in his method of explaining evil, and not as a recognition of the maxim, "Trust to conscience and to thy guilt-consciousness in moral conduct, but pay no attention to them in speculation." No greater reproach could be made against speculation than thus to exile it to the sphere of empty abstractions, and to make it a principle hostile to, and irreconcilable with, whatever is holy and godlike in human life. The consciousness of guilt is with us also a stimulus to development—a stimulus, I mean, to the development of philosophy, urging it on beyond all Pantheistic systems.

you my slaves ;” and “ He who gives me the finger, I have his hand.” What was to be only a point of transition in the man’s self-development towards freedom holds him fast as if within brazen walls. What this philosophy prizes as the true health of man, the highest in the practical sphere, namely, “ life in a moral and upright community ” (see for instance *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. p. 279) has no power to free him from this bondage. There is, indeed, one liberating power,—Redeeming grace ;—but if we regard this as the free act of divine love for the help of man, we shall have no disposition to resolve it into a logical balancing of discord and slavery on the one hand, with the redemption of the world and its reconciliation to God on the other. Man’s self-development by means of evil, taken by itself, ends only in an indissoluble entanglement in sin.

We should, however, be unjust towards the Hegelian system were we to suppose that this permanence of evil, its resistance of all attempts to remove it after it has once gained a footing, is (according to it) something that might occur to any one involuntarily. In one aspect of it the system seems only to necessitate an evil which is transitory, which appears only in passing from “ naturalness,” or a state of nature, into the realm of spirit, and then for ever vanishes. But in another aspect it certainly necessitates an evil which is definite, which continues, and makes itself felt by way of contrast, at every stage of moral development.* For if evil in its reality be the necessary means or instrument of good, that would be a very mechanical and unspiritual view of this medium to regard it as something happening once only and then done with and at an end. On the contrary, as the moral vitality of the spirit depends upon the action and instrumentality of this antithesis, its total disappearance at any point in the development would cause the

* This, and many other contrasted aspects and seemingly contradictory tendencies of the Hegelian system, and the vacillation of Hegel himself, seem to have arisen from the elasticity of his principle of “ negativity.” It may be taken to be only a moderate disposition towards evil, whereby, as by a simple metamorphosis, substantiality is given in consciousness to self-knowledge and freedom ; but a reckless application of it may require that every theory, without exception, should be given up to the resolving process which that principle of “ negativity ” produces, and which is to make—that which comes to pass.

extinction of the moral life.* For if true vitality be possible without the stimulus of this contrast, there would be no necessity for the discord, nor anything to prevent the spirit from pursuing from the beginning the course of an unhindered development. The removal of evil, therefore, can upon this theory be regarded only as something continually taking place but never accomplished; continually being removed, it must still continually exist after each removal, and thus the *progressus in infinitum*, so denounced by this system, is the final issue to which this very system leads. The discord is indeed removed, evil is vanquished, and is known to be so, in a direct manner by faith in the forgiveness of sins, and indirectly in speculative thought;† but how its removal is to be realized in the subject who has still “to make his will good,” —this does not appear. No place is to be found in this system for a finite life unfolding itself progressively, in pure and undisturbed harmony with God and with itself, and the endeavour to force such an idea into it is vain. Hegel, therefore, in his logic, is fond of using “infinitude” and “holiness” as correlatives,‡ and in his lectures upon *Religionsphilosophie*, he uses “the finite” as the correlative of “evil,” with the additional limitation that “evil is the extreme of finitude.” §

Indeed, we must go further than this, and maintain that God Himself, seeing that (upon Hegel's theory) His real existence is contingent upon man's, shares the same fate. Were the contradiction between good and evil to be absolutely put an end to in any one point of human development, the “absolute process of the divine life,” whose impelling power is the incongruity between everything finite and the infinite, would reach its goal, and therewith the divine life itself, which consists only in this process. “If this incongruity or inadequacy were to disappear, the elementary separation (*diremptio*) of spirit in which its vitality consists would also vanish, and thus

* The clever criticism of the Hegelian doctrine of evil in Ulrici's treatise, “*Ueber Princip und Methode der Hegelschen Philosophie*,” p. 174 f. arrives at substantially the same conclusion.

† *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 273.

‡ *Werke*, vol. v. 328.

§ *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 250, 251.

if would cease to be spirit," * history would thus come to an end, for its problem would be solved. If God is to retain His reality, if there is always to be a reason for the production of the finite,—both phrases mean the same thing,—everything finite, not only material things but spirit itself as finite and individual, must perish in its own contradiction. His infinity rises to the surface and ascends to Him, only from the cauldron of this spirit realm wherein all individuality disappears, and which, in the truest sense, is a "kingdom of shades."

Strauss, therefore, cannot be fairly charged with misunderstanding the Hegelian philosophy when he affirms }
 Consequences in relation to Christology. } that a sinless Christ, as an historical individual, is impossible upon its principles.† In so far as Christ is such a personal individual, he cannot be exempted, upon Hegel's theory, from inadequateness or want of harmony with the *idea*, nor from the general contradiction which pertains to everything finite. If that contradiction, wherein evil consists, pertains specifically to human nature, if man (as Hegel says, *Philos. der Geschichte*, p. 333)‡ becomes man by a fall, Christ cannot be free from sin save at the sacrifice of His humanity. Thus the human race, having lost "its undivided and original state in God," § is now robbed of its Head, or rather

* *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 231. In another place, vol. i. 122, he says:—"God is in Himself this movement, and thus alone is He the living God." From the above premisses it would also follow that God can only reveal Himself by His continual inadequateness and self-immolation; and hence—unless there be attributed to Him a vain effort to reveal Himself—this endless appearing and disappearing of everything finite is the only adequate and satisfactory form of His manifestation and self-realization; and as Ulrici (p. 19) expresses it, "the essence of spirit consists in absolute negativity."

† *Das Leben Jesu*, vol. ii. 716, 717, (1st ed.). *Christl. Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. § 66. Dorner has fully shown that Hegel's system cannot avoid this as its logical consequence, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, in the section upon the Christology of Hegel and his school (2d ed., ii. 2, 2, p. 1096) which is the most thorough criticism of this system from a theological standing-point which has yet appeared.

‡ "The animal," it is there said, "is one with God (!) but only as an animal. Man only is spirit, i.e. in and for himself. This existence for one's self is at the same time separation from the universal and divine spirit. If I hold myself in my abstract freedom apart from good, this is the standing-point of evil. The fall is therefore a mythus eternally realized in man; that whereby he becomes man." In virtue of this all-pervading amphiboly, Hegel can immediately add, "*to continue* on that standing-point is evil," so that the fall itself must have been sinless.

§ See above, p. 393.

of its new beginning, in the perfectly holy Son of God and Son of Man, and the completion of the divine kingdom is impossible; all that remains to the unhappy consciousness is an endless desert of fruitless conflict and variance.

We have already shown how this philosophy, which often indicates a very strong consciousness of the depth of evil, is forced to elevate it into a necessary link in the "absolute process." The ultimate reason of this we shall find to be that in this system the essence of spirit is regarded as THOUGHT, and this thought is looked upon as a "necessary process." Will, accordingly, the primary principle of reality, and the distinctive principle of actual existence,*

has to be subordinated to this single unity of logical thought, and to be regarded as a mere mode of intelligence, a particular form of thinking.† But all reality in nature and in history is in this system reduced to the well-known formula, "whatever is rational is real, and whatever is real is rational," and can be nothing else (according to its main principles), save the real dualism of logical reason; so that if anything real be not perfectly clear to thought as part of its own essence, this can only be the fault of the individual Subject. Now as there are in empirical existence various redundancies which cannot be reduced to the pure essences of logic, these are to be regarded as mere contingencies wholly meaningless, to be accounted for in the sphere of nature by a want of power on its part to carry out the ideal in all its bearings.‡

The fatal dilemma thus presented itself to Hegel, either to explain evil as something quite unimportant and trifling, beneath philosophical consideration, or to recognize it as an integral part of the idea itself, thus attributing to it necessity, reality, and therefore rationality. The first alternative involves a most superficial view of evil, and is wholly inadequate to maintain the positive antithesis between evil and good; evil must logically be regarded as something isolated and disconnected, a fortuitous hindrance of good in its outward manifestation, belonging

* It may here be recollected that Leibnitz, in his *Theodicée*, § 8, describes God's understanding as the source of essences, and His will as the source of existences.

† *Encykl.*, § 443; *Philos. des Rechts*, § 4, p. 35.

‡ *Encykl.*, § 250.

entirely to the world of mere appearances, and possessing in its distinctive forms only a momentary and shadowy existence. This view enervates all consciousness of guilt, and makes the conflict against evil an unreal thing; it fails to account for the profound significance of evil in human history, and it leaves the doctrine of Redemption from sin by the Son of God wholly unexplained. Wherefore these disproportionate arrangements of God to obviate what is so powerless and trifling? to destroy what has only a shadowy existence, and what must ere long perish of itself? If this first alternative were adopted, any scientific knowledge of Christianity would be logically impossible for this philosophy. Recognizing redemption and reconciliation as the main principles of Christianity, and admitting that these imply the reality of sin, it could not offer any philosophically dogmatic system or speculative theology if the conception of sin were thus excluded from its range. Such a view of evil, however, would equally contradict the philosophical system itself; for if its most characteristic thought is "negativity" (a thought suggested by Jacob Böhme), which it has exalted into a principle of universal movement and progress in its contemplation of the world, it would never be compatible with the energy of this movement or with the fulness and characteristic definiteness of its results, were this system to cast out of its world of thought the evil, the immoral, and the criminal, which, according to this view, would be only the boldest extreme of negation and the most unmeaning fortuitousness. The other alternative admits of a deeper and more positive apprehension of evil on the part of a dialectic which regards contradiction as a ground of unity, because distinctions and differences must amount to contradiction; but in its wider consequences it not only enervates and volatilizes the conception of evil, but totally destroys it.

Though the system inclines in the main to the latter alternative in treating of evil, it vacillates between the two. Not only does it lean to the former incidentally and in passing expressions,* but that view of evil seems to exercise a powerful influence upon the entire historical method of the system. Evil is throughout regarded as wholly insignificant and weak.

Wavering
between
the two
alternatives.

* *E.g.*, *Encyklopädie*, § 6, p. 8.

a thing which cannot in the least affect the true development of the logical series in its necessary progress. But when the conception of evil becomes a matter of direct inquiry, as in the passages of the *Encyklopädie* and *Rechtsphilosophie* above referred to, the other alternative is resorted to, and in the most unmistakable terms, necessity is predicated of evil. This must unquestionably be recognized as the true teaching of Hegel's system, and we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by occasional inclinations towards the other alternative;* indeed, the historical view of the world on Hegel's system, which makes light of evil, though apparently contradictory, may be harmonized with this. For if evil be a necessary element in the absolute process, it obviously cannot hinder in the least the world's unerring and fixed advance in history, but really must strengthen and confirm it. But in this case we can only be filled with wonder at the clever reason and the daring deceit of the Hegelian "World Spirit" as most prominently displayed in evil. Thus, moreover, in the *Phänomenologie*, evil is represented as "an occurrence foreign to the Divine essence," and is passed over as a mere representation; it is regarded—(and here there is an unmistakable reference to Jacob Böhme)—as pertaining to the Divine essence just as God's wrath pertains thereto, and both representations are done away in the idea of the estrangement of the Divine essence from itself—whereby "His Being retires into itself and becomes evil"—and its return to itself again.†

It is easy to see that by this view of evil, and its necessity, excluding the possibility of recognizing a personal Redeemer, the Christian doctrine of Redemption as a whole, if not altogether rejected, must submit to a complete distortion. It must, first of all, sound very strange to speak of a "reconciliation of evil with good," though in this system this is quite logical.‡ Christianity knows

Consequences
of Hegel's
theory.

* Hegel's hesitation manifestly arises from the rebellion of his moral consciousness against the fearful consequences of the doctrine of the universal necessity of evil, and thus suffice to refute the opinion of Vatke that this necessity cannot come into conflict with our moral consciousness, because as metaphysical it lies beyond its range.

† *Phänom.*, p. 582.

‡ This formula is not often used by the author of the System, but by many of his disciples. See, however, *Phänom.*, p. 583.

nothing of such a reconciliation, it speaks only of a reconciliation of man with God; to identify these two reconciliations could only occur to a system of thought which on Dualistic principles, or by obliterating the notion in question—resolving it into the notions of “the finite,” of “the subjective consciousness,” etc., regarded it as superfluous to distinguish between a nature affected with evil and evil itself. According to the teaching of Christianity, man is reconciled to God because evil in him is removed, first, potentially and in principle,—objectively, by Christ’s atonement, and subjectively, by justifying faith,—and then actually and in experience by progressive and entire sanctification in communion with God. Evil not having any justification of its existence, either in the Christian conception of the world or of man, whereby it might, like other natural contrasts of finite life, lay claim to be explained away by reconciliation with the opposite good, but owing its existence to the perversion of the will in arbitrariness and presumption, must be thoroughly destroyed and annihilated in those who do not exclude themselves from Redemption. It follows, moreover, that the discord produced by evil cannot be truly removed by any science, by any speculation, but only by Redemption. Originating in a deed, it can by a deed only be done away. In the Hegelian system, on the contrary, Reconciliation is resolved into a necessary “dialectic of the Idea;” its significance consists in this logical removal of the contrast between direct unity and separation—or “subjectivity isolating itself.” As knowledge produces separation or evil—for by knowledge the spirit advances out of its “naturalness,”—so it is knowledge again which alone is able to overcome the contradiction, by negating the negation—ὁ πῶσας καὶ ἰάσεται; nay, that very separation contains within itself the principle of its removal.* This is said to be the eternal and speculative import of the Christian doctrine of Redemption when elevated to its ideal; but if it embodies this in that single deed which was once transacted on Golgotha, it accommodates itself to the form of a sensuous representation.†

* See in particular the section in *Phänomenologie* upon Revealed Religion, *Werke*, vol. ii. 582; also *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 217, 228, 250, 254; *Vermischte Schriften*, p. 471.

† *Phänomen.*, p. 573; *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 240, 250, 263; compare vol. i. 140, 141.

But if this were the true idea of Reconciliation, it would be a base *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* to make participation therein dependent upon any moral transformation or regeneration of the Subject. Such a change cannot mean more than the transition of the Subject from the sphere of sensuousness and abstract subjective opinion into that of speculative thought, or an insight into the essential unity between the infinite and the finite, God and man, good and evil. Evil, as opposed to good, is only an abstraction; and if this abstraction is obviated by speculative thought, which alone is truly concrete, reconciliation is realized in the subject, who is thus absorbed into the universal spirit.* Now, if any one chooses to call this transition, as Hegel does, a regeneration by the Spirit, who can hinder him? All we can do is to refuse to regard this speculative regeneration as identical with the regeneration of which Christianity speaks. But in the practical sphere of regeneration, Hegel calls what he substitutes in its place "the necessary reconstruction of man," who, to begin with, is only in a state of nature and evil,—or, more accurately, "chastisement," "education," "government," and "culture."†

It is a beautiful witness to the power of Christianity upon the mind and heart of this great philosopher, that Hegel witnesses to Christianity. evil here laid down; that in more than one place a deeper consciousness of the nature of sin prevails, and breaks through the limits of his system.‡ We have a very striking instance of this in what Dorner justly characterizes as "an

* *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 270, 271.

† *Phil. des Rechts*, § 18; *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. 214; *Gesch. der Phil.*, vol. iii. 105, 106. In the passage first referred to, we read, "The Christian doctrine that man is by nature evil, is higher than the other, which regards him as good; it may be philosophically expressed as follows: man, as spirit, is a free being, who is in a position not to allow himself to be determined by natural impulse. Man, therefore, in his primary and unformed condition is in a state wherein he ought not to remain, from which he should free himself. This is the true import of the doctrine of original sin, without which Christianity would not be the religion of freedom." When Hegel here, and often elsewhere, resolves the Christian doctrines of original sin, atonement, and regeneration into statements which the merest Pelagianism never would have objected to, and then assumes a patronizing air towards "modern piety," as if he must come forward as the protector of endangered Christian doctrine, who can refrain from feeling indignant?

‡ *Phil. der Rel.*, p. 406.

illogical and unmethodical procedure,"* when Hegel, in his Lectures upon the Philosophy of Religion, in arguing concerning the need of man's reconciliation to God, suddenly leaves the high speculative strain and descends to an anthropological argument, which sets out from the fact of a sense of need in the Subject to feel himself reconciled to God. Here the fact is tacitly admitted that man's separation from God does not belong to the ideal, according to Hegel's theory, but to experience only; and, therefore, that it is not a link in a necessary process, but altogether an act of man's arbitrary will.

CHAPTER V.

DUALISTIC DERIVATION OF EVIL.

DUALISTIC theories which regard the distinction of good and evil as primary and essential, and which thus dignify evil as absolute, are, as Twisten acutely says, as foreign to our mode of thought at the present day, as Pantheism used to be not long ago.†

§ 1. Dualistic theories alien to the spirit of our times.

Our consideration of them here may seem to arise only from a desire after a certain completeness in our method, from a wish to carry on our progressive argument, which began with the merely negative view of evil, to the opposite extreme, wherein the antithesis of good and evil is as much exaggerated, as at the outset we found it volatilized. But apart from this, apart from the fact that an examination of them may bring to light some important points concerning the nature of evil which have not come prominently into view in our investigation of other theories, the theological and philosophic character of the present day affords but a poor guarantee that the tendency to a dualistic view of the world may not, perhaps ere long, become again as strong as it was a few decades of years ago, and as the Pantheistic furor is again at the present time. The vigour, indeed, of moral principle, producing a certain demand for, and tendency towards, the classification of all existence according

* Dorner, vol. ii. 209, 210, 222.

† *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik*, vol. i. 136 (3rd ed.).

to the distinctions of good and evil, so little distinguishes our time, that the prevailing inclination is rather to moral torpor and insensibility. But Dualism may spring from theoretic and logical causes, to be found even in methods of thought diametrically opposed to it; the Pantheistic views now in vogue (as the preceding chapter has shown us) have in them clearly enough the germs of it; and if Dualism be, to use Schelling's words, "a system of self-dismemberment and desperation on the part of reason," the tone of the present day seems to favour the development of those germs. If the God who in abstract dignity is indifferent to good and evil, love and hatred, must give way to a God who surrenders Himself to them in the world, and secures His own life and activity by means of evil as well as good,—who, in evil, estranges Himself from Himself, that He may return to Himself,—one step more will bring us to the recognition of two eternal principles, which as affirmative and negative, as love and hatred, strive together and divide the world between them. A fit transition is supplied in some such doctrine as that of Jacob Böhme, who held that there are two principles in God, the one good, and the other not yet evil while in Him, but realizing itself as such in the creature.

Daub's *Judas Ischarioth* again contains very decided tendencies towards Dualistic views, though from a different point of view. Here an absolute and essential evil is demanded and supposed to exist, answering to the relative evil which is found among men. Not only is it said to have tainted man, and brought about many disturbances in nature, but time and space are traced back to its negative activity. This view, however, differs from Dualism, properly so called, in representing its evil principle as a being created by God, and the source of His self-development and activity. But notwithstanding that its existence is thus conditioned, the Satan of this theory becomes virtually *ἀντίθεος*, and in the very region of the absolute, two kingdoms are said to hold sway, the kingdom of Satan and the kingdom of God.*

* Daub himself, as is well known, abandoned the view of evil developed in his *Judas Ischarioth*, so that we are saved the trouble of refuting it here. With all respect moreover, for the profound thoughts with which the book

The Dualistic system of the ancients, as it was represented by the Manichaeans, and apart from its fantastic and mythological garb, could never attain even the semblance of tenableness. Evil is represented here as it was afterwards in Flacianism,* as *mala substantia* or *mala natura*; but it is a clumsy and unmaturing way of thinking, which thus endeavours to blend the idea of evil with that of "substance" or "nature." The arguments of Augustine, and of Titus of Bostra, as well as those in the first article of the *Solida declaratio* in the *Formula Concordiae*, suffice to illustrate the absurdity of this notion of a *substantia mala*, and of the view of the world arising out of it. If evil is at all to be predicated of substance, it must not be of substance in itself, but, on the contrary, with Augustine, of the corruption (*corruptio*) of substance, just as good ministers to its preservation and maintenance. But the opponents we have named, could not see the real ground of the error, because they were not wholly free from it themselves; it really arose from not perceiving the fact, that the moral contrast of good and evil has not its root at all in such conceptions as substance, reality, nature. While the investigation busies itself about these notions, the distinctions of good and evil are excluded; we need thoughts and facts more concrete to understand their ethical import. But their ethical import is primary and essential, and if the conception of *malum* is taken to include the *malum physicum* as well as the *malum morale*—the so-called *malum metaphysicum* should not be called *malum* at all—the former has its origin in the latter, just as this is expressed by the old and profound yet simple distinction of *malum culpae* and *malum poenae*, which in relation to responsible beings is true.†

abounds, we must coincide with Strauss's opinion (*Charakteristiken und Kritiken*, p. 123), that Daub here "got into a lane leading nowhere, and when he could go no further, nothing remained for him but quietly to turn back," alas! to go into another more dangerous, from which he did not escape. This attributing of the notion of the absolute to evil—which must, however, be distinguished from the question, whether a being can become so evil as to have literally no moral goodness whatever in him—may be advantageously compared with the argument of Aquinas, that there cannot be any *summum malum, quod sit causa omnis mali*. *Summa*, i. qu. 49, art. 3. *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. iii. c. 15.

* FLACIUS (died 1575) was the leader of the stricter Lutherans, and held that sin belongs to the substance of human nature in its fallen state.—*Tr.*

† In the same way, Aquinas (i. qu. 48, art. 6), shows that the "*malum*

There is a curious circumstance in connection with this view which we must not pass over. Dualistic views of the world clearly owe their origin to an honourable desire to maintain the sanctity of morality, from a consciousness of the profoundness of the contrast between good and evil, and the impossibility of harmonizing them, and from the desire to find a key to those contradictory phenomena so often met with in the world, even beyond the sphere of morals; a solution which shall do no violence to the moral sense and our idea of God on which this is based.* But while pursuing this as their only aim, they are blind to every other, and attain at last to the very opposite of what they were seeking; the antithesis between good and evil being overstrained gives way, evil is represented as a substance losing its ethical and retaining only its physical import, man's falling into evil becomes a necessity of nature, and if he is to be freed from its power, it must be by some process of nature. Accordingly, the physical view of the conflict between the kingdom of light and darkness in Manichaeism, is not a merely figurative description, but is the essence of the system.

But moral Dualism in its essence may be maintained without attributing the idea of substance to evil. When any system adopts as its principle the notion of one eternal substance (which is the absolute indifference of all contrasts, including that of good and evil), and derives therefrom as equally eternal and original, two opposite personal principles, the one the will of love and self-communication, the other the will of hatred, strife, and discord, alike irreconcilable and alike strong, such a system, in spite of its close approximation to realistic pantheism, is essentially dualistic. The dualism does not consist in the recognition of

culpa possesses *plus de ratione mali* than the *malum poenae*. As to the distinction between the *malum culpa* and the *malum poenae*, see the preceding art. of the same *Quaestio*.

* The interests of morality are even Mani's starting-point, as is clear, especially in his *Epistola ad filiam Menoch* (Augustine, *Op. imperfect. c. Julian*, lib. iii. § 172 seq.). As he starts from the principle, that the sensational impulses are evil, the attributing of these to God as their author, seems to him to sanction sin. Besides, it cannot be denied, that in Manichaeism as well as in Parseeism, the antithesis between good and evil is not recognized in its purely ethical import, being identified with that between which brings salvation and what causes misery.

an activity opposed to God as present and operative in the world—for Christianity recognizes this, but in the fact that evil is made to share the same originality and beginninglessness as good, the evil essence being independent of the God of goodness, an evil nature clothed with power, and thus producing a doubtful conflict between the two. A second active principle independent of God is set up over against Him,* and He is thus subjected to a primary and distinct dependence and control, such as does not arise from His own self-limitation, yea, to a destiny or fate in His revelations and works.

This form of Dualism is not only conceivable, but has been realized in history, and this in its primitive form. The Persian Dualism. In the Persian dualism, besides the two opposite principles, Ormuzd and Ahriman, there is, as is well known, an eternal essence above these, ZERUANE AKERENE, from whom both principles derive their origin. The inextinguishable craving after unity in the reason is thus satisfied. But this, being only seldom mentioned in the Zendavesta, is a very isolated conception, exerting no influence upon the system as a whole, nor upon the development of the conflict between the two principles; and thus this ultimate unity is too meagre and weak an abstraction to have any power in itself to rob the evil principle of its strength or to reconcile it with the good.† It is otherwise indeed with the Persian religion so far as it teaches

* If the second nature be represented as something passive and externally controlled, exerting no modifying influence still less an opposing reaction upon the divine activity, somewhat like Aristotle's notion regarding the *ἄλγος*, such a theory could not properly be called dualistic.

† It cannot indeed be denied that Parseeism recognizes a final reconciliation within the range of its ideas, but this is not brought about by Zeruane Akerene. F. Schlegel urges a very strange objection against this reconciliation when he says (*Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, p. 126), "If it be understood, as it usually is, that the evil principle is to be vanquished and transformed in the last stage of the development, and that Ahriman is to be reconciled and united with Ormuzd"—which of course could only happen by Ahriman's ceasing to be evil—"discord would be done away, all would be blended in a pantheistic way into one being, and the eternal distinctions between right and wrong would disappear." Such a finite reconciliation may in this system be illogical; it is not at all in harmony with the principle of the originality of the evil principle, and it does away with the essential features of Dualism. But to make the variance between good and evil necessarily eternal, because otherwise "all must pantheistically be blended into one nature,"—and thus to make evil a necessary condition for the existence of a God distinct from the world,—this is itself the very worst pantheism.

that Ahriman was originally good, and became evil by a fall, by an act of will. In this case it is not easy to see how the appellation Dualism in its proper sense can be applied to it.*

It is not needful for us here to dwell longer upon the logical consequences of the Dualistic theory; we would only ask whether its fundamental view of evil corresponds with the data of the moral consciousness, whether it truly expresses the nature of evil as conscience reveals it to us. We must call special attention to the supposed independence of the evil principle in relation to the good, by which Dualism stands or falls. Good, as we saw in the preceding chapter, is quite independent of evil; it is the nature of good to reveal itself in contrast with evil, since evil has made its appearance in the world. But good has no need of evil for its self-realization; love would be eternally the same, and ever conscious of its own nature, though there were no hatred. Evil, on the other hand, is so far dependent upon good that it comes into existence only as a contrast thereto. As opposition implies something which is opposed, evil presupposes good, and is conceivable only as a departure or fall therefrom. If evil be regarded as wholly primary and original, it cannot in any true sense be called evil or "that which ought not to be." This dependence of evil upon good is still more apparent when we recollect that evil as an anti-thesis is nothing more than a perverted abstraction and separation of one essential element in our conception of moral good,—the elevation of self-love into a principle of action. Not only, therefore, is moral good perfectly intelligible of itself and by means of itself, but evil, on the other hand, can be understood only by means of good; *bonum index sui et mali*, an expression analogous to Spinoza's fine saying, "*verum, index sui et falsi*."

No one can fairly taunt us here with tacitly admitting that

* Baur, in his learned *Darstellung des Manichäischen Religionssystems* (pp. 42, 43), regards the harshest form of Dualism as pantheistic, and this arises from the supposition that the dogma of unity of substance does not at once destroy the essential principles of Dualism. See the examination of the relation in which Manichaeism stands to Parseeism on the one hand, and to Buddhism on the other, in Neander's master-work, the new ed. of his *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. ii. 825.

metaphysical conception of good which our former investigation led us to reject :—That good, the positive negation and denial of which makes evil evil, is by no means bare “reality,” but is the inmost essence of moral good, love. We cannot recognize evil as in the depths of our moral consciousness we feel it to be—not only something unreasonable, vain, and worthless, but as fearful and loathsome, a continual spring of innumerable ills—while we look upon the eternal being from whom man in evil turns away merely as “absolute substance,” “real existence,” and so forth. It is the very centre of the doctrine of Christianity concerning God, that He who is absolute existence and who contains in Himself the source of all reality, is at the same time PERSONALITY and LOVE. Recognizing thus that in evil man opposes the holiest love by the alienation and enmity of his will, the peculiar clearness of our moral consciousness regarding evil, our deep horror in the contemplation of it (which is wanting only where conscience is seared) is adequately explained : now at last the feeling of shame, repentance, and remorse of conscience, find their adequate solution. If God were not Love, there might indeed be badness and worthlessness, but there could be no EVIL.

Evil, therefore, as the antithesis of good, is directly dependent upon good ; and from this general view of the true conception of it, we see how originality can in no true sense be attributed to it. Its dependence upon good, however, has another, a positive aspect. In order to realize itself in our earthly life, and attain the arbitrarily chosen goal of its endeavours, evil must in some way or other link itself to good, and recognize and fulfil some of its demands in all their authority. Evil has in itself no uniting or concentrating power ; it can only produce an inwardly hollow semblance of unity, an ever vanishing appearance of fellowship. Not only does it separate and isolate its servants, but it brings them into collision with each other by the continual clashing of selfish interests, so that if evil had ever the sole dominion over human life that “state of nature,” as Hobbes calls it, “*bellum omnium contra omnes*” would ensue. The powers enlisted in the service of evil would lay aside their inner strifes and would unite only against the good,

and when it was vanquished would return again to their internal conflicts ; and it is nothing more than this combination that Christ refers to when He speaks of the *βασιλεία τοῦ σατανᾶ*, Matt. xii. 25, 26. But evil would always be in its own way in such circumstances, its inward pain would break through every veil of earthly satisfaction, the innumerable woes and oppressions by which the wicked, as the unconscious instruments of God's righteous punishment, torment one another, would wholly occupy their existence, and thus the present life would become a hell to sinners. Man's sensuous wants compel him to seek the fellowship of his fellow-men, though reason and God's law have lost their influence upon him ; and in order to gain possession of and enjoy that for which he strives in sin he must subordinate his will to certain regulations of society. These regulations themselves, however, are the carrying out of the principles of justice in human relations, and have their deepest objective ground in love.

We thus discover this remarkable fact, that evil in our earthly life is obliged to submit to some extent to the law of good, if it is not to destroy its own subjects and instruments. As the essence of evil is selfishness, which implies separation and isolation, all organized society forms a strong bulwark against its overwhelming power, and the very worst abandonment to evil has to contribute something to maintain this bulwark. Thus every band of robbers who have given up all honest intercourse with the rest of the world, and have declared open war against the laws of the state, has to some extent re-established these laws within itself, so as to put some restraint upon the destructive power of evil among its members. Thus, too, in our own day, we have seen how demoniacal rebellion against all heavenly and earthly majesty, when once it has attained dominion, will prosecute its own laws of utterly limitless arbitrariness against individuals, even with fire and sword. Driven by its own inner discord, evil is ever bearing witness to the conserving power of good in society ; and must, equally with good, become serviceable to that power for the punishment of disorder and crime. Even when the wicked unite together in avowed hostility to good, they must at the very outset submit to certain things which are included in any

Evil needs
good for its
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adequate conception of good, if only the most abstract and formal, such as order, and obedience to a common law. Evil, I say, has in itself no productive or formative power ; it cannot give itself any complete or historical reality in forms and arrangements of human life peculiar to itself ; it cannot attain supremacy in any sphere of society, save by resorting to principles which have their origin in good. In connection with this there is a phenomenon already referred to which is very striking and strange, namely, that evil never manifests itself openly and above board in human life, it always tries in one way or another to conceal itself, John iii. 20. *Evil does not venture to be itself* ; it incessantly shuns itself, and hides hypocritically beneath some outward appearance of good. This is the usual occasion of so-called "white lies," in which the dependence we have been speaking of of evil upon good is strikingly illustrated. The lie which thus in a cowardly way disowns itself, really acknowledges the good as alone true and right, and itself as that which ought not to be, which has only an assumed existence. The moral foundations upon which all society rests thus restrain the most confirmed villain who has quenched the last spark of shame within him, and who no longer heeds the inner voice of conscience. Even the mightiest and proudest tyrant finds himself compelled, from prudential considerations, —provided the principle of his capricious despotism has not become utterly senseless and absurd,—to assume the mask of not seeking his own interests, but the general good, the glory, peradventure, or the wellbeing of the people.

If, therefore, we must recognize the power of holiness in the control which the Divine government exercises over even what resists it, and by which it completes itself in its main outlines amid the discord of selfish interests and passions, how can we maintain the dualistic notion of an independent principle of evil ? In virtue of the conditions to which the divine purpose submits in the history of our race, evil may indeed hinder and retard the realization of that design, but it cannot wholly thwart it. We have seen in the preceding chapter how thoroughly the disturbing power of evil has penetrated the earthly development of the human race ; but however severe the conflict in which we are engaged, there is ever

present and visible to the eye of God the final triumph of the good.

If we examine the inner variance of evil still more closely, and follow it a step further, we shall find it not only in the higher sphere of society generally, but in the inner life of the individual. Passion strives with passion, one affection counteracts another; man, while slavishly dependent on the various objects of desire, never finds that rest and satisfaction which he seeks in the service of sin. He cannot attain these even by a total surrender to any one passion; for—apart from the impossibility of fully satisfying it—it can never attain sufficient strength perfectly to free him from the calls of other impulses striving after unbridled freedom. The two fundamental tendencies of sin which we have already referred to—pride and the supremacy of fleshly lust—are precisely those which stand in the most striking contrast and mutual hostility to each other. Whoever gets between these two currents is restlessly driven hither and thither by them; when he frees himself from the one, the other seizes him. In a condition of greater cultivation this alternation in the service of sin becomes a secret play of arbitrary will. Man learns the miserable art of turning now to the one side and now to the other, now to pride and now to sensuousness. The virtuous soarings into which he rises from the degradation of sensuousness serve only to excite and strengthen his humbled self-consciousness, and he relinquishes the pleasures of lust in order to recreate himself with the efforts of his pride. Rightly recognizing the fact of this inner variance of evil, modern education, by alienating itself from that Christian principle upon which alone true self-love and noble self-reliance rest, frequently adopts the plan of conquering sins of self-degradation and abandonment in youth, by the passionate stimulus of pride and ambition; and thus, alas! it has done nothing more than drive out the devil by Beelzebub the prince of the devils.

Goodness, on the contrary, is ever in harmony with itself; its several parts, its manifold endeavours, and the acts in which it realizes itself, mutually strengthen and confirm each other: whatever violates the ideal of good, cannot, according to the unholy principle of the

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Perfect inner
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end sanctifying the means, be confirmed and advanced by that ideal. Evil is at variance not only with good but with itself; good has but one enemy, evil; but evil has two enemies, *good and evil*. This contradiction of evil with itself has, in addition to its moral and psychological import, a peculiar metaphysical aspect. Evil has, indeed, no existence independently of God the absolute good, but it strives after it; and as we have seen, it is nothing more or less than this departing from the living God, this panting after independence apart from Him. When the creature surrenders himself to evil he practically denies his creation by God, he does not want to have his existence in God, but he will live, behave, and gratify self, as if he had life in himself and were his own lord. How would it be were God to permit evil in the creature to attain its end? were He to separate Himself from man, as man does from Him? The moment such an emancipation of the sinful creature from God were realized he would sink into nonentity, for he could not exist a moment save in the hands of God, and as His *mancipium*, be his will otherwise good or evil. Evil does not possess in itself any substantial being, but as the *Formula Concordiae*, following Augustine and opposing Flacius, explains, it exists only so far as it cleaves to some being in the form of a depraved nature or tendency; and therefore, by its efforts after separation from God (which is the true conception of it) it clearly involves itself in a self-destructive contradiction. If it succeeded, it would not only destroy its basis of good, but it would annihilate itself. The parasitic plant endeavours to extract all the juices from the organic body of the tree, appropriating them to its own depraved and poisonous development; but in attaining the end of its efforts it works its own destruction.

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
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